



UNIV. OF
TORONTO
LIBRARY





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

VOL. XV.—1916-1917

BRITISH EDITORIAL BOARD.

J. SUTHERLAND BLACK, LL.D., London.
The Rev. JAMES DRUMMOND, LL.D., Litt.D., Oxford.
Professor PERCY GARDNER, Litt.D., F.B.A., Oxford.
Professor Sir HENRY JONES, LL.D., D.Litt., F.B.A., Glasgow.
Rev. The Hon. E. LYTTTELTON.
Principal Sir OLIVER LODGE, D.Sc., F.R.S., Birmingham.
The Rev. Professor JAS. MOFFATT, D.D., D.Litt., Glasgow.
Professor J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., Birmingham.
Rev. Canon H. RASHDALL, D.D., Oxford.
Professor JAMES WARD, LL.D., F.B.A., Cambridge.

AMERICAN EDITORIAL BOARD.

Professor B. W. BACON, D.D., Professor of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis, Yale.
Professor WM. ADAMS BROWN, Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology, Union Theological Seminary.
President E. B. CRAIGHEAD, President of the Tulane University of Louisiana.
The Rev. Dr SAMUEL A. ELIOT, President of the American Unitarian Association.
Professor C. J. KEYSER, Adrain Professor of Mathematics, Columbia University.
Professor A. O. LOVEJOY, Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University.
Professor A. C. M'GIFFERT, Professor of Church History, Union Theological Seminary.
Professor GEORGE E. VINCENT, President of the University of Minnesota.
Dr R. S. WOODWARD, President of the Carnegie Institution, Washington.

THE
HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

L. P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., LL.D.

AND

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D.

VOLUME XV

OCTOBER 1916—JULY 1917



146040

10 15 18

SHERMAN, FRENCH & CO.

6 BEACON STREET, BOSTON, MASS.

LONDON: WILLIAMS & NORGATE

1917

BL
1
H5
v.15

THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

L. R. JACKSON, M.A., D.D., F.R.S.

G. DAVIES, M.A., F.R.S.



VOLUME XV

1916-1917

SHERMAN, FRISCH & CO.
100 NASSAU ST. N.Y.C.
LONDON: WILLIAMS & NORWICH

1917

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE ROOT OF THE MATTER.¹

PROFESSOR J. P. BANG,
Hellerup, Denmark.

To a Dane, writing on the subject of the great World War, it cannot seem irrelevant to comment on the fact that this war broke out exactly fifty years after the moment in which the same two great Powers, Prussia and Austria, now confronting a whole world, joined their forces to attack a single nation—Denmark. In that earlier war we fought alone, deserted by Europe. France, England, Russia—all remained neutral, and a third of our territory was torn from us. In the light of recent events a statement of the facts—that Germany then made, and subsequently broke, her solemn promises to the Danish population of Schleswig, substituting for their performance a rigorous Germanising policy—will be accepted without surprise.

It is impossible for Danish sympathy to range itself on the side of the nation which for fifty years has meted out such treatment to the Danish province it then annexed. We are all aware—and more than one Englishman has since admitted our justification—that England treated us badly in 1807, but this ranks as a mere incident in our history in comparison with the ceaseless struggle which, from the very earliest times, we have been obliged to sustain against our powerful neighbour in the South. From this quarter danger still threatens. For the moment it lies chiefly in the possibility that we may be coerced into joining a Mid-European Federation, which would,

¹ "Kaernepunktet." Written by request for the HIBBERT JOURNAL, and translated from the Danish by Miss Ingeborg Andersen.

as a matter of course, be "organised" by Germany, and which would therefore, equally as a matter of course, involve the final loss of our independence. On the other hand, the Entente Powers have given a foremost place on their programme to the independence of small nations, and we hope and believe that this principle will not be forgotten when the final terms of peace come to be discussed.

It can only be regarded as a perfectly natural sequence that we, who in 1864 had to fight single-handed, unsupported, should endeavour to maintain a strict *political* neutrality in the present war. Had we opposed ourselves to Germany, the Entente Powers could not have saved us from the fate of Belgium and of Serbia. Nothing would have been achieved but our own destruction. We are compelled to remain, *politically*, on friendly terms with that Power which, in 1864, was allowed by Europe to set its foot upon our neck, and which has since become the mightiest Power in the world, so mighty that it could aim at—and all but achieve—the dominion of the world. For such, in reality, is the dream of Germany—to become, both spiritually and politically, the ruling power of the world. There is something magnificent in this: it is a colossal conception, and the German predilection for the colossal is sufficiently well known. The Germans are a great people, of enormous powers. Even their enemies must grant their ability, their industry. Such a nation might have become a blessing to the world, but for two things. These are, *first*, their blind enthusiasm for all that is German (and, following upon this, their contempt, equally blind, for all that is not, particularly for those who dare to oppose the German will); *secondly*, their utter inability to conceive the idea of liberty.

The inevitable result of these two grievous defects is that the Germans, despite the many good qualities that they undoubtedly possess, have become a standing menace to the world. Their *will* is to rule the world, but they *can* rule only by compulsion. This is the explanation of the fact that they have become the military-ridden people we know them to be; this is the reason why their spiritual leaders have so enthusiastically proclaimed militarism as the fundamental, never-to-be-relinquished basis of German Kultur. They consider themselves, by virtue of their supposed superior intelligence and ability, morally justified in governing every other nation, but they *can* rule only by issuing orders, while the rest of the world holds its tongue and obeys. And should any poor nation, deprived in the name of German Kultur of

its liberty, express its bitterness at the loss, Germany has always this consolation to offer, that she, being so much wiser and nobler than the rest of the world, knows far better what is best for the welfare of the conquered people than they themselves can do. The German recipe for making others happy is to "cure them by the German system"; and should they refuse to accept this voluntarily—very well, then, Germany by exercising a severely paternal discipline will make them happy against their will.

This basic idea and this propaganda form the subject of my book *Hurrah and Hallelujah!* which is to appear shortly in English. But I am glad to take the additional opportunity afforded to me by the courtesy of the Editor of stating the case more precisely to my English readers. For here, in my opinion, we have the key to the whole situation.

Since war *has* come, its final result should be that Germany shall be checked in her progress towards the dominion of the world, and shall be taught that no single Power will ever again be allowed to wield such dominion as in the time of Roman supremacy, and that no such "Germanic peace" will ever be tolerated. But the end in view is not, of course, that "annihilation" of Germany which she herself constantly pretends to be the desire of her enemies, and I am glad that this has been expressly stated by Mr Asquith, though it naturally goes without saying. For a nation like Germany cannot be "annihilated," and indeed she is characterised by so much that is able and excellent that such annihilation, if it were possible, would be a loss to the whole world. But it is *not* possible, for even the smallest nation could be annihilated only with its own consent and by its voluntary submission.

The German creed that everything German is incontestably the best might readily be granted them, *but* for the conclusion they invariably deduce that they are, in consequence, morally entitled to rule others. Here we find a curious and fatal limitation to their intelligence. The Germans, on the one hand, are the most penetrating, acute, keen-witted nation in the world; but on the other, when it comes to an estimation of their own worth, they are inconceivably *naïve* and deluded. This claim that everything that is German *must* be excellent is the hypothesis, unquestioningly granted, upon which all that they think and say is founded: this they *cannot* criticise. When Germanism is in question, all their penetration and skill are concentrated on a single end—on proving conclusively its absolute rightness and perfection; no facts can make the

slightest impression upon the certainty of this conviction. Of this the war has afforded us the most striking instances. This fundamental idea was the basis of the manifesto of the ninety-three intellectuals. Its line of argument was as follows:—“How can you be so cruel as to doubt that everything which Germany does *is—must be—good*? You ought to know that she cannot do anything which is not lawful and justifiable; all statements to the contrary *must be* ‘English lies’”! When Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium, thousands of German pens set busily to work to prove that it was in reality violated by Belgium herself, and this is what every German now believes. When the facts about the atrocities in Belgium were published, the Germans replied with a statement of the most terrible atrocities committed by the Belgians upon the poor innocent German Army, which had acted only in legitimate self-defence. And in this way, when it could no longer be concealed, the murder of innocent civilians was exalted almost to the level of moral heroism. The Germans were furious at England’s alliance with Japan—to enter into such relations with a yellow race, with a heathen people, was the height of immorality and wickedness. But when Germany made her alliance with Turkey, the assassin of Armenia, the born enemy of Christianity, the loftiest spirits in the nation immediately occupied themselves in proving the Turks to be in reality good Christians (*cf.* Professor Hermann of Marburg as quoted in my book). The latest pronouncement on this subject is the following by A. Bonus in the February number of the *Neue Rundschau*: “Wenn man den Konfessionsbegriff nicht zu eng fasst, kann man den Islam als eine christliche Konfession betrachten.”¹ Before Italy had come to a decision, the most wonderful things were written in her praise. It was proved that the Italians were true Teutons, and that therefore the control of the Mediterranean ought to rest with Italy—and Austria; but when she joined the Entente she was instantly branded as a Judas who had sold Germany for hire. Race-theories invented to prove that the Germans are the noblest race in the world, and the only torch-bearer of Kultur, are particularly popular in Germany. The most remarkable production of this kind is to be found in a book entitled *Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht*² (Berlin, 1915), circulated as part of the propaganda in the neutral countries. Here two authors combine to prove to

¹ “If we take a sufficiently broad view of religion, we may regard Mohammedanism as a Christian religion.”

² “The Destruction of England as a World-Power.”

their own satisfaction that Germany is the noblest of all nations and the only exponent of Kultur—the one by showing that the Germans are the *least* mixed race in the world, the other by proving that they are *more* mixed than, for instance, the English. Here we surely reach a high-water mark! And what a poor opinion they must have of the neutral countries that they should think that they can be imposed upon by such arguments! But this is merely one striking instance in proof of the fact that where Germanism is concerned the Germans themselves are incapable of criticism. They are sincerely distressed and shocked that other nations cannot grasp the truth that if Germans make use of poisonous gas, bombard unfortified towns, sink *Lusitanias*, etc., they must have good reasons for doing so—reasons so excellent that these actions are in reality highly moral, for otherwise Germany would never dream of behaving in such a manner. This combination of *naïve* self-glorification and specious sophistry (enabling them to prove whatever they wish) is of such serious gravity because there is no atrocity that cannot be defended in this way and transformed into a moral duty, and because the final conclusion is that no other nation but Germany can ever possibly be right. For Germany is nothing if not thoroughgoing, and takes herself terribly seriously.

It may perhaps be remembered that some time ago the *Standard* was unlucky enough to quote, not quite accurately, from certain German sermons. The quotations appeared in *Le Temps*, and were made the subject of a public protest by the Lutheran community in Paris. This was regarded as a great triumph for the Germans, for they were able to verify the inaccuracy of the quotation, and accordingly adopted an attitude of deeply injured innocence. This was a pity. No triumph has ever been less justified, and quotations quite as electrifying as those appearing in the *Standard* might easily have been found in other German sermons, as my book abundantly proves.

I have, lying before me, one of these productions, namely, a pamphlet by Pastor E. Loeber (wrongly spelt Loebell) called *Christenthum und Krieg* (Leipzig, 1915). Although it is a "revised" version, it contains statements so wild that they cannot but awaken the deepest indignation. Let me take it as a fair example and make a few quotations from the rich—the far too rich—stores at my disposal. Herr Loeber, like many another German, desires to prove that war is an institution both lawful and Christian. Nevertheless, he cannot find the real war-enthusiasm in the

New Testament, and therefore resorts to the Old, which is, after all, part of the Christian's Holy Scripture :

"We breathe freely again, when, as we ponder the problem of Christianity and war, we step into the halls of light bedecked with gleaming armour which are revealed in the Old Testament."

And then, like a good German Christian, he revels delightedly in the Psalms of war and vengeance. But of course they do not justify *every* war: they advocate neither wars of aggression nor those undertaken from motives of greed or of desire for conquest, but defensive warfare only. Accordingly Germany's participation in the present war is a moral duty, an undertaking well-pleasing to God, whereas on the enemy's side it is the purest devilry. Consequently the Germans have the right to render thanks to God for their victories and righteously exult when thousands of Russians meet with a terrible death in the Masurian marshes. Such thanksgiving, such exultation, can only be acceptable to God. But with the enemy it is far otherwise. Their victories can only be regarded as "Siege des 'bösen Feindes'" ("victories of the Devil"), allowed by God for the testing and salvation of the conquered. Rejoicing and thanksgiving for such victories cannot possibly be approved by Him. "Only consider," says Herr Loeber, "our enemies' disgraceful conduct of the war," and then comes the following description which I should like to submit to the judgment of English readers :

"The mendacity, the maniacal calumny, the perfidy, the brutality of our enemies; the systematic and conscious misleading of foreign countries in their judgment upon Germany, through the medium of the enemy press; the devilish plan of starving our entire nation; the cowardly and despicable misuse of flags by England; the introduction of coloured tribes and primitive peoples to overthrow the German nation, which had become inconvenient in fulfilling its aspirations; the revolting treatment of German prisoners in Dahomey and in other regions of Africa; the senseless and terrible devastation of East Prussia by the 'Beasts of the East,' as the Russians have been rightly called; the unscrupulous use made by the host of our enemies of the principle, 'The end justifies the means'—all these factors combined have so completely overthrown, not merely Christian morality, but even the bare morality of nature, that any attempt to readjust the methods of conducting the war must miscarry."

With Belgium, the bombardment of unfortified towns, the Zeppelin raids, the poisonous gas, and the *Lusitania* fresh in one's memory, this attitude is somewhat surprising—or, rather, would be so if one were not acquainted with the German point of view, according to which German atrocities are such only in seeming, but are in reality the expression of the highest moral-

ity and the most devoted sense of duty, while warfare against Germany, both in its purpose and conduct, must be inspired solely by the Devil. A little further on he proves that our Lord's saying about the leaven cannot be applied to the enemy, for in them Christianity has not acted as a leaven at all—a parable of veneer would have been more appropriate.

“English Christianity, so famous all the world over, has been unmasked: it is the Christianity of treachery and hypocrisy. Such Christianity is valueless. The principles by which England allows herself to be guided in this war, and which throw such a melancholy light upon the English nation, are absolutely incompatible with the Christian religion. The campaign of lies which England has set in motion against us is entirely anti-Christian in character. Here we find ‘the gates of Hell’ wide open. Everything that official England has done for the spread of Christianity in the world is nullified by the request of the English Government in India to the heathen Hindus to pray to their gods for England's victory in arms. This is tantamount to express recognition of the heathen gods, against which the foreign missions are striving, as workers in England's cause.”

He then proceeds to berate Russia, France, and Italy, and the natural conclusion is that “die Retter der Moral und die Träger der christlichen Religion in diesem Kriege sind schliesslich die deutschen ‘Barbaren.’”¹

This is the tone in which reference is commonly made, both in sermons and pamphlets, to the enemies of Germany, and the effect is often truly comic. Witness Herr Theodor Birt in *Was heisst “Liebet eure Feinde”?*² (Marburg, 1915) who, after descanting upon the German passion for peace, and showing how their beautiful dreams have been destroyed by “Diabolus,” goes on to say:

“Diabolus in German means Slanderer. Popular language calls him ‘the Devil.’ And this spirit it is that has desolated the souls of our opponents with narrowness of view, jealousy, lust for revenge, covetousness, breach of faith, and perfidy.”

I shall not dwell here upon the accusation of breach of faith brought by the Germans against their enemies (one would suppose that they have enough to do in sweeping their own doorstep clean), but I will devote some space to the consideration of their accusation of lust for revenge, in which they assume that they themselves in their moral grandeur are far removed from such ignoble impulses.

Let us return to Herr Loeber and see what he has to say. He gloats over the Old Testament Psalms of vengeance, and

¹ “The champions of morality and the pillars of Christianity in this war are, after all, the German ‘barbarians.’”

² “What do we mean by ‘Love your enemies’?”

adds that the most fervent and passionately German patriots have been animated by this same sentiment. He further quotes Ernst Moritz Arndt, who states in his popular and widely known song :

“Then forth ! Arminius’ battlefield
Shall yield us our revenge” ;¹

and later :

“Ho, sound the drums and sound the pipes,
To all the world appeal !
To-day we’ll fight them man to man,
And red shall be the steel.
The Frenchman’s cursed blood shall flow,
To-day shall every German know
The sweets of vengeance, and the glow
Of vengeance in him feel.”²

And Theodor Körner exclaims :

“Cry to the martyrs of the holy German cause
As spirits of revenge.”³

This author not only admits but actually glories in the German “Rachgier.” Is there any other nation which habitually allows its sons to sing songs of revenge ? Is there any other nation which consistently nurses the conviction that it has some grievance or other to be avenged ? Is it not of assistance in understanding Germany to know that when she goes to war every one of her sons will fight in the conviction that he is the injured party and that it is he who has cause to seek revenge ? It is just as Professor Boutroux wittily remarks in his excellent little book *L’Allemagne et la guerre* :

“Non seulement l’Allemagne est l’élue de la Providence, mais elle est seule élue, et les autres nations sont réprouvées. Le signe de son élection est l’anéantissement des trois légions de Quinctilius Varus, et sa tâche est de se venger éternellement de l’insolence du général romain. ‘Nous partons pour livrer la bataille de Hermann, et nous voulons nous venger,’ *und wollen Rache haben* ; ainsi s’exprime le célèbre chant national : *Der Gott, der Eisen wachsen liess*.”

¹ “So ziehen Wir aus zur Herrmannsschlacht
Und wollen *Rache* haben.”

² “Lasst klingen, was nur klingen kann,
Die Trommeln und die Flöten.
Wir wollen heute Mann für Mann
Mit Blut das Eisen röten,
Mit Henkerblut, Franzosenblut—
O süßes Tag der *Rache* !
Das klinget allen Deutschen gut,
Das ist die grosse Sache.”

³ “Die Martyrer der heil’gen deutschen Sache,
O ruft sie an als Genien der *Rache*.”

In his book *Sechs Kriegs-Religionsstunden* (Göttingen, 1915) Dr Bruno Wehnert develops the signification of the expiatory death of Jesus, who being perfect had to die for the sins of others. And the doctor proceeds to consider the Germans in the same light. Why is it, he asks, that the finest sons of our race, the ablest and best, should be forced to die in their youthful ardour and strength?

"We are so proud of maintaining that for each individual as well as for our whole people there is no better life, no higher morality, no purer striving after the greatest human blessings than among us Germans. And yet it is those Germans who suffer most fearfully."

It is a little prejudicial to the validity of the author's arguments that he cannot deny that the enemies of Germany also suffer, and that their—after all—quite severe suffering is caused by the Germans themselves, for we are not told anywhere that Christ allowed His enemies to suffer. But this consideration has not the slightest effect; the author adheres serenely to his own line of argument. It is impossible that Germany should suffer for sin. "Are the godless Frenchmen, the profit-blinded English, the insatiable Russians to be our judges before God's face?" No, that is out of the question. The Germans are innocent, and in proof (since he cannot very well represent them as the only sufferers) he maintains that they have suffered *most*. And how does he support this surprising statement? Just listen: "Since our opponents prefer venturing their lands and wealth rather than their persons, their riches rather than their nation's best sons."

Yes, it is amazing reading! German intelligence is here absolutely given over to the service of German self-love and *naïveté*, which both aim at the one goal, at proving incontestably that the German nation is on the side of Christ. And then follows:

"As the best nation we suffer, that we may help, by propitiation of the eternal laws of morality, and by deliverance from existing evils, to lead up to a better condition of the world than has existed heretofore. Like Jesus, we lift up our eyes and pray, with our gaze fixed upon Heaven: Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do. . . . We—that is, the German people—take our firm stand at His side. . . .

"Though poor, we are blessed. Though persecuted, ours is the Kingdom of Heaven."

And—the point of the whole argument—

"Weil wir sanftmütig sind, werden wir das Erdreich besitzen."¹

¹ "Because we are meek, we shall possess the Kingdom of Earth."

It is very significant that nowhere was the war welcomed with such jubilation as in Germany. Of course, it went without saying that Germany was absolutely innocent and the object of the most infamous assault, but nevertheless when war was proclaimed the people were enchanted. Thousands of pens at once set to work to extol the blessed effects of war, till one at last began to wonder why peace was ever permitted, since she was the mother of all the vices, as war of all the virtues. Thousands of pens were busy in insisting upon a Christian authority for war, till at last one began to wonder why Christ Himself did not go about preaching it. And last, but not least, they looked forward to "ein frischer, fröhlicher Krieg," because it would extend greatly the power and splendour of the German realm, and probably lead to German domination of the world. For that Germany would be victorious there could be no reasonable doubt, as both God and man must admit. It was inconceivable that God, so often called "the German God," should be on any side but that of Germany. Had not the German prophet Geibel foretold that when Germany was attacked both from West and East her fulfilment was at hand. A speedy victory, like that of 1870, was anticipated. And since Germany was the pacific party, and had been attacked by inhuman foes, veritable "hyænas," through no fault of her own, she must be allowed to inflame her own people to hatred. Thousands of articles and pamphlets have been written to prove that it is the right of a German Christian to hate his enemies. For example, Herr Birt, in the book mentioned above, proves that when Christ said, "Love your enemies," He was not thinking of the political enemies of a country, and therefore,

"Deutscher Patriot, richt dich auf! Deinem gerechten Zorn gegen England steht Christus nicht entgegen!"¹

I have given numerous proofs in my book of the way in which this hatred expresses itself, every scruple having been first carefully overcome. The few influential persons in Germany who have attempted to dam up this stream of hate have proved ineffectual. For pronouncements such as those of Herr Birt, for instance, are naturally much more acceptable. He turns our Lord's dictum, "No man can serve two masters," into "Wer den deutschen Staat und seine Herrschgewalt liebt, der wird den Engländer hassen, der uns bedroht."²

¹ "German patriot, arise! Christ does not forbid thy righteous hate of England."

² "He who loves the German constitution, and its dominion, will hate England who is our menace."

In this connection I will quote once more, from a work by Herr Wilhelm Meyer, *Vomehrlichen Krieg: Ein Büchlein von Gott und uns Deutschen* (Marburg, 1915). It is absolutely typical. It is full of exultation in war.

"Blest be the earnest hour that makes us one at last with bonds of steel. . . . Now comes the war, the honest war,"¹

he cries with one of their new war poets. The war has burned out in a moment all the dross from the German character, it has set the soul of Germany free to display its full splendour. The educative force of the war shows it to be of Divine origin. The fiery breath of war is the breath of God, who is invoked by another poet as "der Gott der Deutschen." A third poet sings:

"God is seen in the gleaming iron—God is seen in the tempest; bow thy leaves, oak, to the wind; offer to him, Germany, such sacrifice as he would have. He is thy avenger, thy rescuer, who fires thee to new splendour; let him do his will."²

Victory is certain.

"Germany's victory is coming, Germany's future is made fast as the stars of God, which pass unchangeably upon their appointed way."³

But in this book too there is a chapter, "Vom Zürnen und Hassen" ("Of Anger and Hate"), where sacrifice is made to the Furies of Hate:

"Then kindle, Hate, and blaze,
Like poison burn within;
If sin it be to hate,
Our duty 'tis to sin."⁴

1 "Sei gesegnet, ernste Stunde,
Die uns endlich stählern eint . . .
Jetzt kommt der Krieg,
Der ehrliche Krieg."

2 "Gott erhebt im Eisenglanze,
Gott erhebt in schweren Wetter,
Eiche, lass dem Sturm die Blätter,
Opfre, Deutschland, wie er will.
Deinem Rächer, deinem Retter,
Der dich glüht zu neuem Glanze,
Halt ihm still."

3 "Deutschlands Sieg kommt, Deutschlands Zukunft steht
Fest wie Gottes Sterne, die unwandelbar ihre
Vorgeschriebene Bahn ziehen."

4 "Drum flamme, Hass, und zünde,
Und brenne bis in den Tod,
Und wäre Hassen Sünde,
Uns würde Sünde Gebot."

"Yes," exclaims the author,

"I have thanked God from my heart for such words as these. Thanks be to Him that we Germans can still harbour anger and hate. Anger and hate have more than once accomplished great things in Germany. It was anger and hate, on the threshold of German history, that annihilated the Roman hordes in the Teutberg forest."

(One should note that the enemies of Germany are always "Horden." I wonder whether those Germans were not really more truly "Horden" than the Roman soldiers.) He then quotes a passage from the poet and war prophet Arndt, in which the latter fans the flame of hatred as follows:—

"A new love for the prophet of our fathers glows in my heart when I read this call to hate in this time of Germany's need. Oh, that I could kindle every German man and every German woman in the land to hatred, holy anger and hatred! These words of Arndt's should be scattered broadcast in millions of loose leaves. They should be read aloud in every pulpit. People of Germany, abandon yourselves as one nation to a mighty, overpowering passion! I must hate, hate with my whole soul, those who would be heartily glad to root out Germany from the earth; those who have betrayed us to the yellow race and the black race; who have tendered us cowardly treachery for honest fight; who wage war, not army against army, but upon women, children, and hoar hairs alike; who have devised the shameful plan of starving out an entire nation; who regard every means as just, if it will ruin Germany. I must hate them, for the sake of that God who has created German souls and will maintain them in being."

And he cries:

"In this war, assuredly, the stake is the existence or non-existence of everything that bears the name of German."

Is it any wonder that as the result of such rhetoric the whole of Germany has been filled with raging hatred, that Ernst Lissauer's *Hymn of Hate* was composed and sung everywhere, and that the greeting "Gott strafe England!" became the customary salutation? German authors are unwearied in extolling the ennobling effect of war. Is this ennobling?

I shall now only add a few specimens, also taken from the works of the aforesaid writers, to show to what pitch German self-glorification has attained. Herr Loeber says:

"All that is good and noble, all that is healthy and healing, in German fashion will after the war prove a blessing to other nations as well: German loyalty, German honesty, German conscientiousness, German sense of duty, German truthfulness, German earnestness, German cordiality, German industry, German perseverance. The world is completely diseased. It may be that the Lord God will be pleased to use the German nation as physician to the suffering world."

And naturally Geibel is also quoted :

“And in the wells of German feeling
Shall God's created world find healing.”¹

And Herr W. Meyer depicts the result of German victory as follows :

“The German creation will assume an elevated and decisive importance upon the earth. German thought and research, German songs and sayings, German piety and morality, German justice and unselfishness, German magnanimity and heroism, German sincerity and cordiality, German profundity and purity, German manliness and anger, German staunchness and tenacity, German simplicity and straightforwardness, German reliability and loyalty, German spirit of enterprise and organising capacity, German industry and German thoroughness,—this marvellous, God-given German creation in its entirety shall be born again in pure beauty out of the travail of war, and shall celebrate its proud resurrection. This is the vocation to which the hour of our fate calls us Germans in the world.”

Such a list of German virtues almost takes one's breath away. And they are, too, always made to stand out in relief against the lurid colours of the enemy's vices. How *naïve*, how childish, it all is ! But it is a childishness that holds a menace for the world. The following quotation, which shall be the last, is really classical. It is taken from Herr Wehner's book, referred to above :

“Germany's day as the champion of this world is dawning, even as the day of Jesus as the Christ, *i.e.* the Saviour, dawned : in a struggle with powers which see in her rise their own downfall. Why should they not spit poison and gall upon us ? That is their nature.”

As I said before, only in Germany—if one can judge from the utterances of a host of German poets and writers—was the war greeted with acclamation. England has taken it in quite another spirit. On this point Professor Sanday has enlightened us in his excellent book, lately translated into Danish, *The Meaning of the War*. But it cannot be denied that England at war, undertaking a task demanded of her by the honour and destiny of her people, finds good as well as evil in such conflict. The best statement of this truth that I have found in English literature is made by the clergyman, Dr Barnard, in Thackeray's splendid novel—unhappily unfinished—*Denis Duval* : “War is not altogether an evil ; and ordained of Heaven, as our illnesses and fevers doubtless are, for our good. It teaches obedience and contentment under privations ; it fortifies courage ; it tests loyalty ; it gives occasion for showing

¹ “Und es mag am deutschen Wesen
Einmal noch die Welt genesen.”

mercifulness of heart, moderation in victory, endurance and cheerfulness under defeat. The brave who do battle victoriously in their country's cause leave a legacy of honour to their children. We English of the present day are the better for Crecy, and Agincourt, and Blenheim. I do not grudge the Scots their day of Bannockburn, nor the French their Fontenoy. Such valour proves the manhood of nations. When we have conquered the American rebellion, as I have no doubt we shall do, I trust it will be found that these rebellious children of ours have comported themselves in a manner becoming our English race, that they have been hardy and resolute, merciful and moderate." The contrast between such words, full of common-sense and chivalry, and the German panegyrics of war, surely calls for no comment.

Now I, a Dane, writing of the danger of Germanism, cannot deny myself the pleasure of stating that, long before anyone else, a Dane, one of our greatest, the poet and Church dignitary, N. F. S. Grundtvig (d. 1872) foresaw and foretold the danger. As early as 1838 he wrote that Europe ought to rejoice in the fact that Germany was still split up into small states. "For if one were to picture all the heads that think and speak German gathered under one hat, then one would picture a German Napoleon, a power more terrible in human eyes than France in her most dangerous hour. And, to my mind, it follows that the Germans would be the more tyrannical masters because they take things so much more seriously and thoroughly. That such a political federation, uniting all forces to form one huge German engine of war, would not be less disastrous to all that is good in Germany itself than to the rest of the world, is quite obvious, and this danger threatens Europe and Germany rather from the military state of Prussia than from the universities of Germany. A state having a common speech, stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, from the Vistula to beyond the Rhine, animated by the German military spirit, intelligence, and pride, would under its Napoleon, its war-god, impose upon the world the heaviest chains it has yet borne." It will be admitted that these remarks show considerable perspicacity and prophetic insight. When Grundtvig sought a basis for his hope for the future, he always turned to England as the land of liberty, and the inspiration that he thus drew from England has had a great influence upon the Danish nation.

I will now conclude, referring you for what is omitted to my book. So much is certain: if one appreciates this strange aspect of the German genius depicted above (which, to my

mind, gives the key to the situation), then one must also be aware that, if the war ends in such a way that it is possible for the Germans to represent themselves as victorious, they would see in that a confirmation of the excellence of their military system and of their assumed right and will to rule the world. And England in particular, who has perhaps at last grasped the German point of view and the German method, must realise that Germany will give her no quarter. It is the old story of Carthage and Rome over again. After the war, this *præterea censeo* will be written in every German heart: "England must be destroyed." For the great maxim that Germany has a moral right to the dominion of the world necessitates the removal of every obstacle. And since England is the greatest of these, her fate, in the eyes of every German, is sealed. Sooner or later, by fair means or foul—for to a nation like England no consideration is due,—she must be destroyed. Recently the ex-Legationsraad H. V. Rath stated in the *Dresden Anzeiger*, seconded by Count Reventlow in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, that in a course of a few years the German submarines will always be able to threaten England with starvation. "Accordingly we need not trouble our heads too much over the terms of peace with England, so long as in the future no international hindrance is placed in the way of our technical progress." Such is the situation. All sympathy for the individual Germans one knows, all respect for the undeniable ability and honesty which distinguishes the nation in daily life, cannot after all—and herein lies the tragedy for Germany and for the world—weigh against the deplorable trait in their national character which has just been described, and which expresses itself—to put it shortly—in this conviction that the Germans are the only people who spiritually and morally stand so high that they may, nay *must*, allow themselves to employ any means, even immoral, to reach their goal—to rule the world and seal it with their impress.

J. P. BANG.

APPENDIX.

AN EXAMPLE OF THE GERMAN ATTITUDE.

(*National Evangelical Lutheran Church Times.*)

A GROSS MISDEMEANOUR.

German clerics are for the moment inundated with pamphlets from Berlin, in which the sender's name is not revealed. One of our readers supposes him to be an Englishman. It would certainly be difficult to believe that

in selecting a pattern for Germany at prayer a German would recommend the English Archbishop of Canterbury and his exhortation to prayer dated January 3, 1915, on the occasion of the national intercession in London. "If only all clergymen," writes Anonymous, "felt themselves impelled to help in preparing the future understanding between nations along these lines, each man with the forms suggested by his faith!"

To present us with an Englishman, an Archbishop of this murderous people, as a pattern is in itself an astonishing performance. But the request made in the prayer is a complete departure from the ordinary type. We leave our readers to judge for themselves. It runs: "Let us pray God to nurture in us out of the chaos and misery of the war a better understanding of the true relation between Right and Might, and a deeper comprehension of the mission of Christ and the meaning of Christ to the communion of nations. Let us have no desire to see our foes crushed, let us wish only for their humiliation. For them as for ourselves let us desire that their eyes may be opened to the recognition of the truth; let us pray that in God's grace the day may come when we shall learn to understand and respect one another, and unite as friends in striving after one common good. And, above all, let us pray that, when the peace for which we yearn does come, we may be filled with a firm determination to extinguish the bitter memory of our struggle by beginning anew, as men of good will, the supreme task, which is to lead the peoples of the world to the true knowledge of our only Redeemer and Lord of us all, and to His obedience."

Even from an Englishman's standpoint the prayer leaves a painful impression. There is not a drop of warm blood in it: no feeling or zeal for his own nation, if he thinks its cause just; no pity for the English blood that has been shed; the frightful problem before the present international tribunal is treated with a delicate dissection which savours of the professor's chair; except that even here the English hypocrisy is not quite suppressed: "May the Germans have their eyes opened to recognise the truth." Of course, Englishmen, the nation of liars, do not need this! And all that in prayer before God! But let us leave Englishmen alone. We Germans are, if you please, to pray in this fashion at our altars and in our pulpits. We are to confess that our eyes have been blinded by lies, and the eyes of our Emperor and our statesmen and our soldiers, our best theologians and our best Christians. We are all blind, and God is to open our eyes! And why? That we may stretch out our hand to Cain who slew his brother Abel, may press England's reeking hand to our heart and say, "Dear Brothers!" Has the sender of this prayer forgotten what was unmasked in the papers of the Belgian Ambassador, that it was England alone who began the war? Truly we might pray for the enlightenment of England. But we do not. We smite upon our own breast, and pray God to be merciful to us. We do not even do this, for we have other things to think and to do. We are thinking of the picture God puts before our eyes to-day, the appalling misery which England has brought upon Europe, the blood of nations which has been shed at England's bidding, the thousands of lads and men dead on the battle-fields, the tears of the widows and orphans, the barbarous conduct of the war which seeks to starve innocent women and children, shoots down defenceless mariners like mangy dogs, fights by deceit and treachery, destroys the temples of the Gospel among the heathen, and shatters every

human right. This is what we see, and we raise our hands to the just God and pray that we may "govern and maintain stern judgment."

And where is our Christian love? It is here, not in the form of an academic excursus, but bestowed upon our people among whom God has placed us. He who loves not those of his own household is worse than a heathen; and he who loves not his own people may keep his mouth shut about his Christianity. Our love for our people leaves us almost heart-broken at this flood of lies, treachery, and murder as it reaches us from England. And when we pray, we ask for the mighty help of God against this enemy, for His strong arm and outstretched hand. "Lord, strive Thou with them that trouble me, and fight Thou against them that fight against me."

For it is England's gold and England's Allies that are in the scales, and against them is the omnipotence and compassion of God. But we have chosen the latter, and we wait to see who wins the day.

What will happen later, or how reconciliation will be made between the peoples, we leave to the ordering of that God whom we invoke to-day as our Saviour. We wait upon His nod. But break into the war with frivolous talk about the brotherhood of nations, as the English Archbishop does, we cannot. Our honesty, our sense of justice, and our Christian love, which we bear to our suffering people, all forbid. We are unable to find words to deal with the stuff of which the Archbishop's prayer is made. It almost suggests to us the meeting between Joab and Amasa (2 Sam. xx. vv. 9 *seqq.*). "And Joab said to Amasa, Art thou in health, my brother? And Joab took Amasa by the beard with the right hand to kiss him. But Amasa took no heed to the sword that was in Joab's hand; so he smote him therewith in the fifth rib, and he died."

The Archbishop indulges in loving words about Germany, and his Government forgets Germany's blood. He does not want to see us "annihilated," but he will not lift a finger to stay the annihilation—the starvation campaign: he talks of the "high task" of bringing the nations to the knowledge of Christ, but of the task that lies nearest to him, and ranks therefore first and highest, his duty as prophet to his own countrymen, not a word.

Many people think it possible that the circular may have been sent round by a German, one of the uncured and incurable Pacificists who are incapable of loving even their own people. Let us hope it is so; but he might at least have left God's name and the prayer out of it. It is deplorable that an imperial firm of printers, Julius Sittenfeld, Berlin, has lent itself to the publication of this bastard leaflet.

Note.—The quotation on page 16 is a translation of the German version which is substantially correct, but should be compared with the original in the Form of Humble Prayer issued by the Archbishop.—EDITOR.

MORE GERMAN SERMONS.

PROFESSOR A. S. FERGUSON,

Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.

"We must—that is our vocation—defend God against the world."

PASTOR KOEHLER.

THIS sentence is taken from one of the most significant documents published even in this war. Pastor Koehler is a Berlin clergyman who has digested eight hundred Protestant war-sermons in a number of the well-known *Religions-geschichtliche Volks-Bücher*.¹ These again represent an immense mass of unpublished exhortations, so that the booklet may be taken as the distilled essence of German Protestant feeling. It is therefore on a different plane from the isolated and fantastic extracts—some of them forgeries—which have shocked or amused English readers from time to time. Here is Germanism translated into evangelical language, and rooted in deep religious feeling. I propose in this paper to show how closely intertwined are these alien growths. The spirit that finds expression in pagan hymns of hate or of the sword may pass with defeat and disillusion, but these men, with the lie in the soul, are ripe to consider themselves martyrs for righteousness if Germany fails.

There is, we are told, a tendency among the eight hundred to bring Germany into organic relation with the person and passion of Christ.² "The bursting of this war upon us Germans,

¹ *Der Weltkrieg im Lichte der deutsch-protestantischen Kriegspredigt*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1915.

² This comparison seems to be common to Protestants and Catholics. Witness a sermon by Father Stipberger, chaplain at the Bavarian court. I quote from the French version of *La Cloche Roland* by Johannes Joergensen, a Danish Catholic, as a third translation is perhaps one too many: "C'est un chemin dur et abrupt que suit le peuple allemand, le grand bienfaiteur du monde civilisé et le libérateur sublime. Dans les ténèbres du Vendredi-Saint, on entrevoit la clarté du matin de Pâques; dans les heures sombres de la guerre, les oriflammes du triomphe. A présent encore, la croix pèse sur ses

as a qualified witness rightly feels, has in it something similar to the lot of Christ: envy, self-interest, malice, and jealousy then as now. And as it is Jesus' battle and victory to see the truth of holy love in His life-struggle against falsehood and force, so it is our solace that we in this way not only share the like fortune with Jesus, but also through such a fortune should know ourselves as united with Him. And what this means for our joy in battle and patience in affliction, for our strength of hope and confidence in victory, any man knows who like Paul let himself be brought into the likeness of the affliction (*Leiden*) of Jesus, to fill up that which in the world is still lacking of the afflictions of Christ in his own body and life (Col. i. 24). An infinitely deep thought with wide-shining vistas!" One such vista is the certainty that after this "Good Friday experience" the German nation will ascend with Christ into glory, through the cross achieving the crown. The theme of the suffering servant in Isaiah is naturally pressed into the same service. Under the title "Germany a suffering chosen people" (*Gottesvolk*), she is represented as being now perfected for her great mission. "Germany takes part in this highest title of honour of the Son of God, who crowns all suffering into victory. Our German people must sacrifice itself and does sacrifice itself, that salvation and blessing may come upon all peoples that are not strong enough through like might of sacrifice to release like strength of blessing. A martyr sanctified of God, so stands our German people in this war, a chosen instrument in God's hand." Of this mission more anon.

It is not enough that Germany should be a suffering Saviour: Christ must be transformed into a German hero. Since the war broke out, preachers have found the "mild-faced Jesus" of Thorwaldsen an inadequate representation of the wielder of the whip of small cords. So they have revived the Christ of their ancestors. "Once in their *Heliand* our Christian forefathers looked upon Christ as their battle-trying leader, who inspired them with His ardour and heavenly might to heroic deeds without compare and to any sacrifice. If the war helps us to regain our Lord Christ in this transfiguration, it has conferred a blessing upon us."

épaules; il souffre encore le plus cruel des Golgotha." To which Mr Joergensen, still wavering after a sentimental pilgrimage through Catholic Germany, is all but constrained to reply: "O peuple allemand, peuple patient, peuple souffrant, peuple crucifié, libérateur du monde, nous penchons la tête, silencieusement recueillis, remplis de vénération pour la croix sur laquelle tu as voulu souffrir!" (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 Juin 1916).

What mission has been imposed upon such valour and such patience? "It is as if God were gripping the German Michael firmly by the arms and thus boxing the other peoples on the ear." The unnamed author of this choice metaphor does not mean that Michael is a scourge of God. Germany is called upon to castigate the world because of her own perfection. "If ever a people in the world is called and fitted to make the religion of the undefiled Gospel fruitful for the world, to be a Christopher, a Christ-carrier for all peoples, a banner-bearer of the Gospel, yea, a buckler for morals and culture, it is the German people, which with this high calling simply fulfils the meaning of its own history." "Only thus can the great ages of the German Reformation and German Idealism come to fruition; for the time is now at hand when Germany will be the heart and centre of the world, as Lagarde dreamed and Geibel prophesied." However it may be with Lagarde, few outside Germany would dream that her "high world-mission" is "to lead the peoples in freedom to world-peace."

Minds strung to this pitch have no doubt of victory. If it does not crown their efforts, history will seem to them, as to another maker of peace at all costs, "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Apart from the vocation of Germany, the character of the contestants assures her triumph. "If God is not now in our German Christianity, where else is He to be found in the world?" There is England, the instigator of this war, "with the Cain-mark upon her brow"; godless, frivolous France, "the harlot among the nations"; and Russia "on the verge of being engulfed in a morass of superstition." This is the restrained language of Christian charity, and some preachers who go so far as to identify England with the company of the ungodly heathen are rebuked by Pastor Koehler. But piety forbids the thought that "God, the Almighty Holy God, could abandon His rule in the world to such a set of canting Pharisees. Nay, never will He do that, so long as we do not force Him to." But there is nothing to force Him. "Place our people in comparison with those three torch-bearers to the War-Fury—little as it may become us to exalt ourselves for no reason above others,—who would be so unjust as to deny that Germany is not merely the most pious relatively to the others, but that she also stands at the highest grade of civilisation? And shall God decree to condemn such a people to fall? Unthinkable, impossible!" There were, it is admitted, flecks and stains in Germany before the war, but they are purged away. "How

many has the war made selfless! No trace of desire for plunder or booty! They share the last bite with the enemy dwellers in the conquered country. Of this we have unnumbered proofs.¹ The kindness of the German, which was often counted against him for folly, is now his shining virtue, which wins for him even the foeman's heart."

Is the outbreak of hate one of these virtues harvested by the war? If we may judge by the frequency with which the author reverts to the subject, his conscience is not quite easy. He is honestly anxious to feel like a Christian, and it may perhaps be a sign of grace that he and most of those whose views he reports attempt to adapt history to Christianity instead of squaring Christianity with Prussianism. Those who proclaim a "moratorium of Christianity" meet with unsparing condemnation. His treatment of national hate is a curious example of the sublimation which ugly facts undergo when seen through the mists of German romanticism. "In war too," he writes, "Christians may fulfil the words, 'Bless them that curse you. Love your enemies.' Admittedly God set before us in these words a simply heroic task." "Natural and justified as our hate [*scil.* of England] may be, it must not be our last word and our lasting feeling." Then begins a process of refining away. It is not Englishmen that the German hates, but the English national will. If hate is thoroughly depersonalised it may be righteous, though to hate men must always be unchristian. In this crusade against the principle of evil, the German on his part simply continues "what Christ on His part has sealed through the Cross, that the prince of this world should be driven out, the power of the wicked broken, and room and right be created for freedom and peace." Happily the German mind is peculiarly adapted for this nobler species of hate, for he eternally loathes lying and revenge because he loves truth. Fundamentally he is no hater. He is far too humane for that. He probes deeper than among deluded men for an object worthy of his hate. "It is the German peculiarity, a precious endowment, to understand in love even what is strange to him among other peoples—yea, to admire and marvel at it overmuch. The German can hate and be wrathful only as he is capable of this noble enthusiasm."

Having proved that the German can only hate because he loves and understands so well, our author paints the lily

¹ "Unnumbered" photographs of German soldiers sharing their food with Belgian or Polish orphans are circulated in neutral papers, and the propaganda has not neglected American moving-picture shows.

by distinguishing a still loftier type of enthusiasm, which his countryman naturally possess. So hate vanishes in an almost unearthly exaltation.

If hate is holy in such a setting, the means employed by the German people are hallowed too. This war has finally reconciled those estranged brothers of German culture, "Religion und Technik." The most old-fashioned saint may thank God for the inventor of the 42-cm. gun and the marvellous submarines that have been sent as aid and saviour.¹ Cannon are "thoughts turned steel, embodied German diligence, witnesses of German faithfulness." The troop trains that speed and post from east to west are "praying locomotives."² But words almost fail the author as he turns from the instruments to the minds that direct them. "A silent, impressive, incomparable sermon has been preached by the General Staff, which completed its task of noble self-forgetful duty in quietude. This superb certainty, this manly decision, this noble courage—was that not a sermon indeed, impressive as no sermon in words can be? Here the spirit of Protestant idealism celebrates her fairest triumph."

So far a spirit, one might almost say, of relative moderation breathes over this booklet. But in the final hymn—the epithalamium of Religion and War—the author flings aside the eight hundred sermons and essays an independent flight. It is curious to note how many elements of German experience—from the Apocalypse through mediævalism to Zarathustra—are blended in this amazing piece of self-revelation.

"DES DEUTSCHEN GEISTES SCHWERTSEGEN.

"Ha! how it flashes from the sheath! How it shines in the May morning sun! The good German Sword, never

¹ The titles of some of the sections of Koehler's pamphlet may stand for much unctuous rhetoric:—"The war, the German people's hour of destiny." "The war as the Germans' divine worship" (*Gottes-dienst*). "Why Germany cannot and must not go under." "The war, the fulfilment of the meaning of German history." "The German people and the German God." Naturally the notion that the German God is a tribal deity is repudiated—but repelled as a real danger. "It is not as if there were a German God, as if we were the chosen people, and the others one and all of the devil. Above all, we must beware of the Pharisaism into which boasting about a German special God (*Extra-Gott*) might seduce us."

² Compare a recent article of the Bishop of Kiel, in a Schleswig paper. He exhorts the Germans to thank God, who "allows our submarines to torpedo all American vessels and others carrying supplies to our enemies, quite regardless of how many and how impudent the Americans on board may be" (*Times*, 29th May 1916). This quotation, like that from Fr. Stipberger, has not been verified.

profaned, proven by victory, consecrated. God had thrust thee into our hand; we had clasped thee like a bride. . . . Dear smiter, thou art a bearer of the Spirit for us. Thou art not only the *ultima ratio* of kings; we priests of the Spirit have part in thee and thou in us. And the Spirit of Pentecost shall be our sword-hallowing. Art thou indeed like Him, one given unto us from above? then verily thy power shall work fully in the deeds of our might. Yea, we have marked how strong and firm and free we became through thee. Thou art a transfigurer of our being, even as the Word and the Spirit. Thy lightnings are flashes of fire that bear witness of life and light. Thou holdest the speech of the cloven tongues. For every man understandeth thee, because thou findest the way into all.¹ Come, Sword, thou art as the Revelation of the Spirit. For thou bringest all to the issue. Thou dividest the falsely leagued, thou revealest the hidden depths. Before thy gleam fleeth the lie. Wherefore thou wert also to proceed out of the mouth of Christ. He could not bring peace till he had brought the Sword. So shall his Spirit in us destroy what is not noble. For thus speaketh He who hath the sharp two-edged Sword:—I know where thou dwellest, and where thy secret thoughts are hid. My Spirit cannot stir in thee till thou hast let thy most hidden deeps be revealed before me through the Sword of my Spirit, and till that which sifteth in thee becomes thy guide. Hold fast before this stroke, and thou receivest the knightly accolade of the Spirit. This shall be thy sword-hallowing, thou German youth whom I have consecrated. And now come, my blessed one, I have still a great thing before thee. Loosed from sin as thou art, nought can now loose thee from my love, nor sword, nor persecution, nor nakedness. Now come, my victor, I give thee the white stone and the new name which no man knoweth but he that receiveth it. I have sealed thee with the cross on thy victor forehead. None may slay thee. But thou shalt have spoil in plenty. And thou shalt of right slay them all as my slain. Gird thyself, be wroth, and do judgment. They are about thee on all sides; but in the name of the Lord thou shalt hew them in pieces. Till the spirit of life enters into the bones of the dead and they come together again through the breath of my mouth, and from uncovered graves arises a holy, immortal, blameless (*unsträflich*) generation.”

If the last words mean anything, the world-mission of

¹ Even among German utterances in this war this terrible conceit must be hard to parallel.

peace is postponed until a higher power even than Germany is due to intervene. The heat and exaltation of war has fused piety and barbarism into an odious compound. How many years will suffice to expel the baser element? It is useless to speculate on that, but one illusion is already going. "At the recent meeting of the General Synod of Berlin the Rev. Dr Weber of Bonn declared that conditions in the Rhine provinces were unspeakable, that the criminal and immoral contamination of the youth of both sexes was appalling. Other clergymen told similar tales of their own districts, and it was generally decided that the state of affairs was so bad that it was a case for special legislation. The great war, said one pastor, which, it was expected, would raise the moral tone of the nation, had to the horror of all true Germans the exactly opposite effect."¹ Experience is beginning to tell, but legends that replace history and call religion to their aid have a long life.

A. S. FERGUSON.

KINGSTON, CANADA.

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, May 1916, where other documents of the same character will be found.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE PRESENT WAR : A COMPARISON.

CHARLES F. THWING, LL.D.,

President, Western Reserve University.

LOVE of liberty and love of country are the dominating and inspiring aims of most wars. The Civil War in the United States of America embodied these two great human and national principles. The two principles, however, were the objects of different interpretations and applications, as made by the belligerent powers. The Confederate States believed it was their right, under both the fundamental law of liberty and the written law of the Constitution, to withdraw from the Union. This right they saw fit to exercise for what seemed to them sufficient reason. In order to secure actually certain results, made possible they believed by their secession, they fought. These results were largely summed up in the word "slavery." But as the war proceeded from year to year they came to believe that they were fighting not simply to protect the institution of slavery, but also to defend the integrity of each of their own Confederate States. The war became for them a war *pro aris et focis*. For them the war was a struggle at once for liberty and for country.

The Federal States also fought the war under the power of the same great principles of liberty and patriotism. It was a war for the Union, for the preservation of the nation as one and undivided ; and it was also a war for the abolition of negro slavery. These two fundamental principles were at the beginning of the contest more or less united in the thinking of the North, and they became more united as the contest proceeded. Yet be it said that at the beginning of the contest there were those who declared that the conflict was a conflict purely for or against the Union: slavery did not form, they

affirmed, a constitutional element in the question. There was also a party to whom the constitutional relation seemed insignificant—who emphasised the controlling part which slavery had played and was apparently destined to play in the struggle.

Upon this central and duplex problem the testimony of Lincoln has supreme value, as it has upon other elements of the American conflict, which will be presented in this comparative study.

In notes for speeches made in 1858, Lincoln said :

"I believe the Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I expressed this belief a year ago ; and subsequent developments have but confirmed me. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall ; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and put it in course of ultimate extinction ; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new."¹

He also said :

"Welcome or unwelcome, agreeable or disagreeable, whether this shall be an entire slave nation is the issue before us. Every incident—every little shifting of scenes or of actors—only clears away the intervening trash, compacts and consolidates the opposing hosts, and brings them more and more distinctly face to face. The conflict will be a severe one ; and it will be fought through by those who do care for the result, and not by those who do not care—by those who are for, and those who are against, a legalised national slavery."²

He also said, in addressing the Mayor of New York City, 20th February 1861, a few days before he took office :

"This Union shall never be abandoned, unless the possibility of its existence shall cease to exist without the necessity of throwing passengers and cargo overboard. So long, then, as it is possible that the prosperity and liberties of this people can be preserved within this Union, it shall be my purpose at all times to preserve it."³

Again, near the same date, to the Senate of New Jersey, he spoke :

"I am exceedingly anxious that this Union, the Constitution, and the liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in accordance with the original idea for which that struggle was made, and I shall be most happy indeed if I shall be a humble instrument in the hands of the Almighty and of this, his almost chosen people, for perpetuating the object of that great struggle."⁴

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. iv. p. 233.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. vi. p. 150.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iv. p. 235.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. vi. pp. 151-2.

In a letter to Horace Greeley, 22nd August 1862, Lincoln wrote:

"I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be the 'Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the coloured race I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause."¹

In his Annual Message to Congress, 1st December 1862, he declared:

"Among the friends of the Union there is great diversity of sentiment and of policy in regard to slavery and the African race amongst us. Some would perpetuate slavery; some would abolish it suddenly, and without compensation; some would abolish it gradually, and with compensation; some would remove the freed people from us, and some would retain them with us; and there are yet other minor diversities. Because of these diversities we waste much strength in struggles among ourselves. By mutual concession we should harmonise and act together. This would be compromise; but it would be compromise among the friends, and not with the enemies, of the Union."²

These quotations, the number and fullness of which could be greatly increased, are sufficient to prove: (1) that the American Civil War was, on the side of the North, fought for the nation's integrity, and, on the side of the South, fought for the right to secede from the Union; and (2) that the cause or reason for certain states wishing to secede from the Union lay in the desire to extend slavery into territory which had hitherto been free from it. Behind the Union cause came to stand the emancipation of the slave; behind the Secession cause stood at the very beginning the perpetuation and the enlargement of slavery. The preservation of the Federal Government might be called the final cause of the war, and the extension of slavery its exciting or creative cause. Comprehensive in

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. viii. pp. 15-16.

² *Ibid.*, vol. viii. p. 118.

judgment, and warming to the heart, Lincoln said as late as the year 1864, in a published interview :

"There have been men base enough to propose to me to return to slavery the black warriors of Port Hudson and Olustée, and thus win the respect of the masters they fought. Should I do so, I should deserve to be damned in time and eternity. Come what will, I will keep my faith with friend and foe. My enemies pretend I am now carrying on this war for the sole purpose of abolition. So long as I am President, it shall be carried on for the sole purpose of restoring the Union. But no human power can subdue this rebellion without the use of the emancipation policy, and every other policy calculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion.

"Freedom has given us 150,000 men raised on Southern soil. It will give us more yet. Just so much it has subtracted from the enemy, and, instead of alienating the South, there are now evidences of a fraternal feeling growing up between our men and the rank and file of the rebel soldiers. Let my enemies prove to the country that the destruction of slavery is not necessary to a restoration of the Union. I will abide the issue."¹

Again he said, in an address to the 164th Ohio Regiment :

"We have, as all will agree, a free government, where every man has a right to be equal with every other man. In this great struggle, this form of government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in this contest than is realised by every one. There is involved in this struggle the question whether your children and my children shall enjoy the privileges we have enjoyed."²

To another regiment he said :

"It is in order that each one of you may have, through this free government which we have enjoyed, an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise, and intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life, with all its desirable human aspirations;—it is for this the struggle should be maintained, that we may not lose our birthright—not only for one, but for two or three years. The nation is worth fighting for, to secure such an inestimable jewel."³

Like the American Civil War, the present Great War is a contest for liberty and for patriotism. Every nation involved declares, as did the two divisions of the American Commonwealth, that it is contending for either or for both of these fundamental and sublime principles. As in the case of the American Commonwealth, the war is differently interpreted in different nations. England is fighting for liberty as against autocracy. As Lord Bryce wrote me a year and a half ago, England is fighting for the preservation of small nations and for the inviolability of treaties. Hers is a real battle for

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. x. p. 191.

² *Ibid.*, vol. x. p. 199.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. x. p. 203.

humanity. France is fighting also in love of liberty and of country. Germany is fighting, as she believes, for the attacked and endangered Fatherland. Russia and Italy are inspired also by the patriotic motive. It is not a little significant that in the parallelism which I am intimating the position of England in the present conflict is most akin to the position of the United States in the American contest. The Federal Government, battling for the freedom of the slave, was also battling for the rights of all men to be free: England, fighting Germany, is fighting for the democratic principle everywhere. The Federal Government, fighting for the Union, was fighting for national integrity against a domestic foe; England, fighting Germany, is fighting for the national integrity of Belgium and of other small peoples, and indeed of large peoples, against foreign enemies. Under new conditions and diverse forms New World history comes to repeat itself in the Old World.

In a second aspect of our parallel a similarity exists. It refers to the beginning and the conduct of the two wars. For a generation the Southern States had been preparing for a separation, by peaceable means if possible, by military measures, if necessary.

Lincoln wrote in June 1863:

"The insurgents had been preparing for it more than thirty years, while the Government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that in their own unrestricted effort to destroy Union, Constitution, and law, all together, the Government would, in great degree, be restrained by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathisers pervaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material, under cover of 'liberty of speech,' 'liberty of the press,' and '*habeas corpus*,' they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways."¹

How akin are these methods to the methods and means and measures adopted by the Germans, with a varying intensity, for a generation also—methods which now lie uncovered in part, and only in part, to the world! Likewise the lack of preparation of the Northern States for war was quite as complete as the lack of preparation on land of England to meet a world-cataclysm. Neither could believe that such a catastrophe was possible: both hoped for better things through and for their brothers.

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. viii. p. 302.

The financial analogy also emerges. Lincoln said, in his Message to Congress, 6th December 1864:

"The receipts during the year, from all sources, upon the basis of warrants signed by the Secretary of the Treasury, including loans and the balance in the Treasury on the first day of July 1863, were \$1,394,796,007.62, and the aggregate disbursements, upon the same basis, were \$1,298,056,101.89, leaving a balance in the Treasury, as shown by warrants, of \$96,739,905.73.

"The public debt on the first day of July last, as appears by the books of the Treasury, amounted to \$1,740,690,489.49. Probably should the war continue for another year, that amount may be increased by not far from \$500,000,000. Held as it is, for the most part, by our own people, it has become a substantial branch of national though private property."¹

It is unnecessary, as it would be unfitting, for me to repeat the figures of the cost of the Great War to England. Of course, the amount in both expenditure and income is far in excess of the American figures—as much greater as the number of soldiers and sailors employed in the European conflict is larger than the number engaged in the American. The American Civil War represented the highest cost, in money and men, of any civil war up to the middle of the nineteenth century, as the present war, which is in a sense civil, is the most costly of all wars.

In the ending of the two conflicts, too, is found a likeness of sentiment and of conviction. About nine months prior to the surrender of General Lee, in June 1864, Lincoln said:

"It is a pertinent question, often asked in the mind privately, and from one to the other, When is the war to end? Surely I feel as deep an interest in this question as any other can; but I do not wish to name a day, a month, or year, when it is to end. I do not wish to run any risk of seeing the time come without our being ready for the end, for fear of disappointment because the time had come and not the end. We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God, I hope it never will end until that time. Speaking of the present campaign, General Grant is reported to have said, 'I am going through on this line if it takes all summer.' This war has taken three years; it was begun or accepted upon the line of restoring the national authority over the whole national domain, and for the American people, as far as my knowledge enables me to speak, I say we are going through on this line if it takes three years more."²

Do not the remarks of Lincoln, speaking more than fifty years ago, and almost a year before the cessation of hostilities, voice the deep feelings of England and of her Allies of the present year and month?

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. x. pp. 291-2, 293.

² *Ibid.*, vol. x. p. 129.

It is also to be noted that after three years of constant fighting the resources of the states of the North were found to be not only unexhausted, but apparently inexhaustible. Lincoln said soon after his second election :

"The election has exhibited another fact, not less valuable to be known—the fact that we do not approach exhaustion in the most important branch of national resources, that of living men. While it is melancholy to reflect that the war has filled so many graves, and carried mourning to so many hearts, it is some relief to know that, compared with the surviving, the fallen have been so few. While corps, and divisions, and brigades, and regiments have formed, and fought, and dwindled, and gone out of existence, a great majority of the men who composed them are still living. . . .

"The important fact remains demonstrated that we have more men now than we had when the war began ; that we are not exhausted, nor in process of exhaustion ; that we are gaining strength, and may, if need be, maintain the contest indefinitely. This as to men. Material resources are now more complete and abundant than ever.

"The national resources, then, are unexhausted, and, as we believe, inexhaustible."¹

England is still unexhausted ; and are there not intimations that she is inexhaustible ? One of the war songs of the United States ran :

"We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand strong."

Such in essence is England's soul and voice.

Further is it to be said, that in a sense both wars were religious wars. Each side appealed to its God for recognition, guidance, support. Although the German Kaiser has appeared to believe that his partnership with Providence is a bit more legitimate and intimate than that vouchsafed to any other sovereign, yet each nation has seen fit to ask for the special aid of the God of battles. Each ascribes victory as belonging at least in part to the help of divine reinforcements. Protestant and Catholic—of the Catholic faith, both Roman and Greek—and Moslem are alike in the earnestness of their petitions and in the sincerity of their thanksgivings.

The American conflict was likewise religious. On the whole, perhaps the religious element was somewhat more manifest in the South than in the North. But in the North, with which we are now specially concerned, it was signally evident. In Lincoln both the religious feeling and the religious belief were dominant. His expressions of religious hope and trust were touched by a deep sense of reverence and of humility, which, it may be added, is in happy contrast to the pious pre-

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. x. pp. 305-6, 307.

sumptuousness of the German Emperor. From many speeches, letters, and formal papers quotations might be made.

In 1862, in a private note, Lincoln wrote :

"The will of God prevails. In great contests each party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both may be, and one must be, wrong. God cannot be for and against the same thing at the same time. In the present civil war it is quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party; and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect his purpose. I am almost ready to say that this is probably true; that God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end yet. By his mere great power on the minds of the now contestants, he could have either saved or destroyed the Union without a human contest. Yet the contest began. And, having begun, he could give the final victory to either side any day. Yet the contest proceeds."¹

In a letter to Mrs Gurney he said :

"In the very responsible position in which I happen to be placed, being a humble instrument in the hands of our Heavenly Father, as I am, and as we all are, to work out his great purposes, I have desired that all my works and acts may be according to his will, and, that it might be so, I have sought his aid; but if, after endeavouring to do my best in the light which he affords me, I find my efforts fail, I must believe that for some purpose unknown to me he wills it otherwise. If I had had my way, this war would never have been commenced. If I had been allowed my way, this war would have been ended before this; but we find it still continues, and we must believe that he permits it for some wise purpose of his own, mysterious and unknown to us; and though with our limited understandings we may not be able to comprehend it, yet we cannot but believe that he who made the world still governs it."²

Again he said :

"I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it."³

In January 1863 he wrote to a friend :

"It is most cheering and encouraging for me to know that in the efforts which I have made and am making for the restoration of a righteous peace to our country, I am upheld and sustained by the good wishes and prayers of God's people. No one is more deeply than myself aware that without his favour our highest wisdom is but as foolishness, and that our most strenuous efforts would avail nothing in the shadow of his displeasure.

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. viii. pp. 52-53.

² *Ibid.*, vol. viii. pp. 50-51.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. viii. p. 29.

I am conscious of no desire for my country's welfare that is not in consonance with his will, and of no plan upon which we may not ask his blessing. It seems to me that if there be one subject upon which all good men may unitedly agree, it is imploring the gracious favour of the God of Nations upon the struggles our people are making for the preservation of their precious birthright of civil and religious liberty."¹

A month later he wrote to the Rev. Alexander Reed :

"And whatever shall tend to turn our thoughts from the unreasoning and uncharitable passions, prejudices, and jealousies incident to a great national trouble such as ours, and to fix them upon the vast and long-enduring consequences, for weal or for woe, which are to result from the struggle, and especially to strengthen our reliance on the Supreme Being for the final triumph of the right, cannot but be well for us all."²

To a delegation of Evangelical Lutherans, in 1862, Lincoln said :

"You all may recollect that in taking up the sword thus forced into our hands, this Government appealed to the prayers of the pious and the good, and declared that it placed its whole dependence upon the favour of God. I now humbly and reverently, in your presence, reiterate the acknowledgment of that dependence, not doubting that, if it shall please the Divine Being who determines the destinies of nations, this shall remain a united people, and that they will, humbly seeking the Divine guidance, make their prolonged national existence a source of new benefits to themselves and their successors, and to all classes and conditions of mankind."³

To a Methodist Conference he wrote :

"By the help of an all-wise Providence, I shall endeavour to do my duty, and I shall expect the continuance of your prayers for a right solution of our national difficulties and the restoration of our country to peace and prosperity."⁴

To a Baptist Society he also wrote :

"I can only thank you for thus adding to the effective and almost unanimous support which the Christian communities are so zealously giving to the country and to liberty. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how it could be otherwise with anyone professing Christianity, or even having ordinary perceptions of right and wrong. To read in the Bible, as the word of God himself, that 'In the sweat of *thy* face shalt thou eat bread,' and to preach therefrom that, 'In the sweat of *other men's* faces shalt thou eat bread,' to my mind can scarcely be reconciled with honest sincerity. When brought to my final reckoning, may I have to answer for robbing no man of his goods; yet more tolerable even this, than for robbing one of himself and all that was his. When, a year or two ago, those professedly holy men of the South met in the semblance of prayer and devotion, and,

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. viii. p. 174.

² *Ibid.*, vol. viii. pp. 217-218.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. vii. pp. 154-155.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. vii. p. 164.

in the name of him who said, 'As ye would all men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them,' appealed to the Christian world to aid them in doing to a whole race of men as they would have no man do unto themselves, to my thinking they contemned and insulted God and his Church far more than did Satan when he tempted the Saviour with the kingdoms of the earth. The devil's attempt was no more false, and far less hypocritical. But let me forbear, remembering it is also written, 'Judge not, lest ye be judged.'¹

In September 1864 Lincoln again wrote to Mrs Gurney:

"I am much indebted to the good Christian people of the country for their constant prayers and consolations; and to no one of them more than to yourself. The purposes of the Almighty are perfect, and must prevail, though we erring mortals may fail to accurately perceive them in advance. We hoped for a happy termination of this terrible war long before this; but God knows best, and has ruled otherwise. We shall yet acknowledge his wisdom and our own error therein. Meanwhile we must work earnestly in the best lights he gives us, trusting that so working still conduces to the great ends he ordains. Surely he intends some great good to follow this mighty convulsion, which no mortal could make, and no mortal could stay. Your people, the Friends, have had, and are having, a very great trial. On principle and faith opposed to both war and oppression, they can only practically oppose oppression by war. In this hard dilemma some have chosen one horn, and some the other. For those appealing to me on conscientious grounds I have done, and shall do, the best I could and can, in my own conscience, under my oath to the law. That you believe this I doubt not; and, believing it, I shall still receive for our country and myself your earnest prayers to our Father in heaven."²

In such interpolations Lincoln had the support of the pious convictions, the religious faiths, and the ecclesiastical societies of the Northern States.

In passing, it may be said that Lincoln, on grounds of either law or piety, had little concern with that class of citizens known as "conscientious objectors." The Northern men who found themselves for ethical reasons unable to support the Government were few in number and small in influence. Quakers fought in the ranks. Philadelphia, their chief city, and not far from the field of the war's chief battle, was loyal to the Union cause.

The war was prolonged far beyond the thought of either contestant. The first call for Northern troops was for a term of service of only three months. The Southern States, like the German, believed that the adequacy of their preparation would compel a victory at once early and complete. But from the first defeats of the North in the middle months of

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. x. pp. 109-110.

² *Ibid.*, vol. x. pp. 215-216.

'61, the conflict advanced, through M'Clennan's constant and vain promises of victory and subsequent defeats of '62, into the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg, the fall of Vicksburg, and the Shenandoah Valley triumph of the summer of '63, into the final grapple of Grant and Lee and Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea of '64, and finally into the gradual and inevitable weakening of the Confederate forces, the curtailing of the field of operations, the cessation of hostilities, and the final surrender of Lee to Grant in April of '65.

The first two years of the present war were not unlike the first two years of the American conflict. The attacking party in the Civil War had the advantage: the attacking party in the World-War had the advantage: the attacking party usually has the advantage. But the nation attacked, especially if it be in either form or reality a republic, presently finds itself, and it finds itself the more completely and adequately the longer lasts the struggle. Throughout the second half of the four years of the American struggle it became more and more evident with each passing month that the Southern cause was weakening, the Northern strengthening, and that victory for the Northern eagles was becoming assured. Reverses for Lincoln's men were not unknown; but the sweep of the current was clear and its general force unstemmed. To point out the analogy would be superfluous.

Throughout the four years of the American contest attempts at peace were from time to time made. Not a few of such endeavours had their origin in the thin brains and soft hearts of unworthy philanthropists. Such men failed to perceive the essential relationships of the war, or to feel in particular the grip which the struggle against slavery had taken of the New England conscience. Several of these peace proposals were based on compromises—the compromises usually being a restoration of the conditions obtaining before the outbreak of the war: the seceding states to re-enter the Union bearing their slaves with them. To all such intimations Lincoln gave a hearing as responsive as a patient mind and a humane heart could offer. For he knew the meaning of war, and of its continuance. But after the issue of the Emancipation Proclamation, which took effect at the beginning of the year '63, it became impossible to co-operate in any movement for peace which presumed upon the perpetuation of the South's peculiar "institution." Not only must the Union be preserved, but slavery must remain abolished.

The South desired peace; the North desired peace. But the terms proposed in correspondence, or in personal con-

ferences—one of which Lincoln himself attended,—were not satisfactory. Seldom did the Commissioners come into close relations. The war had to be fought out—fought out unto the exhaustion of one of the contestants. No other conclusion seemed possible.

Is it not probable that the history of the American War of 1861–65 may be a prophecy of the European War of 1914–16–17 in respect to its conclusion? All the warring nations desire peace. But the purposes for which England and her allies are fighting cannot now be gained in the diplomats' council-chamber.

As I have intimated, the evidence became increasingly conclusive, in the last year of hostilities, that the seceding states would be finally and overwhelmingly defeated. Under this belief the problem of their readjustment to the whole national commonwealth became imminent. To this problem of reconstruction Lincoln was, however, called to give little heed. It became the question which, for the decade following the capitulation at Appomattocks, the National Congress, the President, the Judiciary, and the Government of the several states concerned were obliged to address themselves. Lincoln's death in April 1865 freed the great President from seeking to understand and to do a duty more comprehensive, more perplexing, and more prolonged than the duty of saving the Union by force of arms. But before his passing, Lincoln, in the case of certain states whose territory had been won back, had intimated certain principles or methods touching the reconciliation of the rebelling states.

These principles and methods were expressions characteristic of the man himself. In them, as in him, are found no hint of retaliation. If ever there was a commander of armies and navies free from vindictiveness, that commander was Abraham Lincoln.

It was Lincoln who, as late as February 1865, urged the payment of 480,000,000 dollars to sixteen slave states on the basis of their former slave populations. It was he who in the following month, in the second inaugural address—one of the greatest of his State papers,—urged that the wounds of the *whole* nation be healed. It was he who more than a year before the close of the war wrote the common-sense judgment: "On principle I dislike an oath which requires a man to swear he has not done wrong. It rejects the Christian principle of forgiveness on terms of repentance. I think it is enough if a man does no wrong hereafter."¹

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. x. p. 303.

In the last year of the war he indicated under many forms the gracious largeness of his spirit and his desire for a proper peace. Speaking of his second election, he said :

" . . . It adds nothing to my satisfaction that any other man may be disappointed or pained by the result. May I ask those who have not differed from me to join with me in this same spirit toward those who have ?"¹

"He had once before said, but would say again," as reported in an interview, "that those who have differed from us and opposed us will see that the result of the Presidential election is better for their own good than if they had been successful."²

He also wrote to Horace Greeley, the editor of the leading Republican paper :

"If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you ; and that if he really brings such proposition, he shall at the least have safe conduct with the paper (and without publicity if he chooses) to the point where you shall have met him. The same if there be two or more persons."³

An announcement concerning terms of peace, which was made 18th July 1864, reads :

"To whom it may concern : Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways."⁴

Such a policy of amnesty and of reconciliation may well be noted by any nation which is now at war, and which is proving to be a victor along a far-flung battle line in space and in time. It is ever to be remembered that our present enemies are to become our friends and co-workers in a mutual service for our common and needy humanity.

One and one only character emerges from the greatest of civil wars as a consummate contribution to the imperishable human wealth of the centuries. Grant, the commander in the field, by persistence and strategy brought the war to a victorious conclusion. Lee, recognised by the North as well as by the South as a great general and a great gentleman,

¹ *Complete Works*, vol. x. pp. 264-265.

² *Ibid.*, vol. x. p. 154.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. x. p. 271.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. x. p. 161.

throwing his sword into the scales of his beloved Virginia, was, and is, judged as true to the dictates of his conscience. Seward, Chase, Fessenden, Stanton, in foreign, financial, and military folios, did their executive duty. But humanity, like republics, has a short memory and a narrow vision. No one of them makes a universal or a lasting appeal. Lincoln towers above them all, uniquely great, and seems to loom up yet greater as the decades pass. Uneducated in the schools, he yet possessed that judgment which is the choicest fruit of the tree of knowledge, and that political wisdom which Burke defines in familiar phrase and incarnates in himself. Knowing few books, those few were the "life-blood of master-spirits," the Bible and Shakespeare being chief. Knowing few men, till he became President, yet from those few he learned much of those conditions which help to form character and which influence conduct. Called to bear tremendous responsibilities in sudden emergencies, he had patience with himself, and also with his allies and his foes, in meeting these unique crises. Strong in himself, and in a sort of semi-conscious knowledge knowing himself to be strong, he was humble in his own self-estimate and modest in bearing. With much to distract his attention and to exhaust his energy, as a true pilot he kept his eye and his heart upon the port to which he sought to bring the Ship of State. Avoiding the perils of the course of each day, he yet never forgot that other and future day—and at times apparently far-off—when the voyage should be done. Accused of being slow in the first years of the war, he was willing to wait, for he desired to carry his people with him—that necessary help to any executive: for prudence was his birthright and a crowning virtue and grace. By might of arms he won; yet he knew that ideas, sentiments, convictions are the controlling forces among men, and that arms are only the lesser and temporary expressions of principles and emotions. He was obsessed by no theory of the State as a Superhuman Despot, ruling the individual, indifferent whether it crushes or ennobles; but he lived for, loved, and died for a Union of States which was composed of individual freemen. Without the graces of face, form, or manners, he won his great way by the light of a large reasonableness, by the persuasiveness of a warm and big heart, by the majesty of a pure conscience, by a supreme faith in God, and by devotion to the service of God's little children. He was a genuine Shepherd of the People, so called by the greatest of American preachers, and he fed his human flock, and led them forth by right ways into a land of free habitations.

Not as yet, be it said, has the present war brought forth any character at all comparable to the Lincoln whom the American War created. If the present conflict has elevated some, it has not lifted them far ; and others, quite as numerous, it has depressed. What the following year, or years, may bring forth in human leadership now rests in the lap of the gods.

As I bring this long paper to a close, I find at least one reflection pressing for utterance ; it is the belief that, at the conclusion of the present struggle—unspeakable as is the loss of life, lamentable as is the destruction of material accumulations, disheartening and perplexing as is the disintegration of the ordinary and orderly processes of civilised life,—the disintegration will prove to be less fundamental and less lasting than at the present moment seems certain, and the destruction of material values will be replaced with a completeness and a swiftness which now seem incredible. The sorrows of death can for many be removed only by the death of those who do sorrow. The experience of the North in the American War is the basis for such assurances. The soldiers returning fell naturally into their former conditions. The farmer who had left his field came back to his plough and his reaper ; the clerk to his old desk and counter ; and the carpenter again took up his saw and his plane at the same well-known bench. A currency vastly injected gradually shrank to its legitimate proportions. Without jar or hindrance the forces of civilised order and orderliness resumed their wonted functions. Such was the case in the victorious North. In the defeated, sorely damaged, and much distressed South the condition was very different. In our analogy the North represents England and her Allies. For the victors in the Great War the prospect of the restoration of life's orderly processes at the signing of treaties of peace is far brighter, far more reassuring, than some prophets, be they never so wise and just, would have us believe. Those processes may not return to just what they were before, but they will be large, vital, happy though marred, constant, enlarging, enriching, and progressive.

CHARLES F. THWING.

CLEVELAND, U.S.A.

THE LITERARY METHOD OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

THE REV. WALTER LOCK, D.D.,
Warden of Keble College, Oxford.

RECENT criticism in Germany, France, and England, as illustrated by the work of Holtzmann, Loisy, Scott, and Professor Gardner, has tended to favour an early second-century date for the Fourth Gospel, and to dissociate it from the authorship of the son of Zebedee, and in order to do this it has laid great stress upon its sacramental and ecclesiastical tendencies. It may well be doubted, in the light of St Paul's Epistles, whether the inference is justifiable, but there can be no doubt that a great debt is due to those critics for drawing out these tendencies. The Gospel *is* sacramental, laying stress on water as well as spirit in the one Sacrament, on flesh as well as spirit in the other, although spirit is always the last word in both. It *is* ecclesiastical; it points out the gradual association of the disciples with their Lord in work and in teaching; it gives the training of a society which is to stand apart from the world, although it has an outlook on the whole world and a hope of its ultimately accepting the Church's faith. But, while so sacramental and ecclesiastical, it is still as always a spiritual Gospel ministering to the deepest devotion and the deepest philosophy; and it cannot but be that it will have an even greater influence in the future reconstruction of the Church than it has had in the past; for mystic and sacramentalist and institutionalist will turn to it, not only to find support for his own conception of religion, but to learn to respect and reverence that of his neighbour, and to believe in an ultimate synthesis that welds them into one.

The object of this paper is primarily to examine only the literary method of the writer, although at the end a suggestion will be made as to the authorship. But for the present no

assumption is made at all, except one which will be universally admitted, viz. that the Gospel was written after the Synoptist Gospels were known in the church, and therefore that the writer knew them and assumed that his readers would know them too.

The Purpose of the Gospel.—The writer has told us this himself: it is to create a living, vitalising faith in Jesus of Nazareth as being the Christ and also the ever-living Son of God; and this is intended primarily not for the whole world but for a certain well-known group of people (ἵνα πιστεύητε, xx. 31; contrast ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσιν, i. 7). They are people who are likely to be impressed by the evidence of miracles (xx. 30, 31, τὰντα σημεῖα γέγραπται ἵνα πιστεύητε), to whom the writer is especially anxious to bring home the significance of the death of Christ and the symbolic meaning of the blood and water which came from His pierced side (xix. 35, ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς πιστεύητε). In both these passages the reading is doubtful, but W. and H. read in each the present πιστεύητε (not πιστεύσητε, as R.V.), perhaps implying a deepening of a faith that already exists (cf. Abbott, *Johannine Vocabulary*, 1553). This reading strengthens the inference, which seems probable on other grounds, that the readers in whom the writer is interested are neither unbelieving Jews nor unbelieving Gentiles, but half-hearted, half-believing Christians who need to be drawn onward to a higher level of faith and a more whole-hearted self-committal based upon a truer Christology. This is borne out by the constant reference to Christ's desire in His lifetime to lift His hearers to a higher level. They are not to be content with earthly truths (iii. 12): it is not enough to hear the report of Him from others; they must hear Him themselves (iv. 42); they are not to be content with seeing miracles or being carnally fed (vi. 26): even His flesh and blood will be inadequate without the quickening spirit, and they must look forward to His ascending out of their sight (vi. 62, 63): belief for the works' sake is only a lower level for those who will not believe Himself (xiv. 11); the full blessing that He has to give will be given to those who have never seen and yet have believed (xx. 27).

If this inference is sound, the class of people will be very much the same as those addressed by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews: those who, though through lapse of time they might well be teachers, still need others to teach them and to lead them on from the first principles of Christian life to a higher perfection. Those Christians to whom the Epistle was addressed seem to have shrunk back from persecution; there

is slight trace of this here. More probably the readers of the Gospel are hesitating to believe in the universality of a Gospel which their own countrymen are rejecting; and if so, our writer is dealing with exactly the same problem as St Paul in Rom. ix.-xi., and each traces the rejection of the Christ by the Jews to moral failure on their part. But there is in many ways a striking analogy between the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews. That was a "word of exhortation" (Heb. xiii. 22) based on argument; this, a word of exhortation based on appeal to historic facts: that a statement of a high Christology defended by an argument showing Christ's superiority to the Jewish high priest; this, the statement of a high Christology illustrated by a portrait in which trait after trait hints at Christ's superiority alike to Jewish prophet and Jewish high priest, and at the fulfilment of the great types of salvation in the Old Testament.

It is easy to be fanciful and to exaggerate these hints: yet the prologue strikes the note, as it points out that He was greater than Moses and John the Baptist; and the Lord Himself accepts the statement that He is greater than our father Abraham (vii. 53-59), and compares Himself to Jacob (i. 51): only, while to Jacob the angels came once, to the Son of Man they will come constantly. These are enough to illustrate the point; but it is perhaps not fanciful to see in the first miracle one greater than Moses, who only turned water into blood: in the interview with the Samaritan woman, one greater than Joseph who could read the secrets of the heart and prove a Saviour, not of Egypt, but of the whole world:¹ in the feeding of the Five Thousand, one greater than Elisha, who fed only one hundred men with twenty loaves of barley (2 Kings iv. 42); and I can have little doubt that the prayer of chap. xvii. is meant to be a high-priestly prayer, recalling the High Priest's supplication for Himself, the priests, and the people on the day of Atonement; but now it is a High Priest who has no sins of His own for which to pray forgiveness, who has wholly completed His high-priestly work, and who looks beyond the scope of His own followers, praying for their unity in order that the whole world may believe. Possibly, as Holtzmann suggests, there is a silent allusion to this high-priestly work in the reference which this Gospel alone has to the "coat without seam," *χιτὼν ἄραφος* (xix. 23), for such a garment was worn by the high priest according to Josephus

¹ Joseph's new name, Zaphnath Paaneah (Gen. xli. 45), is translated by Jerome *Salvator mundi*, no doubt wrongly; but Jerome may be embodying some traditional explanation.

(*Ant.* iii. 7), and Philo represents the Word of God as wearing it to symbolise the relation of His mediatorial work to the whole world (*de Profugis*, xx.; cf. *de Ebrietate*, xx.). This instance may well be fanciful and not intended by the writer—certainly it cannot be pressed; but in the instances given, when they are combined with the hints that in the Lord were fulfilled the types of the suffering lamb of Isaiah liii., of the brazen serpent, of the manna, of the rock of Horeb, of the pillar of fire which guided the children of Israel in the wilderness, of the Paschal Lamb, there can be no doubt that the writer has wished to portray the Lord as higher than the highest which the Old Testament could offer, in the hope that his readers will be able to see the highest and love it when they see.

Method of the Gospel.—How then has the writer chosen the incidents which will best produce the impression that he wants to convey? Many inferences have been drawn from a consideration of the incidents in the Synoptists which he does not repeat. This argument could not be put better than has been done by the Dean of St Paul's in Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*:

“He omits the Baptism of Jesus, of which notwithstanding he shows knowledge, because, again, the true Baptism is the Incarnation of the Logos in Jesus, and also partly, perhaps, because he is anxious to discountenance the Adoptionist views of the Person of Christ which were prevalent at the time when he wrote; he omits the Temptation, because it was no part of his plan to exhibit Jesus as experiencing any temptation or weakness; he omits the Transfiguration, because in his view the whole life of Christ on earth is a manifestation of His glory, not by visible light but to the spiritual eye; he omits the institution of the Eucharist, because he has already given his sacramental doctrine in his discourse about the Bread of Life (John vi. 26 ff.), following the miracle of the 5000, and does not wish the truth of the mystical union to be bound up too closely with the participation in an ecclesiastical rite; he omits the Agony in the Garden of Gethsemane, and the cry, ‘Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani,’ because the impression which he wishes to convey of the complete voluntariness of Christ's sufferings and death, and of the ‘glory’ which was manifested by His humiliation as well as by His triumph over death, might be impaired by incidents which seem to indicate human weakness and hesitation.”

Nothing could be more ingenious; yet I venture to submit that it is wasted ingenuity: the Dean has to admit that the

writer has often added hints which correspond with the omitted incidents, and this diminishes the force of the argument. But surely the simpler explanation is the truer: he has omitted the mass of the Synoptic incidents because they are already well known, and he can assume them to be known. A far more crucial clue is to notice carefully the Synoptist incidents which he does repeat. As we shall see later, these give very important indications of his real purpose.

I think that we may trace five different clues which will guide us.

i. There is a conscious relation to the Synoptist narrative. It is not exactly the desire to supplement; it is apparently in a few cases to correct (*e.g.* the dates of the Supper at Bethany, of the Last Supper, and perhaps of the Cleansing of the Temple), but in the main it is to support and illustrate their narrative. To put it in an undignified way, it is to dot their i's and to cross their t's; to put it in a pedantic way, it is to add a constant $\mu\epsilon\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\nu$ to all their statements; to hint that all that they say is quite true, but not the whole truth: the Christ in work, in teaching, and in personality was something still greater. Did they tell of the healing of a paralytic, of a blind man, of one dead and carried out to burial? Quite true, but there was also a case of a man thirty-eight years old healed, of sight given to one blind from birth, of a man raised to life after four days in the grave. Did they tell of His claims to revise the Mosaic law, to forgive sins, to give rest to the weary? Quite true, but He claimed more than that—to work as the Father worked, to be one with Him, to be Himself the fountain of life itself. Did they picture Him as the Messiah and the Son of God? Again quite true, but He really was that eternally, before His human life; for He was the very Word of God, who embodied all that the Old Testament had said about the Wisdom of God.

Here again a caveat is needed: it is impossible to draw a sharp line between a conscious attempt to illustrate and an undesigned coincidence which arises accidentally from a knowledge of the circumstances. Two or three instances may show how the one shades off into the other. When the writer adds the note, "for John was not yet cast into prison" (iii. 24), that note seems scarcely needed for his own narrative; but when we remember that the Synoptist narrative of the ministry began "after John was delivered up" (Mk. i. 14), the writer seems to be deliberately fitting his narrative into theirs and saying, "All that I have narrated up to this point preceded the Synoptist story and will help to explain it."

Again, after the feeding of the Five Thousand all the Synoptists say that the Lord *compelled* (εὐθὺς ἡνάγκασεν) His disciples to cross the sea. Nowhere else is this strong word used of His treatment of them, and the Synoptists do not explain its necessity; but St John's note that Jesus perceived that they were about to come and take him by force (ἀρπάζειν, an equally strong word) and make him a king (vi. 15) exactly accounts for the Lord's insistence.

Here are two other interesting illustrations, which are probably undesigned. In St John viii. 25 our Lord, in answer to the question, "Who art Thou?" answers, Τὴν ἀρχὴν ὃ τι (or ὅτι) καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν. This is translated in the R.V., "Even that which I have also spoken unto you from the beginning"; but there can be little doubt that the marginal translation is right, "How is it that I even speak to you at all?" The particle is governed, as often in Greek tragedy on the stage, by some gesture which takes the place of a verb: "*I wonder why*," or "*To think that I should speak to you at all!*" This interpretation is strongly supported by a passage in a dialogue in the Clementine Homilies (vi. 11): εἰ μὴ παρακολουθεῖς οἷς λέγω, τί καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν διαλέγομαι; but the point that I wish to notice here is that this sense of baffledness, this sense that He is wasting His words and that it is useless arguing further, finds a striking analogy in the Synoptist narrative of an event which must have happened about the same period of the ministry: "O faithless generation, how long shall I be with you? how long shall I bear with you?" (Mk. ix. 19).

Another curious coincidence. St John in his account of the Supper at Bethany adds a detail not found in the earlier narratives: "The house was filled with the odour of the ointment" (xii. 3): this seems merely the note of an eye-witness, but it may have a further significance. There was a Jewish saying: "Good oil spreads its fragrance from the inner chamber to the hall: a good name reaches from one end of the world to another" (Medr. Koheleth, viii. 1, quoted by Westcott *ad loc.*).

Now, if we can assume that the writer knew this saying, his note may be his way of expressing the same truth as was expressed in the Lord's own words recorded in the Synoptists but omitted by him: "Wheresoever the Gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world, that also which this woman hath done shall be spoken of for a memorial of her" (Mk. xiv. 9). Browning sums up well the writer's attitude to the Synoptist narrative when he describes him as wishing to narrate

"much of the Lord's life
Forgotten or misdelivered."

ii. It is obvious, also, that the writer loved symbolism. His was a mind which believed thoroughly that God had made "all things double, one against another"; he loved to see analogies between material and spiritual things; in dealing with the Lord's sayings he would give a simple turn to that which had a deeper meaning. Thus the deep spiritual truth, "I kept in thy name those whom thou hast given me, and not one of them was lost" (xvii. 12), is immediately applied to the escape of the disciples when He was arrested (xviii. 9); by itself obviously an inadequate fulfilment, but natural in one who delighted to find many applications of a loved Master's saying. So he chooses those events which most easily suggest a symbolical meaning. The feeding of the Five Thousand and the healing of the blind man of Siloam, with the discourses based on each, are the most outstanding instances; and it is fair to see the same principle at work in other incidents, though here again exaggeration is easy, and Professor Gardner has done wisely in protesting against the extent to which it has been carried.

It is common to trace this allegorising tendency to the influence of Philo: Dr Abbott has selected a striking number of parallels between the two writers (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, s.v. "John, Gospel of"), and Baron von Hügel has quoted Philo's life of Moses as "the true literary precursor of this pragmatic mystical life of Christ" (*Eternal Life*, p. 73). This may be a real influence: I doubt whether it is very literary or conscious. Anyone who will read Philo's "Life of Joseph" or the "Life of Moses" will feel the extraordinary difference between the literary critic trying elaborately to trace principles at work in past biographies, and the creative historian just throwing out slight suggestions of analogies with higher truths. Compare, for instance, Philo's treatment of Joseph's coat of many colours with our writer's treatment of the "coat without seam" which the Lord wore. The latter just mentioned, left with a possible hint of a deeper meaning; the former drawn out thus: Joseph is treated as a type of the public man, the statesman, and a special appropriateness is seen in his coat of many colours, for "a political constitution is a many-coloured and multiform thing, admitting of an infinite variety of changes in its general appearance, in its affairs, in its moving causes, in the peculiar laws respecting strangers, in numberless differences respecting times and places. . . . So the man immersed in political affairs is of necessity a multiform man, assuming many different appearances, one in time of peace and another in time of war, and a different character according as those who are opposed to him are numerous or few in number, withstanding

a small number with vigorous resolution but using persuasion and gentle means towards a large body. And in some cases where there is much danger, still for the sake of the common advantage he will take the place of everyone, and manage the business in hand by himself; in other cases, where it is merely a question of labour, he will let others minister to him as assistants."

Philo does, however, remain a proof of the fondness for treating history allegorically among the Jews of the first century. Yet there is no need to fall back on Philo: our writer would have found exactly the same principle at work in the Synoptists, who all interpret the healing of the paralytic as a symbol of the forgiveness of sins; and St Matthew significantly places the healing of two blind men directly after the request of the two sons of Zebedee that they might sit on the King's right hand and left in the Kingdom (xx. 20-34). Indeed, the life of the Lord lent itself readily to such treatment: the more absolutely that a life is lived in loyalty to principle, in obedience to the laws of nature and the commands of God, the more διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, the eternal truth is revealed; and, it may be added, the more easy it becomes to treat the event as invented to illustrate the principle. Mr Stephen Graham, in his account of the Russian saint, Father Seraphim, writes: "Almost every characteristic of the Father and every circumstance of his life had something in it that was emblematic and suggestive" (*The Way of Martha and Mary*, p. 227). With what greater truth might this be said of Him of whom the Evangelists write! It has, however, to be remembered that in our Gospel the symbolism goes beyond the acts and words of the Lord: the words of Caiaphas have a deeper meaning assigned to them; and it is almost impossible not to see in the account of Judas leaving the Last Supper—"he went out, and it was night"—a hint that he had passed from the realm of the light into the gloom of outer darkness. The words recall the terrific scene in the *Odyssey* (xx. 350) where the seer Theoclymenus, just before the final doom of the suitors came, sees their heads wrapt in darkness:—

"Then the godlike Theoclymenus spake among them:

"Ah! wretched men, what woe is this ye suffer? Shrouded in night are your heads and faces and knees, and kindled is the voice of wailing, and all cheeks are wet with tears, and the walls and the fair spaces between the pillars are sprinkled with blood. And the porch is full of phantoms, and full is the court, the shadows of men hasting hellwards beneath the gloom, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist has overspread the world."

iii. I take a third clue which seems to me to guide us still further and still more surely. The writer writes at a comparatively late date: he has watched the development of church history since the Lord's resurrection, and he is anxious to show that the germs of the development lay in the Lord's own life and teaching while on earth. I should not say that he knows the Acts of the Apostles, but his gospel serves as a justification of the policy adopted by the Apostles as recorded in that book. His own notes make it clear that this was in his mind: *cf.* i. 16, "Of his fulness we all received, and grace for grace"; iii. 33, "He that received his witness hath set his seal to this, that God is true"; xi. 52, "And not for the nation only, but that he might also gather together into one the children of God that are scattered abroad." But this purpose seems also to have guided him in the choice of incidents. For what were the chief events of church history in these early years? They may be summed up in three main results:—(a) The Jews were now quite clearly separated off from the Christians and had become their bitter antagonists. The Temple had been destroyed and a worship independent of any local sanctuary had been established. (b) Christianity had been extended to Samaritans and Gentiles. (c) A Christian church had been established throughout the world, offering its sacrament of cleansing and its sacrament of spiritual food to all mankind. These facts were before the writer's eyes, and he proceeds to choose incidents which shall illustrate and justify them.

(a) Of the first little need be said. The term "the Jews" has taken on a new connotation: it stands not merely as a national name but as the title of the opponents of Christ; and great pains are taken to show the moral causes which led them to reject Him.¹ Then for the Temple worship: there was the saying of the Lord, "Destroy the temple, and in three days I will raise it up"; so, to preserve this, we have the first repetition of a scene from the Synoptists, the cleansing of the Temple. In this case the desire to correct or supplement the Synoptist date, and the desire to explain the charge brought against the Lord at His trial (Mark xiv. 58), may also have operated; but the desire to quote the Lord's saying for its own sake in relation to subsequent history is the chief reason, as is shown by the subsequent note, "He spake of the temple of his body"; and in the light of that history, it seems probable that the writer means by the body not merely the Risen Body, but more fully the Church as the Body of

¹ It is perhaps for the same reason that the betrayal of the Lord is traced to moral faults in Judas.

Christ, in which true spiritual worship would be offered. Here, as often, we can see the influence of St Paul's language upon the writer.

On this theme there was a yet more striking saying of the Lord: "Neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem shall ye worship the Father. . . . God is a spirit, and they that worship must worship him in spirit and in truth." This was one of the reasons for the choice of the interview with the Samaritan woman; and I have made the suggestion elsewhere (*J. Th. S.*, April 1905) that in the verse, "The hour cometh and now is when the true worshipper shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth," the words "and now is" are the Evangelist's comment, pointing out the fulfilment of the Lord's prophecy.

(b) To illustrate the extension of Christianity beyond the Jewish race we have the incidents of the Lord's preaching to the Samaritans and of the Greeks coming to see Jesus; and it is probably because he has his eye on the subsequent teaching to the Samaritans that he makes our Lord anticipate this apostolic work in iv. 33: "I *sent* you to reap that whereon ye have not laboured: others have laboured, and ye *are entered* into their labour." We have also the Lord's own prophecy: "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold: them also I must bring" (x. 16); and the perplexed question of the Jews, "Will he go unto the dispersion among the Greeks and teach the Greeks?" found its answer in the missionary work of St Paul.

We may also perhaps see a recollection of St Paul's teaching in the scene at the Feast of Tabernacles in viii. 31-59. There we have the Lord's teaching to those "Jews which had believed him," who would therefore be the nearest analogy to the Jewish Christians of St Paul's controversies. And the writer shows that the Lord too had laid stress on spiritual freedom (*ἐλευθερία* does not occur elsewhere in the Gospel): that He had attacked trust in descent from Abraham, and that He was met with the same bitterness and was as uncompromising as St Paul in similar circumstances. Professor Burkitt (*The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 228) regards this scene as unworthy of the Lord. It may be that it is coloured by the recollection of later controversy, but there is nothing in the arguments that might not have been used in the Lord's lifetime; it is not more severe than the denunciations in the Synoptists (*cf.* Matt. xxiii., esp. ver. 15): and there comes a moment in controversy when one who is charged with a great message of good news, of primary interest to his hearers, can only, when they refuse to hear, wash his hands of

them and challenge them to consider whether they have not given themselves hopelessly over to the powers of evil.

Before passing from this section I should like to suggest that this thought in the writer's mind, this desire to illustrate the universality of the Gospel, may help in deciding a doubtful point of exegesis. In i. 9 the words, "*That was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man* (*ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον*) coming into the world" are ambiguous. Westcott and most commentators refer them to the innate light of conscience shared by all mankind; but they may also mean, "The true light which is no longer confined to any race, but gives its light to Jew and Gentile alike, was in the life of Jesus coming into the world." This follows more naturally on ver. 7 (*ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσι*): it corresponds to a somewhat similar phrase which the Jews had applied to their own law (*Test. XII. Patr., Levi, c. 14, τὸ φῶς τοῦ νόμου, τὸ δοθὲν ἐν ὑμῖν εἰς φωτισμὸν πάντος ἀνθρώπου*), and would be in exact harmony with this purpose running through the whole Gospel.

(c) Of the Church and its Sacraments it is necessary to speak more fully. The whole picture given is that of a small group of men chosen out of the world, accepting a message which the world rejects, and commissioned to stand apart from it and to carry the truth to it. They are by anticipation associated in the Lord's thought from the first with His teaching (iii. 11 (?)) and with His work in Samaria (iv. 38). They are used as His agents in the feeding of the Five Thousand and the collection of the fragments (vi. 10, 12); they with Him must work while it is day (ix. 4, *ἡμᾶς*); they have to wash one another's feet and to do as He has done (xiii. 15); they are trained in His deeper teaching and allowed to hear His prayers (xiv.-xvii.); they are witnesses of the Resurrection, and receive the power to forgive sins (xx.); they continue His work until His return (xxi.). Here is a very clear conception of a church; and this church has two great sacramental acts: the one the symbol of cleansing and new birth, the other of feeding and of abiding life.

The teaching to Nicodemus on Baptism stands out to view as explaining the former; but it does not stand alone. The thought of cleansing runs through the Gospel like a clear stream through a thick wood—hidden in parts but just appearing to view with its bright limpid water, and at times we are shown its beauty by comparison with the stagnant pools at the side. In i. 34, John's baptism with water is contrasted with the Messianic baptism with Holy Spirit; in ii. 6, water prepared (*κατὰ τὸν καθαρισμόν τῶν Ἰουδαίων*) has to be altered at the

Messiah's word ; in iii. 6, baptism by water and Spirit are both necessary for entrance into the Kingdom ; in iii. 22, the Lord institutes His baptism, though not acting Himself as the minister of it (iv. 2) ; in iii. 25-27 there is a dispute between a Jew and John's disciples *περὶ καθαρισμοῦ*, i.e. apparently on the difference between Jewish baptisms and John's, and the Lord's (cf. Heb. vi. 2, *βαπτισμῶν διδαχὴν*) ; in ix. 7, the man blind from birth is healed by washing in the pool of Siloam, and the interpretation of Siloam (which is being interpreted "One sent forth") seems to point to an analogy with Christ's baptism.

In xi. 55, the crowds go to Jerusalem "to purify themselves" (*ἵνα ἀγνίσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς*) before the Passover ; while, perhaps in conscious contrast, the Lord cleanses His disciples' feet by symbolic action, and then cleanses their hearts and minds by His teaching (cf. xiii. 10, *ὕμεῖς καθαροὶ ἐστε* ; xv. 3, *ἤδη ὕμεῖς καθαροὶ ἐστε διὰ τὸν λόγον ὃν λελάληκα ὑμῖν*). There may be somewhat of the same ironical contrast between the Lord's entire consecration of Himself for others' sake, *ἐγὼ ἀγιάζω ἑμαυτόν ἵνα ᾤσω καὶ αὐτοὶ ἡγιασμένοι* (xvii. 19), with the refusal of the high priests and Pharisees to go into Pilate's house, *ἵνα μὴ μιανθῶσιν* (xviii. 28). More directly to the point is it that special attention is drawn to the fact that both water and blood—the two cleansing powers (cf. 1 John i. 7)—come from the pierced Body of Christ (xix. 35) ; while, lastly, the Spirit is breathed upon the Apostles, and they are left with power to cleanse from sin (xx. 22, 23).

Somewhat similar is the case with the other Sacrament. There again one discourse is outstanding, the discourse or discourses based upon the feeding of the Five Thousand ; but again there is the constant illustration of the Lord's power to satisfy the needs of men and to enrich their life. The first miracle is wrought at a feast, and contributes lavishly to enjoyment (chap. ii.) ; the thirsty Samaritan woman is guided to an unfailing source of living water (iv. 14) ; the feeding of the Five Thousand is given with additional details, and the special command to the Apostles to collect the fragments that nothing be lost (vi. 12) is added. (This is the second instance in which a Synoptist narrative is repeated, and clearly with the purpose of introducing the Eucharistic discourse.) In vii. 37 there is another promise that the thirsty shall find their thirst satisfied by the Lord, and apparently in vii. 38 all believers are to carry on the Lord's work and pass on the streams of living water. In xii. 1-8 another meal is given, the Supper at Bethany. This is the third narrative repeated from the

Synoptists, and the reason for the repetition is not so obvious. The writer may have wished to correct the Synoptists' date; he may have wished to emphasise that it was Judas, with his grudging spirit, who criticised Mary; or he may have wished to hint that it was at a meal that the ideal offering was made whose fragrance was to fill the world, the offering of our best when brought face to face with the self-sacrifice of the Lord's death: indeed, all these motives may well have co-operated. There follows the Last Supper, with all the associations of the foot-washing and of the teaching, to be associated for ever with the Eucharist which the Synoptists had recorded and which was being celebrated regularly in the church. Finally, the scene on the lake of Galilee adds the culmination to this line of thought. There is another meal, to which the Apostles and the Lord each contribute a share, but He is the host and gives the food: then care is taken to provide for the future satisfaction of need, and Peter is bidden to feed both lambs and sheep (xv. 17). It may be that an additional reason for this stress on the Sacraments is the desire to show to Greeks attracted by the mysteries that all the privileges offered in them to their initiates—new birth, the common meal, the union with the object of worship—were to be found in the church; but such a reason, if present at all, is secondary and subordinate to the desire to give to Christians the true meaning of their rites. In Browning's words, the events of the Lord's life had grown "of new significance and fresh result," and they are described by our writer in the light of that significance and result.

"To me that story, aye that Life and Death
Of which I wrote 'it was,' to me it is,
Is here and now."

iv. In a very parallel way, as the writer has his eye upon the development of church history, so he has his eye on what the Lord has become, on what He, of whom he wrote "*He was*," now *is*. Here again the note is struck clearly in the prologue; he is going to describe the life of Him who *is* the Word of God, and in many ways this affects the subsequent story. I will take first one doubtful instance. In iii. 13 we read, "No man hath ascended into heaven but he that descended out of heaven, even the Son of Man, *which is in heaven*." These underlined words are of doubtful genuineness; they may be the addition of some later scribe, and, if so, almost certainly mean "who is now reigning in heaven after His ascension"; and if they are a part of the original text, they may probably be a note of the Evangelist with the same meaning. A more certain

illustration is the use of *ὑψωθῆναι*, "the Son of Man must be lifted up" (iii. 14), "When ye have lifted up the Son of Man" (viii. 28), "I, if I be lifted up from the earth (*ἐκ τῆς γῆς*), will draw all men unto me" (xii. 32). The writer clearly applies this not only to the death of the Lord, but to the very manner of death, the physical lifting up on the Cross; but this is another instance of his loving to find new applications of his Master's words. It refers also to the moral and spiritual elevation of the sacrifice made upon the Cross; but when we notice that the word was a reminiscence of Isa. lii. 13, *ὁ παῖς μου ὑψωθήσεται καὶ δοξασθήσεται*, and the way in which the word is used of the Lord in the Acts, "being by (or "at") the right hand of God exalted" (Acts ii. 33), "him did God exalt with (or "at") his right hand to be a prince and Saviour" (ver. 31), there can be little doubt that the Lord *included* his Ascension in the use of the word. It lets us see the blue sky behind the Cross, and it is to be regretted that the Revisers have not translated it by the same word in the Acts as in the Gospel.

Once more, the discourses in chaps. xiv.—xvi., while they seem always to start out of thoughts perfectly natural and appropriate to the moment, yet are perhaps modified by the thought of what the Lord had been doing since His Ascension, and was doing through the Spirit's action in the writer's lifetime; but the most striking instance is to be found in the great prayer of chap. xvii. The substance of that, again, was quite natural at the moment, but the form is scarcely so. The description of Himself in ver. 3, the impersonal reference to the Apostles, "I pray for *them*" (not "for you"), and other points, can indeed be explained as spoken at the moment, but the explanation is not very convincing. The more probable clue to their use is that the writer is thinking of the prayer, not only as prayed on the last night of the Lord's earthly life, but as being still offered at the throne of God in Heaven. In a word, there lay consciously in the writer's mind the conception of the Lord as High Priest drawn out in the Epistle to the Hebrews: he thinks of Christ as having already offered Himself without spot to God, as having made the one offering by which we are sanctified, and as now appearing in the presence of God on our behalf (*cf.* ver. 19 with Heb. x. 10–14).

v. These four clues have guided us to the writer's choice of most of his incidents and of much of his language; but there is a peculiarity about the whole structure of the book which still needs explaining. The writer begins with an almost day-by-day account of the Lord's life:—i. 28, 29, *τῇ ἐπαύριον*; 35, *τῇ ἐπαύριον*; 45, *τῇ ἐπαύριον*; ii. 1, *τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ*

τρίτην: here are five days clearly marked, and the whole covers a period of one week. Then the method changes: we have a succession of incidents, often with no clearly marked length of the lapse of time between them, and sometimes with long intervening periods, *e.g.* a period of nearly six months between chap. vi. and chap. vii. The writer seems to have a number of independent scenes, like the slides for a magic lantern, which he puts in with no very close connection between them. Then from chap. xii. 1 onwards somewhat of the first exactitude reappears: *cf.* xii. 1, xiii. 1, xix. 31, xx. 1, 19, 26. To what can we attribute this change? It has been suggested that as the writer began his prologue with a reminiscence of Gen. i. 1, so he has begun his narrative with an imitation of the seven days of creation. But the imitation is not exact enough; the fifth and sixth days could scarcely have been omitted, nor is there sufficient progress in the actions on these early days, whereas in Genesis the whole emphasis is on progressive development. No: this is perhaps the strongest fact which points to an eye-witness. Those first days stand out in the writer's memory as the momentous days of his own life—they are the days on which he himself first came to be attracted by and to commit himself to the Lord; and the last days had been equally significant, for they were the days on which his faith in the Lord had been tried and re-confirmed, when the majesty of the Lord throughout the trial and crucifixion, and His Resurrection, had enabled him to commit himself once more to the unhesitating following of a crucified Messiah. These, then, are the days which he will record in full detail that he may win others to a like faith. This inference was never better drawn than by Dr H. S. Holland in two sermons in *Creed and Character*, entitled “A Disciple's Faith” and “An Apostle's Faith.”

I said that a suggestion should be made as to the author: it is the old suggestion that he is the disciple whom Jesus loved. This last clue points us to an eye-witness. The former clues are quite consistent with that view, for they point to one who knew the earlier narratives and felt himself at liberty to modify and even correct them; to one who loved to find many meanings in all that the Lord said and did in His lifetime; to one who had followed from inside the growth of the church and could interpret the essential meaning of its Sacraments; to one who thought of the Lord as still a living, guiding Intercessor. There seems nothing that leads away from the beloved disciple. He had treasured up the sayings, he had dwelt on the meaning of the incidents, he had repeated and taught them catechetically

from time to time. It is not easy to distinguish the nucleus from what has grown around it, but there are certain points on which he feels quite clear that he can trust his memory. If, then, it was the beloved disciple, then he is doing once more what he did on the lake of Galilee. Then the form of the Lord was indistinct upon the shore of the lake of Galilee, but His disciples had been guided to success in their work, and it was the insight of love which first felt sure that "It is the Lord." Now the historic life has become indistinct again; it lies in the far distance and its outlines are blurred by Gnostic and Docetic theories; but meanwhile the church has launched out on new tasks and been guided successfully in its task, and his instinct once more guides him aright: in the Gospel he says once more, "It is the Lord, the Lord who lived on earth, whose glory we have seen,—He it is who has guided the church, who is guiding it still, who will guide it ever, for He was the very Word of God, His instrument alike in creation and in redemption."

Emerson in his essay on Shakespeare says that he saw the splendour of meaning that plays over the visible world. Then he contrasts him with writers like Swedenborg who have seen the sadness of meaning that lies under much of the world's history, and he ends: "It must be conceded that these are half views of half men. The world still wants its poet-priest, a reconciler, who shall not trifle with Shakespeare the player nor shall grope in graves with Swedenborg the mourner, but who shall see, speak, and act with equal inspiration. For knowledge will brighten the sunshine . . . and love is compatible with universal wisdom." Might not Emerson have found the poet-priest in our Evangelist? And was he not such because his inspiration came from the love of Him who knew what was in man?—who had begun by throwing the splendour of a new joy over Jew and Samaritan alike, and who had then looked in the face the sickness and the sorrow and the sin of the world, who had felt it till it troubled His spirit to its depth, but who had healed the sickness and comforted the sorrow and forgiven the sin and conquered it in its last stronghold, death?

W. LOCK.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE REV. STOPFORD BROOKE.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, D.LITT.

WHEN Richard Sinclair Brooke became curate at Letterkenny among the hills of Donegal in 1830, the Irish Establishment was in a position of unchallenged supremacy. Parliament had not yet ventured to suppress any of its numerous bishoprics. There were no premonitions of theological strife. Looking back after forty-seven years, the former curate recalled an age of peace. "Subscription had no terrors, and was unquestioned. Inspiration was an orthodox article and devoutly believed. Reason sat at the feet of Revelation, and embraced her as a loving sister. German divines were little studied and less valued."¹ At clerical meetings the critical meaning of a text, the extent of the Atonement—whether particular or universal,—the future Advent of the Lord, provided the most exciting topics. Meanwhile, the curate married the daughter of his rector, Dr Stopford, and at Letterkenny in 1832, the year of the Reform Bill, as great men were passing from the scene—Walter Scott and Goethe among the poets,—and Tennyson and Browning were preparing for new flights, his eldest son, Stopford Augustus Brooke, was born.

I.

Various elements were mingled in his family, and were wrought by assiduous culture into a rich and many-sided nature. A century earlier Henry Brooke (1703-83), descended from a common ancestor, had made his mark as poet, reformer, and novelist. His daughter (one of two children who survived out of twenty-two) had been a pioneer of the modern Celtic revival in her *Reliques of Irish Poetry*. Another Henry

¹ R. S. Brooke, *Recollections of the Irish Church* (1877), p. 32.

Brooke, his nephew, artist and poet too, had been the friend of John Wesley and Fletcher of Madeley. Soldiers of the same race, full of the spirit of adventure, had served in foreign lands; and others in the tide of the Evangelical revival had given their lives to the work of religion. On the death of Dr Stopford in 1833, Mr R. S. Brooke left Letterkenny, and three years later, in 1836, he undertook the creation of the Mariners' Church at Kingstown. There the real education of his eldest son began.

The atmosphere of the home was full of sincere Evangelical devotion, and the work among the seamen and the poor was energetically pursued. A church was built, "large and gaunt, a satire on taste," with accommodation for fourteen hundred worshippers; and schools, an orphanage, a benefit society, and various other associations, were gathered round it in the true spirit of Evangelical philanthropy. Mr Brooke afterwards lamented that in the exuberance of early enthusiasm he had been misled into preaching the Calvinistic doctrine of particular atonement for a whole year, and taught that Christ died only for the elect, a doctrine "nowhere to be found in God's Word," and contrary to the teaching of both the Articles and the Liturgy of the Church of England. Yet while he rejected all limitation on the redeeming efficacy of Christ's death, and affirmed that God would have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, he admitted a limitation of the Atonement as applied to the elect by God's Spirit. "I cannot understand God's personal election, and yet I believe it with all my heart. I hold the doctrine of predestination, and I may add that I never had true peace or comfort as a Christian man until God taught me these truths, which I have now been preaching for more than twenty-five years."¹ If it was objected that he was preaching contradictions, he boldly replied, "Be it so: they are God's contradictions, not mine. I take them and believe them on the guarantee of His Word, of His character, of His infinite wisdom, of His good pleasure, His divine will and kingly sovereignty."²

Amid the cares of a large family a gentle mother might confide to her diary her secret fears that she had not been chosen for future blessedness. The more robust vigour of her husband sought to dispel such apprehensions in the minds of the seamen and the poor who crowded his church. "Your election or non-election is no business of yours," he cried; that was in God's hands; their business was to respond to

¹ *Christ in Shadow* (1858), an exposition of Isaiah I., p. 47.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

Christ's appeal in humble trust. "Come, come this day, this hour, this moment, and I will pledge you my soul, and all its hopes of salvation, that if you will obey the Gospel call and come unto your heavenly Father through faith in His atoning Son, He 'will in no wise cast you out.'"¹ This type of piety easily leapt over ecclesiastical barriers. It could nourish itself on the practical precepts of Richard Baxter, find incentives for holy life in Matthew Henry, and profit by the dissections of the heart and its affections by Dr John Owen. In Keble's verse it might detect "latent Popery" as the dead fly in the sweet unguent, but it could learn of Jacob Behmen from Coleridge, and Shakespeare opened the way to the interpretation of human nature. Mr Brooke recorded with much amusement that a quotation over the tea-table in an English parsonage drew on him the wrath of his ultra-Calvinistic host in a vehement denunciation of the dramatist as "a Papist, a poacher, and, worst of all, a play-actor."²

The education of the brothers and sisters who formed the large family group of which the young Stopford was the head, was thus based on no narrow lines. To the classical training of his boyhood at Kidderminster he added the poetry and fiction upon his father's shelves; and he had already won prizes at school for his own poems. He loved the sea in its many moods of calm and storm under the granite cliffs of the broken, rock-bound coast. He read again and again with insatiable delight the old Elizabethan voyages which he found in the well-stored library at home, and he talked incessantly with the sailors who had wandered far and seen great wonders in the deep. Some had been with Parry amid Arctic ice; some had rounded Cape Horn with sloping mast and dripping prow; some had hunted whales in the Pacific. Many a tale of danger and self-sacrifice sank into his heart. The Cornish fishermen who came every year for herring were many of them Methodists, and he cherished the memory of their friendship in after years, of the hymns which they sang in the dim light of the big church on Sunday evenings after the congregation had gone, or of the anthems which floated over the water as he stood upon the pier at Monday's dawn and the dark-sailed boats made their way out to sea. At twenty-four, when he was reading for orders, the spirit of adventure was strong, in the exhilaration of splendid physical health. "My blood is fine with winter," he wrote three weeks before his ordination. "I can give you no idea of the joy I feel when I see the hoar-frost and the snow, and feel the glittering thrill of cold. Do you know, I should

¹ *Christ in Shadow*, p. 30.

² *Recollections of the Irish Church*, p. 176.

like to have been a Norse Viking, and to have chased the bear, and roamed the icy seas."¹

II.

In 1850 Stopford Brooke entered Trinity College, Dublin, but he did not take his B.A. degree till 1856. What stirrings of the heart made the first night in the antique place memorable to him he described afterwards in a sermon on "The Presentiments of Youth."² Imagination was already fully on the alert. There philosophy began to exercise his thought; poetry continuously fed his spirit; and science not only awoke an undying intellectual interest through Humboldt's *Cosmos*, but gave him a practical training. He learned Hebrew and delighted in the "sublimity" of the Old Testament. The landscape of Platonic ideas loomed more and more clearly before his inner vision. When Wordsworth's *Prelude* was issued in 1851, he had the insight immediately to discern its greatness; *In Memoriam* demanded "as much thought as Shakespeare, Bacon, or Kant"; and the two became his favourite poems.³ Hammer in hand, often in company with his next brother, William, he wandered over the hills as a working geologist; he was a clever draughtsman, and could reproduce from memory the intricacies of a new invention. At other times, high on the mountain side, or beside the sea at night when mist lay on the water and hushed it to silence, or in the mystery of life in the woodland, he would feel all that belonged to his personality fade away; he seemed to float apart from the body; he became impersonal, "a spirit without bounds."

In this variety of experiences the theology of his boyhood was insensibly modified. The change was no doubt gradual, and issued out of many influences; he could probably have put no date to the surrender of one doctrine or the re-interpretation of another. But by the close of his university career he had travelled a long way on new paths of thought. Among the names that were cherished in the family tree was that of the novelist, Henry Brooke, whose early poem on *Universal Beauty* (1725) was infused with Platonic realism and moulded in the conception of the immanence of God in nature. The long, rambling romance entitled *The Fool of*

¹ For the use of some valuable correspondence I am indebted to the kindness of the Editor of this Journal.

² *Christ in Modern Life* (1872), xxii.

³ On one of the two occasions when he met F. W. Robertson, in 1853, the fervour with which he read "Ring in the Christ that is to be" made an ineffaceable impression on the young Brooke.

Quality (1765–1770) preached, before the French Revolution, “the great brotherhood of man”; emphasised the example of Christ, and the duty and delight of the service of others; declared that God was “no other than an infinite and eternal Good Will,” who founded His authority not in power, but in beneficence; and proclaimed a mystery of universal redemption by which Christ is “invisibly present in all places and in all hearts, begetting in them a new birth of His own divine humanity, that we all may be made one, as He is in the Father, and the Father in Him, that we also may be one in them.” The conclusion of the whole would be “the grand and final consummation when every will shall be subdued to the will of good to all, and the wisdom, the might, and the goodness of our God shall become the wisdom, might, and goodness of all His intelligent creatures.” To these suggestions the theology of Mr Richard Brooke was impervious; they were to become in various forms the staple thoughts of his son.

Fresh influences came with the study of German, and acquaintance with the writings of Herder, Schiller, and above all of Fichte. Here was a powerful ethical force, coupled with a vivid apprehension of a universal Life, manifesting itself in Nature as an ever-active Will. As Henry Brooke had taught that God was infinite beauty and immeasurable love, so also did Fichte. He, too, found in the Fourth Gospel the true presentation of Christianity; he, too, announced with the confidence of a prophet that “at last all must arrive at the sure haven of eternal Peace and Blessedness,” and defined blessedness as consisting in love and the eternal satisfaction of love. To a mind stimulated by these ideas, and already opened to impressions from the American Transcendentalists,¹ the appeal of Goethe came with irresistible force. “Whenever he lost himself in speculation,” wrote Stopford Brooke (October 7, 1856), “in dissipation, in sentimentalism, or in sorrow, he fled to Nature, and in her realities found relief and impulse. He thought no thought, he felt no feeling, that he did not reduce to form.” This becomes a fixed principle with him. All experience must be reduced to positive form. In the same letter he applies it as follows to the moral life:—

“I think this imputing the evil of ourselves to the Devil so much, destroys the sense of the sinfulness of sin. I do not know much about the Devil, but this I know, that when I sin, I sin myself, it is not the Devil

¹ In 1856 he recommended the *Autobiography of Margaret Fuller Ossoli*: “It is long since I read the book, but it struck me much.”

who sins. It is a good thing to consider evil as something objective, not belonging to your inward being, something to be opposed with all your might, something which we should have nothing to do with. But the Devil supplying us with a motive which is sinful, and which we are unconscious of, is nonsense. As long as our conscience is unseared, it will always give us a conscious feeling of wrong. Is the principle on which we act right? If we deceive ourselves, we do it, not Satan. I am not sure of the determinate outward reality of an evil spirit."

The doctrine of total depravity has been cast overboard, and the personality of Satan is about to follow. Plainly, the letter of Scripture is no longer binding, and new moral interpretations are in process of formulation. In one of his first sermons, sent to a correspondent on August 15, 1856, the whole stress is laid on the words "my Father," or "God appropriated, and appropriated as a Father." To declare this was the work of Christ, "making God human to us, and man godlike to God, joining the two, making both one, the At-one-ment, through the blood of his cross." Already, in January 1857, he is looking over manuscripts of F. W. Robertson, and by the summer he has consented to write his Life, though it will not be for two years. Meantime, the influence of Kingsley is the more potent. In a long article on "The Genius of the Rev. Charles Kingsley,"¹ he finds the main element of his books to consist in "the application of the principles of Christianity, living principles as derived from a living God, to the social, political, commercial, and mental difficulties of this age." The note of much future teaching is heard in the declaration that these principles rather than any set of doctrines constitute the essence of Christianity, and they are of universal application. The death of Christ is no longer a doom incurred to satisfy God's justice; it is the supreme type of what all must accomplish who would become truly the children of God: "As redemption was made ours by the voluntary obedience of the Son of Man to the law of the universe (that salvation is to be purchased by a willing sacrifice of life for others), so we should, in the help of a personal Spirit akin to our spirits, make self-sacrifice the law of our existence."²

¹ *Dublin University Magazine*, 1857, June and July.

² This article contains a remarkable view of the influence of the Crimean War on the spirit of England, which may be read with interest in connection with the present crisis, and the article by Mr Brooke published in the July issue of this Journal:—

"Since 1814 England like Jeshurun had been waxing fat; becoming less and less an agricultural country, the wealth was concentrated more in the towns; and where the love of money is the prevailing principle among congregated masses, there will arise unthinking oppression on the one hand,

The process of widening thought was not indeed always without its anxieties. "The demand that to be a Christian you *must always* be sure," he wrote, September 22, 1856, "and feel a sort of joyous fountain faith in your soul, is false to experience, and moreover to the history of all minds in the Bible." But his own difficulties were probably rather on the moral than on the intellectual or the religious side. He went through no darkness of storm and stress; he never touched "the Everlasting No." Conscious of power, he might be vehement of speech and intolerant of criticism. "In the first youth of a Christian life," he said, in the letter just quoted, "the contests are too frequent, the battles are not always victorious, we have not yet become strong in the power of self-submission." To the same correspondent, two years later, he further explained a certain attitude of resistance and isolation (August 7, 1858):—

"To me the opinions which I adopted came home at once. I could hardly be said to have adopted them; it seemed as if I had had them all my life, and they only had then been known to me. My very heart vibrated to them; I could not but pass on to what I felt was higher, nobler, purer air. . . . Then I thought that all must think the same. I talked of them, and, when opposed, no doubt overstated them. My father thought I was very wrong and opposed me strongly (he did not understand what I meant, and fancied that what I believed was totally different to what he thought right; in reality it was not). The consequence was, I was thrown back on myself, and lived in my own thought almost always."

After his marriage in 1858 he was brought into new currents of life in London. As curate of St Mary Abbot's in Kensington (1860–1863), and chaplain to the British Embassy

and fierce resentment on the other—the rights of property, as of old, against the rights of labour, and this is nothing more than civil war. . . . For this state God gives the remedy in war, in a just and protesting war. We have seen the effect it had on England in the time of Elizabeth [in Kingsley's *Westward Ho!*]; every man had his duty to do,—every man felt ten men's strength. Vigour, healthfulness, ran through all hearts like wine—men gave up all to avenge a wrong, or defend a woman, or preserve a friend; and would rather perish by torturing death than deny their young belief. And so war has done for us in these days; it has revived the spirit of self-sacrifice in England; it has lifted the country from off its own shadow, the dark shadow which self projects to blot out the beauty and the life of all things. It has restored manhood once more to England as a nation; the blood that flowed on the wintry slopes above Sebastopol has mingled itself with the hearts of all men, and 'No more is commerce all in all,' nor peace our only object. The pure and true and righteous in the heart of man are woke again to a more vivid life—the soul of England longs to imitate in their strong and calm self-sacrifice the heroes who fought and bled so far away, but in a different way. For we hope that the rich are seeing that they must render their wealth to redeem the wrong they have done; and the poor are feeling that they must be more loving and trustful," etc., etc.

in Berlin (1863-1865), he met many distinguished men in literature and art, in science, and in politics; and when he had completed the *Life of Robertson*, at the close of 1865, he was ready to proclaim to all, with new and fervid eloquence, the ideas which had been so long maturing in his own mind.

III.

These years had seen profound shocks inflicted on popular English theology. The conflict with science was raised in its acutest form by the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in November 1859. In the following March, 1860, *Essays and Reviews* opened the way to freedom of Biblical criticism. Dr Colenso published the first part of his investigations into the composition of the Pentateuch in the autumn of 1862; and in the same year Stanley issued the first series of his *Lectures on the Jewish Church*. To none of these books could the eager mind of Mr Stopford Brooke be indifferent, but it was with the effect of the new studies on the authority of the Scriptures (and consequently of Christ himself) that he was at first most concerned. Stanley's work was welcomed with enthusiasm. He described it as a series of surprises. "I assure you the effect on the Bible history produced by that book is like the Dawn upon the earth wrapped in shadow. Every event, every hint, every prophecy, steals out into clear light as you read on, and the style of the writing is as attractive as the thought, and as clear as the reasoning. I know no book so fascinating. I infinitely prefer it to anything Macaulay has ever written." On the subordinate question of clerical subscription he touches in a letter to his father; more searching matters are discussed with his next brother, William.

To the Rev. R. S. Brooke.

"BERLIN, Dec. 27, 1863.

"If a man loves Christ, and does all he can to serve him, so far as that man's personal salvation goes, what matter his opinions on points of doctrine? . . . So far as W.'s letter is a protest against Stanley's views, so far fair and just; but when he descends to hint that Stanley is dishonest in making his subscriptions, and infers that he cannot take those vows without falseness, so far unfair and unjust. It is the curse of nearly all schools of theology that they will go on imputing motives which are base, and making innuendoes which are infamous. W. holds one view of inspiration, and signs the Articles believing that was the view intended to be taught in them. Stanley holds another view, and signs believing that he can hold that view in accordance with the Articles. Because W. differs

from S., why should he infer that unless the latter holds his view he cannot sign honestly? It is the old fallacy of priestcraft in all ages: unless you hold my view you are wrong. As to his remarks on the Prayer Book, I wonder how many English clergymen could remain in the Church if they were to be forced to adopt his view of signature? 'Seeing, B., that this child is regenerate'—how many would have to leave on that? The Absolution in the Visitation of the Sick—how many clergymen can say that in its full meaning? To get rid of one difficulty a phrase called the 'Judgment of Charity' has been invented which the writers of the Service would have repudiated; and to get rid of the other an explanation is invented which would have considerably startled its composers, who really believed that as Christ's ambassadors, on the profession of penitence, the Church had the power of saying, 'In the name of Christ I absolve you.'

To Mr William Brooke he reports on January 11, 1864, that the writing of Robertson's Life is finished, but the letters have to be arranged and indexed. He has read Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, and will read it again; he is about to begin studying Ewald; Colenso has proved that there are not only inaccuracies but contradictions in the Pentateuchal history. "If in the whole Bible there is a single inaccuracy, a single contradiction, even the smallest, it is enough to disprove the popular theory of inspiration which claims for the Scripture infallibility not only on spiritual questions but on all questions. Now infallibility admits of no degrees." Where, then, is inspiration to be found? The answer is, in what is spiritual and universal; and these truths—as he was often to repeat afterwards—must be felt, not demonstrated. They are not "discernible by human reason," which is here formally equated with the human intellect in surrender of the well-known distinction imported by Coleridge from Germany.¹ "The spirit of man only can see them."

"Here, then, I differ from Jowett and others. Study the Bible like any other book—yes, but only so far as it is like any other book; only so far as it treats in a fallible manner of things which are temporary, of knowledge which shall pass away. But if you want to get at the core of the Bible, there is only one way—to be like God as far as possible, to walk in the spirit and above the world. A man so walking will be able to find truth in the Bible, universal truth. If he be learned, he will be able to mark clearly the difference between what is human and temporary, and what is divine and eternal. If he be not learned, his heart under heavenly guidance will appropriate what is true, and will unconsciously leave behind what is not; e.g., what real fear is there of the most ignorant, if they be growing like Christ, stabbing a helpless wearied man for the glory of God as Jael did, because Deborah calls her blessed? His spirit-taught heart will keep him back from the fanaticism of Corporal Knock-'em-down-in-the-Lord."

¹ Later on, Reason will regain pre-eminence and authority.

As to the authorship of the Pentateuch: "I agree with Stanley that it was not written by Moses; indeed, it is incredible to me how anyone can read the evidence and not agree with a view now very generally held even among the less critical of the English clergy." But this involved difficulties in the language of the Apostles, solved sufficiently easily with the remark that "they wrote, so far as the knowledge of all unspiritual questions was concerned, in accordance with the knowledge of the time in which they lived." The letter—almost a treatise in itself—then continued:

"The question is more difficult when we consider what our Lord says. If on all points his knowledge was infallible, then I must have recourse to the accommodation theory. I must say that in arguing with the Jews he placed himself on their standpoint, and used the *argumentum ad hominem*—that is, he never quoted or alluded to any passage in the Old Testament but according to the notions of the Jews then present. I do not see any fostering of vulgar error in this, any untruthfulness. But because there is in it as a view a chance that many might impute, were it a true view, a shade of dishonesty to our Saviour, I should prefer to hold another view in discussing the subject. I do not think that our Lord's knowledge in matters of science, criticism, etc., was higher than the knowledge of the time he lived in, except so far as the most perfect human nature could make it higher, *as long as he was on earth*. He had willingly limited his Godhead by his Humanity. . . . His knowledge on purely critical points was limited.

"How limited? Not limited as the Apostles' was, of necessity, but self-limited. Here is the grand difference which prevents me, holding this view, from sliding into Unitarian views. His want of Omniscience was self-chosen. He emptied himself of certain powers belonging to his Godhead, those powers which would have prevented him from being made in all points like unto us except in the point of sin. It was an act of self-conscious limitation, an act which none but God could have performed. And now, his human nature being rendered perfect on earth through suffering, he has retaken into it all the divine attributes he of his own will laid aside. *Now* in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.

"I wonder if you will think this startlingly heretical? You cannot at least say that there is any dishonest shuffling in the matter. And I do not think that the doctrine of the divinity of Christ is imperilled by what I have said. In my own mind I retain that doctrine as one of the most precious truths conceivable. But if, on the other hand, I hold that his knowledge on earth was the infallible knowledge of the Father on *all* things, even to the number of figs on a fig-tree, that when he was asking questions of the doctors in the Temple he was not seeking for information but only trying to draw them out, I lose the doctrine of his perfect Humanity, as precious to me as that of his Divinity, and I make event after event in his life unreal fictions, acted as on a stage, not facts."

The doctrine of the self-limitation of the Divine Son at the Incarnation has been familiar to English theology in various

modifications of kenotic hypothesis ever since the well-known dissertation of Dr Gore some twenty years ago. Mr Brooke offered it to his brother without any attempt to commend it by reference to any authority, patristic or modern, and also, it may be noted, without any consciousness of its enormous metaphysical difficulties. It is apparently a spontaneous product of his own reflection. It will reappear at a later stage of his thought before he finally surrenders the conception of the Deity of Christ. Meanwhile he rested on the view which he had derived from Robertson, that the highest truths were poetry—to be felt, not proved. They rested ultimately, not on the authority of the Bible or the Church, but on the witness of God's Spirit in the human soul. And this was given not to the acuteness of the cultivated understanding but to the loving and obedient heart.¹

IV.

For a decade and a half (1866–1880) Mr Brooke continued his ministry in the Church of England. His work was that of the teacher. He had no parish, he organised no institutions; but with the fertility of genius he made his pulpit the vehicle of impassioned appeal to men and women in many ranks of life who were seeking a foundation for the great truths of God and immortality. The theological conceptions which he presented with such inexhaustible variety of illustration were shaped under many influences. Elemental moral experience protested against the crude forms of Evangelical doctrine; he had not read the English and American Unitarians, Martineau and Thom, Channing and Parker, for nothing. Democratic sympathies impelled him to revolt against all forms of sacerdotalism, and he paid little or no heed to the historic or the imaginative claims of the High Church party. His scientific studies had opened to him immense visions of the unity of Nature, which gave intellectual coherence to the inner perceptions of the spirit. His approach to theology, therefore, was through poetry and art as the true instruments of the interpretation of life, rather than through history or philosophy. He saw that religion was involved in a desperate struggle with scientific materialism, and he set himself to show a way out by appealing to truths above and beyond the power of the intellect acting by itself. The super-intellectual, he urged, lay beneath science, theology, philosophy, even beneath art.

¹ After a visit to Brighton to see Robertson's tomb (1863), he wrote: "I found it, and could not but think on all I might have been, had he but lived. Yet perhaps he never would have influenced me so much had he not died."

"Both Faraday and St Paul worked from principles which they could not demonstrate."

To disengage these principles and bring them into clearer application to all varieties of intellectual and moral work, in politics, in history, in science and art, was the preacher's fundamental aim, and he found his special instrument in poetry. There from Cowper onwards, in Wordsworth and in Shelley, he saw the ideas of universal man, of universal brotherhood. Sometimes they were founded on the theological conception of a common Creator. Sometimes they reacted upon it, in protest against the ecclesiastical division of humanity into two parts—one saved, and one neglected or condemned. Burns, Shelley, and Byron had been liberators from the Calvinistic view of the reprobation of the great mass of mankind. Wordsworth started with faith in the nobleness of man, and out of the struggle with illusion and disappointment, as he watched the progress of the French Revolution, he reached the idea of unity, of one brotherhood held in one Father.

Here was the central idea, also, of Christianity, and from this Mr Brooke derived his whole view of man's powers and destiny. Accepting in the broadest sense the modern conception of evolution, he applied it to the education of the race, and loved to picture the illimitable progress of the soul through stage after stage of ascending being. He even ventured to lay it as an "imperative" upon God to see that all his children were brought to perfection; the Incarnation rightly understood necessitated the final righteousness of all; God was dishonoured if he was deemed incapable of redeeming the wicked.

The whole phenomena of the moral life thus implied a personal relation of man to God; mind answered to mind, will acted upon will; our spirits were of the same kind as God's. But personality implied limitation, while science revealed a boundless energy pervading the universe, for ever escaping all measure, and yet for ever acting on uniform methods and maintaining solemnities of Law. How were these aspects of God's activity to be reconciled or harmonised? The answer was supplied in the formula that God, while personal in and to Man, is impersonal in Nature.¹ Of this poetry provided the

¹ The dangers of anthropomorphism were frequently emphasised. In *Theology in the English Poets* (1874) a striking passage warns us of peril in Burns's phrase "the patriot's God." If we think "of a God whose peculiar care is England, or France, or Germany . . . in war, for example, our idea of God must become wholly confused. One or other side must be wrong in

interpretation. Like science, it apprehended Nature as a unity, but to that it added the conception of a universal Life constituting it as a whole into one vast organic Being. Here all limitation fell away; the restraints attached to personality were dissolved, and God in Nature was declared impersonal. The metaphysical problems gathering round the conception of matter were ignored. The preacher's thought soared into the realm of spirit, where God was conceived as "the Essential Being of all those things—invisible, immaterial, impossible for ever to be subjected to the senses—which we therefore call Spiritual Ideas, such as Truth, Love, Righteousness, Wisdom." With a lofty realism in Platonising style, he even affirmed, "He is Spiritual Ideas." He often compared their relation to the scientific doctrine of the correlation of forces which came into view half a century ago. As heat, light, electricity, were capable of reduction to different modes of one constant force, were all motion, dynamic or potential, so the spiritual forces were correlated and interchangeable. Truth is justice, and justice love; "there is one Spiritual Force of which all these are but modes, the Force of the Spiritual Will." Truth, love, beauty, justice, mercy, purity, and the rest, are the Ideas which are to be worshipped as God.

This is the language, not of the philosopher, but of the seer. Ideas and forces dissolve into each other, and unite to chase materialism off the field. God is beheld immanent in Nature; he is conceived as pure thought through knowledge, as pure beauty through art. Here is an idealism from which energy and will have disappeared. The Humanity of God has been driven out; his Personality has sunk into the abyss. But it persists in returning in unexpected ways. In the supreme crises of history, when men fight for freedom and fatherland or the great ideas of faith and religion, on the battlefield, in the rude hospital, beside the widow or the orphan at home, we do not speak of an impersonal Essence of truth and love, but of a living Friend, a personal Father. And over against the picture of "Nature red in tooth and claw" we are assured that "there is no pain, mental or physical, which is not a part of God's continual self-sacrifice in us, and which, were we united to life, and not to death,

claiming God as specially theirs. God is the God of mankind; His equal love belongs to and falls on all, on the meanest as fully as on the most cultured races. That is the large conception which will free us from the national selfishness into which patriotism degenerates, and increase that international kindness and communion which are beginning to be a mark of our time; nay, more, bring us slowly up to the thought which a century hence will, I hope, dominate politics—national self-sacrifice."

we should not see as joy." Here is the reconciliation of suffering: it is shared with the indwelling God; it makes us partakers with him of the rapture of self-giving, flowing in an endless stream through all creation. So, like Browning, he presents him as the perfect Poet, for ever living out his eternal ideas. Vast pictures of Divine activity arise before his mind out of immensity, taking endless new shapes in everlasting procession. They would overwhelm a less robust spirit. When he first visited Scotland in 1856, he wrote: "Loch Lomond was too big for me; I like compressed scenery." So religious imagination feels compelled to concentrate itself out of this realm of infinitude, into some definite form. Mr Brooke fixed his gaze upon the spontaneity of the Divine work, its unconsciousness of self, the unity of thought, and will, and act, the impossibility of weariness in the inexhaustible freshness of activity, an ever present, without past or future. These were the characteristics of childhood. "If, after long searching, it were once granted to mortal eyes to see in a vision, in that solemn dreamland into which we enter once or twice in life, that form which God might afford us as a symbol of Himself, we should see a Child with the awful light of eternity within its eyes, and the smile of unfathomable joy upon its lips."¹

V.

On such lines as these did Mr Brooke's Natural Theology shape itself. What was its relation to Christianity? The new scientific movement which had opened fresh vistas of thought in so many directions, the bold application of moral ideas to the principles and methods of the Divine government taught by Calvinistic Evangelicalism, and the rapid advance of the literary and historical criticism of the Scriptures, all converged on the demand that Revelation should no longer be regarded as once for all complete; its sources were not closed, its range was being perpetually extended over new fields of truth. This was a frequent theme of the preacher; he unfolded it in his first sermon in Westminster Abbey (1868), he urged it before the University of Oxford. He desired, indeed, that "there should be a strong opposition to prevent the Liberal theologians from going too fast for Christian safety";² but he claimed for the clergy of the Church, as for its laity, the right to work out the truths on which it was founded in the forms most fitted to develop each man's

¹ *The Fight of Faith* (1877), p. 283.

² Introduction to the new edition of Robertson's *Life* (1868), p. xix.

own spiritual life. He saw clearly enough that in many of the older schemes of salvation the doctrine of the Trinity was converted into a group of three Gods, "all having human personalities"; he defended it in the form of "three modes of being in one primal Being," on the ground that a conception which represented God as complex was higher than one which represented his nature as uniform. Why the complexity should stop at the number three was not explained. The Incarnation, however, as commonly taught, presented greater difficulties. He had already endeavoured to find a new principle for reconciling it with the Gospel facts, and to this he now attempted to give more definite and precise expression.

Starting from the historic statement that Jesus "increased in wisdom" as in stature, he sought with kindling imagination to trace his development under the influences of home and nature, through his first contact with the varied life of Jerusalem which awoke in him the idea of the unity of the race and the first consciousness of his redeeming mission. But this implied some limitation to which the Divine Word had voluntarily submitted in entering into union with a human nature. How a "mode of being" in the Godhead could thus contract itself without severing itself from its primal source, was not examined. A gradual communication was suggested, which went on step by step with the gradual perfecting of Christ's humanity. Not till the end of his earthly career was he ready to partake of the Absolute attributes of God, and become omniscient, omnipotent, unlimited by time or space, impassible. This complete union was realised only at the Resurrection and Ascension, when he became perfect God and perfect Man. The humanity of Christ, however, was not the humanity of an individual, but of the race. Christ, said the preacher, "was not only a man, but Man—the realisation in one Person of the whole idea which God had of Man." It was by this representative character that God was united in Christ to the entire race. Here was the key to his universal Fatherhood. Here was the secret of the Cross, when God saw his ideal of humanity realised, man victorious over trial, and in the depth of suffering still claiming him as *his* God. Thus did humanity in Christ fulfil all righteousness, and display itself as wholly at one with God's life of self-sacrifice. Such humanity God could take up into himself, and thus the satisfactory conclusion was reached that "in this way Christ reconciled the Father to us, as the Article says."¹ But the theologian had started with the conviction that the principles of Christianity were of universal

¹ *Freedom in the Church of England* (1871), p. 37.

application. What Christ had been, therefore, others might hereafter be.

"There is, indeed, a God with us—in our hearts. Believe in that, live in the truth that God is incarnating Himself in you, that His spirit is at one with yours. So that if you will, your thought and work and will may be God's thought and work and will, and you yourself become a Christ, dwelling in God and God in you, at one with the Father, as He was at one with the Father."¹

If the function of Christ was thus universalised, his Person was at least in danger of losing its unique and miraculous character. At the outset of his London ministry, in a powerful sermon on the "Lessons of the Cholera" (August 19, 1866), the preacher had dwelt on the character of God as "the unalterable, the uncapricious, whose unchangeable love constitutes unchangeable law." The doctrine of the uniformity of the Divine action was repeatedly enforced in his plea for Natural Theology, and was essential to his view of the true harmony of science and religion. He would not therefore pray for rain or fair weather, or the sudden removal of a pestilence. But he still thought it legitimate to expect under the reign of a personal King of nature and of men that at certain great crises of history miracles should occur. One human soul was inconceivably more valuable than a whole realm of matter, and the sacrifice of the order of the material world was a small price to pay for its salvation. The redemption of the race, therefore, might well be inaugurated by miracle.

But a time came when this exceptional intervention could be defended no more. It seemed to involve a breach in God's own fidelity to the ideas on which the entire fabric of the universe had been reared. If his action in the physical world was mutable, the whole foundations of science were undermined. Either the investigation of God's ways in Nature must be abandoned, or belief in God must be surrendered. Moreover, the conception of miracle implied the entry of God into matter from outside; but science had made it plain that only two views of matter were possible—either that God is immanent in all matter, and its laws were then as steadfast as God himself, or that matter possessed a wholly independent existence, which practically denied the Absoluteness of God's Being. Moreover, if he was inconstant in Nature, what guarantee was there of his faithfulness towards Man? The whole order of his moral action was imperilled. Truth in the sphere of creative ideas had its counterpart in the righteous-

¹ *Sermons preached in St James's Chapel*, 2nd series, p. 349.

ness and harmony of his government of the world. The completion of the education of the race, the security of human destiny, fell into doubt, if any breach was made in the daily conduct of the universe. Two sermons were devoted to the exposition of these ideas in July 1880, before Bedford Chapel was closed for the vacation. Save for a brief allusion to the disappearance of the doctrine of the infallible inspiration of the Scriptures, the hearers were left to make the application of these principles to the origin of Christianity for themselves. When Mr Brooke resumed his ministry in October, he had ceased to be a clergyman of the Church of England.

VI.

With the political and ecclesiastical objections which Mr Brooke had come to feel with overpowering weight against the Establishment, we are not here concerned. The theological difficulties which so deeply moved him lay in the miracle of the Incarnation, and the exclusiveness which contradicted his most cherished vision of a Church embracing all the race, existing now, indeed, only in idea, but destined to be realised hereafter when Humanity, one and all, should be made the Absolute Son of God. His withdrawal severed the last tie of authority, whether in Scripture or tradition. The authority of Christ had rested neither on book nor Church, but on the answer of man's own nature. There, in the powers of emotion, intellect, conscience, and spirit, lay the ultimate decision. Taken together they constituted the witness of Reason. As a safeguard against the peculiarities and extravagances of individualism, it was added that this must be sought in the collective judgment of mankind. To this the preacher boldly appealed on behalf of the root-ideas of Jesus. Even where the Fatherhood of God was denied, politics, philosophy, art, social, national, international life, all rested on the beliefs "that all men are to be considered as brothers, that self-sacrifice is life, and that self-sacrifice for the sake of man is our first duty." The optimism of faith never waned.

Released from the constraint of creeds Mr Brooke continued to build his theology on the same large and generous lines which he had laid out in his previous ministry. There were modifications of emphasis, there was a fiercer denunciation of what he regarded as unholy error—he even permitted himself to declare the doctrine of everlasting punishment "an accursed lie,"—principles that were implicit before emerged into clearer light. It was no longer necessary to plead for the recognition of

Natural Theology. The fundamental doctrines of science in respect of the order and uniformity of the Divine action in the universe were repeatedly enforced in their bearing on man's moral life and the prospects of human destiny. God's truthfulness to himself in the physical world became the guarantee of his steadfastness of purpose for the education of souls in the spiritual world. This vast security filled the preacher with unceasing joy, and lifted him victoriously over all sorrow and pain into peace in his great Order with whom he was at one.

Here was the most important change in his theology. The surrender of the miracle of the Incarnation altered his whole conception of the person of Christ. Instead of diminishing, it only enhanced his reverence and love towards him as the leader of mankind. He had long before affirmed that, if forced to choose between two half-truths, to believe in Christ's humanity would be less destructive to Christian life and Christianity than to believe only in his Divinity. He was not, however, reduced to either of these alternatives. His conception of Christianity was still the Johannine.¹ He accepted many of the sayings of the Fourth Gospel as unquestionably authentic. One of his favourite texts was, "I and my Father are one." But this was immediately universalised. The truth of the Incarnation in Jesus was only realised when we understood it to be true for all mankind. God is for ever growing into personal life in us; each has to reveal some portion of God's manifold Being to his fellow-men; when that is done steadfastly, "the truth, the necessity, the absolute imperative of God being incarnate in man will become clear to us, because we ourselves are an Incarnation of God." While Jesus, therefore, spoke "knowing and feeling himself to be nothing more than a man," his words were ideally true of all mankind; they proclaimed the right and destiny of humanity. "Man is at one with God," and that is the Magna Charta of our religion. The "unity of God and man" thus became the centre of his whole theology. As the perfect man, Christ was its typical presentment. Victorious in the great conflict with evil, he had revealed the possibility of bruising on earth, beyond all power of recovery, the serpent's head. Between Christ and the race existed a mysterious connection, so that what was achieved by the Head would be ultimately attained by all. Why? "Because Christ is the race, and the race is Christ." Filled with impassioned devotion to him who was at once the actual

¹ In the minutiae of Gospel study he took no interest, and to the modern "eschatological" view he was supremely indifferent.

and the ideal, the promise and the performance, he exclaimed, "I will never cease to preach Christ Jesus."

But this eminence was not unique in the sense of being supernatural. Just as we may look forward to a race whose intellectual and imaginative powers shall equal those of Newton and Shakespeare, so we may anticipate the future development of men into spiritual equality with Jesus, when the life of love shall have a lovelier shaping, and pain and wrong and sorrow shall be only names of what has been. It might even be that God might inspire another man with a yet nobler revelation, and more of the infinite depths of his being might be disclosed in different ways. But in the meantime Mr Brooke conceived that Jesus, still full of life and love, could not forget the humanity for whom he had lived and loved on earth. He must have the power to be with us ; and so must thousands upon thousands more, according to Law, in proportion to their spiritual capacity and holiness. In this vast communion Jesus still takes the lead. He is in actual, vital, loving fellowship with mankind, supporting the existence and inspiring the daily life of the Christian Church. We are surrounded by a multitudinous company of souls, for ever faring onwards towards the fulfilment of God's purpose for the education of humanity as his sons. In this perpetual ascension what is death ? "A momentary pain," answered Mr Brooke, "a swift dream out of which one awakes into reality of life, the flight of a bird through an arch of gloom into the sunshine beyond." Was it wonderful that he should have once said to an American friend, "I expect the day of my death to be the most romantic day of my life" ?

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

OXFORD.

ARE WE HAPPIER THAN OUR FOREFATHERS?

CHARLES A. MERCIER, M.D.

To many the question will seem ridiculous, so obviously to them must the answer be in the affirmative. Have we not railways and steamships to convey us, with a celerity unimaginable to our forefathers, to destinations equally unimaginable by them? Have we not every morning on our breakfast-tables news from the uttermost parts of the earth of what happened there only the day before? Has not the meanest and poorest citizen the same privilege, and has he not been furnished at the public expense with ability to read it? Are not the very paupers in the workhouses—refuges unknown then—provided as a matter of course with appliances such as the Queen of Sheba or Semiramis, or, for that matter, Queen Elizabeth on her throne, could not command? None of these great ladies had the use of table-forks. It is improbable that Queen Elizabeth, in the whole course of her long and healthy life, ever had a bath. As we look round our rooms, do we not see luxuries and conveniences by the score that were unknown to our forefathers—carpets, wall-papers, clocks, telephones, plate-glass, easy chairs, spring beds, sash windows, door-locks, gas-lights, pianos, electric lights, cigars, blotting-paper, tea, coffee, electro-plate, and, above all, matches? In this one matter alone, is it possible to measure the daily saving of time, trouble, and temper brought about by the substitution of the friction match for the flint and steel? Do not persons of very moderate means now possess, in abundance and profusion, luxuries which only the wealthiest of our forefathers could command—books, pictures, engravings, fabrics of all kinds, crockery and porcelain, implements of iron, steel, brass, and other metals? Only sixty-five years ago, those who were not present at the opening of the Great Exhibition, and who wished to know what it was like, must wait for months until

one artist had painted it, and another artist had laboriously copied and engraved the painting, and then, for the expenditure of several guineas, his wish could be gratified. Now he could have it next morning for a halfpenny. Where our forefathers drew by hand labour, in buckets from a well, the water, often muddy and impure, that they used for drinking and domestic purposes, we have, by the mere turning of a tap, an unlimited supply of pure water. Tropical fruits unknown to our grandfathers, or grown by the wealthy at great expense in hot-houses, are now sold on barrows on the streets at prices the poorest can afford. Undoubtedly, all classes of the people can now obtain a thousand conveniences and luxuries that not the wealthiest nor the most powerful of our forefathers ever dreamed of possessing; but are we therefore happier? Convenience and luxury are desirable, no doubt, but these are not the same as happiness. It may be doubted whether these are necessary ingredients in happiness. Many of our ancestors were happy without our conveniences and luxuries: many of us are unhappy in spite of them.

There are, however, other discoveries that affect our welfare more nearly than mere material conveniences, comforts, and luxuries. Chloroform has robbed operations of their terrors, childbirth of its pains; Listerism is saving, and has saved, incalculable numbers of lives. The science of health has abolished some diseases from amongst us, has reduced other diseases to insignificance, and has prolonged the average duration of life by a considerable number of years. Does not all this contribute to make us happier? It is hard to say. No doubt it is an inexpressible relief to know that if we are to suffer the surgeon's knife we shall be exempt from pain; but it must be remembered that for hundreds of operations that are performed now, but one was performed before the days of Simpson and Lister. The number of persons who had to dread the surgeon's knife was so small that the general happiness of the community was scarcely affected. Life is prolonged, and the pain of separation from those dear to us comes later, but it comes at length. It is postponed, but it is not abolished; and, on the other hand, many a life that is a questionable boon, that would be gratefully resigned, and that in former times would have been mercifully cut short, is now prolonged in years of suffering. In early times only the strong survived, and it is certain that a community that contains a large proportion of the weak and sickly is, on the ground of health alone, less happy than one in which the weak and sickly are few.

Stronger ground for believing that we are happier than our forefathers would be the greater security of life and property, and the greater liberty that we enjoy in comparison with those who lived before us; but it is not certain that even this ground is strong enough to warrant the conclusion that we are happier than they were. In the first place, although, in times of peace, life in Western Europe is now more secure against the depredations of marauders, and from the risks of civil tumult, of privy conspiracy and rebellion, than in many former times, yet it is not more secure from these dangers than some former times were, and it has dangers of its own from which former times were exempt. Civil tumult, in the form of strikes and what are called labour troubles, is by no means unknown in our times, and possibly is not less frequent or less dangerous to life and limb than other forms of turbulence, even in the turbulent Middle Age. The riots and rebellions that occupy so prominent a place in history seize upon our attention just because they were prominent; and the intervening periods of tranquillity do not impress us, for they are not impressive; but they existed, and were often prolonged and complete. Seldom does a year now pass without a strike in which lives are endangered; but in the history of this country there were long periods of internal tranquillity, and it is well known that Gibbon placed the period of maximum happiness of the human race in the great Roman Peace that prevailed in the time of Marcus Antoninus. Moreover, those very appliances that contribute so greatly to our convenience, our comfort, and our luxury have their own dangers, which are neither small nor rare. Our predecessors were in no danger from mine explosions or railway accidents. The enormous quantity of powerful machinery that ministers to a thousand of the wants that our forefathers did not feel, takes its weekly and daily toll of life and limb. A single serious accident in a mine or on a railway will take as many lives as a serious battle between Saxons and Danes.

But, granting what is doubtful, that life is more secure in these later times than in the earlier history of the West, is this security necessary to happiness? May there not be much happiness without it? Does it even greatly contribute to happiness? We are accustomed to look upon the life of a bird, especially of a singing bird, as an epitome of joy. It is impossible to listen to the song of a lark, a blackbird, a thrush, a nightingale, a blackcap, or any other singing bird, without feeling the soul uplifted by the infection of the happiness they express; it is impossible to witness the

graceful unceasing movement of the swift and the swallow without being impressed with the joy of their conquest of the air, of their easy, graceful, sweeping movements: yet all small birds live in extreme and perpetual insecurity. They are in constant danger, and their consciousness of danger is expressed in their conduct. Outside my window hangs a cocoa-nut with its ends removed for the benefit of the tits, who visit it all day long. At the present moment there is a cole-tit manifestly enjoying a feast of its contents. It gives three or four pecks, almost too fast for the eye to follow, and then withdraws its head from the cavity of the nut and looks round inquiringly lest, while it was engaged in feeding, some enemy should have stolen into its neighbourhood. Little more than a second passes without this interruption of its meal. Every sound, every movement within range of its senses, is a potential menace to its life. Yet there is no hint of unhappiness in its demeanour. Its movements are full of the joy of life. It is much the same with all small birds. They live in the utmost insecurity; they take fright at a shadow: the slightest unaccustomed noise startles them into precipitate flight; yet before long they are pouring forth their very souls in joyous music.

No doubt we must be cautious in inferring from the demeanour of birds to their feelings, and from the feelings of birds to those of men; but do we in fact find that people who live in constant insecurity of life live therefore in the misery of constant apprehension? Experience negatives the supposition. The demeanour of our troops in this war refutes it. They live in the utmost insecurity. They never know at what moment a bullet or a shell may not kill them or mutilate them horribly. They frequently see their comrades struck down beside them. They well know the danger they are in, but it does not make them unhappy. Like the birds, they whistle and sing; and like their comrades beyond the danger zone, they laugh and joke. A very short experience, if it does not reconcile them to the life, at any rate accustoms them to it. No doubt it is easier to be happy when life is secure, but insecurity of life is no bar to happiness; nay, in a measure, and to a certain degree, it brings its own sources of satisfaction. It exercises the wits. It sets the faculties agog to avoid, evade, and counteract the danger; and as long as it is successful, this successful exercise of faculty is a source of pleasure, all the keener for the magnitude of the difficulties that are surmounted. It is a commonplace that there are natures that revel in danger, and find their greatest happiness in coping with dangerous situations. We may doubt whether life is

upon the whole much more secure from violence than it has been upon the average in past times; we may well believe that insecurity of life brings its own compensation in sharpening the wits and pleasurable exercise of faculty; and we may feel confidence that insecurity of life is no bar to happiness.

Insecurity of life and insecurity of property commonly go together, and it is doubtful whether insecurity of property is not a greater bar to happiness than insecurity of life; for insecurity of property throws before it the menacing shadow of want, and of misery and death in their most dreaded forms—most dreaded because longest foreseen. Yet of all the supplications of the Litany, which epitomises what our forefathers most dreaded, none prays for security of property. Security of life is prayed for many times. We entreat that we may be delivered from plague, pestilence, and famine, from battle and murder, and from sudden death; but the only reference made to property, if indeed it is a reference to property, associates wealth with the terrors of the hour of death and the day of judgment, and prays for protection, not for it, but against it. It seems that our forefathers of the Middle Age attached less importance to property than we do, perhaps because there was so much less of it, perhaps because in any appreciable amount it was limited to so few. There have been, in the past, times and places at which property has been very insecure—for instance, on the Scottish border, and in the marches of Wales; but this insecurity affected but a small proportion of the population of the country—not more, perhaps, than is now affected by the defalcations of a Jabez Balfour or a Whittaker Wright. If we set off the depredations of the dishonest company promoter, the long-firm swindler, the fraudulent trustee, and the other plunderers who now prey upon society, we may doubt whether property is after all much less secure in these days than in times less enlightened; and in some of those times property was highly respected. The tradition that in King Alfred's day gold bracelets could be hung by the highway, and would remain untouched by any but their lawful owners, may not be literally true; but it would never have obtained currency unless as an expression of the prevailing conviction, even so far from our own time, that property was completely secure from at any rate the cruder modes of depredation. I do not see, therefore, that generally, and looking at the matter by and large, we can claim with any confidence that property is more secure in these days than it was in former times.

What seems a more important element in happiness than

security either of life or of property is personal liberty. In Greece, in Rome, in Saxon and Norman England, the great bulk of the population were slaves in law and slaves in fact; and slavery *de facto* was the state of the great bulk of the population, at any rate the rural population, in France down to the time of the Revolution, and in England to an even later date. A century ago the agricultural labourers in this country, though not so *de jure*, were, owing to an abominable law of settlement, *de facto* in a state of slavery, and *adscriptæ glebæ*. A man could not remove his residence into another parish unless he could find two substantial householders to give security in the sum of £10 each that he would not become chargeable to the parish to which he removed. For all practical purposes the security might as well have been fixed at ten thousand pounds. Undoubtedly, freedom of person and of action is much greater and much more widespread now, at any rate in this country, than in former times; and undoubtedly, if the same restrictions that weighed upon our forefathers were now to be imposed upon us, the check to our happiness would be severe. But it does not follow that it was severe to them. The check to our happiness would be severe because it would be a check, because it would deprive us of liberties that we possess; but the want of these liberties would not be felt by those that had never possessed them. We are not unhappy for want of the ability to fly, for it is an ability we have never possessed. An Englishman in Germany feels acutely the deprivation of the liberty to do the things in the long list of the *verboten*, but the German does not feel it. He has never known liberty, and he does not feel the want of it. Even now we occasionally hear of some ancient inhabitant of a rural parish who has never lived out of it, and has rarely left it, though he has had full liberty to do so if he chose. But he did not choose. The desire to wander was unsatisfied because it was never felt. The majority of our rural forefathers were in the same case. Personal liberty was denied to them, but, as they had never known it, they did not miss its absence. All the testimony we have of the state of the negro slaves in America and in the West Indies goes to show that, if and when they were unhappy, it was not because they were slaves. The evidence is that very many of the slaves were as happy as their masters. If the master was cruel, the slave suffered in consequence; but he suffered, not because he was a slave, but because, being a slave, he was cruelly treated. A free man so treated would have suffered as much. Both in modern and in ancient days the slave accepted his status as part of the

order of nature. If he had not done so, slavery could not have endured, for the slaves were much more numerous than the free men, and by reason of their numbers were more powerful, so that if they had not been slaves *quasi* of their own free will there was no reason why they should be slaves at all. Even the slave who had known freedom, and had been enslaved for debt, must have found, in freedom from the sickening spectre of impending want, a substantial compensation, and may well have found tranquillity and satisfaction in a status that assured to him at least a livelihood. Certainly, freedom alone will not secure happiness. Who so free as Robinson Crusoe?

No. It seems that the matter cannot be decided on these grounds. To discover whether we are or are not happier than our forefathers we must go deeper, and determine what the conditions of happiness are. Not until we have discovered these can we make the comparison. At first sight the problem seems insoluble, the conditions are so various. One man finds happiness in editing a Greek text, or in reading and translating a cuneiform inscription; another says,

"Your Novuds and Omers and Bluturks and stuff,
By G——! I don't value them this pinch of snuff,"

and finds his happiness in watching horse-races and in making bets. This man finds happiness in crowds, in going from assembly to assembly and chattering to people he has never met before and will never meet again; that man finds it in the society of two or three intimate friends, or perhaps in rambling about the country alone and communing, as he puts it, with nature. One man is happy only when he can contrive "the applause of listening senates to command"; another only when he is hunting big game in some wild country; a third when he has composed a telling verse; and a fourth when he is drinking beer and playing skittles. The student's happiness is gained in reading the book which the bibliophile delights to buy but does not think of reading. There is one condition of happiness for the boy, another for the youth, a third for the middle-aged, and a fourth for the old. In this bewildering variety, how is it possible to find a common condition? And if it is difficult to find common conditions of happiness for all in one country and in one age, must it not be futile to seek common conditions for different ages and widely different modes of life?

It is difficult, no doubt, but it is not impossible. However various the conditions of human happiness appear superficially to be, however diverse they may appear on a cursory examina-

tion, yet fundamentally they must be the same for all ; and if the matter is carefully considered, I think it will be found that the universal condition of happiness is the exercise of faculty in the pursuit of interest : it is in doing that in which we are interested, in striving for ends that we desire. Happiness is wider, the greater the number of things in which we take interest ; it is deeper, the more intense the interest we take ; it is greater, the greater the activity and the success of the pursuit. Thus we account for the different modes in which different people seek happiness, and for the difference in the things in which they find satisfaction. Their means of attaining or seeking happiness are different because their interests are different ; but whatever the means, all have in common the element of striving, and of the exercise of faculty in the striving ; and the happiness is greater according as the striving is, first, strenuous, and, second, successful. Striving implies strenuousness. It implies effort, exertion, the endeavour to overcome impediments and obstacles. An end that is attained without effort, or with little effort, gives us little satisfaction either in the attainment or in the approach. That which we can have for the asking we value but little. Happiness does not enter into our pursuits until difficulties arise, confront us, and are overcome. The greater the difficulty, the louder the call upon our resources, the more strenuous the effort, the greater the employment of faculty, the greater is the happiness evoked. When a child, or for the matter of that an adult, is solving a puzzle, and we offer to show him the solution, we get no thanks. No, he says, don't show me : let me find it out for myself. It is the effort, not the result, that gives him pleasure. Satisfaction, happiness, is found, not in the attainment of the purpose, but in the successful striving towards attainment. The nearer to attainment that we approach, the greater our satisfaction becomes ; but the moment of attainment marks the end of satisfaction, or, if it does not mark quite the end, it is accompanied by a great and sudden fall in the intensity of the satisfaction.

Estimated by this standard, he is the happiest (1) who has the greatest capacity for feeling happiness ; (2) whose interests are most intense, and perhaps most numerous and diverse ; (3) whose energy is greatest and his faculties best developed ; and (4) whose efforts meet with obstacles that are difficult but not insuperable. To determine whether we are indeed happier than our forefathers, whether the condition of our race is or is not travelling towards greater happiness, we must compare ourselves in these respects with dwellers in past ages.

(1) Have we in these latter days a greater capacity for experiencing pleasure than our forefathers in past times? Was their capacity in this respect, in comparison with ours, that of the pint-pot to the quart-pot, or, the pint to the pint, or of the quart to the pint? I believe that our capacity is the greater. There can be no doubt, no reasonable doubt, that the more highly developed animal has a greater capacity for feeling of every kind than that which is less developed. Here we are in the realm of conjecture, but still, I think, no one can doubt that a wasp or a bee feels more intensely and more voluminously than a whelk or an oyster; that a bird feels more intensely and voluminously than a wasp or a bee; a dog than a bird; and a man than a dog. The capacity for feeling surely depends on the grade of evolution attained. In this respect we can justly claim that, considering all classes of the community, and striking an average, or comparing class with class, we are certainly more highly evolved and more advanced in development than our ancestors. In intelligence we are certainly superior. I do not refer to the discoveries in science or to the achievements in art of recent times, for in these matters we begin where our predecessors left off, and, though we attain greater altitudes than they, it does not follow that any one of us climbs as far; but comparing individual efforts that are comparable, undoubtedly the level of individual intelligence is raised. Only the most backward of men nowadays entertain beliefs, such as those in charms and spells, and witchcraft, and astrology, that were held by the most advanced of our forefathers two or three centuries ago. Genius is sporadic, and breaks out unexpectedly, we know not why; but undoubtedly the general standard of ability has greatly risen in the last century or two. The foremost writers of the second rank of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would not emerge from the ruck if they wrote now. To go farther back, if St Thomas Aquinas were to write now, no one would read him except the compilers of the Index, and they would probably adjudge him a heretic. Few of the rest of the great Schoolmen would obtain a hearing. They are too dull. To go yet farther back, Cicero would scarcely now find a publisher, and if he published at his own expense would scarcely find a reader. Tacitus might rank with Macaulay and Thucydides with Gibbon, but neither of them would stand head and shoulders above the historians of to-day. Our sympathies are so much more acute, that the weekly hanging of a score of condemned men and women at Tyburn, the frequent transportation of hundreds of convicts to Botany Bay, would

no more be tolerated than the drawings and quarterings and the burnings alive of a still earlier time. Undoubtedly we have evolved: we have developed: we are advanced over our ancestors of a few hundred years ago. The advance may not be far, but there is a certain advance; and if the capacity to feel pleasure partakes, as there is every reason to suppose it does, in the general advance of mental faculty, then we have a greater capacity for pleasure than our forefathers. We see the same difference in contemporaries of different grades. Who can doubt that the capacity to feel pleasure is greater in the cultivated man of leisure than in the boor whose pleasures are limited to his pipe and his pot?

So far, then, there can be no doubt that we have an advantage over those who lived before us; but it must be remembered that along with the increased capacity of feeling pleasure goes the increased capacity of feeling pain; and it is by no means certain that the latter does not outrun the former. Looking farther ahead and with a surer vision than our forefathers, we can taste the joys of anticipation longer and more vividly than they; but the same increase of intelligence that enables us to foresee good fortune enables us to foresee disaster also. That insensibility to pleasure that deprives the labouring man of the enjoyment of a beautiful landscape is accompanied by an insensibility to pain that enables him to look on, with interest unsullied by a qualm, while his damaged finger is being hacked off by an unskilful surgeon. The same development of feeling that gives the delicately nurtured and highly sensitive woman at the coming of her lover a joy more intense and voluminous than the kitchen-maid can feel in similar circumstances, ensures that she shall feel a more bitter grief when he is killed. Still, allowing for this drawback, I think we can say with some confidence that upon the whole, and on the average, we have a greater capacity than those who have preceded us for experiencing happiness.

In the second element of happiness we are without doubt more favourably placed. Our possible interests are far more numerous and far more diverse. To take but one indication: our ancestors, not so very remote, had, on entering life, the choice of but five professions—the navy, the army, law, physic, and divinity. Now, not only is each of these divided and subdivided, but also many more professions, also divided and subdivided, have come into existence—those of the engineer, the actuary, the accountant, the surveyor, and so forth. As with serious professions, so with amusements, so with branches of science, so with matters to be investigated—the possible objects

of interest are innumerable ; and he who now lives the aimless, useless life of the man in easy circumstances depicted by our older novelists does so not by compulsion, not because he can find no object of interest, but because he has not the activity of mind to be interested. The capacity to take interest is a necessary antecedent to the taking of interest, and this capacity is a measure of the mental energy in store. Where there is no energy, there can be no interest ; but even when the energy exists and is ample, there must be some available object for it to expend itself upon, and the object must be not only available but also congenial. The interest of everyone has a natural bent in a certain direction, it may be in several directions ; and it is no more use to supply an astronomer with opportunity for interesting himself in horse-racing or biology than to supply a bookmaker with opportunity for interesting himself in the origin of the Thirty-nine Articles. As things now are, there is scarcely any natural bent that cannot readily find material to expend its interest upon, and in this we seem to have an immeasurable advantage over our forefathers ; but it must not be forgotten that though our interests have widened in many directions they have contracted in others. Our forefathers took the most intense interest—an interest so intense that it led them to suffer as well as to inflict the most excruciating torments—in matters for which no one now living could be induced to care a straw. They were so interested that they were anxious to put others to death, and ready themselves to die, for differences which no one would now take the trouble to understand, and for which no human being living now would sacrifice a pipe of tobacco or a pinch of snuff : for the difference between Arianism, Tritheism, and Sabellianism, Homousianism and Homoiousianism, Supralapsarianism and Sublapsarianism, Socinianism and Erastianism. Our forefathers undertook almost superhuman exertions and perished by tens of thousands to rescue the Holy Sepulchre from the custody of the infidel. We are quite content to leave it in his custody. We take no interest in a subject that aroused passionate enthusiasm throughout the whole of Europe.

The explanation of these vagaries, which seem so strange to us, is that men of active mind must take interest in something. The activity of their minds reaches and stretches out here and there like the tendrils of a plant, seeking something to lay hold of and to take interest in ; and it will lay hold of anything that is not positively abhorrent to it. If it can find nothing on which to expend its interest, it suffers from

the torment of ennui, from which its owner too often seeks relief in drink or drugs. This is the explanation of the prevalence of drinking in our colonies and in other undeveloped societies. The people have not enough things to take interest in. The true antidote to drink is the provision of matters of interest. We who live in highly civilised and highly organised communities have this advantage over our ancestors, that we live fuller lives—that we have more numerous interests, and greater facilities for pursuing those interests, whatever they may be.

The third condition of happiness is the possession of vigour, both bodily and mental. There is a happiness that arises from the mere consciousness of vigour, and that still exists in full force whether the consciousness is justified or is delusive. Alienists are familiar with a morbid euphoria; and we are all familiar with the high spirits of children, which arise out of abounding bodily vigour, and are the mental counterpart of it. It is hard to say whether we are in this respect better or worse off than our predecessors; but if we take a general average of the whole community, it is probable that we are worse off than they. Their conditions of life, their ignorance of hygiene and their indifference to it, and their ignorance of curative medicine secured that only the robust and the vigorous survived. Before the age of Harvey there can have been few long illnesses. Those who did not die speedily of their diseases died speedily of their physicians. The duration of life was much less than it is now, but the proportion of invalids in the population was much smaller. The mortality in the early years of life, still unnecessarily great, was then very great. None but the most robust children survived, and the general average of vigour in the community must have been appreciably higher than it is now, and the consequent euphoria greater and more widespread. I doubt whether the part that this internal factor takes in the production of happiness is sufficiently recognised. It is not only that the less vigorous person is less able to overcome obstacles, and therefore has fewer and less pronounced successes to give him happiness: it is also that the overcoming of obstacles gives to him less happiness than the overcoming of the same obstacles in the same time would give to the more vigorous person, who is by his greater vigour more receptive of happiness and more capable of experiencing it. Of all the conditions of happiness, none is more important than this.

In respect of the development of our faculties it is probable that we are somewhat superior to those who lived in past ages.

Our system of education is faulty enough and inefficient enough, but it is in some respects superior to that of our ancestors. It still consists mainly in the teaching and learning of words, but it does not now consist entirely in the teaching and learning of words. Slowly, grudgingly, and reluctantly pedagogues have at length admitted into the curriculum some modicum of teaching not only a knowledge of things, but also a knowledge of how to do things. The advance is not yet sufficient to make much difference in the degree of development of faculty of the lad who leaves school; but when he has left school and is out in the world, he has many more opportunities for and much more incentive to the development of his faculties than his forefathers had. The activities of life, both in work and in recreation, are much more numerous and diverse, and both in work and in recreation the competition is much keener. The world is much more densely populated; competitors are much more numerous; and therefore competition is much more severe, and the incentive to action, and so to the development of faculty by exercise, is much greater. It is true that avenues and opportunities are much more numerous, or the world could not support its increased population; but it is the pressure of competition that increases the avenues and opportunities, and relatively to this pressure they have rather diminished than increased. The increase in the power and precision of the instruments we use is of course enormous, but the increase in power and precision of the faculties by which these instruments are wielded has been slight in proportion. We still take as our models of excellence old silver, old jewels, old furniture, old pictures, old buildings, old violins, old gardens. Probably our faculties, or some of them, are more highly developed than those of our forefathers were, but the increase has not been great.

Lastly, as the external condition of happiness is the successful surmounting of obstacles, there must, if there is to be happiness, be obstacles to surmount. These we are never likely to want, but we are better off than our forefathers in this respect, that we have a much longer and larger record behind us of difficulties surmounted. Their experience added to our own has provided us with abundance of examples teaching us the way to go about the surmounting of obstacles; has shown us, with respect to this and other classes of difficulties, what ways are likely to prove efficient and what ways are likely to fail. Past experience is in this respect a guide to our steps and a lantern to our feet, as well as an encouragement to our souls. Seeing how many impossibilities have

been achieved, we are reluctant to regard anything as impossible. Seeing that success has been piled on success, we look forward to greater and greater successes in the future. We gain from past experience that general consciousness of power that is so important a condition of happiness. Happiness consists not so much in actual achievement as in impending achievement. If we feel confident that we can do a difficult thing, we already taste the happiness of success in doing it. If we feel confidence in our own powers, we have within us a permanent source of happiness. Here at last we find definite ground for asserting that our happiness is superior to that of our forerunners. All the accounts we have of primitive peoples show that they feel they are the helpless sport of malignant gods or of blind fate, against either of which it is hopeless to struggle. We regard ourselves as living under the reign of laws whose ill consequences to ourselves can be averted when we understand the laws. We are in great measure freed from the paralysing spell of that conscious impotence in the face of natural agents that oppresses those who are ignorant of the laws of nature. Year by year our resources of defence against disease and disaster increase, and with this increase of resources goes, not only greater freedom from disease and disaster, but, what is far more important to our happiness, a continually growing sense of power, and a continually increasing confidence that this growth will continue and increase. Nothing is more disheartening, there is no more fertile source of misery, than a feeling of helplessness in the face of impending disaster. From this feeling primitive peoples are seldom free. They seek to counteract it by the use of prayers, spells, charms, and incantations, but these give little real comfort. The only true comfort is a clear foresight, and a knowledge of effectual means of prevention or avoidance. In this respect there is much yet to be done, but enough has already been done to afford us certainty of much further progress, and enough has already been done to relieve us altogether from the terrors of feeling ourselves the blind and helpless butts of overwhelming and malignant powers.

So far, I have not alluded to any increase of happiness from the general abandonment of the belief in hell and in the depredations of a personal devil. I am not sure that this modification of our belief has upon the whole increased our happiness. Escape from hell by means of a deathbed repentance was so easy and so certain, that no evil-doer need live in apprehension except of sudden death; and hence arose that horror of sudden death which so oppressed our ancestors,

and which we find so hard to understand. Almost everyone now would choose a sudden death rather than a lingering death, and the reason is that we are no longer in terror of that hell that awaited those who died so suddenly that they had no opportunity for repentance. This source of unhappiness was no doubt very real, but it had its mitigations. In the first place, few deaths could be so sudden as to give no opportunity at all for repentance.

“Between the saddle and the ground,
I mercy sought, I mercy found.”

And repentance was an effectual safeguard against consignment to hell, however outrageous might have been the turpitude of the sinner. In the second place, while every sinner looked with considerable confidence to his own escape by a timely repentance from the torments of hell, he was by no means inclined to admit that his sinful enemy would obtain the same immunity by the same means; and it must have been no small satisfaction to the victim of oppression and wrong to look forward to a time when the position would be reversed, and more than reversed—when he would find the joy of ineffable beatitude sensibly increased by watching his quondam oppressor writhing in the torments of hell. Hell was on a memorable occasion dismissed by Lord Westbury with costs, but I do not feel sure that, upon the whole, we are much happier for his judgment.

CHAS. A. MERCIER.

PARKSTONE.

THE MODERNIST REVIVAL OF ANGLICANISM.

THE REV. CAVENDISH MOXON, M.A.,

Marske Rectory, Richmond, Yorkshire.

SOME of the Bishops who are organising the Anglican Mission of repentance and hope deplore the secular outlook of the people and their sinful failure to answer the Church's call. Others, like Bishop Gore, openly ask the question, "Is Anglicanism worth preserving?"

Now, the very fact that such a question should be asked by a Bishop is full of significance and of hope. It means that it is no longer complacently assumed that the Anglican Church must be worth preserving at all costs. It is a hopeful sign that some Anglicans are ridding themselves of the fatal delusion that because their Church is a part of the Catholic Church it must therefore be a perfect and a permanent Church of divine grace and truth.

The success of the National Mission will entirely depend upon its presupposition with regard to the Church itself. It will fail if it is conducted on the assumption that only the unchurched masses need repentance, if it merely condemns the national sins to which Anglicans are not inclined, and if it urges repentant sinners to accept unconditionally a perfect system of truth and fellowship.

The National Mission will succeed only if it is primarily a call to Anglicans to repent of Anglican sins and to consider how far the failure to be in fact the Church of the Nation is due to the sins of Anglicanism that hinder the operation of the Divine Spirit in its midst.

The prevailing sins of the Anglican Church to-day are not the sins of the days of the Evangelical and Catholic revivals. These movements have done much to promote the ideals of individual conversion and consecration and of corporate life

and worship within its borders. The chief sins which to-day threaten to sever the Anglican Church from the Source of its life are its tendency to look back to its golden age in the past, its consequent traditionalism, its practical denial of the present progress of revelation in matters of truth and of conduct, and its unwillingness to hear what the Spirit is saying to the modern world and the living Church.

The most serious symptom of this backward-looking attitude is the failure of Anglican teachers to emphasise the primary *religious* duty of the love of truth and the practice of the open mind towards the new as well as towards the old revelation of the Holy Spirit. The Anglican Church is still to a large extent unaware of the fact that Christian truth is not a ready-made whole to be accepted without thought, but an ideal in course of realisation to be pursued by every follower of Jesus according to opportunity and power. Anglicans whose conscience is acute in other directions practically deny the present activity of the Holy Spirit, and fail to assert the obligation of Christians to venture forward in faith as seekers of the still imperfectly realised kingdom of truth.

If the signs of arrested development of Anglicanism are many, still the situation is not yet desperate. Even the most convinced traditionalists, like Bishop Gore, admit the working of a powerful leaven of progressive or modernist Churchmanship which has the Churchmen's Union as the centre of its activity. It is natural that those Anglican Catholics and Evangelicals who agree in seeing the whole truth of our religion revealed in the past should regard this Modern Churchmanship as a merely negative, rationalist, and intellectualist movement. To Churchmen who find truth absolute and complete in the Bible and the Creeds, Modernists must appear as persons puffed up by intellectual pride, which leads them to lay profane hands upon the holiest shrines of faith. It is inevitable that those who do not recognise the religious duty of striving ever to escape from illusion and error towards the truth should see in Modernist reinterpretations and restatements but new names for heresy.

If Modernist Churchmen are convinced that their principles have a religious and moral force capable of reviving the Anglican Church, they can afford to bear persecution and misunderstanding without bitterness, while they continue to proclaim the truth they see in its application to all the problems of our ecclesiastical and civil life.

From the Modernists' point of view the life of the Anglican Church is plainly in danger in so far as it has failed to adapt

itself to the new world of thought and ideals that is in process of creation. It is therefore the duty of these Modernist Churchmen to state with a united, perfectly clear and unambiguous voice the religious duty of seeking the new truth and of applying it fearlessly to the old forms of Christian theology, ethics, organisation, and worship. We are forbidden to conceal our principles or the results of their application, not only by our duty to God and our Church, but also by the clear teaching of history. The success of the Reformation in the sixteenth century and of the Evangelical and Catholic revivals was due to men who had the grace to proclaim their faith openly, and, if necessary, to suffer and die for the truth's sake. No doubt there is a place in the Modernist movement for the Erasmus-like policy of caution and reserve in order to form an intellectual and emotional bridge between the old and the new. Yet the Reformation was not carried through by men who were dominated by piety for the past and an academic belief in the inevitable trend of events towards the truth, but rather by men who dared to practise their principles and to risk their place in the Church and even their life rather than compromise with error or fail to apply the truth for the reformation of the Church.

Since we believe that Modernism has a message for the Church, we must not be deterred from openly delivering this message by any consideration of party policy or interest. We shall only prove the reality of our faith in the Spirit of truth if we resolutely reject the temptation to withhold our witness lest we should either disturb and split the Anglican Church or lose our own place in it. It may be that the revival we desire will spread throughout our Church. But if the worst should happen and Anglicanism finally rejected the new point of view and cast out all the Modernists, the cause of true religion would be furthered by their exclusion from a Church which for them could no longer appear to be a dwelling for the Spirit of truth. The first duty of Modernists is to make their meaning so plain that the prevalent misunderstandings and misstatements of the belief of these Modern Churchmen shall henceforth be impossible for honest inquirers.

Modernism is a way of regarding the traditional Christian life, ethics, theology, organisation, and worship from the point of view of believers in the progressive revelation of truth and duty by the Holy Spirit.

Modernist Churchmen ought therefore to assert plainly, and not to admit with apologies and reserves, that this

Christianity contains things new as well as old. The time has come for a definite assertion of our right to hold Christian beliefs in a form that is either unknown or rejected by the Councils and the majority of the members of the Catholic Church.

The recent controversies about particular new interpretations and restatements of the articles of belief all lead us back to the fundamental question at issue: "What is Christianity?" If the Traditionalists are right, Christianity is an infallibly exact unfolding of what was fully and implicitly revealed from the beginning. From this point of view what is new is therefore also untrue. But if the Modernists are right, Christianity is a real development, a creative evolution of life and thought and a gradually guided escape from illusion and error into the kingdom of truth and goodness.

Modernism, as here defended, is an attempt to apply consistently a belief in the present activity of God in the Church and in the spiritual world. Hence belief in the real growth of Christianity is the fundamental principle of Modernism. In the past a belief in hard-and-fast dogmas has sought to limit the course of the Spirit and caused the new life and truth to burst out at intervals with a disruptive force that sometimes threatened the very existence of the traditional Churches. The purpose of Modernism is to combine reverence for the past with an attentive watchfulness for Christ's coming in the present. Since Modernism is the religion of life, it is strictly conditioned by the laws of life, and therefore opposed to heresy in the sense of a set of one-sided or arbitrarily chosen beliefs or denials. Modernism by its faith in the supremacy of Christ's spirit of love is also opposed to schism in the sense of an attempt to set up any other test of Catholicity and Churchmanship than conformity with the law of love. Our point of view forbids us either to make a final criterion of the Bible, like some Evangelicals, or of tradition and Councils, like some Catholics, or to reject entirely these authorities, like some liberal Protestants. We cannot seek the eternal essence of Christianity apart from its living forms of worship, work, and thought; but we cannot give a final authority to any book, creed, ministry, or Church in the past.

From this modern faith in Christianity four consequences follow that need clear statement at the present time in order that the Anglican Church may adapt itself to the new world.

(1) It follows from our faith that we are not required by God to test the truth of our beliefs by their exact conformity

with the Bible or the Creeds. We must reject the Catholic saying that the Bible is to prove what the Church teaches, as well as the Protestant appeal to the absolute authority of Scripture.

(2) Earnest truth-seekers must be encouraged to a degree yet unknown in the Church to think, to speak, and to write with freedom. Above all, we must beware of a liberal orthodoxy as a test for teachers. Our Scriptures and Creeds are sacramental means for our absorption of the treasures of the past; they must not be allowed to fetter the expanding life and thought thus generated. The test for Church membership and ministry must be ability and desire to join in the common worship and work, sympathy with Christian ideals, and belief in a kernel of truth and value beneath the ancient husks of faith. The risk of tolerating those Modernists who wish to be included in the fellowship is vastly less than the risk of attempting to silence or expel them in the name of God.

Tests for preachers and teachers encourage mental laziness, suppression of true conviction, and disloyalty to truth. To those of us who listen for new words from the living God, such tests are a faithless and sinful barrier which makes it almost impossible for the Church to hear the divine message. Either the Holy Spirit has new truth to teach the Church or He has not. If He has, then it is impossible for our Bishops rightly to condemn what is new on *a priori* grounds, or to fix its limits beforehand; if He has not, then the least deviation from ancient belief ought to be branded as heresy.

It would appear that some of the Anglican Bishops are unwilling to face this clear alternative. The Bishops of Winchester and Oxford welcome free speculation within the limits of the Creeds. Because the Rev. J. M. Thompson expressed his belief in the Incarnation and his denial of the clauses about Christ's birth and resurrection in their literal meaning, the Bishop of Winchester refused to sanction his teaching office as Dean of Divinity at Magdalen College, Oxford. At the same time the Bishop of Oxford inhibited Mr Thompson from officiating as a minister in the diocese of Oxford, and other Bishops have followed the lead of Dr Gore.

From our point of view it is greatly to be regretted that neither the diocese nor the Church has rallied for the defence of free research and speech like the College authorities, who removed Dr Talbot's power of sanction. The Church which allows such a condemnation of freedom as this is in danger of a fatal severance of the tie that binds it to the life-giving

Spirit of God. The very fact that Mr Thompson's position as an unbeneficed clergyman gives him no right of appeal to the Privy Council makes his case a test of the Anglican conscience, and also a call to all who love truth more than tradition to unite in defence of religious liberty. Even on legal grounds Mr Thompson has a strong case in view of the Subscription Act, which has substituted a general for a detailed assent, and in view of the large liberty that is now generally practised in the interpretation of the Bible and the Creeds. But Modernism implies a defence of liberty not on legal but on moral and religious grounds. And it is on these grounds that we ought to assert the right of clergy who believe in the Incarnation to assert the legendary character of the stories about the manner of Christ's birth and resurrection when the evidence leads them to this conclusion. Modernists are indeed divided on this point; but all unite in asserting that no religious value is lost if belief in the Incarnation is held independently of belief in the virgin birth and the disappearance of Christ's corpse by a miracle.

(3) We must oppose on religious grounds the attempt that is being made to attain religious unity by way of agreement in matters of metaphysics, history, and science as the essential foundation of Christian faith. We must show why we cannot regard as a step towards unity the Interim Report of the Committee recently appointed by leaders of the Anglican and Free Churches. This document bears the impress of Bishop Gore's belief that all the articles of the Creeds form a coherent sequence each part of which is essential to the whole structure. This manifesto, with its implicit condemnation of Modernism, is vitiated by a fatal rationalism, since it makes religious unity depend upon intellectual uniformity of interpretation of ancient Creeds.

Professor Bethune-Baker (in the *Times* of February 23) has clearly shown the error and weakness of the Report; but it is incumbent on those of us who believe that there is a better way, to express the positive faith that is in us. The true bond of unity is a common loyalty to the Highest, a common love of truth, goodness, and beauty, a common faith in the Divine character as revealed by the life and work of Christ, a fellowship for the worship of these attributes of God and for their realisation in all the relations of human life. The religious bond between disciples and God in Christ is the bond of love and not an agreement with the belief either of the Master or of a majority of His followers. The War has revealed to many the possibility of religious unity without uniformity.

Christians of very different beliefs have been drawn together in the face of a common danger and in pursuance of a common super-personal aim. The War is therefore a call from God to all who believe in the ideal of unity in diversity to unite to claim the right to hold this broad ideal in the Anglican Church by the side of the narrow ideal of Dr Gore and the Catholics and Protestants who put the Creeds or the Scriptures in place of the Spirit of Christ as the bond of unity between Christians and Churches.

(4) Finally, we must repent of our unfaithfulness to the Spirit of truth in our services before we dare to go out to the non-churchgoers and rebuke them for their absence from our worship. By constant repetition in our worship of statements we know to be untrue, and of sentiments we know to be not Christian, we have compelled thousands of people, who desire to worship in sincerity and truth, either to stop at home or to form the fatal habit of repeating as a matter of course words to which in heart and mind they cannot assent. If we loved more Him who is the truth, we should refuse to commit the sin of untruthfulness in the very acts designed for His worship. We should then at once force the Convocations to pass a measure of Prayer Book revision by which the untruths we now solemnly utter in God's presence should be removed.

The Anglican Church still allows deacons at the outset of their ministry to assent to a form of belief in the Bible which, in its natural sense, must be a lie for any intelligent student of modern criticism. The celebrant at the Holy Communion must still repeat, as if he believed it, the false statement that the world was made in a week. Choirs are forced to sing psalms containing violently anti-Christian sentiments, and the clergy are forced to read "lessons" which teach neither Christian truth nor morality.

What, then, is the mission to which God is now calling the Anglican Church? Is it not primarily a mission to its own members for the deepening of their faith in truth, and for the expulsion of falsehood, insincerity, cant, and fear? The title of the National Mission has been well chosen if it means that the Church itself needs repentance of these sins before it can hope to bear its full Christian witness and strengthen the nation in the true and consistent service of God.

CAVENDISH MOXON.

ASSYRIA AND PRUSSIA : AN HISTORICAL PARALLEL.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON, Ph.D., D.D.,

Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism in Hartford
Theological Seminary, Hartford, Conn., U.S.A.

THE one problem that engrosses our attention at present is the war. Thinking men in all lands cannot help asking what is its meaning, and what will be its issue? There are no seers among us to-day who can forecast the future, and the only way in which we can answer our questions is by the study of history. History repeats itself, and whenever conditions arise in one age that resemble those in a previous age there is reason to believe that the outcome in both cases will be similar. This is the reason for comparing the growth of ancient Assyria with that of modern Prussia. The historical development, the ideals, and the methods of the two empires bear the closest resemblance; a comparative study, accordingly, cannot fail to shed light upon the meaning of the present world-war and upon its ultimate results.

1. *The Colonial Period.*—Assyria was founded as a colony of the old Babylonian empire to spread Babylonian civilisation and to defend the frontier against the barbarians. In Gen. x. 10 f. we read: "The beginning of his (Nimrod's) kingdom was Babylon. Out of that land went forth Assyria, and built Nineveh." This event occurred as early perhaps as 3000 B.C. The Assyrians spoke the same language as the Babylonians, had the same religion, and down to the latest times recognised their cultural and ecclesiastical dependence upon the mother-country. This early colony stood under the rule of military governors who were directly responsible to the Babylonian emperors.

In like manner the Mark of Brandenburg, the nucleus of modern Prussia, was founded about A.D. 930 by Henry I.,

the last of the Carolingian emperors, as a bulwark of the Holy Roman Empire against the heathen Prussians and Wends. Its ruler, the Markgraf of Brandenburg, was a minor official who owed direct allegiance to the Emperor. The original Prussians were a Lettish race, and the name Pruži, or Prutheni, by which they called themselves, means "the intelligent ones." It appears thus that the modern Prussian claim to possess the only true *Kultur* is of ancient origin. They were the most obstinate opponents of Christianity among the European peoples. They persecuted and plundered their Christian neighbours, until in 1230 the monastic military order of the Teutonic Knights conquered the region, and imposed a superficial Christianity upon its inhabitants.

2. *The Period of the Governors.*—The governors of the city of Asshur early showed an ambition to increase their power at the expense of their neighbours. They gradually brought Calah, Nineveh, and Arbela, the other ancient colonies of the land, under their domination, and extended their territory into Mesopotamia. As early as 2000 B.C. they had forced the Babylonian emperors to recognise Assyria as a state equal in importance to the old city-states of Babylonia, and to confer on them the title of *Patesi* or "Prince."

Similarly, the Markgrafen of Brandenburg, of the so-called Ascanian line (A.D. 1134–1319), united all the towns of the North Mark under their rule, extended their authority into Prussia, occupied and fortified Berlin (A.D. 1240), and eventually made it the capital instead of Brandenburg. In 1356 the Mark was strong enough to be recognised as one of the chief states of the empire, its ruler obtained the title of Elector, and this dignity was made hereditary in the house of Hohenzollern.

3. *The Period of the Princes.*—As soon as the rulers of Assyria had become Patesis they began to aim at independence from Babylon. An inscription of Tiglathpileser I. (ca. 1100 B.C.) mentions Ishme-Dagan and his son Shamshi-Adad, Patesis of Asshur, who lived seven hundred years before his time. Inscriptions of these and of other Patesis have come to light through the recent German excavations on the site of the city of Asshur. These princes strengthened their armies, developed their resources, enlarged their borders by conquest, and eventually as early as 1700 B.C. ventured to throw off allegiance to Babylon. Ashirrimnishesu is the first Patesi who is known to have assumed the title of King.

In like manner the Electors of Brandenburg early manifested a determination to secure their independence.

Frederick I. offered himself as a candidate for the imperial throne in 1438 against Albert II. of the house of Hapsburg. Frederick II. (1440-1470) deprived the free cities of his dominion of their liberties, conquered the Neumark of Prussia from the Teutonic Knights, and would have annexed Lusatia and Pomerania if the Emperor had not stopped him. Albert (1470-1486) gained territory from Mecklenburg and Pomerania, and took the important step of establishing primogeniture in the dynasty of Hohenzollern. Through this measure the territory of the Electorate was kept intact, and the absolutism of its rulers was confirmed. John (1486-1499) still further curtailed the liberties of the cities, and secured his succession to Pomerania on extinction of the ducal line. Joachim I. (1499-1535) promoted education, and unified the heterogeneous elements of his dominion by the introduction of imperial Roman law.

Joachim II. (1535-1571) embraced the Reformation, and thus placed himself in open conflict with the Emperor. He made himself the head of the Protestant Church in Brandenburg, and diverted the ecclesiastical endowments to military uses. He also secured his succession to the duchy of Prussia in case of failure of the male line. John George (1571-1598) filled the offices of state with members of the petty nobility, and thus gathered about himself an aristocracy pledged to his support. Joachim Frederick (1598-1608) introduced the *Staatsrath*, or ministerial cabinet, and thus laid the foundation of the modern Prussian bureaucracy. John Sigismund (1608-1619) inherited the duchy of Prussia after the death of Duke Albert in 1618, and from this time onward Prussia became the main constituent of the dominions of the Hohenzollerns. George William (1619-1640) made treaties with the Protestants, or with the Catholics, as seemed most advantageous at the moment, and broke these when it suited his convenience. Carlyle says of him: "Where the Titans were bowling rocks at each other, George William hoped by dexterous skipping to escape share of the game."

Frederick William, "the Great Elector" (1640-1688), developed such an efficient army that at the peace of Westphalia he was able to add to his territory the whole of Pomerania and the ecclesiastical principalities of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Minden. In the second Swedish war in 1655 he helped the Swedes to defeat the Poles, and received in return recognition as the independent ruler of Prussia. Then he deserted his ally, and helped Poland to defeat the Swedes, receiving as his reward the recognition of the inde-

pendence of Prussia by Poland. In 1666 he added to his domain the Rhenish duchies of Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg. In 1677-78 he drove the Swedes out of Northern Germany, capturing Stettin and Stralsund. At his death the territory of Brandenburg had increased from an original 11,000 square miles held by the first Elector to 43,000 square miles, the revenue had increased fivefold, and the army was one of the finest in Europe. On the strength of these facts Frederick I., his son (1688-1713), forced the Emperor Leopold I. in 1701 to grant him the title of King. From this time onward Prussia was independent of the empire, and took its place as one of the great powers of Europe.

4. *The Period of the Kingdom.*—When Assyria had secured her independence, she at once began to aim at the establishment of an empire. This involved, first, the extension of her territory by conquest, so that she might become stronger than Babylon; and second, the overthrow of Babylon. For centuries there was war between the two countries, with success now on one side, now on the other. Burnaburiash I., king of Babylon (*ca.* 1508 B.C.), had to yield territory to Puzur-Ashir, king of Assyria. Karaindash I., king of Babylon, was compelled to make a treaty with Ashirbelnishesu, king of Assyria, and to establish a boundary line between the two countries. Asshuruballit II. (*ca.* 1400 B.C.) compelled Burnaburiash II. to marry his daughter Muballitashirua, and thus obtained a controlling interest in the politics of the southern kingdom. When the Babylonians revolted against Karakhardash, the son of the Assyrian princess, and slew him, Asshuruballit intervened with his army and seated Kurigalzu II., another grandson, on the throne. His successor Ellilnirari defeated Kurigalzu II. and compelled him to cede a large part of Mesopotamia. Arikdenilu (*ca.* 1310 B.C.) conquered the Gutu on the east and the Aramæan Sutu on the south. Adadnirari I. (*ca.* 1300 B.C.) defeated the kingdom of Mitanni in the west and annexed part of Mesopotamia, in consequence of which he assumed the title "King of Hosts." Nazimaruttash, the contemporary king of Babylon, feared his growing power and attacked him, but he was defeated and was compelled to acknowledge Assyria's claim to Northern Mesopotamia. Shalmaneser I. established military colonies in the regions that his father had conquered, and carried his arms beyond the Euphrates as far as the Amanus mountain range. As a result of this campaign the kingdom of Mitanni, which had been a formidable obstacle to Assyrian progress, was destroyed. He moved the capital from Asshur to Calah in order to bring

it nearer the centre of the kingdom. Tukultininib I. (*ca.* 1290 B.C.) extended the borders of Assyria still farther on the north, east, and west, defeated Kashtiliash II., and entered Babylon in triumph.

After his death Assyria passed through a period of quiescence. Internal disorders and the revival of Babylonia stripped her for a time of her newly conquered provinces, but under Tiglathpileser I. (*ca.* 1100 B.C.) her irresistible forward march began once more. He regained all that his predecessor had lost, and added much new territory to the kingdom.

The death of Tiglathpileser I. was followed by a second period of quiescence until in 885 B.C. Assurnasirpal III. came to the throne. From 885 to 879 B.C. he was occupied in reducing to submission the tribes on the border of his kingdom. In 878 he began to push westward. The Aramæan kingdom of Bit-Adini, which had taken the place of the old kingdom of Mitanni, was conquered. In 876 the Euphrates was crossed, and he marched as far as the shores of the Mediterranean. Here he received the tribute of Tyre, Sidon, Gebal, Arvad, the Amorites, and other districts which dreaded his advance and sought to buy him off. His son Shalmaneser III. (856–824 B.C.) made almost yearly campaigns with the purpose of conquering Damascus, the chief power in the west. He records successes, but he annexed no new territory, and it is clear that in Damascus he for the first time met a foe who could oppose him on equal terms. In 854 Ahab, king of Israel, fought on the side of Benhadad, king of Damascus, and in 842 Jehu, king of Israel, was constrained to pay tribute to Shalmaneser III. These are the first points of contact of Israel with Assyria.

After the death of Shalmaneser III. in 825 B.C., Assyria entered upon a third period of quiescence, but the career of conquest was again resumed under Tiglathpileser IV. (745–727 B.C.). In 732 B.C. he captured Damascus and deported its inhabitants. This event was followed immediately by an expedition against Babylonia which ended in the capture of Babylon. Tiglathpileser then took the step toward which all the kings of Assyria for a thousand years had been aiming. On New Year's Day 728 B.C. he went through the ancient ceremony of grasping the hands of the god Marduk, and thus became the Holy Babylonian Emperor.

The development of the Assyrian monarchy from Ashirrimnishesu to Tiglathpileser IV. that we have just traced has its complete analogy in the development of the Prussian monarchy from Frederick I. to William I. It is

noteworthy that Frederick took his royal title from Prussia, that part of his territory which did not owe feudal allegiance to the Emperor; and that he did not call himself *König von Preussen*, but *König in Preussen*, which suggested that his kingdom was not to be limited to Prussia. From this time onward the Hohenzollerns aimed to take the leadership of Germany away from the Hapsburgs. In order to accomplish this, their first need was to enlarge their territory and their military resources by new conquests.

Frederick William I. (1713–1740) replenished his treasury by the strictest economy, and was able to maintain one of the largest and best-drilled armies in Europe. He added Guelders to his kingdom after the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. He expelled the Swedes from Pomerania in 1715, and after the peace of 1720 annexed the province of Vorpommern. In the treaty of Berlin in 1728 he agreed with Austria to support the Pragmatic Sanction, while the Emperor Charles VI. agreed to recognise his claims to the duchies of Jülich and Berg; but the Emperor played him false, and therefore in 1739 he formed an alliance with France. This is the first break between the houses of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg, and marks the beginning of the struggle for supremacy between the two dynasties that is the central feature of European history for the next hundred years.

Frederick II., “the Great” (1740–1786), absorbed East Friesland in 1744, and conquered Silesia from Austria in 1745. During the next ten years he replenished his treasury and his army so successfully that in the Seven Years’ War he maintained himself victoriously against an alliance that included nearly all the states of Europe. In 1772 he joined with Austria in the first partition of Poland. During his reign the territory of Prussia was extended from 43,000 square miles to 75,000 square miles. He also formed in 1786 the *Fürstenbund*, or league of German princes, under the leadership of Prussia, to antagonise the ambitions of Austria. Frederick William II. (1786–1797) took part in the second and the third partitions of Poland (1793 and 1795), and thus nearly doubled the area of his kingdom.

Under Frederick William III. (1797–1840) Prussian ambition received a temporary set-back through the victories of Napoleon in 1806; but after his downfall in 1815 she regained nearly all of her former territory, and acquired new Germanic regions in the place of Slavic regions that she surrendered. Frederick William also established a customs-union of German states under the leadership of Prussia, which

was another blow at the supremacy of the house of Hapsburg. Frederick William IV. (1840–1861) was offered the imperial crown by the Diet at Frankfurt in 1849, but did not dare to accept it on account of the opposition of Austria.

Under William I. (1861–1888) Prussia began again the career of conquest that had been temporarily interrupted by the Napoleonic wars. In 1863, after the death of Ferdinand VII., king of Denmark, Prussia and Austria laid claim to the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, in spite of the fact that both had signed the Treaty of London in 1852 in which the succession of Denmark to these duchies was guaranteed. These provinces were conquered from Denmark, Prussia taking Lauenburg and Schleswig, and Austria Holstein. In 1866 Prussia broke her agreement with Austria and annexed Holstein. Austria declared war, but was utterly unprepared, while the Prussian army was in the highest state of efficiency. Within seven days Austria was defeated, and was forced to cede Holstein and to pay an indemnity of 20,000,000 thalers. Prussia thereupon forcibly annexed Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, and the free city of Frankfurt. As a result of this war the leadership of the Germanic nations passed from the Hapsburgs to the Hohenzollerns. The North German Confederation was then formed under the leadership of Prussia.

Prussia now saw that the time was ripe for the assumption of imperial dignity. The only obstacles were the opposition of France and the jealousy of the South German states. Both could be overcome by a war which should at the same time break the power of France and unite the German principalities in a common cause. Accordingly, it was determined to provoke France on the earliest possible occasion. On the trivial pretext of the succession to the Spanish throne, Bismarck managed to embroil the two countries; and finally, by giving out to the press a garbled telegram of the King, he goaded Napoleon III. into a declaration of war. Prussia was ready and France was unprepared. Within a few months the French armies were defeated and Paris was besieged. On January 18, 1871, King William of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor at the palace of Versailles, and a few days later Paris surrendered and the new emperor made his triumphal entry. France was condemned to pay a war indemnity of five milliards of francs and to cede to Germany Alsace and part of Lorraine. Thus on the ruins of the Holy Roman Empire the new Prussian Empire arose.

5. *The Period of the Empire.*—When Assyria had defeated

Babylon on the south and Damascus on the west, and had crowned her king Emperor of Babylon, her ambition was not yet satisfied. She began at once to lust for the conquest of the world. From Tiglathpileser IV. to Assurbanipal there was no pause in her effort to bring all the nations beneath her rule.

A similar development has gone on in Germany since the year 1871. No sooner did Prussia obtain the leadership of the German states than she began to aim at world-empire. William I. did not adopt the title *Kaiser von Deutschland*, which would have suggested a territorial limitation of his rule, but that of *Deutscher Kaiser*, which asserted that he was the heir of Charlemagne and of the Cæsars. The utterances of Prussia's military experts, of her historians and philosophers, have been unequivocal, that might makes right, and that Germany has the might and therefore the right to rule the other nations. "Might," says von Bernhardi, "gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest upon the very nature of things" (*Germany and the Next War*, Eng. trans., p. 23). *The Army and Navy Review* for August 14, 1915, reports the remarks of Count von Goetzen to an American army officer immediately after the battle of Manila as follows:—

"About fifteen years from now my country will start her great war. She will be in Paris about two months after the commencement of hostilities. Her move on Paris will be but a step to her real object, the crushing of England. Everything will move like clockwork. We shall be prepared, and the others will not be prepared. I speak of this because of the connection which it will have with your own country. Some months after we finish our work in Europe we will take New York, and probably Washington, and hold them for some time. We will put your country in its place, with reference to Germany. We do not propose to take any of your territory, but we do intend to take a billion or more of dollars from New York and other places. The Monroe Doctrine will be taken charge of by us, as we will then have put you in your places, and we will take charge of South America, as far as we wish to."

In the light of the numerous utterances, both public and private, of men high in authority, there can be no doubt that Prussia has long planned the conquest of France, Great Britain, and America, and the extension of her empire eastward "from Berlin to Bagdad."

In order to accomplish her designs of world-empire, Assyria's first care was to strengthen her army. Every native Assyrian and every citizen of the conquered provinces was compelled to serve. A huge standing army was built up, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and chariotry. All these branches of the service were brought to the highest pitch of efficiency, and were kept in constant readiness.

In like manner Prussia's chief effort for the last fifty years has been to build up her fighting forces. Every German subject has been compelled to serve three years in the barracks, unless he has been able to pass the university examinations, in which case he has been allowed to take military drill in connection with his higher studies. Those who have completed the three years have been placed on the reserve, which is liable to be called out in case of war. Thus the entire population has been converted into one vast military camp. The navy has been built up in a similar manner, and strategic railways have been constructed on the eastern and western frontiers. Overtures looking toward the diminishing of armaments by the nations of Europe, or toward the settlement of disputes through the Hague tribunal, have been systematically rejected by Prussia.

In order to increase the strength of their armies the Assyrian emperors claimed absolute powers. Ancient rights and privileges of the clergy, of the nobles, and of cities were abolished, and the government was centralised in the person of the monarch. He was not only commander-in-chief, but also head of the church, chief executive, and supreme judge.

Similarly the Hohenzollerns, in order to promote military efficiency, have been absolutists. They have been compelled by the march of civilisation to grant constitutions and popular assemblies, but they have always managed to circumvent these impertinent upstarts. Nominally there has been universal suffrage, but by a system of plural votes of the conservative classes the working men have been practically disfranchised. The ministers of state have not been chosen by the people, but appointed by the Emperor, and their function has been adroitly to play off one group of the Reichstag against another so as to secure a majority for the government. There has been no liberty of the press, for newspapers have been censored even in time of peace; and there has been no liberty of speech, for at every public assembly a police official has presided who could dismiss the meeting if any remark were made that he regarded as improper. While the present writer was a student in Berlin, an old workman was severely punished for speaking

of Kaiser Wilhelm I. as "der greise Kaiser" (the venerable Emperor), Kaiser Friedrich as "der weise Kaiser" (the wise Emperor), and Kaiser Wilhelm II. as "der Reise Kaiser" (the travelling Emperor).

The Assyrian emperors realised that victory depended not only upon the army but also upon economic preparedness. Accordingly, they taxed the nation to the limit of endurance, and put forth every effort to foster industry and trade.

Prussia also has perceived that military success depends upon economic prosperity. She has fostered scientific research. She has developed industry, trade, and commerce. She has adopted socialistic schemes for the betterment of the working classes. She has organised production so that the output of the nation is increased to the maximum and the expenditure is reduced to the minimum. Commercial prosperity has brought the possibility of larger taxation. The burden has been increased year by year to meet the ever-growing cost of the armament, and to fill up the war-chest in the tower at Spandau; and in 1914 the extreme step was taken of levying a special super-tax upon the capitalists of the empire.

The Assyrian emperors recognised that they must have the sympathy of their subjects in their ambition for world dominion. Accordingly, they inaugurated a campaign of education that is without a parallel in antiquity. The inscriptions that they carved on the walls of their palaces and public buildings, and set up in every city of their domain, had the aim of imbuing their people with the idea that Assyria was the greatest nation, that she was destined by the gods to rule all lands, and that her enemies were knaves and fools who could easily be conquered. In the inscriptions foes are constantly called by such contemptuous terms as "sinners," "disregarders of the divine laws," "sons of nobody," "men without understanding," "men whom the gods had made mad, that they might oppose my majesty and might perish," "hostile, rebellious men, who did not fear my rule, whom the gods had forsaken."

Prussia, like Assyria, has also realised the military importance of education. A large part of the indemnity received from France after the Franco-Prussian war was spent on institutions of higher learning. Along with the development of scientific and technical training there has gone a unique cultivation of beliefs and ideals. Through supervised teaching in the schools, the universities, the press, and the pulpit the German nation has systematically been brought to believe that it is the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous people on

earth; that its *Kultur* is the only one worth having; that its language is the most beautiful and expressive in the world, and is destined to become the speech of all mankind; that English in particular is "the bastard jargon of a race of pirates"; that it is Germany's duty to conquer the other nations in order to bring to them the blessings of civilisation; that Russia is so corrupt politically that she can make no defence; that France is a nation of degenerates; that England is so rent with political dissensions as to be helpless; that America loves only the dollar, and will not fight for her honour; that large parts of the United States and of Brazil are so filled with German colonists that they can already be indicated on the map as *Deutsche Gebiete*. These propositions have been drummed into the minds of the Germans so constantly for the last fifty years that they have become axiomatic. This accounts for the extraordinary unanimity of the nation in the prosecution of the war. Their minds have been trained to agree with the government just as their bodies have been trained to obey the drill-master.

When Assyria was ready to advance she created occasions for war. The other peoples desired peace and feared to provoke her, but this did not prevent her attacking them. She had made treaties with the smaller nations promising to leave them in peace if they paid tribute; but she had no hesitation in breaking these treaties when it suited her convenience. 2 Kings xviii. 13-16 tells us how Sennacherib received from Hezekiah, king of Judah, three hundred talents of silver and thirty talents of gold, and promised to withdraw; then broke his promise and demanded the surrender of Jerusalem—a perfidy that called forth from Isaiah the indignant protest: "Woe to thee who spoilest, though thou wast not spoiled; and dealest treacherously, though they dealt not treacherously with thee" (Isa. xxxiii. 1).

Once more the analogy with modern Prussia is complete. When Prussia had finished her military preparations, and had built her strategic railways to the Belgian frontier, and when she thought that Britain was so rent by political strife as to be unable to interfere, then she struck her blow. She did not wait for a cause of war, she manufactured one. No neutral nation believes that the Serbian episode would have precipitated a catastrophe unless Germany had decreed that the time had come for which she had so long been preparing. No neutral believes that Germany was attacked by the Allies. The absurdity of the claim is shown at once by the fact that Germany was ready while the Allies were not. The war was

not necessary to secure economic independence. Germany already led the world in educational, scientific, and technical development. Her young men were taking business positions away from Englishmen and Americans in their own cities because of better preparation. Her merchants were crowding out competitors in the markets of every land. Germany was already conquering the world by her superior science; but she was not content with this peaceful victory, she must needs conquer also with the sword. War was not necessary to secure the "freedom of the seas": Germany had that already. Her ships were in every harbour, and a large proportion both of British and of French goods were carried in her vessels. The only reason why the war broke out was that Germany wanted it, and thought that she was ready for it.

When that time came, no weak considerations of justice were allowed to stand in the way of her plans. She had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, but that made no difference. The Imperial Chancellor pronounced the promise "only a scrap of paper," and declared in his speech before the Reichstag, August 4, 1914: "We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. This is a breach of international law. . . . The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military ends have been attained." But the building of railways on the frontier shows that the occupation of Belgium was no sudden necessity, but a long-intended plan. General von Bernhardt in his *Warfare of To-Day* had said already, "The neutrality of Belgium will not stop us"; and the *Deutsche Kriegs-Zeitung*, September 2, 1914, declared: "The plan for the invasion of France was thoroughly thought out a long time ago. It was necessary for its success that it should take place in the north by way of Belgium."

In the prosecution of their wars the Assyrian kings displayed relentless cruelty. Their policy was to strike such terror into the hearts of their enemies that they would not dare to fight; or, if defeated, would not dare to rebel. In their inscriptions they gloat over these atrocities. They tell how wounded enemies were mutilated, captives of war were blinded, flayed alive, impaled on stakes around the walls of beleaguered towns in order to frighten them into submission, or thrown to wild beasts to devour. Cities taken by storm were given up to every species of ignominy and torture. Neither age nor sex nor rank was spared. For such an

empire the only appropriate symbol was a furious wild beast. "Where is the den of the lion, and the cave of the young lions, whither the lions went, the young lions affrighted by none? The lion is rending for his cubs, and strangling for his lionesses, and fills his dens with prey and his habitations with plunder" (Nahum ii. 11 f.).

In the conduct of the present war in neutral and un-offending lands Germany has imitated the Assyrian policy of terrorism. This policy has been inculcated in the manuals prepared for the instruction of officers. "Ruthlessly to employ the necessary means of defence and intimidation is not only a right but a duty for every commander of an army" (*Kriegsgebrauch im Landkrieg*, 1902, p. 115). To the troops who were starting for China the Kaiser said: "Behave like Huns and Vandals." Carrying out this principle, the civil populations of the Belgian towns that lay nearest to the German frontier have been slaughtered without mercy in order to frighten the inhabitants of remoter cities into prompter submission. In violation of the customs of civilised warfare and the terms of the Hague Convention, unfortified towns have been shelled, buildings devoted to religion, to charity, and to science have been destroyed, private property has been stolen, and non-combatants, particularly women and children, have been subjected to outrage and murder. The official reports of the British Committee presided over by Viscount Bryce and of the Belgian Commission by Henri Davignon leave no doubt in the minds of neutrals as to the fact of German atrocities in Belgium.

For the massacres of the Armenians in Asia Minor Prussia is also morally responsible, since Turkey, like Austria, is now a vassal of the German empire. Letters from American missionaries bear repeated testimony that German officers not only witnessed but also assisted in these massacres and in all the unspeakable horrors that attended them. The Armenians loved liberty. Many of them had been trained in American ideals. Therefore they stood in the way of German imperialism, and must be slain like the freedom-loving citizens of Belgium.

Along with the Assyrian outrages there went a pompous religiosity that described these as done in the name of the gods and for their glory. Of himself Tiglathpileser IV. says: "Who, in the service of Asshur, his Lord, shattered all those who opposed him like earthen vessels, swept them away like a cyclone, destroyed them like a tornado; the king who marched in the name of Asshur, Shamash, Marduk, the great

gods, from the sea of the rising sun to the sea of the setting sun." Sargon calls himself "the chosen of Anu and Bel, the favourite of the great gods, whom Asshur and Marduk called, and caused the fame of his name to go forth to the ends of the earth." Sennacherib calls himself "the good shepherd, the favourite of the great gods, the protector of justice, the lover of righteousness, the establisher of order, the bringer of help, the dispenser of blessings, the perfect ruler." Esarhaddon says: "In order to display the might of Asshur, my Lord, before all peoples, I hung the heads of Sanduarri and of Abdimilkutti upon the necks of their prime ministers, and with singing and music I marched into the suburbs of Nineveh."

The same flood of pious cant issues from the mouths of the modern Prussian scourges of mankind. As their soldiers go about the work of murder, rape, and arson in Belgium they bear on their belts the motto "Gott mit uns," and the Kaiser in his speeches rings the changes on the thought, "God will bless us, and give us success in our righteous war for the defence of our liberties." The historian Carl Lamprecht remarks: "Who will deny that there is even now a Christian German God, and that sometimes he reveals himself to aliens as a strong and jealous God?" It is hard to see wherein this religion differs from the old Assyrian cult of Asshur, the war-god, who led his people to victory over their enemies.

6. *The Outcome of the Struggle.*—The gloomy predictions of the Hebrew prophets were soon fulfilled. Under Shalmaneser V., the successor of Tiglathpileser IV. (727–722 B.C.), the great world-war began. He conquered Phœnicia and besieged Samaria, the capital of Israel. Sargon II. (722–705 B.C.) captured Samaria and deported the people of the northern kingdom. He also annexed Philistia, and quelled revolts in Babylonia and in Syria. Sennacherib (705–680 B.C.) devastated the land of Judah, and would have captured Jerusalem, if a pestilence had not broken out in his army that compelled him to abandon the undertaking. He also defeated an alliance of North Arabian peoples, and so opened the way for the invasion of Egypt. In 689 he punished a revolt of the Babylonians by capturing and burning their holy city. He moved the capital of the empire from Calah to Nineveh. Esarhaddon (680–668 B.C.) invaded Egypt, captured Memphis, the northern capital, and divided the land into twenty-two Assyrian provinces. Assurbanipal (668–626 B.C.) destroyed Thebes, the southern capital of Egypt, and conquered Elam, the region now known as Persia. This was the high-water mark of the Assyrian empire. Her territory now extended

from India to Ethiopia, and from the Caspian Sea to the middle of Asia Minor. It was the greatest empire that the world had ever seen, and it had no rival in later times, except in the dominions of Alexander and of the Romans.

At this point, however, the decline of Assyria began. The empire had grown too large for one man to govern, and Esarhaddon had divided it between his sons, giving Asshurbanipal Nineveh and the northern regions, and Shamashshumukin Babylon and the southern regions, with the intention that the two should reign conjointly; but rivalry soon developed between the brothers, and years were spent in a bloody struggle that ended with the sack of Babylon and the slaughter of Shamashshumukin. Assyria never recovered from this disaster. After the death of Asshurbanipal in 626 all the provinces threw off the yoke. Nabopolassar founded the New Babylonian empire, and Josiah declared the independence of Judah. All the other princes of Western Asia hastened to follow their example. Asshuretililani and Sinsharishkun, the two feeble successors of Asshurbanipal, were unable to regain the lost territory, and saw their monarchy reduced to the region that had first been ruled by the ancient Patesis of Asshur. In 606 the Medes and the Babylonians united in an expedition against Nineveh, and succeeded in destroying it. They slew the population, carried off the plunder of a thousand years, and razed the city to the ground. So thoroughly was their work done that the site of Nineveh was forgotten, and remained unknown, until in modern times the spade of the excavator recovered it. Assyria ceased to be a nation, and only its name lingered in legend, until in our own day the boastful inscriptions of its emperors were discovered and deciphered. Thus the expectation of Nahum was realised: "Thy shepherds slumber, O king of Assyria; thy worthies are at rest; thy people are scattered upon the mountains, and there is none to gather them. There is no assuaging of thy hurt; thy wound is grievous; all that hear the rumour of thee clap the hands over thee; for upon whom hath not thy wickedness passed continually?" (Nahum iii. 18 f.).

The parallelism between Assyria and Prussia has been complete up to the beginning of the present war. Will that parallelism continue during the period that is just opening? Prussia has been successful thus far. She has occupied Belgium and Luxemburg, and has annexed part of France. She has taken Poland, and pushed her battle-line far into Russia. She has conquered Serbia, and terrorised Bulgaria into submission, so that the way is now open to Constantinople. Will

she continue her career of conquest? We hope and pray not, but who can tell? If that line of defence in France and in Flanders gives way, France is lost. If France is defeated, the conquest of Russia and of Italy will be easy. Then Britain can hardly hope to defend herself in splendid isolation. If Britain falls, it is certain that America will be invaded in a few months. The Germans hate us for our prosperity, and they bitterly resent our attitude in the matter of the *Lusitania*, and our supplying of munitions of war to the Allies. They will not wait for us to get ready, they will strike us at once. It may be that our cherished Anglo-Saxon liberties are destined to be destroyed, and that we must bend our necks to the yoke of Prussian militarism. It may be that we shall live to see a Hohenzollern prince ruling at Washington, and our states administered by German military governors.

If that time should come, which may God forbid, one thing is certain: the final scene in the parallelism between Assyria and Prussia will soon be ushered in. The German empire, composed as it then will be of Arabs and Turks, and Slavs, and Latins, and Anglo-Saxons, and Americans, as well as Teutons, will be a pyramid standing upon its apex. Sooner or later such an empire, created by brute force, must topple. For a while it may be possible through terrorism to keep the conquered nations in submission; but some day the discipline will relax, and then the enslaved races will break their bonds. The day of reckoning will come, and the Prussian empire will fall just as completely and as terribly as did ancient Assyria.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

IMMORTAL POLAND.

GEOFFREY DENNIS.

MANY years ago, before the Napoleonic whirlwind swept over Europe, the fate of Poland stood as the classical instance of a public crime, the type and symbol of a national wrong and an international wrong-doing. It remains so to-day, when a worse terror has come upon the world.

Crime, and wickedness, and infamy: words like these are the stock-in-trade alike of the idealist historian and the sensational pressman. They annoy rather than convince. They are applied so freely to almost all political acts and movements which fail to appear upon the stage of history decked out in the finery of "progress," that the thinking man has become sceptical, if not cynical, when they are dinned into his ears. He listens to Machiavelli instead, who tells him that right and wrong are terms which have no meaning when applied to the actions of States. His view may be just—but Attila flings his hordes upon Belgium, and visits outrage and horror upon an innocent people. This is *wrong*: no subtleties can explain it away. And our "thinking man" admits that, even if the sentimentalists are at fault in their misplaced hyperboles of moral indignation, so too is he if he refuses to see that political acts may sometimes be tried—and judged—by the old Gospel standards of good and evil. It is in this light that most Englishmen view the War; and we hold that the good fight is ours. So too do most Germans. We believe they are mistaken; but we could not, if we would, pretend to be impartial. The War is not for us a thing to be weighed in the balance, but a cause to be won by the sword.

But if a great struggle has passed into history, impartiality is at once more possible and more desirable. And it is when we come to examine attentively even those wars and political movements which have most stirred the imagination of men,

that we find how barren a crop political history yields to the moralist. Either good and evil are ideas which do not seem to apply to all, or they are divided, in curiously well-balanced degree, between the two parties in conflict. Political struggles seem to be outside the moralist's sphere altogether, or to baffle him by the impossibility of forming a sure judgment in favour of one side or the other. To the first class belong most of the great "principles" for which the nineteenth century fought. They are sunk—those that are not completely submerged—to the low level of expediencies. Free Trade is defended, by those who still defend it, on grounds of utility and expediency, not of sacred and philosophic right. The world still contains many who accept his principles, but it has decanonised Cobden for ever. Parliamentary government is no longer a first principle. It is accepted only as a lesser evil than its alternative, autocracy. The acceptance may still be fairly confident in Anglo-Saxon countries, where there is a great and historic parliamentary tradition; on the Continent it is much less sure; and everywhere it is based on expediency rather than principle—a somewhat weary notion that it is the least evil form of human governance, rather than a belief in its elemental sanctity. And so with the Revolution itself. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity remain what they were: words, words, words. We are more sceptical than the men of '89. We see how little, how infinitely little, political changes can do to change the human character. We see, in a truer proportion, how negligible is the moral difference between differing forms of human government. We follow Taine and abjure Rousseau. We see that the Revolution did not break the iron chains which bind humanity; that at most it rubbed away the gilt.

General movements apart, the past two or three generations have, however, witnessed certain particular political struggles which have strangely touched the consciences of men. Great principles of right and wrong were at stake in the American Civil War: such epic heroism and exalted devotion were never called forth by mere politics, nor by anything less than a great moral enthusiasm. But who was right, and who was wrong? Both sides "prayed to the same God for victory." The North were fighting to prevent the disruption of the great heritage bequeathed to them by Washington and Alexander Hamilton; to destroy a system that made possible and legal the starkest cruelty and vice; and to establish the freedom and equality of man. The Southerners were fighting for the traditional liberty of the individual states, fighting against

illegal oppression as their forefathers had fought in 1641 and 1688 and 1776. They knew that emancipation would not be for the good of the negro himself—an opinion which seems to be borne out to-day by those social students who know the South best; they knew that the slave's lot was far happier than that of the poor of the great Northern towns, and they resented bitterly that the sweaters and capitalists of New York should dare to shed tears for the negro and try to force him into the reluctant misery of "freedom." Both sides fought with a passionate belief in the righteousness of their cause: one for the freedom of the white race, the other for the freedom of the black. On which side was right? Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson fought on one side, Ulysses Grant and Abraham Lincoln on the other. Four noble men of God. On which side was God? Or consider the Bulgarian epic. The balance of right seems to have been with our newest enemy against his oldest, the Turk: though it would need a very comprehensive acquaintance indeed with the varying forms of human knavery and ruffianism to adjudge between the crimes of the comitadjis and the pashas. Italy's case was clearer. Here was a divided people whose one ennobling emotion was for the liberty and unity of their race; on the other side at best no human principle, at worst alien oppression and animal cruelty. Thus the *Risorgimento* furnishes the rare exception of a mere political struggle which was, substantially, a struggle between right and wrong.

The supreme exception is Poland. Here there can be no careful weighing of arguments, no nice appraisalment of pros and cons. The Partition was a crime, and the enslavement and oppression of the Polish nation ever since is a crime. Neither can be palliated by any excuse, legal or moral; nor has a special pleader subtle (or sinful) enough to invent one, ever yet appeared at the bar of history. It is this unmixed moral quality that gives to the eternal "Polish Question" its importance to the moralist and its call upon humanity; a quality so rare that the proofs of it are worth displaying once again. It appears to the present writer that at a time like this, when European public morality is so large in all men's mouths, it should be borne in mind that for over a century European public law has condoned a crime; and that a better public morality can never be built up from the wreckage of war unless that crime is utterly wiped out and atoned for. His only excuse for writing these lines is that in England, where there is the most important and the most moral public opinion in the world, the importance and the moral quality of the

Polish Question are least understood. Wherefore the feeblest plea for Poland may be forgiven.

We must go back to the First Partition, the *fons et origo* of it all. Details are out of place—you may find them set forth by Lord Eversley, or de Rulhière, or by Lecky with his almost plaintive aloofness from prejudice. In the eighteenth century the Polish state was one of the most important in Europe. For centuries the Most Serene Republic had been the bulwark of Christendom against Turk and Tartar. It was but a hundred years since John Sobieski at Vienna gates had saved Europe from the Saracen, like Charles Martel at the gates of Tours a thousand years before him. Cracow and Warsaw were the twin homes of culture in Eastern Europe long before Berlin was heard of or St Petersburg built. The Poles were famed as the most tolerant and chivalrous of peoples. But the state was ill-governed. The constitution was an anarchical hotch-potch of republic and monarchy, with all the vices of one and none of the virtues of the other; a witless mixture of democracy and aristocracy, and worse than either. The Republic was weak, uncovetous, and over-tolerant of strangers. She was encircled, for her undoing, by neighbours who were strong, covetous, and intolerant of all scruples. The strong plotted together, swooped down upon the weak, and robbed her of a large portion of her lands and people. It was stark, unqualified brigandage. But the kings were shameless. Frederick (styled the Great) chuckled, and rubbed his bony hands. Catherine (styled the Great) said, "Poland is my door-mat"; and in her gentle, womanly way hanged noblemen, priests, and little children high on the same gallows with dogs, to teach the Poles the price they should pay for daring to resist the enemies of their country. As to the philosophers, who were supposed to wield the sceptre of European public opinion in those days, they fawned upon the evil-doers. How do otherwise? Had not the king-philosopher of Potsdam shown himself a staunch adept of the new ideas? Was he to be scolded for a mere peccadillo such as the ruin of a nation? Why make so much fuss about a stupid people like the Poles? as he said to his crony Voltaire. And the Semiramis of the North,—she was so discerning as to talent, so up-to-date in her ideas! She wrote such charming letters! she made such splendid plans for the happiness of all humanity!—why boggle if she chose to treat one small section of it as she did her own husband? One only of the monarchs wavered. "It is a great stain upon my name," said Maria Theresa to the Count de Barck, the Swedish Ambassador at Vienna. "Madam,"

said he, taken aback, "sovereigns have only to account to God." "Yes," replied the Empress, "it is Him I fear." And to her signature on the Treaty of 1772 she added these strange and prophetic words: "*Placet*, I consent to it, since so many great and wise persons wish it to be so; but, long after my death, men will see the result of having trampled under foot all things that up to now have been held to be just and sacred." For protest from the philosophers, there was one light word of Rousseau's. "They can swallow Poland," he said, "but they will never digest her." Jean Jacques and the Empress-Queen were little heeded, for 1772 showed the princes that if they succeed force and cunning may take the place of right. The Partition "shook the political system, lowered the public morals, and weakened the public law of Europe, for it is was an example of strong Powers conspiring to plunder a feeble Power, with less regard for honour, or honesty, or the mere decency of appearances, than is shown by a burglar or a footpad." We may deplore the Revolution in that it fought the old faiths, trampled on the old traditions, and let loose upon men the spirits of vain reason and of vainer unrest and unbelief; but we must in justice remember that it was the kings and not the Jacobins who first mocked at the old morality and tore up the public law of Europe. When the monarchs upbraided France for her aggressions their words recoiled upon themselves, who were the prime disturbers of established right and order. For the First Partition was but a beginning. In 1772 the three Powers solemnly declared that they guaranteed what remained of the Republic as free and independent for ever. In 1793 and 1795 they gave themselves the lie. This was the plea: "Convinced of the absolute incapacity of the Republic of Poland to give itself a firm and strong government, Have recognised that it is of an indispensable necessity to proceed to a total partition." Mark well. Then consider the facts:— (1) The basis of Russo-Prussian policy towards Poland was the Secret Treaty of 1764, by which the two States agreed to oppose, *if necessary by force*, any attempt on the part of the Poles to render the throne hereditary, to strengthen the government, or to abolish the *liberum veto*, which was a main source of the Republic's political weakness; (2) Poland at last put her house in order, and by the Constitution of 1791 made the throne hereditary, strengthened the king's power, abolished the *liberum veto*, and improved the condition of the peasants. If the partitioners had put their true reasons on paper, they would therefore have said: "Convinced of the now unfortunately proved capacity of the Republic of Poland to

give itself a firm and strong government, which it has been the bedrock of our policy at all costs to prevent, Have recognised, etc., etc." They acted on the words they dared not write, and Poland disappeared in blood and terror from the comity of nations. Yet when Kosciuszko fell on the dolorous field of Maciejowice, and Poland with him, I will never believe, as his enemies tell, that "*Finis Poloniae!*" escaped his lips. For he knew that a house whose foundations are watered with the blood of sacrifice abides and is not destroyed.

A few words must suffice here to bridge the gulf between 1795 and 1914. The hopes of the Napoleonic era were vain, and the Treaty of Vienna in "liberating" Europe confirmed the doom of Poland. The Tsar promised certain liberties to the conquered people, but the promise was not kept. Hence the great rebellion of 1831. The Poles fought with all their ancient valour; but Russia was stronger, and she took the vengeance of the strong. Poland was henceforth ruled by the sword and the knout. Men who used their own language in public or women who wore the national costume were whipped until they bled. Little children, from seven years old, were taken from their families in thousands to serve as the tragic "*enfants de troupe*" in the Russian armies. These were the years of the Great Dispersion, when Mickiewicz and Chopin and Slowacki established in Western Europe the cult of the martyr-nation. It is hard to read of the Polish exiles (as you may in Edgar Quinet) and to read dry-eyed: of penniless nobles, who had lost their lands and their homes because they had obeyed the call of duty and fought for their country, begging their bread in the streets of Paris; of exiles who risked all to see Poland once again and paid for a few hours in their native land with a lifetime in Siberian chains; of Adam Mickiewicz lamenting, prophet-like, at the Collège de France, "God has chosen my people to bear the evangel of patriotism to the world," till the French youth stood up and cheered him till they wept, crying, "*Vive la Pologne Immortelle!*" — "and," adds an eye-witness rather quaintly, "even an Englishman who was present half-shamefacedly wiped his eyes." All that was best in France responded to the sufferings of Poland, if not her Governments, which are often all that is worst. Vernet, when court painter at St Petersburg, was once at work on a series of historical pictures for Nicholas I. "Can you paint me one on Poland?" asked the Emperor. "No, sire," replied the Frenchman; "I have never learned to paint Christ upon the Cross." . . . If the lot of the exiles was hard, those who stayed behind fared

worse. Misery came to a head in the last desperate rebellion of 1863. It failed, failed utterly; though Mazzini cried aloud for pity on "poor brave Poland," and poor brave Napoleon III. tried vainly to stir the conscience of Europe. There was no pity, and no conscience. Orgies, floggings, massacres, torture; wild Cossacks shooting and sabring in the streets; a vast crowd, men and women and children, kneeling in the snow before the palace and praying to God for Poland, till the last of them was mowed down by the cannon or crushed to death under the horses' hoofs, and the snow was scarlet; while Prince Gortchakoff played whist at the palace window (though he died soon after, as God knows, haunted by spectres of black-clad women, and sick with fear); and the waters of the Vistula were foul with corpses;—thus it was that "order reigned in Warsaw." It leaves one puzzled with human wickedness: why do men treat each other like this? Nor was the fate of the nation much better under her other oppressors. Neither fulfilled in the smallest degree the solemn promises of self-government made in 1815. Austria had sudden qualms of conscience; but by raising the horrible *jacquerie* of 1846 she decimated the great families who were the chief repositories of the national tradition, and by annexing the city-republic of Cracow stole the last inch of free Polish soil. Prussia set to, qualmless and unabashed, at a truly Prussian scheme of systematic denationalisation, which later on culminated in the expropriation laws, the Hakatist campaign—and gaol for little children who pray to God in the tongue of their mothers. Thus in that same generation which witnessed the victory of the national principle throughout Europe, which saw the triumphal entry of Victor Emmanuel into the Eternal City, a German Emperor crowned at Versailles, the Turk beaten and the Balkans freed—Poland sank, maimed and miserable, finally from the sight of men.

That is the story, or rather a hint at its main outlines. The historian would of course describe in detail the diplomacy of Frederick and Catherine, the baseness of which is only equalled by the brilliance. He would note the effects of the fate of Poland upon general history: how the Partitions, by calling into being a nation without a country, first called into being also that new and intense spirit of nationality which has been the chief force in Europe ever since; how the Second and Third Partitions, by dividing the attention of Austria and Prussia between east and west, proved the deciding factor in the Coalition failure against the Jacobins, so that, for good or ill, Poland saved the French Revolution; and how the

destruction of Poland was the making of Prussia, since the greatness of one rested, as it still rests, upon the weakness of the other. This was foreseen by Frederick, admitted by Sybel, and used openly by Prince Bismarck, and in our own day by Prince Buelow, as their justification for the harshest measures against the Poles. Further, the historian would give full measure to the faults of the Poles themselves: their factiousness, which enabled their enemies to form parties, to stir up hate, to bribe, to plot, and to destroy; their failure to amend in time their comic-opera constitution or their tragic social system; their tolerance of a national life which found the mass of the peasants more than half indifferent to the national cause. This is a grave indictment, and the enemies of Poland, from a genius like Catherine to a paid lickspittle like Voltaire, worked it for all it was worth. For their purpose it was worth very little. The fact that your neighbour is foolish does not justify your foully stabbing him in the back. Give the fullest measure to the follies and frailties of the Poles, the destruction of Poland is still without excuse or plea. A crime is still a crime. There are indeed some modern casuists who seem to think that, with sufficient explanation, evil explains itself away; or that, with the lapse of time, its quality is somehow vaguely bettered. But evil is absolute, is always evil, and breeds evil. Until sin is atoned for, its effects continue. This is the Gospel, it is the true philosophy, and it applies to all conduct, public and private alike; for there are not two moralities. Thus it is with the Polish crime. It has had the most malign effect on international morality. It has imbruted still further the spirit of the Prussian State, and thus helped to bring her (and us all) to our present pass. It has been the source and the mainstay of the worst barbarities of Russian officialism. It has been fatal to the nobler conception of the Slavonic ideal and to Russia's role as Great Mother of the Slavs: for the little Slav brothers have seen that the portion of their eldest and fairest sister was the whip. Evil breeds evil. The Austro-Prussian alliance has meant, not that Prussia has been inclined to treat the Poles better, but that Austria has been induced to treat them worse. The Franco-Russian alliance has not meant that Russia felt she need cease to oppress, but that France felt she must cease to sympathise. Where Napoleon III. would have played the knight-errant, and where even Louis XV. roused himself (for five minutes) from the arms of the du Barry to utter protest, the Third Republic has been mute. By the *rapprochement* of the Vatican with Lutheran Germany and

Orthodox Russia, the Poles lost their last friend. Nor did the better intentions of two of the Emperors achieve much, for a house cannot be built on foundations that are rotten. Full credit must be given to Austria for the humane and enlightened policy she has lately pursued in Galicia. But leniency to a maimed fragment of a nation is like kindness to a man's leg when it has been severed from the rest of his body, and hardly more fruitful. Nicholas the Second's goodwill is well known; but how improve a system that is wholly wrong? Sin cannot be conjured away; it can only be atoned for.

Prussians apart, the only critics quite unmoved by the Polish story are the internationalists, who call in question all patriotism. "If the Poles have chosen to suffer for a false ideal, the bigger fools they! Love of country is the worst of evils. The work of the nineteenth century was the reconstruction of Europe on a national basis. Result—new Europe is plunged into a war more horrible than the old Europe could even have imagined. The wars and rivalries of the kings have given place to the far more terrible wars and hates of the peoples. The dear little Balkan nations, those erewhile heroes groaning 'neath the Turkish yoke, have used their freedom only to fall upon each other and to outdo the Turk in barbarity. Above all, Germany, the crowning edifice of the nineteenth century, has used her new-found nationhood to let loose the nightmare which besets the world to-day. Weak and disunited, she was peaceful and moral; united and free, she is a scourge." This sort of reasoning may impress, but it is the result of vague and inaccurate thinking, and more especially of the notion that principles may be judged by their misuse. Love of country, no less than human love, may become egotistical, devouring, insane: the abuse of emotions cannot disprove that they are divine. These are no themes for argument. Love of country, like the love of women, or of God, may not be debated by theorists or bandied in the schools. These are the old sanctities and sanities. Logic cannot weaken, it can only defame them. When all the nations are at this hour pouring out their blood upon the altar of patriotism, the man who calls it in question is a fool unpitiable, or likelier a coward and a knave. In the sacrifice Poland has not been excelled; of the egotistical perversion of patriotism (or, more simply, Prussianism) she is of all peoples least blameworthy. She has been tolerant to a fault. The student of religious history does not need to be told that the humane character of the Reformation epoch in Poland was unique. The Holy Office in Spain; our own Smithfield for the Protestants and Tyburn for

the Papists ; the doings of Huguenot and Leaguer in France ; the Thirty Years' War in Germany ; the internecine infamies of the Puritans in New England : from the like of these the honour of the Most Serene Republic was free. She made the fewest martyrs ; so they made her the martyr-people. We in the West allowed her martyrdom, then forgot it. Before the War, of a hundred educated men in Western Europe, ninety-nine knew nothing more of Poland than the name. At school they had never seen it on the map ; the newspapers, laden with the woes of this or that Congolese or Balkan tribe, ignored it completely. On the 31st July 1914 the existence of the Polish race was neither admitted by the partitioning Empires nor remembered in the West. "The Polish question," wrote an eminent publicist, is "dead for ever."

A few days pass. A strange sight is seen. Three imperial masters are suing humbly for the favours of a slave—a dead slave. The crime they had denied for four generations they admitted in a day. What thirst for liberty ! What zeal ! Germany, whose heart had always bled for their woes, called upon the Poles to help her to free them from "the Muscovite knout." Austria whined that she had not been as bad as the others, please, had she ? Russia, more dramatically, admitted her sins *in toto* and swore to atone. Germany was brazen, Austria suppliant, Russia amazing. Civilisation learnt, from the capers of the tyrants, that Poland was still alive. Three mighty Empires would not cringe before a corpse. Alive—it is a supreme achievement. Division, oppression, and proscription have failed to uproot from Polish hearts their faith in their country. The spirit of the nation is stronger than at any earlier time ; and nobler, refined by the fires of tribulation. Persecution has made Poles of all the peasants. Their hunted and forbidden speech is to-day sixth among the languages of Europe (more important than the six Balkan dialects put together), and it is the vehicle of a great literature. The genius of the race stands forth in two of the world's greatest novelists, Henryk Sienckewicz and Joseph Conrad, in its greatest musician, and in a score of others. One thing they have all in common. From Madame Curie at the Sorbonne to Enver Pasha at the Golden Horn, they do not forget that they are Poles. In face of hindrances hard for an Englishman to visualise, hospitals, schools, peasants' banks, and patriotic clubs have been established. Poland never deserved to die ; by her constancy under her long martyrdom she has proved her right to live. Suffering alone does not make a nation great ; only by the manner in which it supports its lot may

we measure its moral force. There lies the greatness of Poland. She has triumphed, as it seems to me, by one thing only: faith. In the darkest hour she believed in God, she prayed to Him for pity, she knew that He would send deliverance. Shepherded by one of the poorest and noblest priest-hoods in the world, she was untainted by Malthusianism and positivism and internationalism, and all the other isms which seek to cover with fine words the spectres of spiritual bankruptcy and race decay. Her blood is clean, her spirit fresh, her patriotism a devouring flame. To an Englishman the thought of patriotism is woven with a hundred proud and glorious memories; it calls to his mind the immemorial triumphs of our fortunate race: its symbol is Empire. To a Pole it means the memory of much tribulation, of sorrow and sacrifice and acquaintance with grief; its symbol is a Cross. Yet sometimes one may be privileged for a moment to see the spirit of the other. Shortly before the War, in a Polish village (since razed to the ground, while "the few inhabitants who survive are slowly dying of hunger in abandoned German trenches"), in a château at which I was a guest, I was idling away a few moments of a hot autumn afternoon by strumming on the piano—among other tunes the Russian National Hymn. I suddenly saw before me my host's grandmother, a very aged woman. She was crying bitterly. I scarcely understood, but at once stopped playing. "I am not ashamed to weep," she said, "when *that* is played. . . . The first time I heard it was in '31 when the Russians entered Warsaw and my brother was murdered by the Cossacks; the last time was in '63 when we cried 'God save Poland!' and they mowed us down in the snow. . . . But they will never beat us," she broke off—"neither they, nor the others. *La Pologne ne mourra jamais!*" She was just one hundred years of age.

Events have multiplied since August 1914, but we are neither free nor competent to discuss them. The position of the Polish leaders between the warring Empires was difficult. On the one hand was Russia, to whom, despite the horrors of the past, the strongest arguments, political and economic alike, seem to draw the future of Poland. Informed Polish opinion had come to realise that sooner or later the harsh policy of the Russian bureaucracy must change for the better; it was against the will of the Russian people and the Russian Tsar, and in direct conflict with Russia's true interests. Moreover, it was chiefly maintained by German influence. On the other hand, there was Austria, who alone had any sort of claim on Poland's gratitude: a claim which a chivalrous people felt it their duty

to repay, even though they realised that Vienna was becoming more and more but the handmaiden of their most implacable enemy. The dilemma was not, however, for the Poles to resolve. They were conscripts in the three armies, and as such they marched forth, brother to fight against brother, and friend against friend. Poland's lot is indeed much harder than the hard lot of Belgium. The Belgians have this last consolation, that they are fighting for their country in a last corner of free soil, side by side with the most powerful Allies in the world, who are pledged to their cause eternally. For poor Poland no one is fighting; her children are slaughtering each other for a cause which is not theirs. She is laid waste. The German armies are wilfully starving her. The mills are idle, the factories destroyed, the villages burnt. Hunger and misery reign. The abomination of desolation rages through all the land. The Niobe of nations, God had stricken her with all the plagues but one, and now she is a bondswoman to famine. Each day more and more little children are dying of starvation. The friends of Poland are to-day bending their chief efforts, not to weaving plans for her future, but to finding her bread to eat. But when the guns are silenced, and the fate of this unhappy people is once more to be ordained, let England remember that it is her interest to support that nation on whose ruins the Prussian might was first established, and whose rebirth is the sure and historic safeguard against Prussian power for evil. Let England remember, too, that to save the weak and wretched from the unrighteous and the strong is her duty, her privilege, and her right. The end is not seen. But whatever it may have in store, even though by some unthinkable catastrophe Poland be again enslaved, even if once again she be doomed to walk in the valley of the shadow of death, she will not die. Sorrow and sacrifice have made her immortal.

GEOFFREY DENNIS.

B.E.F., 1916.

THE DISTRUST OF THE INTELLECT.

J. W. SCOTT.

Two features of religion, its inherent worth and its indispensability to society, seem to unite in calling for another treatment of it than is forthcoming from a great deal of our influential reflective thought.

As to its inherent worth, that, to name it by the shortest word, is absolute. Take your stand within its own ground, and you find that religion estimates itself as literally of absolute value. It is the pearl of great price. To possess it, is to have all the worth there is. To miss it, no matter what else you have, is to miss everything. Religion spans the extremes of man's being. In a sense it takes him through all possible experience. It conducts him from the lowest depth of self-abnegation to the height of affirmative power. With its advent, something beyond man, which at first rose superior to him and seemed to surpass him infinitely, has condescended to come within his soul and dwell with him. Whereupon, from being prostrate with self-distrust before its awful majesty, he arises exalted and empowered. This infinitude, so far from being a threatening foreign power, has revealed itself to him as the very soul of his own soul. Having given him to realise his utter helplessness apart from it; having allowed him to be forced, through adversity and sorrow and sin, to acknowledge his own strength unequal altogether to the battle with the world; having seen him beaten, baffled, lost,—this power induces him at length to abandon the struggle, to renounce utterly, to say, "Fly, then, false shadows of hope, I will pursue you no more, believe you no more; and ye, too, haggard spectres of fear, I care not for you—ye, too, are all shadows and a lie: let me rest here, for I am way-weary and life-weary; I will rest here, were it but to die. To die or to live is all alike to me, alike insignificant."

And lo ! in the very act of such self-annihilation the soul finds itself mysteriously clad with the armour to defy principalities and powers ; all the resources of the infinite suddenly appearing within its own being ; making it "strong, of unknown strength ; a spirit, almost a God." In finding religion man finds his last enemy disarmed. He may suffer still, but the temper of his suffering is changed. Beneath it all there is a vast and quiet confidence, even a foretaste of ultimate triumph before which the uncertainty, the evil, and the wrong of the world lose all power over him and fade away. He can say with St Paul, "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me."

This thing, then, plainly means to be no less than complete human salvation. It sums up in itself the whole good of man. It does not expect to be measured by its value for any of the ordinary ends of life, however lofty. It is they, rather, which will have value or not according as they lead to it. The facts of the world, even, are not permitted to say whether it shall be true ; nor the exigencies of life to determine whether it shall be obeyed. At its height, religion has all these things in its own hand. It says which of the facts of the world can be true ; it measures how far life's exigencies are worth meeting. It exists on no sufferance—not even on the sufferance of the universe. Its nature is to be absolute.

But religion is not a mere rhapsody of sublime nonsense. Not as such could it ever have prevailed among men, or done for society what it has done. Rhapsodical enough may have been many who felt its power. But except religion had also addressed the intelligence of men, told them the simple truth about a world beyond the present, with reference to which they must conduct themselves, it would never have survived, and neither would they.

For religion, imperiously as it declines to be considered a mere social convenience, is yet a condition of social survival. It provides the fulcrum for human conduct—the only one possible. Man is so circumstanced that he cannot live without, as it were, having one foot planted in the unseen. By the very conditions of his being he must live with his fellows. The life he leads, therefore, must be, at the very lowest, one which will let his fellows live with him. Which necessitates self-denial. It necessitates that he learn, in one way or another, to do things which do not immediately benefit himself, things the "good" of which, from his own private point of view, he does not just see—and therefore must believe in without seeing. Here is the primary and fundamental social

need—the power to act on trust, to step out in the dark, believing when we cannot see; the habitual doing of hard things which we could escape and yet would not, believing them to be somehow good, though with a goodness we shall never actually taste or reap. There never was a time when society did not depend for its continuance upon this spirit. Hence religion, with its love of another world, and with all the stimulus to self-sacrifice which comes from remembering it and thinking upon it, and acting in view of it, entwines itself into all institutions of human society in all the ages of history. Religion, then, has always been needed. And it has always required to be able to address man's intelligence.

Having regard to both these sides of it, religion seems to require of us a certain positiveness of treatment. It leaves us with a very positive question: namely, is it still true, in any socially effective sense? Short of a mere sophistication or a dream, is there anything which on the one hand is thus absolutely worth having, and on the other hand stands accessible to us by following the path of that higher life along which the good of society requires that we should walk? The question would seem to be for us one of the last importance. Being no less than the question whether there is an adequate stimulus to the service of the social organism; and that at a moment when society appears to be going to require more and more service from us as the years go on. If there is such a stimulus, we may face the future with confidence, provided only people can be made to feel it. If not, then the case is otherwise.

Such a positive answer has not been forthcoming. Not that people have failed to realise the importance of the question: it is rather because they have realised it and have been driven to think that the sort of answer required is impossible. After a century great in apologetics, the broad question of the truth of religion is anything but new. But the efforts with which the nineteenth century has made us familiar, to find satisfactory corroboration of what passed as religious truth amid the apparently growing evidence of its mistakenness, have not been successful. Their failure was more or less in the nature of the case. It was impossible for orthodox Protestant Christianity to stand a combined attack by the science of the nineteenth century and by its historical criticism. The doctrine of evolution and the rapidly advancing sciences of geology, chemistry, and physics seemed to have the effect, practically, of thrusting the Deity out of the world. Having first assailed the story of the creation by

pointing to the evidence of a natural development of man from the lower forms of life, they further, by reducing life and mind to the same matter and motion which accounted for other things, made it seem as though any sort of creative intervention whatever in the history of the universe was superfluous. Almost as severe was the pressure of the new historical sense upon orthodoxy; which, having first overhauled the classical writings, inevitably advanced to the biblical, and treated them in the same way. Very energetic were the efforts to defend the traditional view—and productive of no small amount of fine scholarly and even scientific work. These efforts tried to treat the whole situation positively; they tried to meet science with science, criticism with criticism. And not at once did the contention begin to seem hopeless. It was a long-drawn struggle. So much so, that, despite the overwhelming strength of one side, people had even begun to lose interest in the contest before the issue was decided. Yet it was none the less an unequal fight. The weight of the social motive supporting the weaker side alone made it seem otherwise. The orthodox view sustained itself, only because too much was at stake for it to be given up. Had these extraneous supports been absent—had the weight of sentiment, for instance, gone into the other scale,—it would not have survived at all. Had the masses of people been as anxious to accept unorthodox views as they were to resist them, then certainly the arguments of men like Mr Gladstone or Cardinal Manning would not have stood long before the contentions of Tyndall or Huxley.

The experience of the nineteenth century in defending religion has had its effect on us. It, partly, has induced the mood to which this paper is addressing itself. We do not imitate its method; or at least we try not to, and we profess not to. Two attitudes have become characteristic of the reflective religious mind, which are not hard to connect with the two main forms of nineteenth-century criticism, the scientific and the historical.

To begin with the latter: there is the attitude reminiscent of the Oxford Movement—that typical reaction against the historical side of the modern spirit—the simple relapse upon authority. It is not our primary object of interest here; but as a factor in our intellectual life it is worthy of more careful consideration than it often gets. It is more widespread, and more massive and masterful, than is probably generally understood in Protestant countries. It includes all that is involved in that revival of mediævalism which we are beginning to feel

in the air and read about in the reviews. It is responsible for the reaction against modernism in the Roman Church. It accounts for the numerous recruits to Romanism from the ranks of "intellectuals." It may claim, perhaps, as one of its most magnificent practical triumphs what is often referred to as the rejuvenation of France. But it carries the suggestion of a capitulation. It is correctly described as a relapse.

The attitude with which we are concerned here is different, is more forward-looking, and may justly be called the converse of this. One conspicuous feature of it is that, while resolute to accept the results of science and face the bankruptcy of historical tradition, it yet feels itself able to face the future by the sheer force of the will to believe in bright possibilities. But this is not its only feature. We are not concerned only with the Pragmatism which has striven to make a gospel of man's right to believe what is in keeping with his higher human interests; but with all that is essentially affiliated to it. We regard as essentially on the same platform as Pragmatism whatever in our reflective culture seeks to sweep away logical difficulties by a *tour de force* from another quarter of the mind—by an appeal to intuition, will, life, the subconscious, or however the other-than-intellectual part of the mind may be indicated. I take it that most of our current efforts at constructive thinking on the subject of religion—apart from attempts to revive scholasticism—take this general line. We regard the "rational" treatment of this aspect of our experience as an impossibility. "The grounds of religion are super-rational or sub-rational." "Religion lies close to the primitive moving-forces of life; deeper, then, than reason or any work of reason." And it is doubtful, to us, whether any human philosophy of religion can be better than a bad defence, which means a betrayal.¹ And it is to this general view that I refer when I say that a treatment of religion adequate to our needs is not forthcoming.

But it is fatal to overlook the vast momentum which is behind the attitude, both historical and logical. It is not nineteenth-century science and criticism only that seem to teach us that no good can come to religion by our trying to "think it out." The whole story of eighteenth-century rationalism, rightly read, teaches the same thing. In quite opposite vein, Carlyle seems to teach it. And an imposing array of modern reflection regarding not religion only, but

¹ See preface to W. E. Hocking's *The Conception of God in Human Experience*, Yale University Press, 1912.

morality, æsthetic experience, and the whole higher life of man, is ready to endorse the lesson.

We say "the eighteenth-century rationalism, rightly read"—that is, first read pretty nearly as it read itself, and then a vow taken to have nothing whatever to do with it as we value our souls. For this general way of thinking is coming to have an anti-religious force with us, which for a time it did not appear to have. Of the many symptoms of a return of the spirit of the eighteenth century amongst us, this is one of the most conspicuous, that we are unable any longer to see over and beyond its general philosophical attitude. It was different with a mind like Carlyle's in the great opening of the nineteenth century. Despite the warfare of orthodox and unorthodox which marked a great part of that century, there was, in the passage to it from the eighteenth, some reconstruction—even religious reconstruction; and Carlyle's teaching is essentially that of one who had re-enacted in his own personal history the religious aspect of this reconstructive movement. But from whatever cause it may have come, it is becoming difficult for us—if it ever was easy—to enter into the spirit of Carlyle's teaching and make the reconstruction with him. We do not feel the force of his peculiar logic; and we do feel the force of the neat and clear-cut arguments he opposed.

To put the situation briefly: to Carlyle it was only because the orthodoxy of the eighteenth century was so shallow that its scepticism could so easily lay destructive siege thereto. For that was equally shallow. Had orthodox religion perceived the full depth of its own roots, it is questionable whether the attacks of thinkers inspired by Voltaire could have made any impression upon it. But where faith meant only the acceptance of a certain supernaturalistic tradition as historical fact, it was at once a serious matter to begin to reason about it at all. The sceptically inclined only needed to assail any part of that tradition—say the verbal infallibility of the sacred books—and religion was overthrown. The broken credit of the Scriptural record passed readily, in the view of intelligent and open-minded men, into the general bankruptcy of the orthodox position. The supernatural came to be thrown out. Traditional views of things such as the origin of the Ten Commandments, the divine punishing of sin or rewarding of virtue in this world or another, were discredited. And the intellectual revolt was not uncommonly strengthened by a moral revolt against doctrines of eternal punishment and vicarious suffering. And it was easy to

explain why such absurdities had been so long believed. Morality of the usual kind meant submission to custom and the advantage of the people in authority. And this obvious fact supplied all the explanation that was wanted as to how morality had been so long believed to be divinely sanctioned and had been strengthened by supernatural threats and promises. The whole scheme was an invention of generations of rulers and ecclesiastics who had sought to consolidate their power by keeping up the fiction which awed the people into submission. They pretended that God had commanded the things that they found convenient, but in the "Age of Reason" such an idea could no longer pass muster. It did not, of course, follow that once the fiction was exploded there was to be no more morality. There was still to be a right life and a wrong. But in future that question was to be decided, not by asking what kind of life was in accordance with God's commandments—for that only meant the kind of life which time immemorial had shown best for the ruling classes,—but by asking what kind of life was in itself most desirable: which meant most natural; which again meant most pleasure-giving. Thus a hedonistic and rationalistic moral code was offered in place of the theological one. And the more honest a man was, the less did he know where to turn to escape the ubiquitous logic of the position.

To Carlyle, however, all this is shallow. It attacks the merest outworks of religion. To change the metaphor, the whole way of thinking concerns itself about what are nothing more or less than the mythological swaddling-clothes of religion which had protected its infancy, and had never had any other destiny than to be laid aside. This type of thought did not see that its attacks upon Christianity were but the putting of these away; and that when it had rendered religion this unwitting service its work was done. So he could apostrophise Voltaire with his "Cease, my much-respected Herr von Voltaire . . . shut thy sweet voice; for the task appointed thee seems finished," etc. And as for the same enlightenment's explanation of the existing law and order or its principles for another, they were to Carlyle mere ignorance of history or purblindness to the nature of man, and to the divine law which equates the ultimate destiny of nations accurately to their inner worth. This whole rationalistic armoury, then, pitted against the crude, defenceless, orthodox Calvinism of Carlyle's youth, drove him out of the orthodoxy of the previous century; but in passing beyond it he also passed beyond the criticisms of it and found a foothold at

length in the general atmosphere of idealistic thought and sentiment, little as he was ever interested in its philosophical expression. In so doing, he saw what he took to be the most important and central truths of the faith in which he had been reared to be still true; and so attained in his own mind what is the most urgent social need of any age.

But while Carlyle gets above this philosophy, we do not. This, despite the fact that we have Carlyle before us and may even think we are following him. Partly it is Carlyle's own fault that we are slipping out of his masterful grip, and that he has not taken us further towards a real supersession of the point of view which he had himself so thoroughly left behind. But partly, also, it is because, for us (and wrongly), he seems to possess a feature which we are fond of in much other, more modern teaching, and which is essentially weak.

What *was* this transition of his? He has himself recovered the essentials of what he had lost; he has apparently come forth from his temptation in the wilderness strengthened and triumphant over his spiritual foes. But he does not really tell us how it was done. Clearly, it was not by discovering that the traditional wrappage of the ancient faith could be reinstated as it was. But this, after all, is a negative point; and he does not seem to take us further. The fact is, Carlyle is not in the strict sense a philosopher, but a preacher, or rather a prophet. As such, he possesses a standpoint where his feet are secure; but he never, as it were, steps back from it and points it out to us. He cannot. It would not be prophecy. He cannot talk about his point of view; but can only stand in it, and speak forth what he sees from it. Having got the universe in focus, he proclaims to us how it looks, in tones such that we cannot but listen and almost cannot but believe. Yet he does not tell us where he is or how to get there. Hence, though he inspires us with a kind of militant mystic faith, which, while it lasts, enables us to do without logic, he yet does not in fact offer any logically thought-out philosophy of life; the result being, that when the charm of his personality fades we are left lonely and unarmed against that rationalistic logic which, while he was close to us, he could enable us to ignore. We may still believe in that spiritual triumph which his standpoint represents. But if we do, we cannot stay where he left us. Seeing that he has not really told us where he stands, we must endeavour to make out for ourselves. And we do it—we very largely have done it—by yielding to that modern impulse of which we have spoken: what we may call, for short, the modern anti-intellectualistic bias.

This plan for getting ourselves to a place from which we could see religion to be acceptable calls for comment.¹ It was not really difficult to hit upon. When we become a little accustomed to the type of sceptical-intellectual argument above sketched, when we step back from it a little and summon courage to look at the havoc which reason has here wrought with what we took to be religious truths, it soon appears to us that we can gather up the total of the worst that has been done in this: that the truth of religion cannot be grasped by thought. To thought, religion is all astray; and it cannot be true if we insist on understanding it. But there may lie the whole trouble—viz. in our instinctive and persistent desire for a logical understanding of which we are to accept. Perhaps our desire is quite mistaken. And this idea only needed to be suggested. For the notion of repudiating logic has itself a logic in it, which when we pursue it into all its connections can come to seem prodigiously convincing. We cannot understand religion. But what do we understand? In sober truth, neither religion nor morality, nor art, nor freedom, nor any part of the higher life of man—if what we mean by these things is their spirit and not their mere letter.

Look carefully at it, the religion hardly seems to be an attitude of mind with which that logical, intellectual nature which argues us into scepticism has anything properly to do. Not to speak of the gap between doctrine and life, look at the antagonism of knowledge and faith. Faith is now the knowledge of things seen: it is the substance of things hoped for. A living faith which holds the soul together and keeps us working for God in the world is very different from a fixed and settled knowledge. Otherwise it were not a practical attitude. Only that suggestion or spirit of doubt which survives still, along with the certainty, could secure our religious assurance that "God's in His heaven" from being a passive bed of rest instead of a spur to action. Doctrine really, seems superfluous in religion. Truth—in the sense of a truth which can stand intellectual tests—is not what it is here to give; and it would not be any the better for its being able to answer the intellectual questions it raises. In the moral sphere, too, we hanker after clear knowledge. We would know right acts from wrong and be able to classify and segregate them. We crave for fixity and definiteness and

¹ It calls for comment, whether it was Carlyle's plan or not. We incline to think that it was not, but we admit that the point is highly controversial and uncertain.

inviolability of moral laws. But the same series of considerations seems to show that knowledge is in its wrong place here too. If morality is to be a matter of the spirit—in other words, if it is to be truly human—it must be something more than mere passive obedience to clearly given command. He is a good horse who obeys the curb and a good dog who does what he is told; but man must do something more. He must do things of himself—not merely imitate, but originate. Simply to keep by a rule, follow a beaten track, may suffice for the mere mechanical work of life, but no morality worth the name ever consists in that. It is not the following of a path, but the breaking of one. It is not making a prescribed move and getting a prearranged result like the working of a machine: it is the taking an experimental step to see what the result will be, like the inventing of a machine. The position seems confirmed by a profound psychology. You cannot lay down moral rules as you can scientific laws. For, strictly, moral beings do not obey rules: they *elect* to obey them. In getting them to obey set rules you only work them from the outside. Nay, in themselves following moral rules they are but working upon themselves from without; whereas morality consists in their working themselves, spontaneously, from within.

Morality, properly regarded, is in fact an art. Morality deals with the concrete. In the complicated course of our human endeavour to live our life and do right, “situations” arise, tangled or tragic. Morality is the meeting of these concrete situations. It has no “duties of perfect obligation.” It is not the consistent standing “through thick and thin” by a principle. It is the seeing what is needed to solve these “situations”—so to solve them as to heighten the harmony and intensify the throb of life. It is the seeing what is wanted, and the daring to execute it, finely. A life of morality would be a perpetual meeting of successive sets of circumstances, and successfully rising to them. It is an enlarged and intensified etiquette; and would find its highest expression in the man whose life is all complexity and yet is never in a tangle, and who yet never needs to do anything merely abrupt or gross or rude in order to keep out of a tangle. The ideal character would be the incarnation of Bergson’s *élan vital*, sinuous, resourceful, yielding, graceful, free from the angularity and awkwardness of the merely “moral” life—in the sense in which the man is “moral” who lacks most gifts and graces and can do little more than stick mechanically to the rules of life, but who does so, and

whose characteristic attitude is that he "wouldn't tell a lie" and so on.

Morality is art, and all art is this sort of superiority to the palpable and clear distinctions of the ordinary practical intelligence. It has not any rules. It is a dexterous *playing* with rules. And they are not seeing it, who see in it an honouring of rules, whether moral, natural, or æsthetic. To take an instance: people informed with the habits of the Scottish peasant life of a day now past might well have handed their children their *Cotter's Saturday Night* or some such thing to read, "because," in their simplicity, "they thought it would do them good"; as no doubt it did themselves, when in reading it they felt their hard, ascetically regulated life shot through for a moment with a gleam of gold. But the chances are that they did this, not as people who themselves read artistically, or valued specially the *art* of the work of art. They did not offer their children simply a piece of poetry to enjoy; nor did they treat themselves to such, but went in for a moral lesson. That poetry was welcome to them, presumably, simply because it sang of their own life. It therefore did not interest them as art. It only fixed attention afresh and somewhat vividly on the rules or habits they practised, the stiff regularities or familiar amenities of their life. It was not art to them any more than Scripture-reading every night or kirk-going every Sunday was art. It only recalled these things, did them over again in imagination. In itself it might be poetry; but in appreciating it only as it gave back to them the familiar categories of things as they knew them by ordinary intelligence—the things they had always called good and pious, or wrong, or ludicrous, or perplexing—they missed the art and saw instead only the familiar lines of the map of life. And this, perhaps, was why they got it all out of focus, passed over the lyrical beauties, and thought the maudlin parts the grandest. Whether it was over the moral order or over an immoral order, or merely over nature, that the glamour was being cast, made no difference so long as what they saw was verisimilitude: the incidents and scenes of nature, the well-known situations, the customs, catastrophes, riddles, drolleries of life. Upon such mood, the art of the poem, the true poetry of it—the higher flights of imagination, the subtleties of fancy—is lost.

And if representation of the facts of life or endorsement of its rules is nothing to art—if its business is only to play with them both,—it similarly makes play with the so-called laws of the beautiful. Canons are an irrelevance. Art has no

business with them,—or with anything theoretic. Art simply conjures up loveliness—anyhow, anywhere. And loveliness is surprise. It can have no rules, else we should learn them, and forestall it, and the effect would be lost. Fine art is free—nay, it is freedom. And morality being art, the best summing up of the whole situation would be to say that the higher life of man is simply freedom. It is that state in which the soul for moments deserts the tracks and leaves the uniformities along which ordinary practical intelligence guides ordinary life. And man advances only as he realises this. The maxim of all human advance, therefore, is “win freedom.” Don’t be preoccupied with the world or with life as ordinary knowledge sees them: the one with its facts classified and distinguished as this or that, the other with its rules plain and clear and not to be stepped over. Do not be preoccupied in ensuring that your statements merely reproduce the first, or your acts merely conform with the second. Follow the beautiful, wherein the soul leaps free of its fetters. Meet your situations and dare to strike them into music, whatever that may require of you. Without by any means forgetting that it will require the blunt truth occasionally, as well as the graceful evasion, the “standing up on a moral point,” as well as disdaining the pedantry of old-fashioned adherence to the letter of the law. But let the long result of it all be that you manage yourself and manage your circumstances, live beautifully, an interesting member of an interesting world—amid all the necessities of nature and of life, a free being. Make music of your life. Do not attempt to teach others; for you cannot. You cannot teach what you cannot lay down rules for, or make generalisations about, or draw together into categories. You can teach the laws of nature. You can teach the map of life. You can point to facts and say the sun always rises here and sets there, this always happens thus and that so. You can say abide by this rule of life and never forsake that. You can say God is a spirit, and His purposes are righteous. But that is knowledge—knowledge of nature, knowledge of morality, knowledge of religion. All it does is to give men a picture of facts which are, and enable them to imitate deeds which are right. But imitation of good deeds is not morality, nor knowledge of God religion. By this way of knowledge you only attain a higher life which is dead—an art which merely follow rules, a morality which has done all the commandments and is satisfied, a religion which ends in theology; an art without beauty, a morality without heroism, a religion without faith. All you can do, therefore,

is enter into the spirit of the higher life—the part that the understanding just misses—and contrive to infect others with your spirit.

The general tendency to disparage the intellect, the rational faculty, the practical intelligence of man, is too widely ramified and too various in its manifestations for us to hope that this attempt to pull it together into a focus will enable it to be recognised under whatever guise it appears. Still less is it possible so much as to begin to show all that is mistaken in it. What we wish to point out is simply that, however the destructive work of the intellect when it enters the sphere of religion is to be repaired, it cannot be by abandoning the attempt to understand; for if history teaches anything it teaches that the religion which has in fact held society together is the religion of the common man, and to the common man (however we may try to persuade ourselves otherwise) religion contains an address to the intelligence. It comes as the messenger of truth. It tells of fact. It comes home in the literal sense as a message—a piece of news. It is quite true that the pious mind has not verified the news; but he has been told it, and on authority which he trusts as he would that of any ordinary messenger. It may be quite true that there is a distinction between knowledge and faith—and that it means that faith is not manifested in the act of recognising as a fact on which you rely, that there is a God, or a providential order, or a means of human salvation. But this is an academic point. Anyone who chooses can say that these things were theological knowledge; and that the living spirit of religion only came out in the *triumph* of these assumptions over the threat of the world to belie them—in the great moment when without seeing the soul still believes, and in that attains heroism. But it is a matter of psychological terminology only, whether we are to confine faith to the moment of uncertainty in the total mental act. The substantial point is that the man of faith *is* certain of something. Much is obscure in the ways of Providence, but there is a Providence. Much is baffling in his effort to make himself a temple of the Holy Ghost, but he is saved. Hard it is to see how all things work together for good to them that love God, but he knows that they do. Religion is a splendid venture, on the basis of something which is not a venture. And to insist that mere knowledge of which one is sure, as one is sure of the laws of nature, is no part of religion, *has this grave danger: that it encourages us to think that we can have religion*

—a religion that can live, and inform society, and save the world—*while we are (intellectually) sure of nothing*. And in trying to sever art and morality from the intellect, taking them as the transcending of rules, the flowing together of distinctions, while thought is the maintenance of them, cuts at the root of art and morality precisely as the other cuts at the root of religion.

We are afraid of the artificiality of thought, of its abruptness and its mechanism; we would fain leave it behind us: and we think that we do so in art and in the highest religious and moral life—in all, in fact, that is original and creative or in any way spiritually valuable. But ordinary life is full of that abruptness and mechanism; and to try to sever art from life is to set it to live on itself and eat out its own vitals. It is to attempt to have art without anything to be made artistic, beauty without anything ugly to be made beautiful. Art involves an immense unseen background—unseen by either artist or spectator, because they must both alike be standing in it and wholly surrounded by it. Beauty, though the fact is often forgotten, is life breaking into beauty. The servant girl who sings when her work is running sweetly is not aware that it is the work that is breaking into music. The weather-beaten peasant who gladdens a winter evening by the reading of the peasant-poet is not aware that it took all the stern stress of generations of toil—all that went to make the life which is here sung—to give the poet's word-pictures their aroma. Yet so it surely is. It is life's square corners and straight lines, its rigour and its discipline—the hard conditions, in fact, upon which thought shows that the world will yield man sustenance and satisfaction,—it is these that make art possible.

And morality is not art, except by accident, but is rather the patient preparation of the soil of human nature to take on the heavenly gleam of art when it comes. It does rise into art, perpetually; especially at its crises; and in the hands of a great man may quite well be art all the time. But there is a difference between the moral life and living beautifully. The latter is for the gifted; the former is for all. For that reason, no man whose beautiful life keeps all the moral laws is good, except he be a man prepared still to keep them when he arrives in a state of society wherein he cannot keep them beautifully. Morality is often more than the simple faithful abiding by those plain rules that give life its cohesion and its strength. But it is only affectation to deny that this is its primary function. It has its moments when it rises superior

to its limitations, passes beyond the bounds which thought has fixed as the conditions of human welfare. And it may have a beauty of high, tragic sort when it does so—probably always has when it does so honestly. Yet the beauty is but the tune which the passing breeze has played upon the strings kept true and tight throughout whole nameless ages of commonplace moral discipline. The very act which breaks the rule does so in full remembrance of its sacredness. And it is not the breach which makes it moral, but the remembrance. Else the only morality would be a breach of moral rules, which would rapidly make no act worth doing except there were a “moral difficulty” about it, and would end in a generation the winnings of a thousand years.

And for religion, it too has its crises, and it may be the defiance of all the powers of the universe; but among all generations of saints it has been on its other side an assurance about the universe—the resting assured of the divinity of the ultimate Power who works there. It is not a standing on nothing, but a standing on the Rock of Ages. Its truth is sure and its objects are real, with the same sureness as the march of the seasons and the same reality as the hills and the stars.

J. W. SCOTT.

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY.

CHRISTIAN INTERNATIONALISM.

HENRY T. HODGKIN.

WHATEVER view we may take of the causes of the present world conflict, our eyes turn with eager longing to the future, when we may begin to build for something very far better. Much is being written about a world-state, a league of nations, a league to enforce peace, and so forth. It is well, indeed, that the best minds in all countries should turn to these questions, and seek to discover some method by which the world may, as it were, take out an insurance policy against war. How unspeakably terrible will be the prospect if, at the close of this war, we are to set to work preparing for another such, only worse!

The politicians and statesmen recognise that a plan for peace will not suffice unless it is accompanied by a change of heart.¹ There is need to-day of men and women who will prepare for that change, who will state the fundamental issues in such a way that men's consciences will be aroused, who will help to create the atmosphere, moral and mental, without which the better policies will assuredly come to nothing. No doubt this better state of mind is being created, in many cases, by the actual experience of war. Many are coming back from the front determined to find a more sensible and a more

¹ To give two examples out of many, Mr G. Lowes Dickinson says:—"It is impossible to make territorial boundaries correspond accurately with nationality. A change of heart is, therefore, as necessary as a change of frontiers and allegiance. . . . Let the nations, having acquired the right to govern themselves, do so in peace, without aggressive ambition. That must be the rule for the new Europe; but it too implies a change of heart. . . . The will to peace is the only sure guarantee of peace." (*After the War*, pp. 16 ff.)

"Somehow or other we must overcome these difficulties, and that at bottom depends upon the change of heart brought about by the war. If every Great Power will look at the problems from the point of view of humanity, they are soluble. If they look at them from their own national standpoint alone, they are not." (*Round Table*, No. 20, p. 792.)

Christian way for the settlement of international disputes. The deep sorrow of unnumbered homes is bringing to birth a resentment against the whole method of war that must help towards the accomplishment of our constructive tasks when the war is over. But there are other tendencies which cannot be overlooked. Those whose dearest have fallen bravely fighting on the battlefield are apt to cover war with a halo of glory that handicaps the would-be reformer. The making of vast quantities of munitions is fixing on all countries, and not least on some of the neutral ones, a vested interest in war which cannot fail to exercise a far-reaching influence when peace is re-established. Psychic forces are liberated by the outburst of passion expressing itself in so barbarous a way; these forces are affecting all peoples, and stimulating, even now, the demand for preparedness. A decisive victory to either side is likely to put apparently overwhelming arguments into the hands of the military party on the other side, and therefore to speed up the military preparations all round. The friends of peace will be greatly misled if they underestimate these forces. A consideration of their strength serves to confirm the conviction that we need to base our new policies upon ultimate principles, and to call forth for their accomplishment more compelling motives. The deepest springs of life must be drawn upon, and in order to do this we need to make our appeal to the religious instinct. Nothing short of this will carry us forward to a righteous and enduring peace—a state of society in which the common good shall triumph over all lesser interests. It is this conviction that lies behind the title, “Christian Internationalism.”

What, then, are the foundations on which alone we can hope to build a human society (world-state, league of nations, or whatever form it may take) which shall be stable and free, giving full play for the individual, and yet not subject to sudden submergence through the caprice of the individual? Let us state constructively the ideas which must take shape in action if this end has to be attained, and in doing so it will be apparent that their establishment involves the destruction of certain other ideas which have been very generally accepted, and the prevalence of which has largely accounted for the present war.

I.

War is the breakdown of negotiations and diplomacy. That is to say, it is the surrender of the hope of discovering the right. This means either that our machinery for making

this discovery is inadequate, or that there is no principle of moral order in the universe which can be counted upon as ultimate. We are apt to throw all the blame on the machinery, or on the men who have been trying to work it—or on some of them. As we think more deeply, however, do we not discover that the reason of their failure is found in a lack of faith in the moral order of the universe? If we really believed that a just settlement of any dispute could be arrived at, should we not see to it that means were provided *and relied upon* which were calculated to reach that settlement? Now, this involves not only a belief in the principle of moral order, but also a belief in the moral sense of the human race as a whole. If the human race will, in the last resort, choose the unjust and unfair, we have no hope for the progress of humanity. War will not help us, and indeed the atmosphere of war makes it exceptionally difficult for us to form an unprejudiced view of any point at issue.

What we call "the sporting instinct" is an expression of this inherent love of justice. The British rule in India is possible to-day because the British *raj*, with all his overbearing manner, is known to be just. The experiment of Pennsylvania rested upon a belief that just dealing would be understood and appreciated by uncivilised Indians. Within the State we assume that justice can be administered, and that the right course can be discovered, even if the question at issue has to be carried from one court to another, through a painful series of appeals. It cannot be said, in any true sense, that the modern State rests on force. It rests upon the conviction, among other things, that right can be established by an appeal to the sense of right in the mass of men. The modern State would break down if that sense of right were openly violated by the "powers that be," on any large scale. That there are cases in which the assumption does not appear to be justified does not really invalidate the general conclusion. We stand for the State-idea even at times when our loyalty is strained by what we conceive to be a miscarriage of justice, simply because we still believe that, in the main, we can rely upon the moral order and upon the instincts of the community in responding to it.

The extension of this basal faith to the whole human family is a prime necessity if a world-state, or any similar grouping of nations, is to become a *fait accompli*. In time of war it may seem very hard to exercise this faith. The minds of belligerents—and even of neutrals—are inflamed with a sense of injustice done, or supposed to have been done, by the other side. The

enemy nation is personalised as an inhuman being subject to no law of pity, of decency, or of justice. A mad dog, a pirate nation, and so forth, are terms that blind us to true moral judgments. We are carried away by their sweeping condemnations. Even now, however, we should seek to reconstruct on the sure foundations of a belief in the moral order, and in the fact that the great mass of mankind, in whatever nation, have instincts that will respond thereto.

The Kingdom of God is not to be built upon a series of compromises between good and evil. It is to rest upon solid foundations of righteousness and love. When we pray to our Father, "Thy kingdom come: Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," we assume the possibility of the establishment of a kingdom of truth and justice *in this world*, or else we mock Him in our prayers. That assumption needs to be more vital and vitalising: it needs to be translated into national policies, and into the management of industrial concerns. The plain fact is that we do lip-service to it, but we do not take it with the tremendous seriousness with which we must take it if human life is to be delivered from the constant fear of war, with all that we now know it to mean.

II.

War, whether industrial or international, rests upon the further assumption that there are conflicting interests between nations and classes that can only be adjusted by testing the strength of the contending parties. "Vital interests" are said to be involved in the expansion of Germany or Russia. When these interests conflict, what means have we but war for adjusting them? The weakest must go to the wall. The "fittest" must survive. The superficial talk that carries over biological phraseology into all our life is partly responsible for this assumption. The struggle for existence presupposes that all cannot exist, and this is manifestly true in nature. But is it true in human life? Certain facts have to be borne in mind. The rate of increase in the human family is relatively very slow, and is found to become slower with the advance of "civilisation." The development of the hidden resources of this earth makes possible a much larger population on any given area than was the case even a century ago. History seems to show that, as one stock becomes more or less effete, there is need of the infusion of fresh blood if the progress of the race is to be maintained. There are still vast tracts of undeveloped and sparsely populated country on the surface of the globe.

Now, whatever the ultimate solution may be—and we are far enough from a deadlock to be able to leave that plan to unfold itself—it seems clear that we have no sufficient reason for assuming that one race can only prosper in this world at the expense of others. Is it not possible for us to discover an adjustment between the true interests of all races? This can only be done if our efforts are inspired by a genuine belief in the family idea. The extension of the family idea from the single family unity to the smaller and then to the larger community has been the line of human progress. The great need to-day is for prophets of the larger family—the unity in which men of every race can find their fulfilment. On any purely superficial view of society it will not be found possible to discover the essential unity. Conflicting interests always appear on the surface. The casual observer sees nothing else.

If there is any unifying principle in the universe, however, we are bound to believe in the possibility of discovering the deeper interests which unite men and nations. To surrender this idea is to sink into a practical polytheism. Indeed, we may be said to be perilously near doing this very thing to-day, when each nation appeals nominally to the same Father to aid it in the task of destroying another nation. We must summon ourselves to-day to a truer view of human life. We must reassert the family idea. In the family each individual's success is the success of all, his failure a loss to each other. Where interests seem to clash we have to go back to the deeper common interest of all. If we may dare, after what has been said above, to borrow a biological parallel, we would quote Kipling's "Law of the Jungle":

"For the strength of the pack is the wolf:
The strength of the wolf is the pack."

The wolf in the pack organised to resist all foes is driven to recognise the deeper interest which unites him to his brother wolf over against the lesser interest which prompts him to claim for himself all that he can get. So to-day we see the submergence of many signs of "private-mindedness" in the nations at war under the pressure of the national situation.

Is there any demand upon the whole human race strong enough to unite us? Can we visualise any controlling interests, any great opposing force to be contended with, any supreme object to be won, that shall be operative to unite all nations, and permanently to submerge the reign of private-mindedness in each nation? Already, when this war came

upon us, men in all nations were united in some of the greatest endeavours of the human intellect. Together we were seeking to read the secrets of nature, and to curb its mighty forces for our daily use. Together we were waging war against disease, so that advance in any nation became at once the property of all. Together we were pressing forward towards truer methods of education, towards a better social organisation, towards the knitting together of the race by commercial and intellectual ties. Together the great nations now at war were seeking to extend the principles of Jesus Christ which they believed to be their most precious possession.

To name these alone, among the many tasks that confront the united intelligence and moral earnestness of mankind, is to appreciate the magnitude of the common interests of the race. Many of the best minds in all races have been realising that these supreme aims can only be achieved by united effort. What seems to be needed is to gather up all these great uniting aims into one, so that it may appeal to the imagination and capture the best thought of the race. The uniting interests must be made more living and imperative than the superficial dividing ones. Now, this is precisely what is involved in the conception of the Kingdom of God. This idea has been far too limited. It has been treated purely as a theological dogma. The day has come for it to be brought out into the open as a great compelling ideal, to supply the motive which alone is adequate to draw together, in one common welding purpose, the best life of men and women in all races. In this conception must be included all that makes for the higher life of man. As the Humanists in the Renaissance rediscovered the rich treasure-house of human knowledge, and determined to strive for a fuller human life, in which every side of man's nature should find expression, so must we in this day unite in one the highest aspiration of all nations. The Church that stands in the way of such a synthesis is doomed. The Church that can lead the way shall find a mission beyond her wildest dreams.

III.

More than this is to be said. Not only are there fundamental common interests, towards the fulfilment of which the whole race should, and may, bend its energies, and in the pursuit of which unity may be discovered. If these common aims are to be achieved, we *need* one another. The severed members of the human family are not destined to find their

highest good in isolation. The remarkable article of Professor Forster, parts of which were reproduced in the HIBBERT JOURNAL last October (p. 35), gives eloquent expression to this idea.

"Humanity has reached a point at which mutual completion, co-operation, education, of the nations is essential. No nation can solve its own problems without the aid of the traditions of foreign nations. France needs Germany, and Germany France. Germany needs the spirit of the Slavs, and the Slavs need that of Germany. England needs Germany, and Germany England. . . . The individual nations are no less necessary to one another for their spiritual completion than are the two sexes. Without such higher companionship both nations and souls must be ruined by their own onesidedness. In the union of races will the universal Christ be born in us."

The extension of the family idea involves the belief not simply that we must tolerate one another, but that we must learn to appreciate one another. In the little tribe among the mountains overlooking the Dead Sea, rent by diverse factions, trusting the one to Assyria and the other to Egypt, the vast warring world-powers of the day, there arose a man who had the audacity to proclaim that Israel should be a third with Egypt and Assyria, her two giant enemies. To him it was given to think in family terms of a world rent with war, and he saw through the hatreds and prejudices of his day that each needed the other for the fulfilment of its own best life. That stupendous vision has come down through the ages. Is the world yet ripe for it? Dare we express it in national policies? Where is the statesman who can make it a reality for the relations of America and Japan, Germany and England, Austria and Servia?

Yet nothing short of this conception will suffice to bind the nations together. The old idea of unity through uniformity is fast dying, if not dead, in the modern world. It has no constructive power. Unity through diversity is the only conception true to the facts of life, and adequate to express the infinite richness and majesty of the world of thought and action. The very policies that have led to war have been, in large part, due to the development of an exclusive nationalism, so that the faults of each nation become accentuated, and are not checked by healthy comparison with those nations whose strength lies in the place where we are weak. Everyone knows the value of a large family in turning out adaptable and large-hearted characters. Even the weaknesses of one member contribute, within the family, to the education of all. If each were trained separately, how deplorable the results! So, in the

great human family, there is strength and weakness in each unit, and it is by the mixing of these units in friendly emulation that all may be able to give their best and to discover their highest good.

How great a change in our educational systems the full recognition of this truth would effect! The child trained to see the part which each nation has played in the unfolding drama of human existence, to appreciate the beauty and strength of the national life developed even in "hereditary enemies," to understand sympathetically the fierce struggles through which other nations have been finding their way to true ideals of human freedom and self-expression—struggles which have often left their mark on the constitution like scars on the human body;—the child so trained could not fail to develop into a citizen with a world-outlook, eager to find points of contact and spheres for co-operation between nations.

If Christ has any right to the supreme title "Son of Man," we cannot resist the thought that His Kingdom *needs* men of all races for its completion. As we move among different peoples, and touch them on the deeper sides of their nature, the thought takes on a larger significance. He, our Lord, waits for the isles to bring in their treasures; and for the nations that knew Him not, to run to Him. He cannot be all He would be to the human race, or to any part of it, until all the members of His great family gather together to place each his own peculiar offering at the Master's feet. As the passion for this supreme consummation seizes us, we become international in the Christian sense. Christian internationalism is, indeed, more than a theory of human existence: it is a transforming motive that carries us out into a larger world than the purely or narrowly national—into the wider horizons of the whole family in heaven and on earth.

IV.

War, lastly, is the expression of self-seeking in one form or another. It is based on the belief that we must assert or defend our own position if we are to maintain it. The conception of the meek inheriting the earth finds no place in the philosophy of war. The race is to the strong; be ready to maintain your rights; the weak will go to the wall. Such are the maxims of defensive or offensive warfare. If they express the true order of the universe, what is the use of striving against the spirit of war? Human society must rest, in the last resort, on physical force, and each unit must be ready to

support its view of truth, its interests, its rights, at the point of the sword.

There can be no doubt that Christ's view of life is a direct challenge to this philosophy. He believed that the ultimate principle which can be relied upon fully is Love expressing itself in giving and, if need be, in self-sacrifice. If He is right, every form of human society based on physical force, on contending for rights, on self-assertion, has within it the elements of self-destruction. It has an inherent tendency to break down, because it is running counter to the central principle in conformity with which alone can any stability be discovered for human life. The principle of the Kingdom of God stands over against the kingdoms of this world. "My kingdom is not of this world, else would my servants fight." To the question, "Can human society ever be constructed on these principles of love and self-giving?" we may answer, "It can never be permanently established on any other principles." Any other society will be a house builded on the sand. The time will come—and has not such a time come upon us to-day in Europe?—when, under the stress of some storm, the whole structure will tumble incontinently to the ground, "for it was founded upon the sand."

No other conviction is adequate to meet the world situation. We need such a belief in the God of Love as shall enter into all our policies, and express itself in our fundamental thinking about human life. There are men and women everywhere ready to take this venture—for it is a venture—if they can but see the way. Our Lord seems to have believed that the world of His day was waiting for this stupendous assertion of the Love of God, and for the translation of that belief into the whole of life. A few feeble folk, possessed by that idea, turned the whole of their day upside down. The stream became mixed. The principle of love was not fully accepted. The Church which should have expressed it entered upon a path of compromise. The brightness of the early vision faded.

The Lord of Glory is still in our midst in mighty power. His Spirit still calls out those who will commit themselves wholly to the way of Love. The world was never in greater need of the message. Any true and lasting peace can only be founded upon the ultimate principle of love, where each nation shall seek to give into the common life of humanity all the richness of its own added stores, accumulated through the long years of toil and struggle. This is the only ideal of the Kingdom of God which can fit into our Lord's conception of it. Again, do we really mean it when we pray "Thy Kingdom

come"? Or do we mock our Father in our daily prayer? If we mean what we say, there is surely but one course for us, to make the holy experiment in our own lives, and, as we may, in the life of the community—so to order human life that it may express the love of God, and to base it, first and last, on the actual conviction that He will stand behind those who trust Him completely, that His power is ultimately supreme, and that it is love.

To attempt any such reconstruction of life—even to state it as an aim—is to be called utopian, a mere idle dreamer. It must, indeed, be an idle dream unless—and this is the whole point—unless, behind that dream, ever ready to be manifested in and through those who dare to dream it, is the infinite power of the Living God. Those who have that faith stand—how often!—shivering on the brink, unwilling to put it to the supreme test. The Christian international is the man who dares. No other can help the world to rise to that higher level of faith and experience that may carry us forward into a new age worthy of the vast total of human suffering, and adequate to the passion of self-sacrifice with which men in all nations to-day have poured out their lives unto death.

HENRY T. HODGKIN.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1916, p. 799.)

I.

I AM not sure that materialism as a philosophy exists any longer, outside Germany, in the sense of being sustained by serious philosophers; but a few physiological writers, of skill and industry, continue to advocate what they are pleased to call scientific materialism. Properly regarded, this is a Policy, not a Philosophy, a limitation of scope for sound practical purposes; but they make the mistake of regarding it as a Philosophy comprehensive enough to give them the right of negation as well as of affirmation. They do this in the interest of what they feel instinctively to be the ultimate achievement, a Monism in which mind and matter can be recognised as aspects of some one fundamental reality. We can sympathise with the aim, and still feel how far from accomplishment we are. Nothing is gained by undue haste, and by unfounded negation much may be lost. We must not deny any part of the Universe for the sake of a premature unification. Simplification by exclusion or denial is a poverty-stricken device.

The strength of such writers is that they base themselves on the history and achievements of the past, and by artificial but convenient limitation of outlook achieve practical results. But they are not satisfied with results actually achieved—they forget their limitations, and, by a gigantic system of extrapolation from what has been done, try to infer what is going to be done; their device being to anticipate and speak of what they hope for as if it were already an accomplished fact. Some of the assumptions or blind guesses made by writers of this school are well illustrated by an exposition in the *Hibbert Journal* for July 1916, where Dr Hugh Elliot states the main propositions of scientific materialism thus:—“(1) The law of universal causation; (2) the principle of mechanism—*i.e.* the denial of purpose in the universe and all notions of absolute finalism or teleology; (3) the

denial that there exists any form of 'spiritual' or 'mental' entity that cannot be expressed in terms of matter and motion." These appear to be its three propositions, "here named" (to quote the writer of the article) "as being of the first importance in the representation of materialistic thought."

Now proposition 1 is common property; materialistic thought has no sort of exclusive right over it; and to claim propositions 2 and 3 as corollaries from it is farcical. Taking them as independent postulates,—which they are,—all that need be said about proposition 2 is that a broad denial always needs more knowledge than a specific assertion, and it is astonishing that any sane person can imagine himself to know enough about the Universe as a whole to be able complacently to deny the existence of any "purpose" in it.

But attention may be more usefully directed to the extravagantly gratuitous guess involved in hypothesis 3. As a minor point, it is not even carefully worded; for entities which cannot be expressed in terms of matter and motion are common enough without going outside the domain of physics. Light, for instance, and electricity, have not yet proved amenable, and do not appear likely to be amenable, to purely dynamical theory.

Certain phenomena have been reduced to matter and motion,—heat, for instance, and sound, the phenomena of gases and liquids, and all the complexities of astronomy. And in a famous passage Newton expressed an enthusiastic hope that all the phenomena of physics might some day be similarly reduced to the attractive simplicity of the three laws of motion—inertia, acceleration, and stress. And ever since Newton it has been the aim of physics to explain everything in its domain in terms of pure dynamics. The attempt has been only partially successful: the Ether is recalcitrant. But its recalcitrance is not like mere surly obstruction, it is of a helpful and illuminating character, and I shall not be misleading anyone if I cheerfully admit that in some modified and expanded form dynamical theory in mathematical physics has proved itself to be supreme.

But does dominance of that kind give to that splendid science—the glory of Britain and of Cambridge—the right to make a gigantic extrapolation and sprawl over all the rest of the universe, throwing out tentacles even into regions which it has definitely abstracted from its attention or excluded from its ken? There is not a physicist who thinks so. The only people who try to think so seem to be a few enthusiasts of a more speculative habit of thought, who are annoyed with the physicists, from Lord Kelvin downwards, for not agreeing with them. And being unable to gather from competent authority any specific instance in which dynamics has explained a single fact in the region of either life and mind or consciousness and emotion or purpose and will,—because it is known perfectly well that dynamical jurisdiction does not extend into those regions,—these speculators set up as authorities on their own account, and, on the strength of their own expectation, propound the broad and sweeping dogma that nothing in the Universe exists which is not fully expressible in terms of matter and motion. And then, having accustomed themselves to the sound of some such collocation of words, they call upon humanity to shut its eyes to any facts of common experience which render such an assertion ridiculous.

The energy and enthusiasm of these writers, and the good work they

may be doing in their own science, render them more or less immune from attack; but every now and then it is necessary to say clearly that such extravagant generalisations profane the modesty of science: whose heritage it is to recognise the limitations of partial knowledge, and to be always ready to gain fresh experience and learn about the unknown. The new and unfamiliar is the vantage ground, not of scientific dogmatism, but of scientific inquiry. OLIVER LODGE.

II.

I HAVE watched the controversy between Mr Elliot and Dr Carr, on the one hand, and Dr Mercier, on the other, with a good deal of interest, and though I do not accept the materialistic theory—unless you define “matter” to suit the case—I think that Mr Elliot has the better of the argument, at least the *ad hominem* argument, for that is all that he presents. I can also say that I fully agree to the proposition that scientific materialism is absolutely invulnerable, judged from the standpoint of normal experience, and I do not believe that any philosopher or physiologist can refute it with any of the weapons at his command. I think, however, that Mr Elliot has not put his case with a fraction of the strength that it really has. His arguments in most cases are exposed to an easy refutation, and this would lead to the belief that his materialism would be false, when in fact it might still be true, or at least the opinion that all phenomena are reducible to phenomena of matter, whatever conception we take of it.

(1) Mr Elliot, in his argument, appeals to the various conclusions of physical science as establishing the case against a teleological point of view, though the whole force of this argument rests upon a specific type of teleology, which, though excluded from nature, does not set aside another type of teleology, which he should either eliminate, or make the case rest upon something else than the antithesis between mechanism and teleology.

(2) The abstract doctrines of physical science, like the conservation of energy, natural selection, the uniformity of nature, are quite as compatible with a spiritual interpretation of nature as is materialism, though they exclude the narrow and anthropomorphic views of the past. They are not relevant to the case in its wider aspects, however difficult it actually is to get a teleological view of things to suit them. Their truth is in no respect evidence of universal mechanism, unless you define your “mechanism” much better than is usually done by physicists. They do exclude certain naïve views of the universe, but leave open the definition of the bases of materialism, which Mr Elliot does not undertake to do. He supposes that we all agree as to the nature of matter and materialism. He should get a starting-point on which all of us will agree.

(3) The three propositions on which he bases his materialism are simply each a *petitio principii*. They are: (a) “The law of universal causation,” (b) “the principle of mechanism,” and (c) “the denial that there exists any form of ‘spiritual’ or ‘mental’ entity that cannot be expressed in terms of matter and motion.” Now, in regard to these, the first of these doctrines is quite as consistent with spiritualism as with its opposing doctrine. The spiritualist has always used “spirit” as involving causality.

Whether it was uniform or capricious was another question, but all the spiritualistic theories have made intelligence and volition the very basis of causation. The second principle, that of "mechanism," is as compatible with spiritualism as with the other theory; indeed, one might maintain that the true conception of "mechanism" is incompatible with any theory of materialism based upon the inertia of matter, and any abandonment of that doctrine lands you in spiritualism at one leap. Then, the denial of the existence of the "spiritual" or "mental," other than in terms of matter and motion, is the question in dispute, and you beg the question in making it an axiom in the discussion. That is the thing to be proved.

The question of materialism is an evidential one, not of deduction from scientific doctrines which are mere generalisations of experience. A defensible materialism does not even depend upon the definition of matter which is usually accepted. *It is based upon the relation between consciousness and the organism, and that is a question of fact, not of deduction from abstractions.*

Nor need we agree on the definition of matter. You may take any conception you please of it, whether in the atoms or the ions and electrons, and the case remains the same. The materialism that affects the spiritualistic philosophy is that which makes consciousness a function of the organism, and you may make the elements of the organism anything you please. Scientific materialism is the doctrine that consciousness is a function of the organism or the brain as a compound. The elements may be spiritual if you like: the question is whether consciousness is an ephemeral phenomenon of this compound. Suppose the atoms were "spirits," Tait and Stewart's "demons," mental phenomena might as well be transient modal functions of their compound and have no existence apart from their organisation. This is quite as conceivable as making the basis of things material atoms. It is merely a question of evidence, not of any form of philosophical speculation.

Now the evidence for this materialism is the fact that we always find consciousness associated with an organism, and when that organism dissolves we have no normal evidence of that particular consciousness. We study the facts in the same way that we do the nature of dew or rain or steam. We do not require to know the nature of consciousness, whether a mode of motion or not, nor the nature of matter, to decide this question. Nor is it necessary to determine the class of phenomena to which consciousness belongs. All that we require to know is the uniformity of its connections, and these, in normal experience, show that it is uniformly connected with the organism, and that when this disappears all traces of this consciousness disappear, unless you admit the validity of the facts purporting to be evidence for the persistence of this personality. But this is going beyond the territory of normal phenomena. Within that field all the facts point to the uniform association of consciousness with the body, and the total lack of evidence for its existence in a dissociated state. This may not be proof of materialism—that I grant; but it establishes the fact that all the normal evidence is on that side, and none on the other. And science that does not go beyond this must remain by the conclusions which the facts determine, and these facts are based upon the method of agreement. That is, the uniformity of connection between consciousness and organism, taken with the uniform normal absence of evidence for survival, leaves us with

no other rational hypothesis than the materialistic one. It may require the method of difference to prove the case, and it may be impossible to prove that consciousness is annihilated. This would leave us at least in the agnostic position, but materialism would have the scientific credentials as an hypothesis, with nothing to justify the spiritualistic one. If you wish to refute materialism at this point, you must isolate an individual consciousness and have evidence that it persists apart from the organism. Until that is done, materialism, in the writer's opinion, has the right of way, so far as the evidence is concerned.

I am glad to see Mr Elliot identify materialism and idealism as he does. I think him quite right in this position. I have for years contended that there is no essential difference between materialism and idealism. The "materialism" of the philosophers is nothing but sensationalism metaphysically considered, and idealism is intellectualism and sublimated or, perhaps better, respectable emotionalism of the aristocratic sort. But in metaphysics, idealism is the same as philosophical materialism when intelligently defined and interpreted in terms of the facts. Some day our self-complacent idealists will awaken to this fact. Just as soon as the materialists stop combating idealism to defend their own views and insist upon the identity of the two views, we shall have an intelligent and scientific discussion of the problem, and the idealists will run away from their verbiages. It is a waste of money and paper to discuss the question to-day in the way it is usually done. Philosophy has not yet learned what religion has learned, though not accepting the result with good grace. namely, that science or scientific method is the criterion of truth. Just as soon as philosophy gets out of its disguised scholasticism it will learn where its salvation is.

It is so easy to revel in the abstract generalisations of philosophy, and even our scientific men are as guilty of it often as our philosophers. Mr Elliot himself does not escape this vice. He weakens his argument for materialism by deferring to philosophic methods at all, so far as they are merely analytical of conceptions and generalisations. If you want to defend scientific materialism, stand on the facts of the relation of consciousness to the organism and the absence of all normal evidence for the continuity of mental states after death, and you can at least give trouble. But talk about the uniformity of causation and the principle of mechanism only shifts the issue. They are consistent with a spiritual view of nature, and are not so clearly determined conceptions that you can draw inferences against that view. Let us have science at the problem and not metaphysics.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

NEW YORK.

"THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENCE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1916, p. 725.)

THERE is surely some confusion of thought at one point in the otherwise clear and able article by Principal Selbie on "The Problem of Conscience" in the *Hibbert Journal* for July.

The main argument and purpose of the contribution will be generally approved. But Principal Selbie first posits for conscience a Christian

origin, and then proceeds to point out what he considers to be misapplications of the word. He gives two instances of "a conscience clause" introduced into Acts of Parliament, and demurs to the use of the word conscience in such a connection. The first example is the conscientious objection to vaccination. This he describes as merely "a private opinion." But except for his previous definition, why should not a parent's regard for the life of his child be a matter of conscience? Then there is the case of the conscientious objector to military service, when the objection is urged on "humanitarian grounds." He would restrict cases of conscience to objections urged "on strictly religious grounds." These also are no more than mistaken opinions which, while they are to be respected, we should at the same time endeavour to correct as being a misreading of the mind of Christ—in conflict with the general, educated, Christian conscience. But surely religion is not something superimposed upon nature. Christianity does not create duty toward God. As God is the author of man's entire nature, why should not what affects the physical life of one's offspring, or the physical life of one's fellow-man, be as truly a matter of duty to God as what is in the stricter sense religious belief? The objection in all these cases is to the violation of what is conceived to be a divine law.

It is not very easy to see what is gained either for philosophy or for religion by limiting the term "conscientious," as Principal Selbie does. The Christian objector is apparently mistaken too; in other words, his objection also is "a private opinion." Is not conscience the light anybody has at the time, that is, a man's reason applied to anything which touches the "moral" life—touches a man's innate sense of duty?

G. SINCLAIR.

DUNBAR.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE completed his sixtieth year last November, and a special number of *The Philosophical Review* (May 1916) has been issued containing the papers read at the December meeting of the American Philosophical Association in honour of the occasion, together with other contributions dealing with various phases of Professor Royce's philosophy. The papers are largely critical as well as appreciative, and, written as of course they are from many different points of view, they bring together much valuable reflexion on current problems. The collection also contains some interesting personal reminiscences. An old pupil, Mr Richard C. Cabot, writes, for instance, upon "Josiah Royce as a Teacher," and gives some instructive anecdotes illustrative of Royce's method in the classroom and seminar. Professor G. H. Howison speaks of "the significance of his work in philosophy," and relates, in a pleasant way, how he first came to make Royce's acquaintance. One of Royce's abiding services to philosophy he takes to be his steady insistence upon the position that the defence of our capacity for absolute certainty must rest upon an idealistic metaphysics, although the idealism need not be of the monistic type of Hegel and the Hegelian school. Professor Howison has some pregnant things to say about pragmatism. "When 'truth' gets translated into mere preference of feeling, or even into sturdy resolve, and yet remains, after all, but an uncertain conjecture, subject to revision, and sure to come to this in the lapse of time, a revision that with the lapse must recur and recur and recur *in perpetuum*, it cannot but cease at length to be worth the trouble of the guess and the testing by trial." Professor John Dewey deals with "Voluntarism in Royce's Philosophy," first of all as it is evinced in an early essay of 1881, and then as it is manifested in his later writings. In the early essay the act of thought by which sense data become a knowable world of objects and a world of other minds is itself regarded as an affirmation of the spontaneity of consciousness which can be justified only in terms of its own worth as an act,—that is to say, ethically. In the later writings the relationship is reversed: an all-inclusive thought is assumed to be eternally realising itself in all fragmentary and partial acts of will, and the ethical justification is transcended in the cognitive. Still, however, the voluntaristic tendency, in a modified form, persists in Royce's speculation. The Absolute Thinker possesses also, so Royce

conceives, a Universal Will that is being realised in the world. And in his theory of judgment, Royce contends that the cognitive idea is, in its objective reference, an intent or a purpose. At the same time Professor Dewey admits that construing the operation of fulfilling a supreme cognitive interest in terms of purpose and will is a very different thing from construing the cognitive interest in terms of a process of fulfilment of *other* interests—vital, social, ethical, æsthetic, etc. There is an elaborate article by Mr W. H. Sheldon on "Error and Unreality," in which, however, no reference is made to Royce at all. The author points out very truly that two distinct questions are comprised in the problem of error—(a) the psychological question as to the nature of the mental process when we err and what causes lead to it, and (b) the metaphysical question as to the nature or status of the erroneous object, the illusory thing. The former question has been often enough answered; the latter has seldom been squarely faced. It is with the latter that the article is concerned, although I am bound to say I think the author often brings psychological considerations to bear upon it which have no relevance. The solution of the problem which Mr Sheldon has to offer is certainly sufficiently drastic. He proposes to "extirpate the notions of unreality, appearance, non-being, out of philosophy." There is nothing unreal; or better, everything is real. Everything which is an object of thought is real, and consequently every illusory object is real, for it is the object of thought when one errs. If I mistakenly believe there is a tortoise on my writing-table, the tortoise is real not merely in the subjective world, but in the physical world, for it is of him as being physically real that I think when I make the error. The error consists, not in my belief in the tortoise, but in the denial which, in my mind, goes with that belief. I take the tortoise's presence to exclude the presence of whatever else is there—be it a book, a pencil, or just air, and it is in the denial of that fact or object that the sting of error lies. Error entails denial of some fact; it is a belief in the non-existence of something. So far as I can see, this explanation simply amounts to a matter of terminology. If Mr Sheldon chooses to call every content of thought "real,"—well and good. But not the faintest light is thereby thrown upon the difference which the ordinary distinction between "real" and "unreal" implies, nor the least clue given to the solution of the problem which the recent work of Meinong, for example, has been forcing upon us,—the nature, namely, of the "being" to be ascribed to objects which are ordinarily described as "unreal." In a paper on "Realistic Aspects of Royce's Logic," Mr E. G. Spaulding tries to show, and I think with some amount of success, that, in his recent essay on "The Principles of Logic," Royce is virtually moving in a direction which is the direct opposite of the logical monism which he seems to support; whilst Mr Morris R. Cohen, writing on "Neo-Realism in the Philosophy of Royce," urges that the recognition of the complete objectivity of mathematical truth by Royce fully bears out the contention that his philosophy is not in any true sense Hegelian. Several articles are concerned with Professor Royce's philosophy of religion, the two most important being those by Professor W. Adams Brown and Professor B. W. Bacon, the former dealing with the first volume and the latter with the second of *The Problem of Christianity*. Professor Adams Brown has a twofold criticism to offer. He believes (a) that Royce unduly simplifies

Christianity by identifying three conceptions which, however closely related in Christian experience, must ever remain distinct,—namely, God, Christ, the Church; and (b) that he empties loyalty of its highest significance by treating it as an end in itself irrespective of the object which calls forth loyalty, for loyalty in the abstract may lead, no one can tell whither, to militant imperialism as well as to Christian self-sacrifice. Professor Bacon is much more in accord with Royce's teaching. The philosophical definition of Christianity as the religion of loyalty does give us, he thinks, the real key to the psychology of the resurrection faith. "Loyalty" is the root-idea. Only it should not have been called the "Christianity of the Pauline Churches"; for what is most distinctive in it, the doctrine of absolute devotion to the Kingdom, is the doctrine of Jesus. The unqualified, unreserved, absolute devotion to God the Father and the interests of God's Kingdom laid down in Jesus' teaching, lived out to the uttermost in his life, and made imperishable by his death,—this is "the essence of Christianity."

Amongst the articles in the issue of *The Philosophical Review* to which I have been referring is one by Professor W. E. Hocking on "The Holt-Freudian Ethics and the Ethics of Royce." Professor Edwin B. Holt's book *The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics* (London: Fisher Unwin, 1915) is certainly a striking and suggestive little volume and deserves to be widely known. The author tries to show that by "wish" Freud does not mean desire for, or interest in, some "end," but a purpose or course of action with regard to the environment,—a course of action which the living body executes or is prepared to execute with regard to some object or fact. In short, Professor Holt interprets what Freud understands by "wish" in terms of what it has now become customary to call "behaviour." Freud's method of "psycho-analysis" is based on the principle, which he conceives to be established, that a large percentage at least of mental disorders are caused by a repression (*Verdrängung*) of wishes. And Professor Holt seeks to carry that principle into the ethical field and to maintain that such repression is the cause of moral disorders. If one set of tendencies is suppressed, there is, he urges, a steady escape of these through furtive by-paths of thought and action, whilst, in some cases, first one set of tendencies and then another may be suppressed, with a like consequence. The truly moral course consists in following the path that involves integration and not dissociation nor yet suppression. Free play is thus given to the various sets of tendencies involved, whereby they meet each other, and a line of conduct emerges which is dictated by the sets of motives together, and which embodies all that was not downright antagonistic in them. Thus, to refrain from eating mushrooms because some mushrooms are poisonous is not morally meritorious conduct; what we ought to do is to find out which mushrooms are edible, and, if we wish, to eat them. Right conduct is that conduct, attained through discrimination of the facts, which fulfils all a man's wishes at once, suppressing none. Suppressions occur in this world of ours through lack of knowledge. And truth is the sole moral sanction; the discrimination of hitherto unrealised facts is the one way out of every moral dilemma. The subject of "psycho-analysis" is at present much in evidence, and is likely to occupy still more attention in the immediate future. The translation, therefore, by Dr Constance E. Long, of a selection of articles and pamphlets by Dr C. G. Jung, under the title *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (London:

Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1916), ought to be of help to the psychologist. Jung is the leader of the Zürich school of Psycho-analysis, which differs in many essential particulars from the Vienna school of Freud. One of the chief characteristics of the Zürich school is the positive value it attributes to what is described as "symbolism." The functional importance of the symbol is clearly shown, Jung contends, in the history of civilisation. For thousands of years the religious symbol proved a most efficacious means in the moral education of mankind. Concrete values cannot take its place; only new and more efficient symbols can be substituted for those that are antiquated and outworn, and the further development of mankind can only be brought about by means of symbols which represent something far in advance of himself, and the intellectual meanings of which cannot be yet entirely grasped. In the unconscious region of the individual's life such symbols are produced, and they are of the greatest value in the moral development of the personality. The essays here translated deal with special aspects of this general view.

Professor J. S. Mackenzie contributes an interesting article to *Mind* (July 1916) on the significance of "The Laws of Thought." The one aim of all logic is, he insists, to make our meaning clear, and the laws of thought would seem to be the fundamental conditions of clearness. A concept, if it is to be a concept at all, must have a definite meaning. It thus acquires a certain permanence, and is distinguished from every other concept. Thus there are involved in all cases of clear conception the aspects of identity and difference; and the first law of thought lays down that a meaning is identical with itself, and distinct from every other. So, again, a judgment is a meaning, but a meaning of a somewhat different kind from a concept. Every judgment may be regarded as both affirmative and negative. It asserts something, and negates everything that is inconsistent with that assertion. The principle of contradiction is thus implied in all judgment. It makes the meaning definite, and brings out its positive and its negative aspect. And the principle of excluded middle serves simply to lay further emphasis on the definiteness of the judgment. Whatever the meaning of the judgment may be, it excludes its opposite; one or the other of them must be true. In the same number of *Mind* there is a careful treatment of what the writer, Professor J. Laird, calls "Berkeley's Realism." Berkeley's insistence, frequently reiterated, on the reality of sensible things in the form in which they appear and just because they appear seems, Professor Laird argues, a statement of the theory of neo-realism that colours, shapes, and sounds must be accepted at their face value whatever the difficulties. And if, as Berkeley asserts, sensible things are "in the mind" *only* in the sense that they are the direct objects of mind, it would be hard to look for a fuller measure of agreement between two theories widely separated in time and in form of expression. All the same, Professor Laird points out that Berkeley's intuitive certainty of every idea being "in the mind" implies an interpretation of "idea" which is foreign to neo-realism. It is clear that Berkeley believed ideas were "in the mind" because they require a *substratum*, and, being ideas, they cannot have an unthinking *substratum*. From this it is a far cry to modern realism. A valuable article appears in the May number of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* from the pen of Professor A. N. Whitehead on "La théorie relationniste de l'espace." The author starts by carefully distinguishing the different senses of the word "space," and then deals

with the relation of physical objects to physical space. The main body of the article is devoted to a discussion of the changes the relativity theory of space introduces in geometrical theory. According to the relativity theory of space it is, for example, essential that points should be complex entities, logical functions of those relations between objects which constitute space. Because, if a point were a simple thing, incapable of being logically defined in terms of relations between objects, then points would be, in fact, absolute positions.

It is gratifying to be able to record the appearance of an English translation by Mr Fred Rothwell of Professor Émile Boutroux' important book, *De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature*, under the title of *The Contingency of the Laws of Nature* (Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Company, 1916). This was the first work of Boutroux', published as far back as 1874, but its influence upon French thought has been wide and deep. The author raises the question whether the laws of nature are absolutely necessary, or whether they do not admit of some sort of contingency which affords scope for the free activity of rational beings. He tries to show that an absolutely rigorous necessity is in truth inconceivable, and that from a scientific point of view natural laws do not imply the absolute necessity that has been claimed for them. As we advance from the world of inanimate nature to the world of life, and from the world of life to the world of thought and morality, the degree of contingency permitted by the laws of nature becomes, he argues, more apparent. What is subject to measurement and calculation, and thus presents an aspect of perfect regularity, is but the surface of things. Man is able to act on nature because nature itself is neither a brute force nor a lifeless thought, but rather a veritable being, which even now, in its own way, tends to exist and develop, to create and transcend itself. If they were actually necessary, the laws of nature would signify the immutability and rigidity of death, whilst if they are contingent they constitute the bases which enable us constantly to rise towards a higher life. Professor Boutroux' argument has not hitherto received the attention it deserves in England, and this translation ought to secure for it due recognition. The enterprising Open Court Publishing Company has also recently brought out the second volume of George Boole's *Collected Logical Works*, which comprises his *Investigation of the Laws of Thought*. It is an exact reprint of the original edition of that famous work which appeared in 1854, and which has long been out of print and only obtainable at an exorbitant price. The reprint will be of great service to the philosophical student.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

REVIEWS

Our Ultimate Aim in the War.—By George G. Armstrong.—London : George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1916.

THERE are passages in this book which indicate the author's expectation that it will be treated by many as the production of an idle dreamer. His book is certainly nothing of the kind. It is an able, honest, earnest book; it shows both knowledge and trained argumentative power. An ethical fervour sustains the argument, and on this account a more fitting dedication could not be found than that which the author has chosen—to his father, the late Richard Acland Armstrong. On all grounds the book is one to be examined on its merits, with no prejudice against the democratic faith which inspires it nor against the vastness of the proposals arising from that inspiration. It will prove instructive even to those who cannot agree with its conclusions.

Our "ultimate aim in the war" should be, according to Mr Armstrong, perpetual, world-wide peace: in his view this is a "war to end war"; a justifiable war on that ground, but, as I gather, on that ground only. Mr Armstrong does not discuss the question whether perpetual peace is or is not a desirable ideal. His faith in the wisdom and goodness of democracy, especially of world-wide or international democracy, gives him all the guarantees he wants for the right use of peace. The belief to which many persons have been brought by their study of ante-bellum conditions—the belief that, bad as the state of war may be, there are some kinds of peace which are infinitely worse—sheds no cloud over Mr Armstrong's vision of a federated world in which the war-drum beats no longer.

The interest of the book, however, centres on the *method* by which Mr Armstrong proposes to achieve this ultimate aim of perpetual peace. He proposes to set up a world-state governed by a world-parliament which would express the common will of mankind. This proposal involves two assumptions, both of which I venture to think are gravely open to doubt. The first assumption is that a common will of mankind really exists, or would exist if the world-parliament were called into being. This may be so, but must not be treated as self-evident. The second is that the common will of mankind, assuming it to exist, is, or would be, in favour of perpetual peace. This is yet more doubtful. Unless the peace which Mr Armstrong promises were devoted to the pursuit of aims very different from those which have hitherto absorbed the industrial energies of mankind, a strong reaction against peace might soon disturb the harmony of his newly constituted world. The arguments for perpetual peace may be sound, but they are hotly contested by many thoughtful persons at the present moment. And I see no reason for believing that these militarist arguments, which at this moment are showing their immense power in the course of history, would be immediately silenced or overwhelmed by the establishment of a world-parliament. The opposite is quite conceivable. A parliament of pacifist states would probably be a pacifist parliament.

But existing states are not pacifist. They are armed to the teeth, and they would come to the world-parliament as armed states—unless Mr Armstrong could disarm them in advance. And how does he propose to do that? I lack Mr Armstrong's faith in the magic of parliaments—even world-parliaments—to bring all their constituent members instantly, or even ultimately, to reason on this or any other question. No existing parliament has ever done so.

Mr Armstrong enters into much detail with regard to the nature and functions of his world-parliament, and in the Appendix gives us a rough sketch of its constituency. It would consist of 525 representative units gathered from the four quarters of the earth. Now Mr Armstrong has a way throughout his treatise of regarding this immense congregation of races, religions, nations, and tongues as though it would come easily to unanimous decisions regarding matters submitted to its jurisdiction. He speaks, for example (p. 153), of "forwarding the good of the family of nations in the manner *which the family of nations desires*." In what manner, we may ask, does the family of nations desire to forward its own good? Mr Armstrong will reply, "It will be the business of the 525 to find that out." But does Mr Armstrong anticipate unanimity, even working unanimity, in a parliament of all nations called upon to define the manner in which mankind desires to forward its own good—perhaps the most perplexing question the mind of man could conceive? If he does, I think he is mistaken. As I try to imagine his world-parliament interpreting in detail what the world wants, or what mankind in general desires for its own good, a picture of hopeless confusion arises before the mind. On abstract principles the 525 might conceivably agree—as that "all the world wants liberty." The trouble would come when a particular arrangement was proposed by which the liberty of nations should be furthered—*e.g.* the surrender of South Africa to the Dutch. About *that* there would be two opinions, though there might be only one about the abstract value of liberty. And since the business of the world-parliament would be to make particular arrangements, and not to pronounce moral epigrams, after the manner of President Wilson, I foresee that it would be divided. The best that we could hope for would be a majority vote. But if China, Japan, Russia, Turkey, Mexico (to make a random combination) happened to vote with the minority, would the peace of the world be very secure? Minorities, as we know, are not always willing to "take it lying down." Would there be no "Ulsters" in the world-federation? The more I think of it, the more does Mr Armstrong's proposal resolve itself into a scheme—not for stopping war, but for substituting civil war for the other kind. There would be war, bitter war, *within* the federation. Internal disruption would threaten it from the moment of its birth.

I cannot reconcile Mr Armstrong's chapter on "Small Nationalities" with his subsequent chapter on "The International Judiciary." In the former chapter he lays down the principle that each people is to be placed under what government seems to it good. Each people is to decide for itself its own individuality, both as to its human content and its method of government, and these decisions are to be accepted as final by the world-state. If the Poles say "We will not be under Prussian rule—we will be a sovereign independent State,"—that decides the matter. So far the first chapter. In the second we are told, quite explicitly, that the international judiciary is to decide "*all* questions of fact and law even

where affecting vital interests, honour *and independence*" (p. 157). From this it would appear that the question of the independence of Poland is wholly at the mercy of the world-state. And the independence of every State, whether large or small, is apparently to be decided in the same manner. These two positions appear to me inconsistent.

What the second position implies can best be realised by imagining a concrete case. The independence of all nations being under the jurisdiction of the world-state, it is easy to imagine a majority vote, to which the Central Empires, the Asiatic nations, and others might conceivably be parties, decreeing a general dismemberment of the overseas dominions of Great Britain, including the independence of India. "That," the majority might say, "is what the family of nations desires for its own good." Against this decision would stand Great Britain, France, Holland, and all other countries whose dominions might be similarly dismembered, to say nothing of the Colonies themselves. Well, Mr Armstrong may have some vision of a transfigured world which enables him to predict that Great Britain and the rest, in loyalty to their world-parliament, would quietly accept the decision. For myself, I have no such vision, and can see no possible outcome but an instant resort to arms. Certainly Great Britain would be ill advised to enter any world-federation, which had the *independence of states* in its power, unless she were prepared in advance to accept the dismemberment of the Empire. For nothing would be easier than the swift formation of a majority among the 525 of Mr Armstrong's Appendix, in whose hands the British Empire would not be worth six months' purchase. Mr Armstrong himself is not averse to making similar decrees for other countries—as, for example, that the Turks must be turned, by vote of the nations, bag and baggage out of Europe—a proposal not justified by the principles of the book. A proposal of that kind is hardly calculated to induce Turkey to enter the federation—and I observe Turkey is on his list. Nor is it quite consistent with the rights accorded to small nationalities in the chapter under that title. For if the European subjects of Turkey, posing as a small nationality, declare a right to be considered a constituent of the Turkish empire, who, on the principles of that chapter, is entitled to say them nay? The second chapter settles the matter differently. But this would only justify the Turks in fighting for the right accorded them in the first. We must not begin by preaching the rights of small nationalities and then decree the extinction of any nationality which, like the Turks, does not agree with us on this particular point, or whose manners appear to us objectionable.

In short, this "bag-and-baggage" principle is a two-edged sword which internationalists, of all people, should not lightly unsheathe. An educated Chinaman, reading Mr Armstrong's book, and contemplating the European penetration of Asia, would think of other modes of applying the principle than those which commend themselves to Mr Armstrong.

In the chapter on the international police, Mr Armstrong unwarrantably eases the difficulties of his problem by assuming that this police would never have more than *one* recalcitrant nation to deal with at a time. He ought to add to the one recalcitrant all its sympathisers—in other words, the whole minority of nations whose wishes had been overruled by the majority of the world-parliament. He would have been much nearer the truth if he had divided his world-federation into two approximately equal halves and framed the question thus, "How can an international

police composed of the forces of the slightly bigger half enforce obedience against the will and the forces of the slightly lesser half?" Framed thus, the problem is far more formidable. For example, if the question were raised in an international parliament of giving independence to India, in response to its national aspirations, the result would be not merely to produce a recalcitrant England, but to evoke the opposition of a whole group of nations, both Asiatic and European, who would regard an independent India as a new and dangerous factor in the path of their own interests. How so fierce and confused a controversy could be amicably settled it is impossible to conceive. It is certain that there would be no unanimity, and if England cared to resist the proposal she would have no difficulties in finding powerful backers among other nations who had motives of their own for giving her support. Such combinations, with which the party system of all existing parliaments have made us only too familiar, and which every astute individual, alas! knows how to engineer, would occur over every question of national interest submitted to the judiciary of the world-federation. How would the international police act in these cases—cases, that is, in which the policemen would be pretty equally divided among themselves?

Throughout the whole of his book Mr Armstrong's reasoning is dominated by an idea which, as he himself tells us, has been derived from Kant's treatise on Perpetual Peace. The idea, which has a wide currency even among people who have never heard of Kant, is that as each civilised nation has established the reign of law within its own borders, and so put a stop to civil strife, we only need a further extension of the same process to unite all nations into a single society in which quarrels will be settled in court instead of by war. Thus only one step divides the European nations, as now constituted, from federation. The idea is attractive, and I am far from saying it is futile; but I cannot help thinking that, as presented by Kant, and by those who repeat his argument, it rests upon a false analogy. Among the many motives which have played their part in consolidating warring factions, or provinces, into great States the strongest has undoubtedly been that of presenting a united front against the foreign aggressor. When two neighbours A and B fall to quarrelling, it is certainly true that the interests of each will be better served by submitting to civil jurisdiction than by fighting it out. But historically this is not the only argument which has brought A and B to their senses. The argument has rather taken the form of reminding A and B that unless they cease their efforts to kill each other, C, the foreigner, will step in and kill them both. To this a second argument, I am sorry to say, has been frequently added—to the effect, namely, that A and B, by ceasing their efforts to kill each other and by coming to terms, will put themselves in the best posture for killing C and taking possession of his goods. By means of the first argument Bismarck effected the unification of Germany; by adding the second Germany brought about the present war. For how much exactly these arguments have counted in the growth of nations we cannot say, except that they have counted for much. Certain it is that if you eliminate from the history of nations the part played by the needs of self-defence against the aggressor—to say nothing of the lust of aggression itself,—not one of the great law-governed communities of Europe, as we now know them, would be in existence. To treat the federation of mankind, therefore, as a mere extension of the process by

which single States have been formed, is to make use of a false analogy. The federation of mankind lacks one of the principal (I do not say the highest) motives which have brought the several States into existence—and will continue to lack it unless we suppose a campaign against this planet undertaken by the inhabitants of Mars. That world-federation is impossible without the aforesaid motive is more than I would say; but to assume the possibility of federation among *all* States together because it has already been accomplished in *each* State separately is certainly bad reasoning, even though Immanuel Kant may be quoted in support of it. It reminds me of an Irishman who, on learning that a patent gas-stove would save half his bill for fuel, immediately purchased *two* gas-stoves on the ground that thereby his fuel would cost him nothing at all!

It is only in the later portions of his book that Mr Armstrong's proposal expands to the immense proportions of a world-state and a world-parliament of 525 representative units. In the earlier portions he rests upon Mr Asquith's more modest ideal of a *European* partnership—"a real European partnership based on the recognition of equal rights, and established and enforced by a common will." But Mr Armstrong dimly discerns that a merely *European* partnership would not solve his problem—though even in the later stages of his book he constantly uses language which is only applicable to the more advanced European nations and to the United States, completely overlooking the rest of mankind, a common oversight with writers who discuss the question of internationalism. The inadequacy of a merely European partnership needs more constant and more explicit emphasis than we find in these pages. Let it be clearly recognised once and for all that on no principle—certainly not on the principles advocated by Mr Armstrong—can a partnership of European nations (not even with the United States thrown in) claim the right to draw up and enforce a programme for the government of all mankind. Such a partnership would constitute an intolerable menace to the non-European portions of the human race—at least two-thirds of the whole,—and in presence of an awakening Asia would give promise of a world conflict of which the present hideous war is only a faint foreshadowing. It is a mistake, a common mistake, to regard a *European* federation and a *world*-federation as lesser and larger forms of the same proposal. They are different proposals, and must be judged differently. A *European* federation would, I repeat, be a menace to the liberties of the rest of the world, and would be so regarded by every non-European nation sufficiently awake to be alive to the danger. Armed as they now are, the European nations might indeed compel the black and yellow (?) races to accept their hegemony—but is that what internationalists want? As, I think, Mr Hobson has very clearly shown, the only effective federation for the preservation of the world's peace would have to be world-wide in character. But would even that be effective? For the reasons given I confess to having doubts. What Mr Armstrong has here put forward as a programme of peace seems to me to be fraught with possibilities the exact opposite of those which he and I alike desire.

L. P. JACKS.

The Problem of the Commonwealth.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1916.

THIS able and interesting statement of the problem of government in the British Empire is preliminary to the fuller discussion in *The Commonwealth of Nations* and the more elaborate solution in *The Project of a Commonwealth*. *The Problem of the Commonwealth* contains, first, an analysis of the problem as it at present stands and, secondly, a general statement of the conditions of its solution. The problem, as viewed in this book, resolves itself into that of the control of foreign affairs and responsibility for them. It is said that the self-governing Dominions have shared willingly the burden of the war, but that they have had no share in deciding the policy which preceded it. On the other hand, they have paid almost nothing in the long years before 1914 in preparation for the common task they have now assumed. They do not really govern themselves so long as they have no power in this fundamental political issue, their relation to other states. By a short historical sketch it is shown that until men feel political good or evil as results of their own decision there is no government which is consonant with freedom. The electorate should control its agents, and the agents deal with all the issues affecting those who have appointed them; but certain colonial issues have in the past been decided by the British electorate alone.

In the American Revolution, however, complete control was demanded, because the interests of the colonies could not be fully represented in England. And the same kind of need has driven men to demand in Canada and Australia and South Africa complete control of such governmental action as affected their welfare. Thus self-government in purely local affairs has been won by parts of the King's Dominions. The principle at work is acknowledged to have been empirical, that of leaving the self-governing colonies to assume whatever powers they might "*finally insist upon taking*" (p. 64).

After a short review of Dominion navies and of the Imperial Conference of 1911, the general solution of the problem is suggested. The Dominion Governments must have some control over foreign affairs, and therefore Imperial or Commonwealth ministers must be responsible not only to the electorate of the British Isles as at present. But this will involve a more complete sharing of the burden of taxation for common ends by all the "federated" parts of the Commonwealth, and a distinction between the Commonwealth ministers and those responsible only for British affairs. The Commonwealth is to have as its supreme executive the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary for India, the Colonial Secretary (for Crown Colonies), the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Munitions (p. 217). There will also have to be changes in the present Parliamentary system.

Praise must be given for the ability displayed in the argument and for the political sanity with which large issues are faced. It is a most cheering sign of a better future that political thinking should not be reserved for party quarrels and trivial tinkering at the ancient system of law and government. Radical transformations are, indeed, too slow in coming; for the majority cannot see any alternative to the old system except chaos. *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, therefore, will be a first sign of the new constructive ideas. But we cannot allow it to pass without some

adverse criticism. The practical difficulties in the suggestions made are innumerable, and they will be urged more cogently when the time appears to be approaching for such a reconsideration of Imperial problems as Mr Asquith has lately foretold. The suggestions as to an executive for the whole Commonwealth are clearer and more persuasive than the suggestions as to the central legislative authority. There seem to be many difficulties which cannot be avoided by any plan of a representative assembly for peoples and countries so widely separated as ours. And one of the good qualities in the book before us is that such difficulties are not used as an excuse for avoiding all attempts at a formal constitution for the Empire. But the fact remains that the plan suggested is vague and less persuasive than the main argument. And after all it makes very little difference to personal freedom and local development, if we establish a strong central executive and leave the popular control over it weak or ineffective. Yet neither the present British Parliament nor a new representative body seems quite to meet the case. Such practical difficulties, however, may perhaps be solved gradually when different situations arise, and we may leave their consideration to other critics. Within the limits of the discussion we may suppose that the practical difficulties appear to the author the most important, since he is concerned entirely with a political device to supply a definite practical need. He sees the issue as one of means and not of ends. He is contriving a method by which we may do more effectively what we are agreed to do; and he does not consider the effect of the changes he proposes upon the policy to be adopted towards other states.

But our criticism for the present must turn upon the less practical issues involved. For there are some who think that our chief need is not a more effective machinery of government, but a better purpose for government to pursue. And there are dangerous implications in what is taken for granted when the remodelling of the Empire is discussed. The author of the *Problem* is a political empiricist who, like all empiricists, adopts as true the abstract principles of an obsolete school. The disdain for general conceptions always is thus avenged. Self-government and liberty are words of which the sense becomes more obscure as we peruse the author's argument; and often he seems to be merely an apologist for things as they are, so long as they may be called by new names. He struggles nobly to use the word Commonwealth instead of Empire; but he comes in the end to advocate the control of other races than his own by means of force—naturally, for the good of these races. It may be necessary. We shall not dispute the point. But this leads back to other assumptions; and we perceive that his Commonwealth has a foreign policy which is defined only in terms of force. The Dominions are to have their say in this policy; but when we seek to discover what precisely the purpose of such policy may be, we are confronted with the masked word "defence." The assumption of the whole book is that the British Commonwealth has external relations; but no word is said as to their nature, no analysis is attempted of their present state or possible future developments, and we are left with a suspicion that the changes suggested are merely administrative and are not designed for any end more ideal than ease of government. This is what is often called practical politics. But an occasional attention, not to say an unpatriotic deference, to French and American criticism of the British Empire, would have proved to the author that the officials he

has so carefully consulted may be authorities on the methods to be used without knowing anything at all of the end which is worth our labour.

Again, he pays no heed to the economic currents and forces which complicate the problem of political administration. He does not see a world divided into currency areas, much less a world divided into economic productive regions. But the frontiers of such units are not the same as those of administration, and it is doubtful whether they ever will be. Religion, again, has no word given to it, though it may complicate questions of administration. Ireland is still part of the Commonwealth, and not yet a dependency. The author has abstracted so completely, in the attempt to isolate the problem of constitutional change, that one might imagine the British Empire to exist in a political and economic vacuum. And finally, he appears to be satisfied with such primitive state-worship as this: "A state is a community claiming an unlimited devotion on the part of each and all of its members to the interest of all its other members, living and yet to live" (p. 91). What then is a church? And are there no other interests of man besides the political? But it is useless to ask. By the elusiveness of its terms, such a sentence as we have quoted can be made to mean anything; and the use of language throughout the book has the same deficiency. But that again may be practical politics. A biblical phraseology (pp. 6, 11, 69, 207) is skilfully adapted to give a spurious air of sacredness to the activities of a superior borough council; and in place of a clearly defined purpose for all the change suggested, we find only a political mysticism which is as dangerous as any tyranny. The author and the practical constitutional lawyer may regard such criticism as beside the point; but the common man, when he hears of a new constitutional suggestion, would like to know for what purpose the device proposed would be useful. He may even go so far as to ask what effect the new plan will have on his own life. For effective government is good, but not the only good; and the price we have to pay for it may be too high. These problems are not solved nor even stated. They are, indeed, not problems at all to the minds of officials. And although the author of the *Problem* may have conceived other purposes for the change he desires, he names none but such ideals as will attract administrators. In the complete absence of political humanism, the consideration of human needs and human suffering, one begins to feel that it would be better to be a man in Ecuador than an unconsidered trifle in such a Sovereign State as the *Problem* suggests. For why is this all to be done? Not that labour should be free or poverty diminished or justice made more adequate or the liberty of each man to follow his own vocation more safe, but that the poor instruments of an absolute government may completely acquiesce in the pursuit of the most primitive ambitions we have inherited.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

LONDON.

Comparative Religion: its Adjuncts and Allies. By Louis Henry Jordan, B.D. (Edin.).—H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1916.—Pp. xxxii + 574.

For many years Mr Jordan has been a most ardent and untiring exponent of the claims and possibilities of Comparative Religion. He has devoted his life to the furtherance of this subject, and no one has been more

industrious in the endeavour to determine its aims and methods. In this book, as in his other writings, he urges that the comparative study of religions should be a separate, self-governing discipline, and not a mere adjunct of theology, philosophy, history, etc.; and he imposes upon himself the duty of indicating its boundaries. He here enumerates some 500 volumes which might be said to promote Comparative Religion in one way or another; and of these about one-third are noticed at greater or less length, and their value for the subject is judicially estimated. In addition to this, Mr Jordan takes note of relevant periodicals, learned societies, congresses, and all that is of importance for the present situation in the growth of the scientific study of religion. Thus, in his account of the *Survey of the General History of Religion* by Professor Söderblom of Upsala, he points out that the Swedish Government considered the subject of sufficient importance to warrant its introduction into the high schools of that country, and he very pertinently asks whether it is not time that educational leaders in other lands should follow this excellent example (p. 193 *seq.*). One may note also his references to the significance of Indian and Mohammedan religions, and notably the development of Bahaism; these bring questions involving the technical study of religions which have a very distinct bearing upon our Imperial responsibilities and problems.

In general the reader will find in this book a great deal of interesting and useful though rather varied information. It will enable him to realise the abundance of literature of a technical or expert character (in contrast to works of a purely devotional value), and it should assist him to form some idea of the nature of the field of religious research. He will observe the numerous lines of inquiry, the various types of research, and, in particular, the very serious differences of opinion and divergences of method. He sees a science in the making; he witnesses the efforts to work out problems of religion, ancient and modern, theoretical and practical, significant for the interpretation of the past and for guidance in the future. Not least of all will the reader observe the confidence among individual inquirers, and the extraordinary conflict when, as in this book, the "comparative method" is extended to modern writers, and one is compared or contrasted with the other. And this is of no little importance, for, while Comparative Religion is essentially the objective comparison of all religious and related material, we now pass from the unfortunate heathen, the misguided totemist, and all who offend our religious and rationalistic susceptibilities, and we can compare with equal objectivity those who handle the material and are contributing to the religious and other thought of the immediate future. Mr Jordan's book, in fact, leads the reader to that higher ground where it can be seen that opinions touching religion are in themselves data for the study of religion, and that in modern tendencies, aims—and prejudices—we have material for comparative religion, and especially for the more fruitful prosecution of this branch of research. People may dispute whether, say, there were angels at Mons, but no one will dispute that there are three types of minds: (a) those that at once accept the proposition, (b) those that at once reject it, if not contemptuously, and (c) those who compromise or discriminate in some way between all the alleged angelic visitations, past and present. The point is that these types are *facts* of permanent interest for religion in the past and in the future. Just as the study of myths leads on insensibly to that of the methods of

those who study them, so it is the chief value of Mr Jordan's book that one is forced to realise that methods of organising and synthesising research are quite as important as, if not more so than, the mere collection and classification of data.

The book consists largely of reviews and notices, and there is a certain amount of repetition owing to the recurrence of criticisms, remarks, and encomiums of a more or less similar character. Several of the reviews are of a very high quality and are most informing; but in not a few cases the notices are scanty, and relatively poor accounts are given of the real value of writers or their work (*e.g.* of Wundt). Fewer reviews and some effort to co-ordinate and elaborate the criticisms would perhaps have been more serviceable than the notices which often have a rather ephemeral and bibliographical value. Some unevenness was inevitable, but one is surprised to find the *Cambridge Medieval History* (p. 452 *seq.*)—with the little "pat-on-the-back" at which Mr Jordan excels; and one misses some books or periodicals which deserve mention for their more obvious contributions to the subject. The classification, too, is open to criticism, though one must freely acknowledge (as Mr Jordan himself recognises) that it is frequently difficult to determine whether a book is to be registered under anthropology, ethnology, or some other of the groups which are enumerated.

If at length we reach the conviction that the great field of religious research is in a singularly incoherent condition, we have only to recollect that this is true throughout the world of thought. There is everywhere an enormous mass of material, the problems are vital and press for a solution, but divergence of opinion is complete and extends to fundamentals. There is an unwillingness to allow that one is swayed by theories, ideas, and ways of thinking as truly as is one's opponent; there is a readiness to ignore the conceptions of an opponent or rival, and that which gives them their power and life. Yet the influence exerted by conceptions and theories which *we* feel to be false and harmful proves the urgent necessity of re-testing and purifying our own body of thought; and the powerful effect of religions or philosophies we repudiate warns us to examine those by which we are consciously or unconsciously influenced. A complacent indifference to the strength of all ideas except those *we* feel to be "true" is fatal; and it is the extension of the "comparative" spirit which is so necessary at the present day, when constructive zeal and energy may easily outrun laborious and unprejudiced thought. Obviously the study of religions cannot be kept isolated either from the rest of the inter-related fields of research or from the methods of all ordered thought and research, and Mr Jordan's book illustrates what is in reality the problem of the present situation: an immense quantity of data, an absence of unanimity as regards methods and principles, and an inability to find a synthesis of any logical value.

Mr Jordan has no difficulty in showing how the study of religion has grown and differentiated itself as in course of time there have arisen new subdivisions, standpoints, methods, tendencies, etc. But while he makes us realise the importance of considering preliminary questions of method, he himself does not pursue them further. It is easy to point out again and again the hopeless differences among specialists touching totemism, but what is the methodological problem? It is to determine what totemism shall be; what conception—what definition—will be most

serviceable. Are we justified in recognising totemism in ancient Palestine, Greece, or Egypt? We find details which in certain contexts and under certain conditions belong to totemism; we find tendencies, beliefs, and practices which recur in totemic societies. But there are important differences, and we ask: Are we to define totemism so as to put in one class or category the theriomorphism of Central Australia, North America, Palestine, Egypt, and Greece? In like manner, we find endogamous and exogamous details in all sorts of societies; but when we speak of endogamy and exogamy we must needs have some clearly defined conceptions underlying the terms. Thus the problem is essentially one of conceptions and categories, of terms and connotations—a problem that meets us everywhere to-day. What is magic? Is it what we happen to call magic? is it what is opposed to the religion of the environment? In the meanwhile, writers commonly fuse subjective and objective views of magic, and the scientific study of religion suffers in consequence. So also when we talk of Christianity, connotations and definitions are handled in a fluid manner, and it speedily appears that the incoherence in the world of research reflects the absence of organised or systematised knowledge in the mind of all inquirers. The theriomorphism of Greece involves the problem of defining totemism for purposes of research, and totemism—as also Buddhism—is a religion or not according to our conception of religion, what it is or what it should be, and this is a question of more than academical value. Conceptions of God, Right, and Order are involved as the questions are pursued, and step by step theories of ultimate realities are implied or presupposed. Because of some barely analysed conception of magic, beliefs and practices with valuable psychological effects will be summarily dubbed “magical”; and, conversely, accustomed to find “magic” only in the rudimentary and backward stages—beyond which we of course have “advanced”—we are apt to forget that anti-religious, anti-social, and other harmful features with all the effective criteria of magic can recur in an age like the present and in an apparently rational or beneficial dress.

Practical questions enforce the necessity of determining the effective criteria of our conceptions of militarism, liberty, conscience, democracy, the State, etc., and equally also of co-ordinating and synthesising the results. But the practical problem is precisely analogous to that in the world of thought, where the eager efforts to solve problems ignore the preliminary questions upon which effective solutions depend. It is instructive, therefore, to notice the increasing significance of the sociological department (pp. 62 *seq.*). The constituents of a community or people and all the interconnecting ideas move *pari passu*. The rudimentary society, low in the social scale, is relatively undifferentiated; differentiation of thought finds its counterpart in subdivision of function, labour, or profession, and the excessive specialism of to-day agrees with the manifold differing and conflicting tendencies and groups of interests and convictions. Some organisation of life and thought is possible—witness modern Germany, where, however, ideas are involved which we repudiate; but the pretty successful ascent of man from the days of the primitive prehistoric savage is a guarantee that there is some “curve” to be determined, factors to be ascertained, rigorously proved, consciously realised and employed for the organisation of life and thought in the future. The problems of comparative religion are in touch with all problems of the effective organisation of thought in social, economic, and other departments of research. Take the

errors that have arisen through one-sided, ingenious, and learned systems—the phallic, astral, serpent, and other cults, with all their array of evidence, argument, and apparent logic, but with their absurdities and forced conclusions contrary to human nature and elementary psychology. Such systems stand out like certain misguided theories of State and society as things to be avoided, which could not have arisen had attention been paid to questions of method. Consequently, when one sees how easily specialistic and narrow work (however brilliant) can go astray, one realises the need for systematising knowledge; for these systems suffer—even as the German State theory and, also, the imposing edifice of Roman Catholicism suffer—from their failure to determine the theoretical requirements of all practical systems, syntheses, or organisations in the world of life and of thought.

Methodology, philosophy, and metaphysics find little favour with the generality of men; but every deep and searching inquiry involves questions which these endeavour to handle consciously and exhaustively, and the advance of thought has lain in the more conscious recognition of that which had hitherto been implicit and potential. For this reason, almost every page in Mr Jordan's book invites some remark. When, for example, it is said that Christianity can "make itself at home amid *any* given surroundings" (p. 375), it is easy to imagine a Mohammedan or Buddhist making the same claim, for each will be thinking of some particular feature in his religion and will ignore those features which do not easily travel. Moreover, again and again, writers imply materialistic theories of "survival," as though every irrational or lowly idea had been inherited from a remote past. And the amount of confusion caused by this easy theory, with its materialistic and spatial ways of thinking, is hardly less than that due to facile theories of the development of thought. These have already brought confusion into Old Testament study, and readily prove a hindrance in all practical questions of reconstruction because of the appearance of ideas, etc., which, happening to recur in some antiquated or harmful system, are thought to be no longer serviceable. This is not the place to pursue these points; it is enough to emphasise the fact that conscious or unconscious notions of the nature of thought and its development leave their stamp as much upon learned and specialistic inquiries as on popular or semi-popular questions of immediate practical value. The need for a deeper, clearer, and more objective analysis of conceptions has not yet made itself generally felt; but such a book as Mr Jordan's may serve to emphasise the significance of urgent problems of a rather novel type, which, however, have a profound bearing upon the spiritual life and thought of the future. It introduces us to problems of a semi-psychological, semi-logical character—and there it leaves us.

STANLEY A. COOK.

CAMBRIDGE.

Writings by L. P. Jacks, M.A., LL.D., D.D. Vol. I. *Mad Shepherds*; Vol. II. *From the Human End*; Vol. III. *Philosophers in Trouble*.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1916.

THE appearance of Dr Jacks' works in a cheap half-crown edition is a manifest proof that the excellent literature he supplies has not failed of appreciation by the reading public. Of the present instalment *Mad*

Shepherds is, of course, an old favourite; *From the Human End* is composed of twenty-two crisp little essays that may well have been preached in Manchester College Chapel, while *Philosophers in Trouble* contains half a dozen pleasing tales which mildly satirise the pretensions of philosophers. All three are highly provocative of thought, and as Dr Jacks never bores by trying to say everything, he generally leaves in his reader's mind a sting to further reflection. Moreover, the same set of ideas crop up continually, though they are nowhere set out systematically, and find terse expression in language all the more effective for only insinuating them; moreover, these ideas are certainly deserving of being taken to heart by philosophers of every brand. They may, perhaps, be summarised as follows: there is everywhere a great gap between theory and practice, especially between what ethical doctrine declares to be right and what turns out to be so in actual fact; so the course of events is always stultifying even the best theories when they come to be applied, which they usually cannot be, because the problem of application has been overlooked altogether; thus human nature is full of surprises, and of an unfathomable individuality which overflows all abstract schemes of classification. But "the human end" is more important than the scientific, and we must beware of letting mechanism dominate life.

All of these positions Dr Jacks had already advocated, somewhat more technically, in his *Alchemy of Thought*, and it is clear that they are modern, and easily affiliated to the philosophies of James and Bergson. In *From the Human End* they are given a number of concrete applications, which are, naturally, rather overshadowed by the War, though not as excessively as most forms of literature. Accordingly, Dr Jacks joins in the revolt of our younger political philosophers against the German ideal of the omnipotent and morally irresponsible State, by denying the thesis that the State as the imponent of the moral order must necessarily be above moral criticism, and by dubbing it a "steriliser of virtue." He "cannot see that anything is gained, either in ease or in cogency, by treating morality in terms of the State and not in terms of the individual. True, the individual and the State cannot be understood apart from one another. But it does not follow that they are immediately understood when we put them together" (p. 35), and it is "a fatal mistake to suppose that a State, merely because it is a State, is wiser and better than its individual members" (p. 39). He suggests, therefore, that in the matter of organisation Hell may be as good a "State" as Heaven, though its type of organisation is different. "The organisation of evil is mechanical: the organisation of good is vital" (p. 23). Indeed, Hell may be the more efficient; for it is "at all times much easier for evil to organise itself in the evil way than for good to organise itself in the good way" (*ibid.*). This idea connects naturally with the contribution to the problem of evil which is contained in "the Psychology of the Devil." Having defined the Devil as "the being who is at once the worst character in the universe, and, of all bad characters, the most powerful" (p. 174), Dr Jacks argues that, if so, he cannot be aware of his own badness, but must think himself the best, and be able to give a reasoned defence of his belief. This, of course, raises the question of "who is to decide which is right—our philosophy or the Devil's?" (p. 179), which is evaded by the suggestion that it may be best "to assume that there is no such being as the Devil."

It does not seem to me that this argument is quite driven home. No doubt, as the Greeks thought, the extreme of depravity is unaware of its own badness and lacking in self-knowledge, and can consequently make out a case for itself. But this reduces the question to a struggle between competing valuations. The Devil is essentially the *adversary* of the Deity, who disapproves of the established cosmic order and differs from the moral reformer only in his radical disapproval of the *whole* of it. It becomes, therefore, merely an *ex parte* description of him to call him a devil at all. This is merely a violent expression of dissent from his views, and he is quite entitled to reciprocate. Hence it is once more evident that differences of opinion about moral values are not to be settled simply by the feeling of rightness entertained by either of the contending parties. Something more objective is needed. And it is curious that Dr Jacks does not appeal to experience to decide which valuations will wear best. He seems somewhat hasty, too, in conceding that an evil organisation is just as possible as a good. No doubt any organisation, once it is achieved, may be used for evil ends. But must not the basis of organisation everywhere be that it conciliates the forces organised and enables them to co-exist and co-operate harmoniously? If so, utter badness will be incapable of organisation; it will be anarchy and dissolution of every sort of order. A bad order may be easier to impose than a good; but it is intrinsically such that it cannot be carried to completion. Thus it would always be in virtue of a soul of goodness in things evil that they survive, and by an admixture of evil in things good that they fail. Dr Jacks dismisses this interpretation rather lightly (pp. 21-2), partly because he restricts himself to the notion of organisation without thinking of the harmony to result from the organisation, partly because he forgets that the "good" organisation also is not perfect, and indeed may be but little better than the evil with which it contends, or "better" only from a partisan standpoint.

As for the point which is at issue, viz. the comparative merits of the types of organisation which are supposed to be exemplified in the German State and in the British Empire, it may be doubted whether the distinction of "mechanical" and "vital" entirely hits the mark, *pace* Prof. Bergson and Dr Jacks. For, in the first place, it is absurd to say that the Allies would dispense with mechanical contrivances if they could, and untrue that they have shown themselves inferior in the use of them. The use of mechanisms is essential to the control of nature, for whatever purpose. Secondly, it is dangerously metaphorical to transfer the notions of "mechanical" and "vital" from science to politics. Both terms are too vague to yield a good antithesis. It should be remembered that living beings also are mechanisms, indeed far better ones than any of the machines we construct, while mechanisms are strictly *means*—to the ends pursued by their makers.

Nevertheless, the distinction Dr Jacks aims at is a real one. The so-called "democratic" type of social organisation demands a larger measure of active support from its members than the bureaucratic (misnamed "autocratic"), and this is in some respects a source of weakness. It means that the actual rulers have to win the *assent* of their subjects to what they do (even though it may have to be won by cajolery and trickery), and cannot simply order them about. But can the bureaucratic type of organisation ever *satisfy*, as fully as the democratic, even its own subjects?

And even if it can, can it produce as good and attractive a type of man? In the last resort governments exist for the sake of the governed, and should be conceived as instruments for the betterment of the human type: if they become oblivious of their functions, and turn themselves into engines of destruction, will they not have the error of their ways brought home to them in due season?

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.

The Works of John Smyth, Fellow of Christ's College, 1594-8. Tercenary Edition for the Baptist Historical Society, with notes and biography by W. T. Whitley. 2 vols.—Cambridge: at the University Press, 1915.—Pp. cxxii + 776.

DR WHITLEY is already known to students of English Church history by his excellent edition of the *Minutes of the General Assembly of the General Baptists, 1654 to 1811*. He has placed them under a further obligation by this noteworthy edition of the works of John Smyth. Hitherto those who desired to consult Smyth's books have had to journey to Cambridge, where Emmanuel College has the only known copy of his *Bright Morning Starre*; thence to York, which holds in the Minster Library *The Last Booke of Iohn Smith*, in a unique copy; and thence to Oxford and London for the rare examples of his other works; while it was necessary to cross to Amsterdam to study some of the manuscripts he left behind. Here in these two volumes the reader has the whole of Smyth's published writings reproduced in good clear print (the original editions are in execrable typography), and in addition Dr Whitley has printed some of the Latin manuscripts of Smyth from the archives of the Mennonite Church at Amsterdam, which are important for giving an insight into his later views. In bringing out this edition Dr Whitley has received the help of the Hibbert Trustees, Principal Gould, and Sir George Macalpine; but his best reward for the loving care freely bestowed upon this task will be that the works of Smyth thus rendered accessible shall be carefully and sympathetically studied.

John Smith or Smyth (Dr Whitley prefers the latter form of spelling) matriculated as a sizar at Christ's College, Cambridge, in March 1586, became Master of Arts in 1593, and was elected Fellow in the following year, when he was ordained by Wickham, Bishop of Lincoln. He took his part in tutorial and collegiate work in Cambridge till 1598. It is not quite clear whether he was ever beneficed. As Dr Peile, the late Master of Christ's, puts it, "beneficed John Smiths abound," and Dr Whitley has not been able to identify him with any of the beneficed clergy of that name who have come under his notice. For my own part, I think the testimony of his contemporary and fellow-collegian Richard Bernard, that "he was instituted into a living," is dependable. However that may be, Smyth appears in Lincoln in 1600 as "Preacher of the Citie," where he delivered courses of expository sermons in the church of St Peter at Arches. Inhibited by Bishop Chaderton, he reappears at Gainsborough, where, in the absence of the vicar, he took upon himself to "read the forme of prayers till he came to the psalmes and then he expounded the psalmes appointed for that day, standing in y^e place where y^e minister

useth to reade and not having anie surplisse on." In this work also he was checked. It was the time when Bancroft was keying up the Anglican Church to a level pitch and insisting upon a strict conformity. The Puritan clergy were placed in great straits. They had no desire to leave the Church they loved; they sought a further reformation from within. Smyth divined that such a course was hopeless, and after a period of doubt and discussion took the bold step of separating from the Anglican Church and setting up a new church, according to what he deemed to be the Biblical model, in which the members were knit together and with God in a solemn covenant. He formulated a practical rather than a dogmatic bond of union for his church. It was a covenant with a broad outlook. Here are its terms: "We covenant with God and with one another to walk in all his ways made known or to be made known unto us according to our best endeavours, whatsoever it shall cost us." It formed the model for the covenants in many Congregational churches in England, Holland, and America. Smyth, however, did not rest in that position. Forced to flee to Holland, he settled at Amsterdam with his little company of followers, and in that stimulating environment he made further progress. His friends were startled by some bold utterances of his in reference to the letter of translated Scriptures. Smyth hungered for the religion of the spirit, and came to hold that the formal reading of Scripture in the assembly was no real act of worship, though it might serve as a preparation for worship and a starting-point for exhortation. His views on these points were too easily misconstrued. His next step alarmed his friends still more. Smyth noticed that the form of admission into the Church in apostolic times was by confession and repentance of sins and baptism. Accordingly, he and his followers dissolved themselves from church order and started afresh. Smyth "baptized first himself and next Mr Helwisse and so the rest making their particular confessions." The baptism was not by immersion but by affusion, and "into the name of Jesus," though the alternative form from the close of St Matthew's gospel was also allowed as valid. This act excited comment and brought Smyth into touch with the Mennonites of Amsterdam, whose gracious influence upon the thought and temper of Smyth's last years is well set forth in Dr Whitley's luminous narrative. Smyth had a personality of singular freshness and force. Standing as he does at one of the fountain-heads of the Congregational and Baptist movements, his work and influence must be taken into consideration in any account of the development and history of religious thought amongst English-speaking peoples.

Dr Whitley does not identify John Smyth; indeed, he "does not claim to have added much to the facts known." In my little book on *John Smith and Thomas Helwys* (1911), I said it seemed probable that Smith belonged to a family having a connection both with Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire. I have since come to the conclusion that he was the fourth son of one "John Smyth," yeoman, of Sturton-le-Steeple, in the county of Nottingham, to which parish I had discovered already that John Robinson, the pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers, belonged. There are several pieces of evidence which point to this young John Smith as being our man, none of them indeed decisive, but weighty in their cumulative effect.

WALTER H. BURGESS.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

NATIONAL TRAINING: THE MORAL EQUIVALENT FOR WAR.

HAROLD BEGBIE.

A MEMBER of the House of Lords has defended our system of education on the ground that British soldiers have fought courageously on the battlefields of France. This argument is transparently irrational, but it is not much more irrational than a very popular argument which has lately found favour in various circles of the community—the argument against “Germanising” our children.

It is argued that if we borrow anything from the German system of education—we long ago borrowed without much hurt Germany’s excellent Kindergarten system—we shall run the danger of turning our children into ferocious Huns. This is to exalt education to an altitude so dizzy that the mind reels in its effort to follow it. Instead of having to meet the usual degrading view of education, as something which enables us to pass an examination and earn an income to which a pension is attached, we are here presented with a view of education which shows it to us as the supreme miracle-worker in a world of miracles. It can change character. It can transform personality. It can turn an Englishman into a German.

Curiously enough, the very people who use this argument were the hottest supporters of conscription in the days of Lord Roberts. They saw no danger then of a psychological perversion. The young men of this country were to undergo the experience which is common to young men in Germany. They were to be forced into a military discipline. They were to be drilled as conscripts. They were to be taught the Prussian

doctrine of a citizen's duty to the defence of his country. And no one breathed a fear that such a system might transform the nice young men of England into horrible Prussians bristling with arrogance and frightfulness. Nor was such a fear expressed, if I remember rightly, when we borrowed from the Germans their idea of old-age pensions. Perhaps it was thought that an Englishman at seventy years of age would be too far gone in Englishness to suffer so transcendent a change, or that, even if the change supervened, he would be too feeble to do much damage to the State. In any case, the argument was not raised.

It may be said that the case of a child is very different, and that to borrow the Prussian system of education and apply it to our children during the most formative years of their existence is an experiment fraught with real and understandable peril. Even so able and reflective a man as the Rev. W. Temple made use of some such argument in his paper on education read at the recent meetings of the British Association. But in truth this is just as foolish an argument as the other. For there is no transmutation of personality. Iron stolidly refuses to be turned into gold, and personality as stolidly refuses to be turned into something which it is not. To suppose of education that it has any such power is to wander into a labyrinth where nightmare and folly sport with the wits of men. Education can only draw out and develop what is there: it cannot create what does not exist. Education cannot make a saint of a sinner or a philosopher of a fool. It can make nothing. It is a means of developing rational faculties and fostering moral tendencies. It can help, but it cannot save. It can improve, but it cannot create.

No one, so far as I am aware, has proposed making a German revolution in our system of national training, and I only mention this foolish fear about "Germanising" our English children to emphasise the limitations of education. It helps to clear the understanding, I think, if we entertain from the very beginning of any inquiry on this subject a definite notion as to the powers of education. In seeking to make a change in our present system, which is probably the worst in the world, let us acknowledge to begin with that education cannot radically change character, and that its only function is to develop the most useful talents and the best characteristics of a personality which are already in existence, and which would, by the force of their own spiritual reality, develop without any education at all. At its very best and at its farthest education is only guidance. But it may be guidance of the very highest kind. If we are agreed upon this definition, it will be easier for us to think

out a rational system of education for our own particular English needs.

What is the natural purpose of a national system of education? What is it that the State seeks to accomplish by training its children? Let us keep carefully in our minds the idea of *national* training: let us limit ourselves entirely to the notion of a *State* system. We may imagine a private school seeking by its system of education to turn out statesmen, soldiers, lawyers, artists, or clergymen; a private schoolmaster may have all manner of dodges and fads, and may legitimately indulge himself in those notions so long as there are parents who believe in him; but such ambitions are altogether beyond the natural limitations of a State system. State education is not education at large, but a particular education. Its business is the training of its children in such qualities as the State demands in its citizens; its one and only object is to provide the State with a healthy, intelligent, and moral community. The State insists upon education because it believes that education is necessary to its welfare. It undertakes the training of its children because it has need of their talents.

Now, there are three things which the State demands, directly or indirectly, in its citizens. It demands that they shall be moral, intelligent, and healthy. It claims the right to take the life or the liberty of a citizen who breaks its laws; it demands intelligence in its workers, and bears hardly on its unintelligent citizens; it demands health and strength, and makes only the most scurvy provision for physical weakness. If it be considered a misuse of words to say that the State *demand*s these three things in its citizens, at least we shall agree that it is these three things which the State most urgently *needs* in its citizens. Therefore, whether or not it is the *duty* of the State to instruct its citizens in these three things, at least it is *in its own highest interests* that such instruction should be given.

The whole system of national training, then, should have this object in view, namely, the production for the service of the State of moral, intelligent, and healthy citizens. The State does not demand that its citizens should hold a dogmatic religion, or that they should be of a certain school in philosophy, or that they should enter a particular trade or profession. Its demands are general and simple. But these general and simple demands are of such tremendous importance, and the time of education is so niggardly brief, that the State should concentrate its whole attention upon these

three matters and refuse a moment's interruption to those who desire to teach anything else.

Great as is the difficulty of the religious question, I believe it can be solved by rigidly insisting on the *national* character of public education. No parent ought to be allowed to interfere with a system which is a State system of education. If he wish his child to receive instruction in dogmatic theology, a parent should make his own arrangement outside the hours in which the State claims the child. The State has nothing to do with dogmatic theology. It does not punish a man for being an agnostic or an atheist. It does not need a dogmatic religion in its citizens. It needs morality, but it does not need a religion. It needs the spirit of Christianity, but not its creed. And since it makes no profession of faith itself, and since its citizens have failed to formulate a national creed of religion, it has no right to teach in its function as a schoolmaster any dogmatic form of theology.

The difficulty of this question arises from the notion of individual right. We are dealing with a national matter, and we confuse the whole issue by introducing a personal factor.¹ The State does not say to a parent, "Your child shall not be taught religion"—that would be tyranny of a disgraceful kind; it merely claims that in the hours of the child's life which it demands for national instruction the child shall only be trained in those things which it insists are essential in its citizens. It has no time for anything else. For a few hours of the day, and during a very few years, it has the children of the commonwealth under its influence; and every minute of that time is so inexpressibly precious that not one of them can be wasted.

In passing it may be said that the ministers of religion have all their work cut out for them in preparing the public life of the nation for the reception of these children after the State has finished with them. Their real work is to create a social conscience in the adult community. And it may be argued, I think, that the present weakness of the Churches lies to a very considerable extent in the failure of these ministers to impress themselves upon the public conscience. It seems clear to me that religion must exercise a much more powerful political influence (I do not mean a party influence) if it is to become a vital part of the national existence. If the Churches united to cleanse our national life of those things which most disgrace

¹ If a Wesleyan, or a Salvationist, or a Roman Catholic demand that his child should be taught the creed of his religion in the hours of State instruction, the vegetarian and the atheist may justifiably formulate a similar demand in the interest of their children.

and degrade it, if they associated more closely the spirit of Christianity with the political evolution of this country, they would surely accomplish more for religion and for the State in a single generation than they have been able to accomplish in all the generations of instruction in dogmatic theology. The business of the minister of religion is not with the school, but with the world which waits for the child when the door of the school closes upon it.

Since it is clear that education cannot create character and cannot radically change personality, it should be essential to any national system of education that some definite idea of English character should be before the eyes of the schoolmaster. His work is not to develop intelligent, moral, and healthy human beings, but intelligent, moral, and healthy English citizens. His material, that is to say, is English character. The children who come under his care are the stuff of the English race, and it is his business to work up that stubborn and magnificent stuff into the highest types of English character. In nearly every child who comes under his care, indeed in every child who should not be under the care of a physician, either near to the surface or deep buried under individual inhibitions are the great qualities of the English race. These qualities are a sense of justice, ineradicable individualism, stubborn commonsense, invincible courage, instinctive liberality, and an unconquerable self-reliance. Great intelligence is not a shining quality in English character, but the germ of it is there, and the quickening of this germ is at once the most difficult and the most necessary task of the national schoolmaster. For all those great qualities of English character which have made their signal mark on the history of the world stand urgently in need, and will ever more and more stand increasingly in need, of intelligence for their full effect. Our incomparable energy, our love of adventure, our unbreakable fortitude, our large good-heartedness, and our unconquerable self-reliance will be of less and less service to the world unless they are guided more and more by intelligence.

The task of the schoolmaster is therefore to quicken the intelligence of children while at the same time he develops the fundamental qualities of their English character. Before his eyes he should ever see the perfect Englishman and the perfect Englishwoman. He should never for one moment lose sight of this ideal. In all that he teaches he should be directing his aim to the production of this type—a high-minded, fearless, straight-dealing, and clean-hearted citizen. There should be this fine English music as an obbligato to the very least of his

lessons. Always the children under his care should be conscious of this national ideal, and should understand that they are being educated to the proud end of fulfilling this ideal. Nationalism is not the end of pure education, but the right kind of patriotism is an essential end of national education. And I am quite certain of this, that a child who does not reverence the higher types of his own race will never feel an interest in the highest types of another race. And also I am certain of this, that the most glowing, passionate, and *intelligent* patriotism is the finest preparation in childhood for an international mind in manhood. If we understand English history, if we feel the romance of that splendid adventure of English character, we shall find ourselves curious to understand the history of other nations, and to discover in what manner they differ from ourselves.

Our gravest danger comes from the apathy of the public in the whole matter of education. Sir Arthur Evans very wisely and ably called attention to this danger in his presidential address to the British Association in September of the present year. "It is a lamentable fact," he said, "that beyond any nation of the West the bulk of our people remains sunk not in comparative ignorance—for that is less difficult to overcome—but in intellectual apathy. The dull incuria of the parents is reflected in the children, and the desire for the acquirement of knowledge in our schools and colleges is appreciably less than elsewhere." These are brave words and grave words. It needs courage at a time like this, when England has so magnificently proved her great qualities on the battlefield, to charge the nation with intellectual torpor, with a lower idea of culture than obtains anywhere else in the West. Our intellectual standard in England is not only lower than the French, Scandinavian, and German, but lower than the Welsh and Scottish. We are in fact, from an intellectual standpoint, the most stupid people in Europe. The character of our most popular magazines and newspapers is an alarming proof of this; and the character of our theatres, cinemas, and music-halls is additional evidence on the same head. With a very gracious, tolerant, and attractive aristocracy of intelligence we drag along a most formidable democracy of rank stupidity. For millions of our people it is as if there were no Shakespeare, no Wordsworth, no Keats, no Shelley, no Dickens, no Lamb, no Sterne, no Fielding in our English heaven. They live as if English literature were a dead letter. And when they take their holidays it is not into the sacred and inspiring woods and fields of the English countryside that they go, but in horrible droves to some roaring fair on the sea-coast. They

are the most patient, good-natured, and energetic people in the world, but intellectually they are as dead as the shrimps they eat out of paper-bags at Blackpool, Yarmouth, or Skegness.

It is for our Board of Education to change all this. ♦ The State needs, and urgently needs, a quick-witted democracy; and the Board of Education must see that it gets it. No business of the State presses more gravely. Whatever the cost may be, we must find the money. If we can spend five millions a day because we have to, we must spend as many millions as are necessary because we ought to. Our whole future existence as a great imperial power depends upon this matter. We cannot hold our place in the world unless the standard of our national intelligence is raised, and raised enormously. "It is an appalling reflection," said Lord Haldane in his notable speech in the House of Lords, "... that in this country 90 per cent. of our young persons, nine out of ten, get no further education after the age of fourteen."¹ It is not only an appalling reflection; it is a startling explanation of that dull incuria which Sir Arthur Evans deplores in the parents of English children. How can we expect intelligent curiosity or any enthusiasm for mental development in a democracy which goes into the service of industrialism at the age of thirteen or fourteen? And how can we expect any delight or pleasure in education on the part of our children, when we consider the character of the education which they receive at the present time?

I feel strongly that we need a revolution, and not a mere improvement, in our system of national training. I believe, to begin with, that we have got to build very much handsomer schools—I would make them as splendid as some of the universities in Canada and as some of the great railway stations in New York, veritable palaces of beauty, for the influence of architecture is very great. And then we must employ for the staffs of these schools the very highest types of manhood and womanhood turned out by our universities. Nothing makeshift or second-rate should be allowed in this tremendous concernment of national existence. The whole enthusiasm of the nation should be behind it, and the training of our children should become to us that moral equivalent for war which William James desired in the last years of his life. Into this great business, that is to say, should go all the wonderful devotion, self-sacrifice, and steady enthusiasm which have characterised the whole nation in its struggle with Prussian militarism. To turn out a magnificent English race should be as great and as earnest an ambition with every one of us as to

¹ *The Ebbing Tide*, by Viscount Haldane (Mills & Boon), 6d.

beat the Prussian War God to his knees. We should give ourselves heart and soul to this end, seeing in it the one supreme means of reformation, the one reform which promises to make the path of all other reforms smooth and easy, the highest service to which those who most deeply love their country can most hopefully give their lives. For what labour can so powerfully inspire our enthusiasm as the labour of moulding the stuff of English childhood, with its delightful quick-wittedness, its radiance, its glee, and its instinctive chivalry, into a democracy which shall by the very force of its spiritual excellence veritably lead the nations in the great march of humanity? How mean, how futile, and how childish, in comparison with such work as this, appear the political perturbations which have agitated Parliament in recent wasteful years—Welsh Disestablishment, Home Rule for Ireland, National Insurance, Old-Age Pensions, and Compensation for Accidents! Useful and worthy as some of these reforms may be, how paltry do they all appear when we bring them into comparison with that reform which Parliament has only fumbled with and botched, a revolution in our whole system of national training!

To examine in any detail the changes which should be made in the curriculum of a national school would exceed the space at my disposal; but I should like to suggest broadly and generally the spirit which I venture to think ought to characterise those changes. And here, at the very beginning, we must insist once more on the limitations of education. No system of education can convert a sinner into a saint, or make a mathematician of one who is without the faculty of calculation. No amount of training can manufacture a poet, an engineer, or a surgeon. Therefore it is essential to any rational system of education that it should avoid rigidity and be watchful for special aptitudes. It should be rather a laboratory for experiment than a forcing-house for all and sundry. Those who direct such a system should have a special staff for seeing that particular children are treated in a particular way. This staff should be composed of men and women specially trained in the psychology of childhood, and its visits to the national schools should never partake of the perfunctory nature which characterises the examining visit of the average inspector.

Every normal child can be taught to read, write, and count. This is the elementary stage of education through which all the children of the nation must pass to the second stage. At the second stage discrimination between various children is not very necessary, although the schoolmaster will take particular pains

with the least of his explanations in dealing with a child who appears to be heavy or slow of understanding. In this second stage there are three principal subjects which should be taught—history, natural history, and a modern language. History, it seems to me, is the most important of all subjects to be taught in school; and in the real teaching of history, morals, literature, and geography would be included as essential parts. I believe that nothing is more inspiring to a child, or more powerfully fosters character and talent, than a thoroughly intelligent knowledge of humanity's evolution. A knowledge, too, of natural history is a great insurance against intellectual apathy. Almost every child is curious about the world in which it finds itself, and this natural curiosity can be used to waken some of the noblest qualities of the soul—reverence, wonder, and delight in beauty. We may be quite sure of this, that every child who is sympathetically taught the first lessons in natural history will never relapse into unimaginative apathy. Let a child feel the spell and magic of his national history, let him be inspired by the example of heroic men and noble women, let him learn the great poems which celebrate famous events, and let him see how the whole movement of his conquering fathers was a movement from darkness, tyranny, and shame towards light, liberty, and glory; let him see this, and at the same time learn that in the natural world surrounding him there has ever been an unbroken movement towards sympathy, goodness, and beauty, a movement full of wonder and mystery, and you may rely upon it that you have stimulated in that child all his most valuable qualities and awakened his intelligence. "Absorption in trifles," says Miss Elizabeth Haldane, "just means that the bigger things have not yet got a hold; and narrowness, that the world has not yet disclosed her treasures."¹

As regards the teaching of a modern language, it should be carried at this stage only so far as to see which of the children has an aptitude for learning foreign languages. Every child can be taught the first simple words of a foreign language, and can be taught to speak a few simple sentences in that language. But no grammar at all should be taught at this stage. Beyond reading aloud, learning by heart, and simple recitation the child should not be permitted to advance a single step. It should be enough for his teachers if at this stage of his training the child's imagination is stimulated, his faculty of observation developed, and his memory brought into a certain state of discipline. History, natural history, and a foreign language are sufficient to secure these benefits.

¹ *The School World*, November 1915 (Macmillan).

In the third stage begins the real work of discrimination. To a sympathetic inspector, in consultation with a wise and observant master, it should soon be apparent which of the children have a special faculty for particular subjects. And this third stage of the system should be very largely a preparation for what is called secondary education. While the children are advancing in knowledge, there should be a constant selection of particular children to receive particular instruction, a constant division into smaller classes, a constant watchfulness not only for special talents but for specially developing the more backward, a constant respect for personality. And throughout this third stage there must be in all cases a deepening of that central purpose which we emphasised at the outset of our inquiry, namely, the development of our finest national characteristics.

A gymnasium and a large playground should be part of every school, particularly the schools of crowded urban districts. And in this third stage of education games and drill should be a regular part of instruction. With this physical training, so essential to character, should be associated lessons in health. Every child should be taught intelligently the necessity of physical cleanliness, of temperance in eating and drinking, of fresh air, of exercise and of rest. In every district there should be a doctor whose sole care is the children of the schools. He should be as much a member of the civil service as the schoolmasters, and he should be constantly under the inspection of higher authorities. If a man with the genius of Sir Alfred Keogh were called upon to devise for the schools of the country a system such as that great sanitarian has devised for the army, there would be a revolution in the health of the community within a generation. Lessons in health, we must remember, would be a beginning for the children in scientific knowledge, and might easily serve to develop a genius for scientific research. An able doctor devoted to a few schools would soon pick out those children who could be encouraged during the course of secondary education to pursue scientific subjects.

With the system of secondary education would begin the great work of technical training. Children with special aptitudes would be selected for special trades. Every encouragement which naturally appeals to a child's mind should be given to these children so that they would find real joy in fitting themselves to be skilled craftsmen. But something more has to be done in a wise system of secondary education. The stupid idea of teaching mere "accomplishments" should be rooted out. No child, simply because its parents desire it,

should be allowed to waste its time in learning to draw or to play a musical instrument. Selection should decide which children are to be taught particular subjects. The whole object of secondary education should be to turn out for the State's use an efficient citizen; and the efficient citizen is one whose natural aptitudes have been developed to a point where only practice and experience can complete their perfection. If a child have genius for music or painting or literature or science, then the State in this course of secondary education should take every possible pains to develop and encourage that genius. But the State should equally take every pains to discourage a child with no talents in these directions from wasting its time in a useless effort to acquire them.

Beyond secondary education there is something else. I should like to see in this country a movement which has been begun with extraordinary success in Moscow. Some years ago a Russian Minister for Education issued an edict which the most distinguished professors at Moscow University felt to be reactionary. Rather than submit to this degrading order they resigned, and among those who resigned was the first thinker in Russia, Prince Eugene Trubetzkoy. But they did not remain inactive. They brought into being a People's University, a University which was free to all, and which consisted in lectures on all subjects of intellectual research. The result is that the halls in which these lectures are given, particularly when Prince Trubetzkoy is lecturing on history, are crowded from end to end with representatives of every class in the community, from the noble and the tradesman to the mechanic and the labourer.

Our educational system ought not to stop short at secondary education, or even at the university. There ought to be a national effort to develop the university extension movement on much wider and far more attractive lines. The idea that education ever stops should be destroyed in the public mind. And the idea that education is something which belongs to pedants and pedagogues, unable to express themselves in comprehensible language, must also be destroyed in the public mind. Education must be felt in the very soul of the people as one of the supreme joys in life, one of the most satisfying pleasures of existence. Access to knowledge must be made not only easy but attractive. Every centre of our national life should become a centre of our national culture. To the worker home from his toil the only diversions offered for his amusement are at present the cinema and the tavern; in the future he must have the opportunity of hearing the best music, listen-

ing to the best plays, and attending lectures of a stimulating and enlarging character. In a word, the State must never leave the mind of democracy to the chances of economic struggle for existence.

The main idea which I desire to leave in the reader's mind is the idea that in national training the business of the State is to provide itself with moral, intelligent, and healthy citizens. And my argument is that discursive theories about education, and all difficulties about particular instruction, vanish away directly this function of national training is truly grasped. It is the duty of a State to teach its children, because it demands or needs certain qualities in its citizens: education can only develop and guide, it cannot create, and therefore education must be selective; the material on which any English system of national training has to work is the material of English character, and a definite idea of that character must be formulated before the system of national training can be intelligent and of service to the State: finally, it must be the duty of the State to extend its system of national training into the community at large, so that respect for learning and a desire for knowledge may characterise the whole life of the nation.

When we reflect upon our imperial responsibilities, when we consider how of all nations we are the most adventurous, and reflect upon the immense influence for good or for evil of all those thousands of Englishmen who live among foreigners, we must surely see how essential it is that our system of national training should seek to turn out high-minded, intelligent, and attractive citizens. We are continually sending forth from these shores ambassadors of English Character, and the more these ambassadors commend this character to foreigners the more honourable and secure is our place in the world.

"The war which is going on," as Lord Haldane reminds us, "is not the only struggle in which this country is engaged. There is a larger rivalry, a rivalry more peaceful, less obvious, less rapid in its progress, but not less decisive in the end, in which we have to hold our own if we are to maintain our place; and that rivalry is one in which knowledge, skill, and foresight are required as urgently as they are in the war."

Our energy will no longer serve us, unless it is directed by the highest intelligence. And we cannot trust ourselves to an aristocracy of intelligence. Our character and our destiny are in the hands of democracy.

ENFORCING PEACE.

EDWARD M. CHAPMAN,

New London, Conn., U.S.A.

"WAR," says Emerson, quoting Heraclitus, "is the Father of all things," and he goes on to remark that it "passes the power of all chemical solvents, breaking up the old adhesions, and allowing the atoms of society to take a new order." The truth of this is evident enough, and when a great war comes it always leads some men to hope that a new order impends which, taught by the bitter lessons of its own origin, will do away with war itself. Despite repeated disappointments, that hope persists. It may be said, indeed, that such a war as the present divides thoughtful people into three groups. Some strengthen their conviction that war is normal and that its recurrence must be expected while human society endures. These are the apostles of militarism; and multitudes look up to them,

"The strong to drink new strength of iron endurance;
The weak, new terrors; all, renewed assurance
And confirmation of the old despair."

A second group proclaim the doctrines of extreme pacifism, though often in a highly belligerent tone. The gospel of protest against a social wrong, as every observant person must have noticed, is likely to be preached with an extremity of bitterness and a disregard for the rights of other people to their own opinions that scarce any other propaganda approaches. Few tongues are so unsocial as that of the Socialist, so intemperate as that of the Prohibitionist, or more truculent than that of the Pacifist. War to him is organised murder and nothing more. The Christian who participates in it, whatever the motives of duty, sacrifice, or love of right and justice which actuate him, denies the essence of his faith and contributes to what it has become the fashion to call the "bankruptcy of

Christianity." The cry of this group is "Peace, peace"; but they rarely point out any practicable road by which peace may come. The casting up of highways is too slow and laborious a process to suit the typical pacifist of the extreme type; moreover, it takes breath, which, he often thinks, might more profitably be spent in crying—since "*Vox clamantis*" is his motto.

Let it not be thought, however, that this man is to be condemned or got rid of with a sneer. On the contrary, he is, at his best, a much-needed person and distinctly to be reckoned with. Mr Henry Ford, for instance, is far more than an amiable enthusiast. He is quite capable of becoming, if indeed he has not already become, that very terrible engine of reform a highly practical idealist. He has organised a great and serviceable business; managed to pay a minimum wage which a few years ago must have been beyond the dreams of labour unions; and is not only tremendously in earnest in his peace propaganda, but has deeply impressed multitudes of plain people, who will finally translate his influence into votes, laws, and treaties. Yet when Mr Ford in the autumn of 1915 talked of "getting the soldiers out of the trenches by Christmas," he spoke as though no great moral issues were involved in their presence there. To slight these issues as though they did not exist was an act so cynical as to throw all Mr Ford's contemplated philanthropy into the shade.

So a well-known Professor in Yale University, a man of ability, humanity, and, it should be added, of an abounding humour, has recently proclaimed once more the doctrine of the martyr nation: which is that a nation might conceivably render its greater possible service to the world by deliberate disarmament in face of probable conquest and possible extinction in order thus to bear its ultimate and extreme testimony against the enormity of war. Curiously enough, this at once roused a commotion, especially among the graduates of his University. Hot little men bubbled up from the four quarters of the land to burst in the Professor's face. They seemed to think the doctrine new; although it had been proclaimed by an English pacifist, speaking at an international gathering in Boston, in 1899. Moreover, they appeared to regard it as grievously heretical, seeming quite unable to understand the place and worth of a truth somewhat extremely stated.

Literally construed, Professor Phelps is very likely right. It is possible that the self-immolation of a nation upon the altar of Peace, as the monk Telemachus thrust his body

between the weapons of the gladiators in heroic protest against such spectacles, might shock men into better ways. But the analogy between personal and national sacrifice is not quite complete, since the men who offer up the nation involve others than themselves and may often sacrifice ideals and spiritual values left to them as a sacred trust. The suggestion, therefore, while it is to be treated respectfully and by no means to be dismissed from the realm of the possibly practicable, must be relegated to the ranks of the forlorn hopes and last resorts of the peace-maker.

Moreover, it is likely to be further invalidated by the tendency of the extreme pacifist to imply that the doctrine of non-resistance is fundamental in Christianity. This cannot well be maintained so long as the Golden Rule holds its central and regnant place in Christ's teaching. Brotherly love is of the essence of Christianity. It involves patience, a gracious kindness, a high respect for the rights of others, a frank recognition that others have a technical right even to be disagreeable and unbrotherly. "Resist not evil" is a good doctrine when preached after the Oriental fashion which Christ used. Its message is pertinent to the need of every man faced by the contradictions of his fellows. But it cannot be taken out of its place in the stream of Christian teaching any more than the antithetic injunction to sell one's cloak and buy a sword. All such sayings must be held subject to certain fundamental and normal principles, chief among which is the word, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." That command provides a platform for the exercise of discipline in the family, in society, and among nations.

Suppose a child asks for some tempting thing that may prove injurious or even fatal. Shall his mere wish for it be permitted to bludgeon a parent into meeting his whim? It is the thing he wishes for in his sane moments when his will is good will that must influence parental action. Or suppose a generally normal man to be betrayed into intoxication and through it into violence. Is he not to be arrested in his course before the threatened mischief is accomplished? Is the constable to hold his hand because the man desires not to be hindered or meddled with? Who of us in his right mind would not earnestly wish to have strong hands of restraint laid upon him before he could, while under the influence of drink, passion, or other incitement to mental unsoundness, do a neighbour any material wrong? It is not too much to say that a wise and dispassionate resistance of evil is of the very

essence of the Golden Rule; and the militant pacifist who pours the vials of his eloquent scolding upon it is in danger of putting the letter in place of the spirit of supreme law.

Thus the militarist and pacifist, the groups of thesis and antithesis, hold as ever the centre of the stage in time of war and make the most romantic appeal. Between them they manage to rouse almost every passion except the passion of permanent service. That remains the prerogative of the unromantic representatives of synthesis—the men who realise that an earnest and extreme man is as rarely wholly in the right as wholly in the wrong. Here then is the third group which the travail of war develops. They believe that since war is so great an evil as to seem, while it continues, the supreme evil, it can be done away. At this point they encounter the militarist, who would rule them out of court by calling their plan Utopian. On the other hand, they not only believe in law but in its enforcement, and here as advocates of an international police power they become anathema to the extreme pacifist with his doctrine of absolute non-resistance. Moreover, they seem to represent a principle of compromise—a prosaic and unromantic thing in the eyes of all.

What now shall this benighted traveller in the Via Media say to these superior persons on either hand? He is put to no sort of confusion by the cynic's charge that his ideal is Utopian. It is probable, to be sure, that the cynic does not mean anything very particular by that vague term; but in general he implies that the thing called Utopian is ideal, that it is beyond the present experience of society, that it may arouse a more or less sentimental enthusiasm, and that it is adapted to the sneers of the man of the world. All this is true and may be admitted. But when the militarist goes on to claim that therefore the ideal of peace is altogether impracticable, the sober advocate of its enforcement by law stoutly objects. He has no need to labour the proposition that the realisation of dreams is the measure of human progress. The cessation of private war and the adjudication of private quarrels was a dream; but it has been practically realised. Even in realms where dreams seem out of all relation to normal human experience, astonishing things have happened. The theory of Columbus that the world was round and might be circumnavigated flatly contradicted the convictions of the vast majority of sane men. Yet Drake sailed round it. From the days of Icarus to those of Darius Green the flying man was the butt of all common-sense folk with their feet firmly planted on reality. But to-day the

flying man is the eye of armies. Intercommunication of men over wide distances, with no physical medium except the elements, fitted excellently into an Arabian Nights Tale, but as a plan to be realised must always have been laughed out of the consideration of really practical people. Indeed, fifty years ago the more "scientific" a man thought himself to be, the more pronounced might well have been his insistence upon special media for such intercourse. Yet the other day naval officers not only telephoned by "wireless" from Washington to Paris, but were overheard in the Hawaiian Islands with such distinctness that acquaintances recognised each other's voices. Man is so constituted that within the widest limits he can have what he needs when he is willing to pay an adequate price; indeed, it has become a part of his bill of rights that he has a right to believe along the line of his profoundest needs. The thing that his welfare calls for is to be thought of as within the circle of the ultimately practicable, even though the means to the end be not yet clear.

Meanwhile the pacifist upon the other side is crying that any use of force to preserve peace is a contradiction and a mockery. Here again the believer in an organised rather than an automatic peace refuses to be put down. He reminds his academic friend that peace and freedom within states and communities have been gradual in their growth. Their processes have been evolutionary as the co-operative forces in society have by degrees gained the upper hand of the competitive forces. The policeman's truncheon is as real a symbol of peace as the hard-used dove so long as its presence in a community prevents disorder ten times where it descends in necessary violence once. Force exerted for the protection of innocence or for the repression of evil-doing, with a decent regard for the rights of the person coerced, has the clear sanction of the Golden Rule, since men of genuine good will would wish themselves to be coerced rather than do violent wrong to their neighbours.

Is there now any possibility of applying this truth to the world's need? A large group of experienced and practical men answer, Yes. It was in the early days of the present war that a Baltimore publicist who had long been an advocate of the judicial settlement of international disputes invited a number of distinguished public men to dine with him and consider the matter. He had been Minister to Belgium, and thus united practical diplomatic experience to his theoretic interest. Those who accepted Mr Theodore Marburg's invitation met with little expectation that they could discover any

practicable means of putting their good will into concrete form. Indeed, the developing catastrophe of the European war seemed to mock any attempt to do so. But remembering no doubt that the great work of Grotius upon the Law of War and Peace appeared during the Thirty Years War, they addressed themselves to serious discussion. Further conferences were held and correspondence entered upon with men of like interests in other countries. In due time, somewhat to their own surprise, they found themselves in substantial agreement upon some points. If a League of the larger nations, or of a substantial majority of them, could be formed to which the smaller nations should be freely admitted if they desired, and the members of the League would agree to three rules of international conduct, it appeared as though the way of progress toward general and lasting peace must at least be entered upon.

The three rules of conduct are as follows:—

I. *All justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.*

By “justiciable questions” are of course meant such as are governed by the recognised rules or principles of international law as at present constituted. They comprise a vast number of cases in which nations differ as individual neighbours might differ over matters of boundary or of wrong done by one to the property or to the representatives of the other. It seems so evident that these contentions between individuals are justiciable—that is, capable of settlement in court if they cannot be settled by negotiation between the parties concerned—that every civilised community insists that they shall be so treated. The degree and quality of its civilisation, indeed, are to be judged by its ability to compel recourse to the courts in such cases, instead of to private war; and highly organised communities treat the individual who proceeds to violence in his own quarrel, even though his contention may in itself be just, as a law-breaker and liable to punishment. It was not always so in communities, and no doubt there was a time when peace must have appeared as difficult of maintenance between private neighbours as it now seems to be between nations. But the life of man needed this advance in organisation, and among civilised people it has come.

Since, however, in the case of nations many cases must

arise which are not justiciable or are thought not to be by considerable groups of people in the nations concerned, the tribunal provided for by Article I. has power conferred upon it to hear and pass judgment, not merely upon the merits of a case, but upon any issue as to its own jurisdiction in the premisses.

II. *All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.*

It is evident that questions must arise with which international law in its present state of partial development seems inadequate to deal. There will be matters affecting the general policy of a nation or touching its honour so deeply that its people, if not its government, will refuse to submit them to any tribunal for "hearing and judgment." It is to be hoped that the number of these will diminish as civilisation develops. But, at present, they constitute a category of very great importance—perhaps of the greatest, since in the case of plainly justiciable questions it has grown increasingly easy to resort to arbitration. To deal with this large class in such a manner that war shall be avoided and justice done, it is highly necessary that time shall be given to their consideration and discussion—that they shall be opened in all their bearings to the people as well as to the governments involved, and that final issue shall not be joined upon them until the passions roused by their first discussion shall have had time to cool. It is to this end that the council of conciliation is proposed.

III. *The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith, both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories, before any question arising shall be submitted, as provided in the foregoing.*

This article, as is generally admitted, contains the crux of the whole matter. In it the proposed League utters its special message; and here the pacifist begins to bridle, and the militarist dons his superior smile. The League to Enforce Peace is frank in its insistence upon the sanction of force: but it is the force of co-operative and international police, bent on maintaining order, rather than of competitive armaments ready to disrupt and destroy. Moreover, the use of this force has one specific end, which is to arrest the disorderly conduct of the mischief-maker. It is not designed primarily to punish; it is not designed at all to enforce the decree of the tribunal

of Article I., or the recommendations of the council of Article II. Its sole object is the keeping of the peace or the restraint of its disturber until the matter at issue can be examined and some rational solution discovered. If after due examination and adjudication or recommendation the parties to the question are not satisfied, they may then conceivably go to war without the exercise of any constraint by the fellow-members of the League.

If this seem to be a lame and impotent conclusion, a second thought will show how improbable such an issue is likely to be.

In the first place, the mere lapse of time necessary for adequate arbitration or conciliation will in a multitude of cases permit passion to subside and dispose nations to reason. The numbers of those in every nation who believe that utmost forbearance should be exercised and great sacrifices made before the test of war is invoked are steadily increasing; their voice is heard in spite of the present conflict, and their message is likely to have an increased emphasis because of it. These men will be active in this interval provided by the sitting of court or council, and they will speak directly to the people, who are coming to see with increasing clearness that the burdens of war must finally be borne and the waste of it made up by them, instead of by the military caste that is so willing to see it come.

No claim is made that the masses of the people are always pacific in their attitude. They are indeed peculiarly liable to be swept away by passion, and when a war has once broken out they generally are so swept away. "Amid the clash of arms the laws are silent," says the proverb; and it might have added, "Popular reason takes its flight." This, however, is a passion which soon burns itself out; and half the battle for peace has been won when time is granted for reasonable men to speak and for passionate multitudes to hear. Moreover, increasing numbers of individuals and highly influential organisations are aligning themselves with the advocates of peace. The Labour Unions are to be counted on this side, and so are the Socialists, despite the fact that their internationalism was not sufficiently developed to resist the impulse of the present war. It will revive with the return of peace and a realisation by the rank and file of the economic burden which this war has placed upon their shoulders, and it will probably be developed into a more definite and effective policy than ever before.

Beyond this, it is highly probable that the certainty of economic and, if necessary, of military pressure to be exerted

by the League upon a violent member will be sufficient in the great majority of cases to keep the peace. Nations cannot afford to rush hastily into a war when assured that the act will array against them the public opinion of the world and the arms of powerful neighbours. Even should the improbable occasionally occur, however, it would not necessarily invalidate the plan. As President Lowell of Harvard has happily pointed out, the eradication of public war may follow a course like that which attended the eradication of private war. It was only by degrees that kings grew powerful enough and states were so highly organised that the ordeal by battle could be dispensed with. But a time came when society was able to insist that hostile barons must have their causes heard before resorting to arms. At once such resort grew less frequent; then, as the organisation of society became more stable, less frequent still, until finally pacific means for the settlement of private differences became the rule and private war was either forgotten or degenerated into such petty breaches of the peace as it was quite within the power of the constituted authorities to control.

It is as a step in such development that the League justifies its organisation and service, and as a fourth article in its platform it is provided that from time to time the constituent nations shall hold conferences with a view to formulate and codify rules of international law.

This is the platform and these are the ideals of the League to Enforce Peace. They have the merit of being specific and definite. No quixotic attempt to interfere with the present war is meditated. No wholesale and revolutionary reform of the world is aimed at; but certain steps along the path of a better organisation of society are pointed out which seem practicable to thoughtful and instructed men. That the scheme is no hasty or sentimental one is vouched for by the leaders whom it has enlisted in the United States. Its formal organisation was effected in Independence Hall in Philadelphia, in June 1915. The Honourable W. H. Taft, former President of the United States, was chosen President. The Chairman of the Executive Committee is Mr A. Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard University. Its active Vice-President, lately chosen at a largely attended meeting held in Washington, is Mr A. B. Parker, the candidate of the Democratic Party for the national Presidency in 1904.

Joined to these are a large number of eminent publicists, diplomats, and men of affairs who believe that the next step toward lasting peace lies along the path which the League

points out. They quite realise that great difficulties are to be overcome in effecting an adequate organisation and making the proposed League efficient. Many of these will be peculiarly great in the United States with its settled policy of diplomatic isolation and its fear of "entangling alliances." Yet the United States itself offers a unique instance of such a League as is proposed, with its family of commonwealths, independent in so many respects, but compelled by their union no less than by their individual good will to submit all questions at issue between the several states to a regularly constituted tribunal of law. This method of settling differences has stood the test of more than a century and a-quarter of time and has survived one terrible civil war. Faulty as it may be in some ways, no one would for a moment think of returning to a condition when each armed against and might conceivably levy war upon its neighbour. If something of mere independence have been surrendered, there have also been enormous countervailing advantages in security of life and conservation of resource. Competition still exists and along some lines may seem acute; but the vital and ultimate relations are co-operative.

There is no speech and little thought among sane men to-day of a United States of Europe or of the World; but the lessons of the present catastrophe emphasise the need and at least suggest the practicability of some international League which shall have both good will and physical power sufficient to compel its constituent nations to keep the peace.

EDWARD M. CHAPMAN.

NEW LONDON.

IS INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT POSSIBLE ?

J. A. HOBSON.

THERE are a few persons who seem not to desire the abolition of war. The spiritual gains of such a war for liberty and justice as they believe the Allies to be waging have impressed them so profoundly that they are loth to contemplate the making of a world in which so ennobling a conflict is no longer permissible. But none, I think, of those who have given expression to this view has tested in his personal experience the toil, the pain, the fear, the filth, the physical and moral degradation which modern war involves. The vast majority at any rate of reflecting men and women would desire above all things that the peace which ends this war should issue in some international arrangements by which the risk and the opportunity of future war should be reduced to a minimum. But are any such arrangements really feasible? This is the issue which Dr Jacks raises in his striking review of Mr Armstrong's book *Our Ultimate Aim in the War*.¹ He rightly expresses the two assumptions underlying the proposals alike of Mr Armstrong and of such powerful organisations as the American "League to Enforce Peace." They are, first, "That a common will of mankind really exists, or would exist if the World-Parliament were called into being"; secondly, "That the common will of mankind, assuming it to exist, is, or would be, in favour of perpetual peace." Dr Jacks appears to regard these assumptions as open to grave doubt. But are they? Is there no common nature and experience among the members of the different nations, no growth of common interests, feelings, and ideas, no spread of personal intercourse sufficient to generate a common will? Do not the great majority, for instance, of the more developed minds among the different nations desire, will, and plan many of the same objects and in conscious co-operation?

¹ See HIBBERT JOURNAL, October 1916, p. 161.

Not merely in commerce, but in many other fields of science, philosophy, religion, art, hygiene, education, social reform and philanthropy, a world-society has long been growing up. Most of its co-operation lies outside politics, but at an increasing number of points intergovernmental action has come in.

In the face of such experience it is impossible to maintain that "a common will of mankind" does not exist. Whether it is at all adequate to the task of securing peace through interstate co-operation is, of course, another question. But it is right to recognise that, in some considerable measure, this common will of mankind does exist, and that Mr Armstrong is not under any obligation to prove that a "World-Parliament" would bring it into being. It is, however, reasonable to hold that any interstate arrangements for securing peace, whether amounting to a World-Parliament or not, would tend greatly to strengthen and nourish that common will—provided, of course, that they did not straightway collapse in ignominious failure. Is such failure inevitable? The answer depends upon the worth or worthlessness of the second assumption, viz. that the common will of mankind is in favour of perpetual peace. Here I complain that the introduction of the epithet "perpetual" unfairly biases the judgment. I believe that, as the product of the war, there will exist a greatly strengthened common will for peace, for peace at almost any price. But such a will cannot reasonably be supposed to operate over eternity. It must be conceived primarily as a will for peace in our time, or over such a range of time as falls within reasonable limits of speculation.

Dr Jacks has no belief in the reasonableness of a World-Parliament. The term "World-Parliament" conjures up in cautious minds all the prejudices against dangerous Utopianism. But is it really inconceivable that a treaty, by which all the great States would agree to submit all disputes to arbitration or conciliation, and even to resort to common action in enforcing the awards, should work? For that is the gist of Mr Armstrong's and other similar proposals.

Dr Jacks seems to think that no such arrangement could work, because, though the Governments of different nations represented on the Courts or Councils might agree on general principles, such as that "all the world wants liberty," they would disagree on any particular application of such principles. There would, he holds, always be strong minorities who would resent so bitterly the award or decision of the majority that they would break away and wreck the international agreement. There is no doubt that, at any rate in the early stages of such

an international experiment, some real risk of this kind would exist. But is it as great as Dr Jacks assumes? and even if it is, are we warranted in refusing to incur the risk, *i.e.* have we any better method of trying to secure peace?

The international agreement depends for its success upon a belief that nations will abide by their agreements, first, to submit all disputes to arbitration or conciliation; secondly, to accept the awards or recommendations; and thirdly, to bring united pressure, economic or forcible, upon any one of their members which refuses to perform the first and second obligations. Mr Armstrong and I in this matter go further than the American League, in that we would apply united action to enforce both the obligation to submit disputes and the obligation to accept the award, whereas the American League confines united action to the former, leaving it open to any Power to defy public opinion and refuse to carry out the award, if it dare. The crux, of course, is the case of a Power refusing to arbitrate some issue alleged to be of honour or of vital interest, or defying the judgment of an international Court. Dr Jacks complains that Mr Armstrong assumes that only one State at a time would show such recalcitrance. He thinks that a State, thus defying the international Court and repudiating its treaty obligations, would be joined by "all its sympathisers," *i.e.* "the whole minority of nations whose wishes had been overruled by the majority of the World-Parliament." But this pessimist view rests upon the disputable assumptions, first, that there must exist strong fixed "parties" in the Courts or Councils or the "Parliament"; secondly, that their party sympathies will be so strong that, in order to satisfy them, a considerable minority will at any time be willing to break their express treaty obligations and wreck the whole experiment. I do not think we need assume the existence of such powerful sympathies as would draw strong minorities into such criminal behaviour. In the first place, if there is enough faith in internationalism to bring into operation such arrangements, that faith would imply a weakening in the particular alliances which would carry the danger that Dr Jacks assumes. Secondly, we cannot assume that a disagreement with a judgment which goes against one of our friends will lead us to side with him against the law which we have solemnly undertaken to obey. The case which Dr Jacks takes to sustain his attack is that of an International Parliament voting by a majority the independence of India. But neither Mr Armstrong nor any other responsible advocate of international government asserts that such a Government, at any rate for a long time to come,

would be endowed with powers to interfere with the internal government of the British or any other Empire. It may, indeed, be certainly assumed that, in the setting up of any international body endowed with legislative and executive functions, such interference, which proved the ruin of the experiment a hundred years ago, would be most rigorously excluded. I do not think that Dr Jacks is right in supposing that Mr Armstrong assigns any such function to an International Parliament. In support of his supposition he refers to Mr Armstrong's statement that among the necessary extensions of the Hague Convention "it must include *all* such questions" (*i.e.* questions of fact, or international law, or both) "even where affecting vital interests, honour, and *independence*." But such an issue as whether India ought to be accorded independence does not come within the scope of Mr Armstrong's requirements. It is a question neither of fact nor of international law. Whether a particular piece of country and its inhabitants do or do not fall within the jurisdiction of a named State is a question affecting independence which might be a proper subject for arbitration, involving an issue of fact or law. So might the question of a threatened interference by one State with the internal affairs of another, as in the case of Austria's demands to supervise the judicial procedure of the Serbian law courts. But the case imagined by Dr Jacks of a majority vote in the International Parliament for a "general dismemberment of the overseas dominions of Great Britain" has no relevancy to any actual proposals. Such a Parliament, were it formed, would not have "the independence of States in its power."

A word in reply to the charge of false analogy which Dr Jacks brings against the argument that Internationalism is only an application on a larger scale of the same federative forces which have brought into being the existing States. "To assume the possibility of federation among *all* States together because it has already been accomplished in *each* State separately is certainly bad reasoning." Now, I do not think Mr Armstrong's position is actually open to the charge. He really argues that the same motives which have induced small States to federate in history will be available to bring into existence a world-federation. Why not? Because, says Dr Jacks, one of the strongest motives of such minor federations, *viz.* the desire to be stronger against the possible aggression of an outsider, will no longer be operative when the proposal is for a federation which leaves no outsiders. But whether the issue be that of entering or of helping to maintain a world-federation, each

separate State will still be actuated by the desire to escape the possible aggression of stronger States by forming a confederation which shall negative their superior strength. Each State will recognise that, if the federation should not be formed, or should not be maintained, it will be liable to a continuance of the present risks it runs in a dangerous world. The main federative motives do rightly make for a continuance of the federative process into world-federation.

In conclusion, may I plead once more that "world-federation" prejudices our case by its excessive pretentiousness? I agree with Dr Jacks that "European partnership" will not suffice, and that it might prove "an intolerable menace to the non-European portions of the human race." But the federation of the whole world is not the only alternative. If all the seven Great Powers could be got in, together with the European neutrals, or possibly all the States already represented at the Hague, there would be a strong foundation for the international experiment. Even if the Great Powers were, by representation or prestige, paramount in the International Parliament, their conduct towards the weaker countries of the earth would be likely to be far juster and more considerate than the conduct which the separate Imperialism of each has yielded. However imperfectly, they would tend to exhibit some qualities of a genuinely international mind and policy. The selfishness of each would be kept in some check by the public opinion of the larger body. That Mr Armstrong's scheme, or any other along these lines, must certainly succeed, and that it will yield even a high probability of terminating war, may indeed be questionable. But if there is some probability, however weak, in its favour, is it not well to evoke in its support the utmost possible amount of interest and good feeling? For it does not appear that Dr Jacks, or any other sceptic, has another and a better way of trying to avoid a recurrence to the struggle of competing armaments and the menace of another war, which in default of some scheme of international concert may bring the material and moral fabric of our civilisation to ruin.

J. A. HOBSON.

LONDON.

DEMOCRACY AND COMPULSORY SERVICE.

G. G. COULTON.

UNPREJUDICED men are now beginning to realise that Compulsory Military Service has an honourable history in the past, that it is doing most honourable work at this moment, and that it may be unfair to damn all compulsory systems under the single unpopular term of Conscription. The word is convenient, of course, but it has the fatal defect of confusing between very different manifestations of a single principle. If all compulsory military service is conscription, then conscription was warmly supported, not from political opportunism but on principle, by Jaurès, Vaillant, Bebel, and all the greatest among those Pacifists and Internationalists who have not had the peculiar good fortune to inhabit the United States of America, or Britain in the narrowest sense of the term.¹ It may safely be said that four-fifths of the Radicals and Socialists in the civilised world are convinced conscriptionists in this sense. The one country which has been fundamentally and consistently conscriptionist for the last six centuries is Switzerland, "the laboratory of democratic experiments." Yet, when we hear the word *Conscription*, we think not of democracies but autocracies; not of Switzerland but of Germany. It is literally true to say that the compulsory militia service of Switzerland, where all men start in the ranks and no man need spend more than seven months of his whole life under military training, differs as much from the German system as a glass of beer differs from a pint of whisky. To a few temperance cranks, this difference is negligible; and to some people all different forms of "conscription" will doubtless always remain similarly indistinguishable. In the past this confusion has

¹ New Zealand and South Africa are, it will be remembered, "conscriptionist" countries.

been very general; for it sprang from a thoughtlessness and ignorance natural enough in their time, though now fast disappearing in the world's present serious mood. We can look away now from words to things: remembering that conscripts once defended Liège, and are still defending Verdun, we are prepared to recognise in conscription, not only certain forces of evil, but also potentialities of much good. We see that the problem here, as in every other field of human civilisation, is to seize upon things which are manifold in their natural action; and, by the help of those faculties which distinguish man from brute, to control and direct this natural action; to neutralise the evil while we give free play to the good. Conscription is certainly a bad master, but we now ask ourselves whether it may not be a good servant.

Until quite recently, such unprejudiced inquiry was almost impossible among the general public. Certainly a very large number of educated and thinking men, perhaps even the majority, told us they were opposed to conscription *on principle*. The war has cleared our minds here, as in other directions. We see now that, with ninety-nine men out of a hundred, it was really not a question of absolute principle but of military expediency. Many men held opinions not easily reconcilable with conscription; but very few found their political or moral principles absolutely incompatible with it, as soon as it began to appear that conscription alone stood between us and the gravest national risks. Even among those who offered the most determined opposition to the Military Service Bill, some had already abandoned the purely voluntary principle at an early stage of the war, and had become not only passive but active agents of partial conscription. It was natural enough, of course, that these should stop short at a certain point in the progress of military compulsion; but that breaking point was not fixed by principle; it was fixed by their conception of military expediency: these men no longer thought that the further result to be obtained would justify the more stringent interference with personal freedom. And, from the merely logical standpoint, this clearance of views is an enormous gain. We see now that consistent non-resisters are the only people who can claim to be absolutely opposed to conscription on principle; and that, with all the rest of us, the real question is one of compromise. We seek, each in his own way, a balance between the exigencies of National Defence, and the disadvantages of introducing a new compulsory law, involving the same sorts of hardships and friction that have already attended compulsory education and compulsory insurance in their initial stages. Even if

(though some would doubt this) the friction and the odium of a conscriptionary law on the Swiss model would be still greater than in the cases above quoted, yet this would not alter the essential character of the problem. It still remains a balance between loss of personal freedom and loss of national security. Leaving non-resisters for the moment out of the question, we are all agreed as to the value of National Defence; we only differ as to the exact price which it is worth while paying for it—and mainly as to the ethical cost.

Now, there is probably a growing body of people who recognise that so-called questions of principle, in the moral and even the religious sphere, are often to a great extent historical questions. Though the points at issue between Roman Catholic and Protestant are, at first sight, mainly philosophical, yet historical method has already brought each side to a far more sympathetic recognition of the other's point of view than would have been possible so long as the discussion had been confined to the strictly philosophical sphere. And, in the present problem, many misconceptions may be avoided by beginning with a brief historical view of Conscription.¹

Paradoxical as the Briton thinks it at first sight, educated Frenchmen have long been familiar with the historical generalisation which connects compulsory military service with democracy, and enlistment by "free contract" with despotism. An anti-militarist like Vaillant, in the French Chamber of Deputies, assumed this as common ground between himself and the militarists whom he attacked. And, indeed, it seems impossible to read history in any other sense. The growth of despotism in Rome was contemporaneous with the decay of the citizen soldier. The first beginnings of democracy in the Middle Ages were organised on the basis of universal citizen-service. From sixteen to sixty, all men were called out to fight side by side in the Italian republics, in the great democratic cities of Flanders, and in those cantons which crystallised into the Swiss confederation. In Italy and in Flanders the decay of political liberty was roughly contemporaneous with the rise of the hireling soldier; in Switzerland democracy and compulsory service have always flourished side by side.

Take, again, the story of England and France. In the fourteenth century, while the theory of universal citizen-service prevailed everywhere, England was the European Power in which this theory was most completely realised. Many of the

¹ The assertions here made will be shortly published in fuller form, and with chapter and verse, in a book by the present author, dealing mainly with the historical aspects of the subject.

victors of Crécy were literally conscripts; the rest were volunteers from a nation whose government enforced such a rough and ready military training as made us the most "conscripted" of great Powers. In the France of that age, the theory of personal service scarcely survived except as a pretext for taxation; and when at last Charles VII. organised his forces on a basis which enabled him to drive our exhausted armies out of France, this was at the expense of French political liberties. The mercenary system and arbitrary taxation were riveted upon the nation at one single blow; and France never had a really national army or a really national assembly until the Revolution. All this while, the English citizen-militia flourished; it prevented the Tudors from supporting their rule by strong mercenary armies, and had much to do with the successful revolt of 1642. When we consider the stagnation or decay of French political liberties during the last five centuries before the Revolution, and the growth of English liberties during the same period, we begin to understand why democracy and universal service are inseparable in the Frenchman's mind.

Still more significant is the story from 1789 onwards. Dubois-Crancé, one of the ablest Radicals in the Assembly, wished to introduce universal service at once, but nobody listened to him. When the Revolutionary wars broke out in 1792, even the new religion of liberty could not make the voluntary principle a practical success. Out of a nation of at least 23 millions, only 84,000 real volunteers were raised. The other revolutionary levies, though for some time dignified with the old name of volunteers, were in fact pressed men: a certain contingent was demanded by Government from each district. Next, in 1793, came the *levée en masse*, and all pretence of voluntarism disappeared. The whole system was finally regularised, and made into an integral part of the constitution, by Jourdan's law of 1798. It was these conscript armies which saved the Republic; nor must we be misled by the superficial exception of Napoleon's despotism. Jaurès, though an anti-militarist, was an able historian; and he agreed with his political opponents that Napoleon's power was not based upon conscription; that some of Napoleon's most serious dangers came from the army; and that at the head of victorious mercenary troops he would have had even more power. Nor was Napoleon's despotism, at its worst, half so onerous as that of the *ancien régime*. To the smaller states of Germany, Napoleon's rule actually brought their first glimmerings of political liberty. After his fall, the Bourbons reverted as

much as they could to the "free contract" principle. The short-lived Republic of 1848 contemplated the restoration of universal service, but had no time to realise its ideal. Napoleon III. reverted again to a semi-mercenary system; the Third Republic restored universal service in all its rigour.

Prussia, again, in her most despotic days had feared to arm the whole population: the King, in a public proclamation of 1793, expressly alleged the danger of political unrest as one of his main reasons for refusing to follow the French Revolutionary example. After the disaster of Jena it was a great wave of popular opinion which brought universal service into Prussia, whence it has spread to the rest of Germany. In Prussia, as in Revolutionary France, this movement coincided with a far more thorough organisation of education. It was this universal service and universal education which compelled Bismarck, in 1867, to desert his Conservative friends and grant universal suffrage to the North German Confederation, whence it has passed as a matter of course into the Empire.¹ The fact that universal suffrage has hitherto done so little for German liberty cannot be regarded as final. The awakening of her democracy, which must be only a matter of time, will be immensely quickened by so powerful a political factor; and we may fairly count the Kaiser's despotism, like Napoleon's, as a passing exception.² So long as a despotic government can fight often and win always, it can doubtless bend to its purposes even the democratic system of universal service; but the first great military failure must break this spell.

At the moment when Jean Jaurès was writing in favour of the compulsory principle for home defence, Lord Haldane and Sir Ian Hamilton were attacking the same principle in their *Compulsory Service*. But all three authors, however divergent in their conclusions, agree on one point, that a nation in

¹ I need hardly say that I here use "universal" in the loose sense in which it is commonly used. But it may not be out of place to point out that this war, by its revelation of the power of women's work at any great crisis, even military, will do much to break down old prejudices against the extension of the suffrage.

² We are in great danger of forgetting that, small as may be the political and social freedom of modern Prussia, it is far beyond anything known in the days when military service was to a great extent voluntary. Voltaire and Bernardin de St-Pierre deliberately compared Prussia with Turkey; Burke spoke of her as a typical land of slavery; and Dr John Moore, in 1787, gave detailed descriptions which suggest that Prussia was even farther beyond Britain in militarism and despotism than she is now. Within the last few months, quite as much mischief has been done by attempts to draw a crude contrast between modern Germany and "the Germany of Goethe and Kant" as by the equally superficial attempts to draw hard-and-fast lines between the present German people and their rulers.

arms is a dangerous tool for despots to wield ; that it is a good weapon only when the nation is really fighting in self-defence, or can be hypnotised into that state of mind. And no true democrat believes that nations can be permanently hoodwinked. The general connection in history between democracy and universal service—which, of course, means compulsory service—is so evident in the very face of the facts, that our grandchildren will probably find it difficult to understand how Britons could have managed to ignore it for so long. Even the United States of America, the one country of all history whose position has given her the best excuses for ignoring military risks, can supply us with an instance here. Abraham Lincoln was obliged to bring in the Draft Law as part of his determination “that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” And in defending this Draft Law against its opponents, he reminded them that the original independence of their country had been won partly by the same means.¹ Moreover, the verdict of past history is borne out by the present experience of all Continental States. In these States, which know conscription by experience, not even half of the Socialist parties could be polled against the compulsory principle. Whatever faults democrats may find with the system in detail, they recognise frankly that, of all real armies, the “nation in arms” is the most efficient and the most democratic. Continental anti-compulsionists, therefore, are only to be found amongst Tolstoyans or other extremists who believe in the possibility of total disarmament, and who, in many cases, would abolish even parliamentary government and compulsory taxation. All others, however strong may be their democratic principles, accept compulsion for national defence. They see in it their best safeguard against foreign invasion, which always involves consequences disastrous to social progress. And, with all its disadvantages, they recognise in it the nearest approach to equality of civic sacrifice.

All fair-minded people, therefore, must ask themselves whether past British prejudices against compulsory military service are not founded mainly on insularity of thought. The moment we get outside our own four seas, we find compulsion taken for granted by people as thoughtful and as well-educated as ourselves. Even if we go a little way back in our own history, we find that Trafalgar and Waterloo were partly won by conscripts. Moreover, we find a very close analogy to the present problem in the compulsory education question, which was so hotly debated among us for a whole generation from

¹ Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, vol. vii. p. 55.

about 1845 onwards. In that memorable discussion, even distinguished statesmen were sometimes convinced that this diminution of individual freedom would involve the loss of higher political and social liberties. "No Prussianism!" was the watchword of the voluntarists, who ignored the fact that not only Prussia, but almost every other civilised nation, had accepted more or less definite compulsion. Eminent politicians indulged in the most fantastic prophecies of slavery and dishonour, if we once abandoned the liberty that was our children's birthright. This should make us cautious of repeating in our own generation the blunder which Macaulay exposed in his speech on the Education Bill of 1847—the blunder of applying the principle of free competition to a case to which it is not applicable. It is unjust and immoral (argued Macaulay) that men should be free to grow up into ignorant and vicious citizens, a danger rather than a strength to the State. It is unjust and immoral, according to many advanced thinkers of our generation, that men should grow up in enjoyment of liberty, yet with no organised means of defending the State which has done so much for their freedom. Mill, in his essay on Liberty, emphasised the right of the State to claim personal military service from all able-bodied citizens; and Mill advocated for Britain a short-service compulsory militia on the Swiss system. No serious political philosopher, I believe, has ever attempted to meet Mill's abstract arguments; the resistance to compulsory service has really based itself on expediency. But expediency has often sheltered itself behind arguments which, if we press them seriously, lead us to the ground of non-resistance. Yet it is noteworthy that, however definitely a theorist's arguments may imply the principle of non-resistance, very few are bold enough to state clearly, and argue consistently from, a principle which has been abandoned, in practice, even by its extreme advocates. Two attempts have been made to set up non-resistant states—Pennsylvania and Paraguay. Both failed when the time of real stress came; and the attempt has not since been repeated. The excuse for the Pennsylvanian failure which I once heard publicly given by a Friend, before an audience in which Friends were strongly represented, was in itself a clear condemnation of the policy. Pennsylvania lost its original character (it was explained) because bad men came in and gradually perverted the policy of the State. But how can we exclude bad men under a régime of non-resistance? Moreover, what moral excuse could we find for excluding them? The blessings of non-resistance, like God's rain, should be

free to the just and the unjust. If virtue is so much stronger than vice, and if the non-resistant spirit stands so high above the resistant spirit as the theory of non-resistance implies, then the Pennsylvanians ought positively to have welcomed bad men for conversion's sake; and the bad men, so far from distorting Pennsylvanian State policy, ought to have been converted and absorbed by the virtuous inhabitants. The snowball should have rolled victoriously along its greater and greater path, until an avalanche of peace and virtue should have swept over the Western world. Even by its own logic, non-resistance would seem to stand condemned. And it is condemned by the still plainer test of practice. Not only has no fresh attempt been made to base a State on non-resistance, but not even any religious society really bases itself on this principle. Many preachers of non-resistance are very wealthy men; the average income of non-resistant theorists may certainly be estimated as higher than the average income of the world in general. Yet have we a single instance, in all history, of wealth accumulated or kept except with the aid of physical force, either latent or patent? Did not Christ himself teach us of the strong man armed keeping his goods in peace? Would it be possible for a millionaire to remain a millionaire, or even for a prosperous store-keeper to possess plate-glass windows, except under protection of the law, which depends upon the policeman, who frequently has to employ force? An angry and misguided mob may break a pacifist's plate-glass windows, but the sufferer can console himself with the reflection that physical force has only taken away that which physical force had already bestowed, and will bestow again still more abundantly upon those who patiently follow the well-known rules for money-making in civilised countries. Until non-resistance succeeds in reconciling the apparently irreconcilable—until it constructs a capitalist group based upon purely moral sanctions—so long would it seem impossible to avoid the conclusion that the non-resistant capitalist is a parasite of modern society. He would not fight; but he needs not to fight, since it is notorious that more men would fight to defend him from robbery than would fight to rob him. Though the non-resistants count philosophers among their ranks, is there anyone who has yet evolved even the vaguest theory of a non-resistant capitalist State? The frequent attempts to compare the non-resister of to-day with the early Christians would seem calculated only to emphasise the want of logic, and the blindness to facts, already complained of. If ever it becomes evident that these theorists are making in practice all the

pecuniary sacrifices implied in their creed—if ever a man begins to run more risk of death by even the most obstinate defiance of State requirements than by joining his fellow-citizens in the trenches—then will be time to talk of the Christian martyr parallel. No reasonable person can wish that matters should ever come near to this pass; but, until then, the facts are what they are; and those well-intentioned people who compare the non-resister's plight with that of the Christian martyr are only holding up their own protégés to ridicule. The Society of Friends, who would have a better right than any other society to make this claim, would in fact be the last to fall into such exaggerations.

We come back then to our earlier point. Since national security must be maintained by arms, what social and political price are we prepared to pay for it? No price, evidently, which would mean *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*. If a compulsory defensive militia, even on the Swiss democratic and short-service model, meant the perpetuation of wars in Europe, or military rule at home, or the brutalisation of our national manners, or a set-back to free thought, then most of us might think this too dear a price to pay even for victory. But what excuse have we for anticipating any of these evil results? History, as we have seen, points in quite another direction; the century *par excellence* of compulsory service in Europe has in fact been the century *par excellence* of political freedom and social progress.

Nor is this so paradoxical as it might seem at first sight. To interest the whole nation in the contingencies of war is, by a double process, to postpone the danger of war. First comes the fact, already acknowledged by disputants on both sides, that a nation in arms cannot so easily be used for aggressive warfare as a hired army. Germany, under her exceptional circumstances, has done so; but France is very different. All who, like the present writer, have known France under the Second Empire and the Third Republic, have been struck by the enormous growth of pacificism during the last half-century. The Jingoism of the Second Empire, with its semi-mercenary army, had disappeared from among the conscripts of 1914. But it has survived to some extent in Great Britain, where voluntarism, for many years past, has defended itself in the boastful language of the Jingo.¹ A year before the

¹ Few things are historically more instructive than a glance at the back numbers of *Punch*. Let the reader look through the cartoons of 1859 onwards, in which we bragged of our new Volunteer force, and he will realise how unlovely a side there was even to that movement, which can be compared with the magnificent effort of this present war.

outbreak of this war, and again a few months after it, two of our Cabinet ministers bragged to us in words which could hardly be paralleled from the lips of responsible statesmen in any conscript country. One put the fighting value of the volunteer soldier at ten times, the other at three times, that of the conscript. The fault lay here not so much with the speakers as with the traditions of the system for which they spoke; only by the intervention of such a *deus ex machina* can the voluntarist shelter himself from the historical fact that no great war has ever been won under a purely voluntary system. The false note of exaggeration is essential to voluntarist propaganda in military matters, as it was fifty years ago in matters educational. Our besetting temptation was then the pride of ignorance; now, it is the valour of ignorance. The men who are actually seeing and doing our fighting for us are now among the most unsparing in their scorn of these newspaper-braggarts at home. Jaurès especially emphasises the difference between the man who performs military service and the man who talks about it. He notes that the drilled and disciplined citizen acquires a feeling of responsibility which makes him less dangerous to society than the irresponsible enthusiast (p. 54).¹ Experience is against the assumption that national military training encourages the Jingo spirit or the spirit of military adventure—except, of course, in the necessarily exceptional cases where it succeeds in giving a sense of overwhelming force, and therefore of moral irresponsibility. Here, then, comes in our second consideration. We ourselves are partly responsible for the apparently overwhelming military superiority of the German nation, and thus for something of their moral irresponsibility. If our armed forces in the past have numbered only about one-eighth of the German forces, this has not been entirely because we have been eight times more peace-loving and more generous than they. Some ten years ago, I had occasion to point out in the *Spectator* that the thermometer of esteem for Britain was steadily falling in Germany, partly on this account. In 1887–8, when I studied at Heidelberg, I found a not unnatural feeling of superiority among those men who knew that they bore in person every national risk. Even pacifist Germans asked me whether the motives at the back of voluntarism in Britain were unmixedly generous, and whether it was really for the final peace of Europe that we should steadily ignore the existence of so many nations in arms. Few people who know Germany will deny that this feeling had grown

¹ These quotations from Jaurès refer to the abbreviated English translation, "Democracy and Military Service" (Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1s. net).

considerably during the past thirty years. It was natural (if not just) that Continental nations should see in us the generosity of weakness and the valour of ignorance; for it was not only Germany who miscalculated, and we now freely confess how little we ourselves saw the true proportions of things. Our weakness, though perhaps more apparent than real, unquestionably did much to tempt the German spirit of adventure. Continental Socialists, therefore, would seem to have been more clear-sighted than we. A nation may tempt war not only by its own aggressive spirit, but also by a state of unpreparedness out of all proportion to its ordinary diplomatic claims and responsibilities. Jaurès insisted that both these risks were automatically minimised by a system which made all citizens share alike in the risks of offence, and contribute alike to the forces of defence (p. 17). He saw clearly the enormous superiority of modern armaments for defence, and hoped that a system of short-service democratic militias would so discourage adventure on both sides as to provide the necessary transition between the present era of bloated armaments and an era of arbitration and proportional disarmament. The present war has strikingly fulfilled many of his anticipations. Who can reasonably doubt that, if France had at once "dug in" her four million soldiers all along the frontier, fighting no pitched battles, but simply retiring from trench to trench as at Verdun, the Germans would have conquered far less of her territory than at present? And, that being so, who will believe that the Germans would have been so easily tempted to their present venture?

Jaurès saw clearly, too, how much falsehood there is in the common antithesis between "voluntary" and "compulsory." He pointed out frankly that even our Territorials were often recruited by veiled compulsion; and he insisted that, if France had a more democratic officer-system and a more defensive foreign policy, the French conscript would show all the ardour of the volunteer. Here, again, we have only to look at the actual facts of this war. It is not only thoughtless, but very mischievous, to talk as if legal compulsion and the volunteer spirit were incompatible. Every Briton is bound to maintain his wife and family, by a law which makes allowance for no conscientious objectors. How many men find their family affections blunted by the existence of this onerous legal obligation? and, if there be any such, at what price should we estimate such a man's family affection, if there were no law in the background to keep him straight?

I have tried to show that the ordinary objections to compulsory service rest upon confusion of thought and neglect of facts. To make an historical case against compulsion, we must artificially confine ourselves to the last two generations of German history, and even shut our eyes to a good deal of what we find there. The past history of Germany and Europe teaches a very different lesson. It not only shows us voluntarism always breaking down under the strain of a great war; it shows also that the principle of universal service has been specially characteristic of democracies. To the nation, as to the individual, History says: "If you want a thing well done, do it yourself."

Apart, therefore, from the small minority who do not want to see national defence well done, or indeed done at all, must we not say that a heavy burden of proof lies upon the shoulders of the voluntarist? He ignores the past, and trusts that his party nostrums of "ten to one" or "three to one" will save him from the natural consequences of inefficient organisation. His attitude of contempt and dislike for the soldier, in peacetime, does much to degrade the lives of the men whom we hire to fight for us. While even such determined Continental anti-militarists as Jaurès and Urbain Gohier see no harm in six months or a year of barracks, British voluntarist propaganda lives upon lurid denunciations of the longer barrack-system, which it persists in confusing with the shorter.¹ One of the first effects of universal compulsion in Belgium—brought in, be it noted, under pressure from the *Radical-Socialist* "bloc"—was a marked improvement in barrack-life. The Swiss system of compulsion would mean, for Britain, simply compulsory Territorialism, with a far more democratic officer-system. Does anybody really believe that the Territorial is a fire-eater? or that the ordinary citizen, put through six months of similar training, would want to go and shoot somebody? Not democratic sensitiveness, but democratic unfaith, would seem to underlie this assumption, that Britons could not do what the Swiss do with such conspicuous success.

To ignore facts is one of the most subtle and dangerous of ethical weaknesses. All men now know, or may know, what invasion means to women and children. What excuse could

¹ The rate of venereal diseases is higher beyond all comparison in the British and American armies than in those of the Continent. This is, of course, a very difficult subject, but I say with every sense of responsibility that I have never met with any British anti-conscriptionist publication which even attempts to deal scientifically with the matter of barrack-morality, or which betrays the vaguest consciousness of what men like Jaurès and Gohier really thought.

a man find for standing by and suffering these outrages without attempt at interference? What excuse, then, for not so preparing as to offer effectual, rather than ineffectual, defence to the helpless? What excuse, therefore, for preferring an imperfect form of organisation, which has never yet saved a country in a great war, to that more thorough system which civilisation has always adopted for ends once recognised as necessary? If the soldier is an honest man, why leave him to tread the wine-press alone? If dishonest, why pay him to sin for us? Though peace (thank God!) is the normal state of human life, it is certain that peace has great temptations, and that war rends the veil from great self-deceptions. Theoretically, each of us can display more heroism in his own trade than the soldier in the trenches; but do we realise this in practice? or are we even moral enough to confess our shortcomings here? Jacques Novikow, perhaps the most learned of recent professional pacifists, acknowledged sadly that "the organisation of intellectual propaganda is almost always closely copied from the organisation of our standing armies, because these latter have the most perfect organisation which men have yet invented on this earth" (*Luttes entre Sociétés Humaines*, 1893, p. 440). And John Stuart Mill wrote, a generation before him: "Until labourers and employers perform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform that of an army, industry will never be moralised, and military life will remain what, in spite of the anti-social nature of its direct object, it has hitherto been, the chief school of moral co-operation" (*Essay on Comte*, 1865, p. 149). If, as Jaurès was convinced, the risk of actual war is minimised by the citizen-army system, so also are the forces of co-operation stimulated; and this frank recognition of communal duties would seem to mark a real step forward in ethical evolution.

G. G. COULTON.

CAMBRIDGE.

FRENCH NATIONALISM.

H. A. L. FISHER,

Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University.

THE spirit of Catholicism may be distinguished from the special quality of Catholic doctrine. The doctrine of Catholicism is universal. The spirit of Catholicism is a spirit of submission to the local pieties, inherited instincts, and particularising forces of history. The doctrine of Catholicism posits a Universal Church; but the spirit of Catholicism, so far from being cosmopolitan, is intertwined with an unconscious tangle of exclusions and preferences accumulated in the passage of centuries and transmitted from a distant past. It would seem that the absolute submission which the Church requires of the faithful in the sphere of doctrine promotes a general temper of acquiescence in the sentimental legacies of time. The Catholic is naturally a Conservative. He feels the call of the blood and the imperious attractions of the soil. Without any process of analysis or questioning he is prepared to shoulder the burdens of history and to live upon the large force of its impulse. He trusts democracy, but only when it follows its instincts, never when it uses its reason, and believes in the Army and the Church as divine agencies for the formation of character and the inculcation of habits of reverence and submission. A diffused and equable philanthropy does not attract him. Respecting the claims conferred by priority, he remembers that he was born first and baptised afterwards, and so metes out his allegiance between his country and his creed.

Such a sentiment, at once conservative, patriotic, and militant, has been evidenced all through the history of France, but never in a relief so salient as against the stormy background of the three Republics. The political Catholicism of modern France has had its periods of ebb and flow, its transmutations of colour and shade, its exaltations and its lapses. It has been

royalist and absolutist with De Maistre and De Bonald, democratic with Lamennais, nationalist with Barrès. It has risen to the heights of *Les Paroles d'un Croyant* and sunk to the depths of the tirades of La Croix during the *Affaire*. But in general it has managed to combine with the fevers of combative emotion, engendered by the controversies of the hour, some of those gentler graces of mysticism and piety which properly belong to the religious temperament.

The future historian of the great war will take account of this element in the public consciousness of France. Modern war, as distinguished from the military amusements of the past, is a malady which can only thrive at a certain temperature. It may be plotted by Governments, promoted by armament firms, precipitated by the machinations of military cliques; but under whatever form or through whatever agency it may come, modern war always implies a general inflammation of the public mind. Nobody who studies the history of Europe during the last decade can fail to note a steady and alarming rise in the political temperature. It was most dangerous in Germany, because it was in Germany that it could be most easily used as the lever of grandiose and world-shattering ambitions. But it was not confined to Germany. The temperature was blazing in the Balkans. It was high in the British aristocracy, fast mounting in the British colonies, and had several times risen to the point of fever in the Catholic and nationalist circles of France.

The peculiar condition of the public consciousness in Europe, which alone made the war possible, was the product of forces and agencies too numerous and diverse to recount, but converging one upon another with accumulating momentum to increase the friction and mutual jealousies of the rival powers and peoples. Of these perturbing forces one of the most vivid and arresting was French nationalism. Other movements exercised a more direct influence upon the development of events, were more closely associated with the crucial turns of public policy, bear a larger measure of responsibility for the tragedy which ensued. The nationalist movement in France was not decisive in the sense in which the term may be applied to the stirrings of the Pan-Germanic idea or to the restless aspirations of the Southern Slavs. It never obtained entire control of the French Government; it was never a triumphant and overwhelming power in the sphere of opinion. Its central core of doctrine was associated not by inner necessity but through the tissue of historic circumstances with suspect causes, royalism on the one hand, ultramontanism on the other—

and this in a country where Pacificism was vigorously preached and the old humanitarian gospel of the Revolution still exercised a wide and seductive appeal. Twice within a decade French nationalism had associated itself with an ill-judged enterprise and experienced a resounding defeat, and to onlookers on this side of the Channel a cause which was connected first with Boulanger and then with the accusers of Dreyfus seemed to be bankrupt of future and definitely overthrown.

But there is a certain type of minority opinion which can never be safely disregarded, and to this type French nationalism belonged. A minority opinion may be the craze of eccentrics, the plot of a sinister group, the airy fabric of prophetic minds dreaming of worlds to come—in all of which cases it is negligible; or it may be a creed, comprising, amid some unpopular or disputable articles, certain deep and widely shared instincts of the race—and that was the case with French nationalism. Its errors were the result not of corruption but of impatience. It caught at straws. It was anxious to be doing. It was full of inexperience, ardour, and desperate irritation. But it was a vital force in France because it represented an instinct, a tradition, and a dream; and being vital and vigorous there, it could not fail to radiate some part of its heat through the whole body of Europe.

The founder of the movement was a soldier-poet who, having fought the campaign of 1870 as quite a young man, dedicated the remainder of his long and stirring life to the idea of national revenge. Déroulède was totally lacking in balance, sagacity, and statesmanship. He was a wild, reckless, passionate figure, exercising by reason of his elemental force and sincerity an influence to which prudence can never attain. During the war his course had been marked by romantic vicissitudes. He had been wounded at Sedan, he had escaped from a German prison at Breslau, had stolen into Paris during the siege in the disguise of a cattle-drover, and had been shot in the arm fighting against the Commune. His great stature and martial bearing, his flashing eyes, with their stern glint of fanaticism, his gift of direct and vehement eloquence and rare capacity for throwing his whole nature into all that he did and said, would have won for him a hearing in any assemblage of his countrymen. But he was not merely a vigorous platform speaker. His little books of songs for soldiers hit the taste of the barrack-room between wind and water. Edition followed edition. Before the war his *Chants de Soldat* (published in 1872) had gone through a hundred and fifty-eight editions, his *Nouveaux Chants de Soldat* (published in 1875) had gone through

a hundred and thirty editions, his *Marches et Sonneries* (published in 1881) through fifty editions. Of such work we do not ask whether it is literature, but whether it accomplishes the purpose for which it is designed. It is sufficient to say that Déroulède achieved an extraordinary success. Having been a private in the Zouaves, and being a man of plain, wholesome, vigorous appetite, he knew exactly how to speak to the rank and file of the French army. His ballads and songs have no sense of strain or condescension about them. He does not fall into the fatal weakness of parading a familiarity with the technicalities of the military art or the curiosities of barrack-room slang. His metres are simple, rude, sufficiently intolerable to the cultivated ear, but well adapted to a marching tune or a rousing chorus:—

“ Dans la France que tout divise,
 Quel Français a pris pour devise,
 Chacun pour tous, tous pour l'État?—
 Le soldat.

Qui fait le guet quand tout sommeille?
 Quand tout est en péril qui veille?
 Qui souffre, qui meurt, qui combat?—
 Le soldat.”

This is not a high order of art, and Déroulède, who came of a cultured family and was the nephew of that accomplished artificer in language, Émile Augier, could do a good deal better when he pleased. But in general it did not please him to do better, and he managed to discover just that subtle mixture of high spirit, sentiment, and moral platitude which seems to be demanded of the author of popular airs.

In an autobiographical fragment of characteristic sincerity Déroulède records how the shock of the Franco-Prussian War produced in him an abrupt and entire reversal of judgments, opinions, and sympathies.

“ I was anything,” he writes, speaking of the days before the Franco-Prussian War, “ but a patriot. There was a long period of my youth during which the glory of arms did not count for me compared with the glory of the arts. I had no comprehension of the grandeur of military service vaunted by Vigny, and I took pride in the fact that I loved Frenchmen no better than foreigners. This malady of cosmopolitanism, this coldness for France, this aversion to the army, had got hold of my brain during the last year of the *lycée*. My professor of philosophy had sown the first germs, which rapidly developed when I passed to the Law School. Every Sunday

I read the *Rue* of Jules Valles, and, as Édouard Détaillé recently recalled to me, there was hardly a student meeting in which I did not bawl out the old refrain:

‘ Les peuples sont pour moi des frères,
Et les tyrans les ennemis.’ ”

It was, however, one of those conversions which have more show than substance. Déroulède had always been a violent, combative young man, with a genuine love for the soil and scenery of France. Hitherto his enemy had been the tyrant Napoleon: henceforward it was the Prussian. If he was a professed cosmopolitan as a youth, it was because it was fashionable among the clever young men of the Latin Quarter to oppose the revolutionary catechism to the maxims of a decadent and unpopular Empire, not because he was in nature and temperament a pacifist, as he professes to have been. His conversion, in fact, like so many conversions, was a discovery rather than a change. He had hitherto not attended to Prussia, had not connected the great developments of European affairs with the future of his country, and had failed to realise the perils with which France was environed. The war taught him a new scale of values and made him known to his real self: and if his new philosophy was not the highest, it was now based on serious experience and was an integral part of a real and spontaneous man.

The most distinguished of Déroulède's disciples tells a story of an interview, which must have taken place sometime in the early eighties, between the prophet of nationalism and Ernest Renan. Déroulède had come to the Collège de France to importune the great theologian to join his Ligue des Patriotes, a newly founded association devised to sustain the martial spirit of France and to promote the war of revenge against the German Empire. “Jeune homme,” replied the sage, with the suave melancholy of resignation, “la France se meurt, ne troublez pas son agonie,” words calculated to dash the bravest spirit, and to the philosophic student of comparative birth-rates not without a sinister background of plausibility.

But the strength of nationalism lay in its sanguine defiance of the oracles of prudence and the counsels of resignation. The air was full of self-questioning, of delicate cynicism, of exact, intelligent, but essentially despondent labour. One man wrote a book to explain the secret of Anglo-Saxon superiority. Others invited their countrymen to study and admire the Germans. The best minds took refuge in an atmosphere of intellectual criticism, disillusioned with each one of the

political ideals which France had in turn tried and discarded with such bewildering rapidity. But the nationalist refused to be drawn off the scent. He despised the great Paris exhibitions, deeply distrusted colonial enterprises as likely to divert the nation from its proper work of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, and poured scorn upon the whole tribe of politicians as upon a gang of jobbers. Among a population deeply desirous of peace and rapidly outgrowing the crude ambitions of Continental militarism, *Déroulède's* men were a disturbing and upon the whole an unacceptable element. Why should France be required to brace herself up to an effort which upon every sane calculation of military probabilities must end in crushing disaster? Surely the wise course was to accept the inevitable, to find some means of living upon reasonable terms with the Germans, and to seek compensations for the lost provinces beyond the seas! So thought *Hanotaux*, the historian Foreign Secretary, and *Caillaux*, the coolest and best financial head in France.

Besides, there was something light-headed and preposterous about *Déroulède's* whole conduct of the affair. In England, where the sense of humour is comparatively strong and the dramatic instinct comparatively weak, movements are more easily killed by ridicule than they are in France. But even in France the *Boulangier* movement, though at one time decidedly formidable, suffered in esteem through the exuberant antics of its supporters. The enthusiasm lavished on the General, the crowds who escorted him to the station, the devotees who laid their bodies upon the railway line in order to prevent his departure from Paris—all this frothy ebullition of loyalty to a half-hearted, ineffectual soldier who, if he had been honest with himself, would have bartered all the dictatorships in Europe for a quiet life with his mistress, seemed to sober politicians little better than a fool's phantasmagoria. Visitors to Paris in the eighties will remember the smile which used to come to the lips of wise men when the name of *Déroulède* was mentioned. He was regarded as an attractive but rather dangerous madcap, picturesque as an incident in the landscape of politics, but of too fantastic a vehemence to give stable direction to any considerable mass of public opinion.

But the movement to which his energy had supplied an originating impulse gathered strength as it proceeded. When the *Ligue des Patriotes* was founded in 1881, the intellectual atmosphere of Paris was saturated with philosophic rationalism. The writings of *Herbert Spencer*, a thinker rarely mentioned without contumely in the lecture-rooms of Oxford and

Cambridge, were accepted as the last judgment in the Latin Quarter not only by students but also by their most influential instructors. Scientific co-operation with Germany had been renewed, and the brilliant Curtius was elected a corresponding member of the French Institute. The giants in the world of letters were Taine and Renan, the one a strict determinist in philosophy, the other a sceptical historian of rare genius and learning, and both as far removed as possible from the temper which promotes or enjoys the animosities of nations. Cultivated ladies and gentlemen were beginning to taste the first fresh sallies of one of the most delicious inheritors of the spirit of Voltaire, and while the wits saluted the earliest romance of Anatole France, the vulgar devoured the laborious materialism of Zola.

Twenty years later the intellectual atmosphere of Paris was strangely transformed. The great captains of rationalism had disappeared. The old idols were deposed, and, while an anti-clerical campaign was waged as briskly as ever in the sphere of politics, some of the most attractive of the novelists and critics were numbered among the orthodox fold. At the Sorbonne the idealism of Boutroux had prepared the way for a philosophy which exalted vital impulse at the expense of the reasoning faculty, now declared to be but a fractional and delusive element in the apprehension and evolution of reality. It was no longer an unfashionable heresy to allude to the soul, or to believe in its endurance after death. A philosopher of genius, with the pen of an artist and shining with an incomparable lucidity and grace as a lecturer, would throw a spell over a crowded and fashionable audience, with a metaphysic which was surmised to give support to the supreme hope of religion.

In this cultured and more congenial atmosphere nationalism received from its Catholic and literary exponents all the illustration and support which deep feeling and penetrative imagination could bestow. During the rushing hours of his tempestuous life, Déroulède had recked little of the rites and observances of the Church, nor was it until his last illness, as we learn from the charming pages of a reverent disciple, that he was brought to accept the consolations of religion. But though the nationalist movement, as its name implied, was designed to include, and succeeded in including, men of the most various convictions and antecedents, its prophetic literature was in fact Catholic, if not in profession, at least in sentiment, drawing its strength from the older traditions and memories of France, and reacting powerfully against the

cosmopolitan hospitality which had given to Jews and aliens so large a part in the economy of the State.

There was nothing distinctively Christian about the doctrine. "Nos gentes, nationesque distinguimus. Deo una domus est mundus hic totus. . . . Igitur qui innocentiam colit, Deo supplicat, qui justitiam Deo libat; qui fraudibus abstinet propitiatur Deum; qui hominem periculo subripet optimam victimam cædit. Hæc nostra sacrificia, hæc Dei sacra sunt; sic apud nos religiosior est ille qui justior." This was the primitive Christian spirit, the soul infusing that beautiful dialogue from the pen of Minucius Felix which is one of the few lovely things in early apologetic Christian literature. But it was not the spirit of French nationalism, even when expounded by the most devout and tender of its prophets, for the essence of nationalism was the hatred of Germany and the will to a war of revenge.

Hatred and revenge are not Christian sentiments, but imperfect human nature is so compounded that there is no easier way to produce cohesion among men than to show them an enemy whom they can agree to detest. It is a tenable hypothesis that the nationalist leaven in French thought tended upon the whole to sweeten the body politic and to rid it of some of its more rancorous humours. It is true that it administered in a very deplorable degree to foment anti-Semite prejudice; but if this aspect of its influence be deducted, the general trend of its operation was to infuse a wider and more generous tone into politics, to inculcate a spirit of comradeship a higher sense of devotion to the large interests of the State, combined with a greater feeling for the historic glories of France and for that invisible and imperious bond which binds the living to the dead in a spiritual and efficacious communion. This was the valuable side of nationalism, viewed as an ethical agent. It was estimable not because it preached the hatred of Germany but because it preached the love of France, not by reason of its antagonisms but in virtue of its generous affinities, not because it worked for a foreign war but because it endeavoured to compose a domestic peace. Its strength lay in the fact that it did succeed in restoring to the national consciousness a vivid sense of some precious things which had been overlooked, forgotten, or trampled under foot. The admirable speeches delivered by M. Maurice Barrès in the Chamber in 1911, in defence of the small parish churches in France, at a time when the reckless iconoclasm of the Government was placing them in grave peril of destruction, not only exhibited in a true light the minor glories of French ecclesi-

astical architecture, but brought out in a very striking and eloquent way the value of the parish church to a village as a centre of age-long associations and a symbol of social unity and peace. And in general the nationalists rendered excellent service by their exaltation of all the natural forms of local and provincial piety which had been so greatly overshadowed by the centralising policy of the revolutionary State, so that, in reading the literature of the party, one is conscious of a pervading tone of affectionate warmth about everything in France which might contribute to build up the patriotic purpose and character.

The weakness of the party, if party it can be called, was on the side of practical and constructive statesmanship. It represented emotion rather than a plan. "Je croyais qu'on obtiendrait la Revanche avec quelque heureuse fièvre française," says the most conspicuous of its later leaders. And again: "Nous n'avons pas cessé de proclamer, je voudrais dire de chanter obscurément, obstinément, glorieusement, la nécessité de protéger notre sang et notre société, de nous méfier de nos envahisseurs pacifiques, de vérifier les intrus, de leur fermer notre maison et notre génie."¹ But the "happy French fever" was no scheme of national regeneration, and the doctrine of strict racial purity could never be applied in a country so full of miscellaneous elements and world-wide connections. Indeed, it is one of the little ironies of life that it fell to Maurice Barrès to devote his *discours de réception* at the Academy to the praise of Heredia the Cuban, and that Naquet, the political agent of the Boulanger party, was by origin a Jew.

Still, there are moments in history when it is more important to work for a general change of mind than for any defined scheme of practical reform. The nationalists in truth were not agreed upon the polity for France. Some worked for a restored and modernised monarchy; others were suckled in the Imperial tradition; but upon the whole they contrived to swing themselves free of the old dynastic anchorages, and were content to wait upon the tide. The one thing which mattered to them all was the ignominy of belonging to a vanquished and acquiescent nation. "The important thing," says a character in *L'Ennemi des Lois*, "is not the formulas by which one expresses one's emotion, but to be a little heated with life." That was the position of the nationalists. They wished to spread a passionate, full-blooded way of feeling about the national problem.

¹ M. Barrès, *La Croix de Guerre*, pp. 162-3.

In this they were greatly assisted by the fact that the memories of the Franco-Prussian War were still living and poignant among men who reached the summit of their literary power in the closing decade of the last century.

“La trouée de Charmes, le passage de la Moselle sur Mirecourt et Neufchâteau, voilà des pays nobles, des pays de grande histoire et qui furent, en tous siècles, la route des invasions. Quand j'avais huit ans, j'ai vu la retraite de MacMahon et du général de Failly après la bataille de Froeschwiller et tout derrière eux l'arrivée odieuse des Prussiens.”¹

Barrès had seen with the impressionable eyes of a child enough of the tragedy of defeat and the insolence of conquest to furnish the basis for a life of political action. He remembered the weary and haggard Turcos streaming back in dejection from the field of Froeschwiller, the first Uhlans, revolver in hand, crossing the bridge at Charmes in the dusk of evening, the candles which by command of the conquerors were lit in every window of the village, the seizure of his father and grandfather as hostages to safeguard the trains, the murder of the chemist Marotte in the village street. On a sensitive artist-nature such experiences make an impression which colours every activity of the mind; an impression the more formidable seeing that it is of a kind eminently communicable to beings of the most ordinary clay.

These memories combined themselves with a vague and undefined aspiration towards a state of society governed more nearly as to its aims by the large popular instincts and traditions of the race, but in which military and clerical discipline should exercise a commanding influence upon character. The movement was not antagonistic to democracy, though its leaders rejected the particular form which democratic government had in fact taken in France. In all forms of Cæsarism there has been a popular element, an appeal, as it were, from the refined philosophy of the Whigs to the elemental loyalties of the unlettered multitude “to the sumptuous treasure of the popular soul.” It was so with Napoleon; it was so with Disraeli; it has been so with the Catholic nationalists in France. They believed in the existence of a Tory democracy, and thought with our own Jew prime minister that an aristocracy could be so transformed as to undertake the neglected work of social reform, while giving effect to the full range of national ambition.

The importance of such ideas to France cannot be gauged

¹ M. Barrès, *L'Union Sacrée*, p. 347.

by the standards of a country in which the aristocracy has always borne its full share of the responsibilities and charges of public life. In England, it is so much a part of the established order of things that the upper class should devote itself to politics and render social service of one kind and another, that there was nothing specially startling or original in the notion that the aristocratic party might become the organ through which wide-reaching social changes were to be effected in the interests of the poor. But in France the doctrine pointed to a state of society and to modes of social action in the sharpest contrast to the known and established conventions of ostracism and *fronde*. There was accordingly something startling in the suggestion that the legitimist aristocracy, so long dwelling in proud and embittered isolation, should once more plunge into the warm and genial currents of national life—something original in a programme which did not repose on dynastic principles and was not worked in the interests of a dynastic party. Frenchmen have always felt an air of unreality about our English party divisions. Our opposing politicians meet one another at dinner and at country house parties, do not fight duels, very rarely bring charges affecting personal honour. While the amenities of life are allowed to be so little affected by the asperities of debate, may it not be inferred that there is either agreement upon fundamentals or a singular lack of interest in questions of principle? But in France it was just the fundamentals which were in dispute. The Chamber, and the country behind the Chamber, were always skirting fundamentals, touching the raw nerve of civil-war matters, such as the ultimate form of constitution, the dynastic claims, the issue between Christianity and secularism; so that the realisation of national unity in France demanded a greater effort, implied a more violent change, and could indeed only be accomplished, even temporally, by an immense displacement of interest and alteration of values.

Meanwhile, on the side of emotion and sentiment, the higher type of nationalist literature contributed in a marked degree to deepen the channels of patriotic feeling and to rekindle a spirit of hope in the destinies of France. One of its most distinguished features has been the attention which many of its writers have devoted to local history and to that resisting fabric of dialect, tradition, and belief which in many a province of France still retains something of its old richness of colour and pattern. This is specially apparent in the writing of M. Maurice Barrès, who has made it a large part of his political mission to spread through France a knowledge of his own

native province of Lorraine and a sympathy with her political misfortune. M. Barrès is not, like Mistral, the epic recreator of a literary language; but a tender vein of elegiac poetry runs through his musical and accomplished prose, and he is never seen to better advantage than when he suns himself in the sweet valley of the Moselle, meditating on its gentle beauties and the tragic vicissitudes of its fate. Here, for instance, is a charming description of the little military towns on the eastern border of France in the days before the war:—

“Il est fâcheux que les romantiques qui nous disent avec des expressions saisissantes le grand secret de mélancolie des bois, de la mer et des prairies du centre aient ignoré les petites villes militaires de l’Est et leur atmosphère propre à former les âmes: le son du clairon, tout le jour, le drapeau, le général, les promenades sur le rempart et chaque soir soudain le fracas militaire de la retraite éclatant en apothéose. Ah! les magnifiques tambours se déchainant à huit heures sur un geste bref de la grande canne et s’engouffrant dans les rues avec toute la population derrière! Cette discipline théâtrale et monotone pénétrait, pour en faire des héros et des amateurs de mort glorieuse les jeunes garçons des places à la Vauban. Il y a là un état d’âme français qui disparaît sans avoir reçu son expression littéraire.”¹

Another prominent feature in the nationalist creed was a revolt against the domination of the “intellectuals,” and in particular against the cast-iron system of efficient but monotonous education which is part of France’s heritage from the first Napoleon. So far as impatience with intellectualism went, the movement was only better than most young men’s revolts against the existing order and its defenders by reason of its attachment to a fashionable but highly intellectual philosophy which tended to exalt instinct at the expense of analysis. But there is a good deal of pith and marrow in the bitter attack upon the *lycée* which so often recurs in the writings of M. Barrès—the *lycée* with its gloomy barrack, its rigorous and often unintelligent discipline, its neglect of individual aptitudes and susceptibilities, its hieratic type of instruction framed without reference to the spirit of the homes from which the boys were drawn, and imposed, often with considerable force of intellect and conviction, upon minds and characters for whom most of it could never be made real or organic.

“Une de mes thèses favorites est de réclamer que l’éducation ne soit pas départie aux enfants sans égard pour leur individualité propre. Je voudrais qu’on respectât leur

¹ M. Barrès, *L’Appel au Soldat*, p. 340.

préparation familiale et terrienne. J'ai dénoncé l'esprit de conquérant et de millénaire d'un Bouteiller qui tombe sur les populations indigènes comme un administrateur despotique doublé d'un apôtre fanatique ; j'ai marqué pourquoi le Kantisme qui est la religion officielle de l'Université déracine les esprits."

Such criticism, though perhaps overdrawn and liable to correction in the light of the experience of the present war, contained the germ of some wholesome developments. The French schools of the Third Republic are certainly much better than the French schools of the Empire, more efficiently staffed, more enlightened in their methods, superior in the design of their studies and the quality of their text-books. It is only the exceptional boy who would gain by an exchange of the *lycée* for a scheme of private tuition assisted by a personally conducted tour to Rheims, Domrémy, and Lourdes. But the system of State teaching in France has its defects as well as its merits, and one notable defect, pointed out by M. Barrès, is that it tends to uproot provincial loyalty and to starve that aptitude for admiration and reverence which is engendered in the wondering mind of the small child and fostered by all the sweetest and most enduring influences of family life.

What then is patriotism as it is understood by the nationalist in France, whose creed and influence we have been attempting to describe? The love of country, for M. Barrès and his friends, is not, according to Renan's famous definition, the love of a soul, of a spiritual principle. It is nothing so ethereal. Rather it is first and foremost the love of a material thing, of an extended space upon the globe, of a land of plough and corn and meadow, shaded with trees, watered with streams, flowery with blossom, here offering some fat reposeful pasture to the sun, elsewhere broken into dark ravines and glistening crags, and bearing upon its surface the multiplied and appealing tokens of the long and diligent labour of man. And secondly it is an understanding "with those who have engendered us according to the flesh"; and by an understanding we mean no conscious or reasoned pact, but a willing compliance with those mysterious and potent instincts which, being handed down from man to man through natural inheritance—"a secret effort of the Unconscious, a tiny shock propelled from the infinite past to the infinite future"—vanquish all reactions of the cold, discursive intellect, and so form the main tissue of human history upon this planet.

H. A. L. FISHER.

SACRAMENTAL RELIGION.

THE RIGHT REV. J. W. DIGGLE, D.D.,

Bishop of Carlisle.

IN its widest connotation the term "Sacrament" is immeasurably vast: for it includes all cognisable signs of the presence and attributes of the Invisible God. In this sense Nature is a Sacrament, because it declares the glory of God and is a manifestation of His handiwork. History, too, is a Sacrament, because it writes on the scrolls of the ages the stability of righteousness and the perils of iniquity. So also the personal experiences of individual lives are a Sacrament, because to those who have ears to hear they tell unmistakably of God's providential dealings in the way of warnings, chastisement, and consolation, and thus are evident tokens of His unseen Hand. All these—the starry heavens, the rainbow, the loveliness of flowers, the feeding of sparrows, the moral constitution of the world, the things our fathers have told us of God's works in their days, and our own experience of His doings among ourselves and with us—are pledges of His character and power, evidential tokens of His will. They are God's Sacraments to man: perceptible signs of His imperceptible presence.

But besides God's Sacraments to men, the certificates of His presence with them, there are men's Sacraments to God—their oaths of enlistment in His service, their vows of loyalty, their enrolment into covenant relationship, pledging them to be His faithful soldiers and servants to their lives' end. Indeed, every true Christian promise may be regarded as a Sacrament, seeing that it is both an outward promise made to men and an inward promise given to God. A Christian's word is not only his bond: it is, moreover, a sacramental bond—an outward bond between men and an inward covenant with God.

We narrow too much, and with fatal consequences, the sacramental character of human life when we limit it to specific

ordinances and observances. All genuine religious life, in every department, is essentially sacramental. It is the declared expression of God's unseen presence with us and of our own abiding covenant of communion with Him. In this sense there are not only seven Sacraments but seventy times seven. Marriage is thus a Sacrament: not merely in the particular celebration of the ordinance of matrimony, but in all its subsequent continuance as a visible mirror of the invisible relationship betwixt Christ and His Church. In like manner parenthood and childhood are sacramental relationships, as also are the relationships of employers and employed when Christianly regarded: seeing they are meant to be visible patterns on earth of things showed to us from the heavens. Confirmation too is a Sacrament, because it is a visible representation that the invisible Christ lays His hands on His children and blesses them; and that children ought to dedicate themselves to His glory and praise, as soon as they intelligently can. In the same way penance and unction (not merely extreme unction) may be regarded as Sacraments if they are effective signs of an inward gift; though as mere lifeless forms they are non-sacramental nothings. For it is of the essence of a Christian Sacrament to give life, and to nourish it, ever more and more abundantly.

Again, Holy Orders are a very great Sacrament, but not, I think, in the sense commonly supposed—a restricted and exclusive sense. There have been periods in the history of the Christian Church when the dominant idea attached to ordination was that of separation. In a most real sense, indeed, all sanctification—and not only the sanctification of Holy Orders—implies and involves separation. But Christian sanctification, unlike that of the Jews, never means separateness of order, tribe, caste, race; but separation to service, distinctness of aspiration, motive, character, conduct. Jewish separateness meant aloofness, alike in racial, religious, and domestic life. Christian separateness means separateness for purposes of permeation and penetration: as of a lamp to give light to all a house, or leaven to leaven the whole lump, or the separation of Barnabas and Paul for the work of the ministry. Ordination signifies, therefore, not professional seclusion from the world, but sacramental work for God in the world. As far as we know, the Apostles ate and dressed and lived like other men. Some were manual workers as their Lord had been. Their apostolate did not withdraw them from intimate association with the world. Their concept of the “religious life” had nothing of aloofness in it. In abandoning Judaism they abandoned all traces of caste. The Jewish religion, its

priesthood, sacraments, ordinances, were ramified with the spirit of caste. The Apostles on their conversion to Christianity flung all this to the winds. For them Christ and caste were antagonistic incompatibilities. And whenever the feeling of caste forces itself into Christianity, whether in its Orders or Sacraments, to that extent Christianity has backslided from Apostolic ideals and reverted to tribal Judaism.

The question of what constitutes the sacramental validity of Ministerial Orders is a very important question, and many strange bewilderments have been imported into its discussion. Yet the question is at bottom quite simple and clear, and without any difficulties in its solution, so long as we adhere to the plain teachings of Christ and His Apostles, and keep caste out of the case. Jesus Christ told His chosen that He had ordained them that they should bring forth fruit, and among other fruits that of effectual prayer. Good fruit and effectual prayer were therefore our Master's signs and tests of a valid spiritual ordination—a sacramental ordination by Himself. In a technical sense the ordination of Judas Iscariot was unimpeachably valid; but in the sacramental sense of an outward sign of an inward grace, given and received, its technical validity was not of much spiritual worth, and I imagine most people would rather have been ordained by John Bunyan than by him.

In settling, then, the question of the validity of Orders, everything turns upon what is meant by validity. Is it actual, Apostolic validity—the validity which is known by its fruits and proved by its works? Or is it professional validity—the validity dependent on what is called Apostolic succession? I understand that some of the most learned ecclesiastical scholars are growing increasingly doubtful about the unbroken continuity of this succession. But suppose it to be beyond all doubt, a matter of absolute certainty—what then? How does it stand in the light of such great revelations as “God is able of stones to raise up children unto Abraham”; “he is not a Jew which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew which is one inwardly: and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter”; and “they are not all Israel that are of Israel”? If heredity and circumcision and centuries of God's special favour counted for so little with the Apostles after they had put off their Judaism and put on Christ, is it likely that ecclesiastical succession and genealogy would have counted for more? Neither hereditary descent nor transmitted succession is a light or trivial matter. They both may well be

a justifiable ground for legitimate pride, and ought to inspire a splendid *esprit de corps* and sense of duty. But to elevate them beyond their proper sphere is not to bring them to honour. On the contrary, it brings them to dishonour and disrepute. Yea, worse in the case of succession. For the grace of God is obviously no more bound by succession than by heredity. And the desire to bind that which God has not bound is but little removed from the desire to fetter the freedom of God's grace and put limits to the universality of His love. Before a Church gives itself over to the delusion that it can chain God down, and imprison Him within its own pale, it should seriously consider whether its ultimate fate may not be to perish in its own delusions.

The spiritual experiences of Christendom abundantly show, as indeed a father's love and common justice would predict, that God's great salvation is not limited to official successions. It is a spirit, and bloweth where it listeth. You cannot say it cometh from episcopacy or goeth to non-episcopacy. It is greater and freer than either, and is independent of both. *Gratia Dei non alligatur mediis.*

But if this is true of the grace of God, which it undoubtedly is, *a fortiori* must it be true of the channels of His grace. It seems absurd to imagine that God's means of grace are less wide and free than His grace itself. Salvation is not less than Sacraments, but greater. They are a means. It is an end. But if it be acknowledged that the greater may be secured apart from an episcopal ministry—and who would commit so great an outrage on God's mercy as to deny this?—why not the less? It surely betrays confusion of mind to suppose that what is sufficient for effectual salvation is insufficient for a valid Sacrament.

How, indeed, can anything—say episcopal ordination—which is not considered a necessary pre-requisite to a soul-saving ministry be sanely regarded as a necessary pre-requisite to the validity of a Sacrament? As far as I can see, only in one way, and that is by considering sacraments to be restricted ecclesiastical ordinances, rather than great Gospel means and helps to salvation. But a Church with restricted Sacraments must itself be a restricted Church. It cannot be truly Catholic unless the ministry of its Word and Sacraments be as Catholic as the gospel of God's Word and the grace of God's salvation. To be divinely Catholic, a Church which administers Gospel Sacraments must in their administration, by the nature and necessity of the case, be as unfettered and wide-embracing as the Gospel itself.

This necessity would have been clear to all Christians if Christendom had through the ages retained and maintained the primal conceptions of Apostolic Catholicity. Instead of this, Apostolic Catholicity was abandoned, and a schism-provoking Catholicity, such as that of St Ignatius, was substituted in its place. Once maintain with St Ignatius that bishops are necessary to the existence of a Church—a postulate nowhere propounded in the teachings of Christ and His Apostles—and all the rest naturally follows, the syllogism running thus:—Bishops are necessary to the existence of the Church; Sacraments are necessary signs of initiation and corporate fellowship in the Church; and therefore Episcopacy is necessary to the validity of the Sacraments. Whatever be thought of this syllogism, its first premiss has no foundation in the facts either of revelation or experience. And those who treat their requirement of episcopal ordination as a pre-requisite for the validity of a Sacrament scarcely realise, I think, that they are building their fabric of the Church on stubble foundations such as those of Ignatius and his followers, and not on the rock foundations of the Apostles and their Lord; and moreover are setting bounds to the Gospel and its Sacraments other than God Himself has set.

The true Sacramental character of Holy Orders does not, however, consist in validities of this little, narrow Ignatian and monopolistic kind. St Paul would have shuddered at the notion that the validity of his Gospel was a monopoly of the College of Apostles: as all truly Christian bishops must shudder at the notion that loyalty to the historic episcopate necessitates disbelief in the salvation of non-episcopalians. St Paul himself tells us that he rejoiced whenever and by whomsoever the Gospel was preached. As an Apostle of Jesus Christ he declared that the validity of his own teachings and the authority of his office were neither of men nor by men. They were not the result of transmission but of vision. They came from God the Father and Jesus Christ the Lord. The evidence of their sacramental character was his personal call, and his personal communion with the Risen Lord. These were the proofs of his Apostolate, and all vital Apostolic successions in the ministry of the Catholic Church, which is the whole body of Christ with its many organs and diverse members, as distinct from mere technical succession in an official Church or exclusive ecclesiastical institution—in which Sacraments are too often treated as barricades—must show the same signs as were required by Christ and manifested by St Paul. They must be known by their fruits and recognised by

their efficiency. It is a duty laid upon us by the New Testament to try all the spirits—and among them this spirit which requires episcopal ordination for the validity of the Sacraments—whether it be of God.

There are two kinds of validity: the validity of God's grace and a validity of man's invention. The former is known by its fruits and its freedom: the latter by its leaves and its fetters. When Holy Orders exhibit the signs of God's freedom and the fruits of His love, then are they rightly esteemed Sacraments—outward ordinances dedicated to the generation and nourishment of the inner spiritual life of men; and being thus Sacramental, no question arises as to their validity.

Again, in the same most true and vital sense the whole Church of Christ is intended to be a glorious Sacrament. The clear purpose of the establishment of the Church on earth was to make visible among men the spirit of its Ascended and Invisible Lord, to declare His mind and set forth His will, and to serve as a channel of communication between Him and them. Valuable as is the witness of individual Christians to their Lord, far more striking and potent is the witness of the whole body of the Church in the combination and co-operation of the federated members. This witness of the whole Church is a strong evidence and vivid expression of the existence of its Invisible and Vitalising Head. Thus the Church is verily the Sacrament of Sacraments, the sacramental instrument by which other Sacraments are mediated. It is sacramental fellowship in Him Whom having not seen we love. Baptism is visible incorporation into this sacramental fellowship; and the Supper is the sensible sign and visible seal of spiritual strength and refreshment through that incorporation.

For this cause the Church is called in the New Testament, "the Body of Christ." But I ask, What means this term "body"? A body is nothing less or more than the outward expression and organ of some inner essence or spirit. Man's body is thus the Sacrament of his soul—its outward and visible symbol. Directly a body ceases to hold correspondence with its soul it dies and turns to corruption. All living bodies, therefore, are, in their degree, and man's body most of all, organs of spirit; instruments for the manifestation of spiritual being. Nothing is truly a body which is not organised and sustained by an inner life. Apart from life a body becomes a corpse.

So is it with the Church of Christ. Apart from its Head, which is its life, it is a dead nothing. Only in so far as it is vitalised and directed by its Head is it truly and effectually

the Body of Christ. It may be a strong ecclesiastical organisation, an ancient historic institution, a school of mysteries, a benevolent or educational society, a magnificent ecclesiastical club; but it is not a Church in the New Testament sense of being the Body of Christ. Unless Christ through the Holy Spirit is the soul of a Church, that Church cannot be the Body of Christ. Moreover, when a body seeks to direct its soul, the soul becomes materialised, carnalised. Similarly with the Church. It is only by loyal obedience to the mind and loving devotion to the will of its Head that the Church can become and continue Christlike. A Church with a mind of its own and a will of its own, at variance with the mind and will of Christ, is an un-Christlike Church: *i.e.* truly not a Christian Church at all. And the most trustworthy means we possess for the authentic determination of the mind and will of Christ are the New Testament writings. Whenever, therefore, Church doctrines pass beyond these writings they pass into vague, uncertain, and dangerous realms. And if they run contrary to these writings, not only danger, but disaster also, is inevitable. For whatever be the inspirations which throughout the successive ages of its history Christ, through His Holy Spirit, has condescended to vouchsafe to His Church (and a living Church will naturally and graciously receive such inspirations according to its needs), one fact about them is clear and sure: if they come from Christ they can never be at variance with, far less in opposition to, the teachings of the New Testament. Sometimes, indeed, they may be expansions of New Testament revelations; yet never contradictions. To be true developments they must run steadily on New Testament lines. Whenever they run off these lines they are not Christian developments but Jewish or other reversions. For this reason, unless the statements of sub-Apostolic or other fathers are fundamentally congruous with the teachings of Christ and His Apostles, they are not statements to be clothed with the authority of the Body of Christ, but should be resolutely rejected by that Body as being contrary to the mind and will of its Head.

A Church regarded simply as an ecclesiastical institution or organisation clearly has a right to make its own conditions of membership, its own regulations of discipline, its own forms of government; and so long as these are not contrary to the Christ they do not de-Christianise a Church. But unless it can show unmistakably that its own constitution and none other, its own administration and none other, its own regulations and none other, are agreeable to the mind and will of the

Lord, it has no right to unchurch other Churches, or pronounce their ministrations either irregular or invalid because they differ from its own methods and teachings. There is all the difference imaginable between a Church regarded as an institution and a Church regarded as the Body, or even as a member of the Body, of Christ. As an institution the ways of a Church will naturally, almost necessarily, be institutional: as the Body of Christ their scope will be as universal as the Incarnation of the Christ.

When, therefore, men are considering the validity of Sacraments it behoves them to define the kind of validity they are considering, and to say whether they mean institutional validity or validity according to the fullness of the Incarnation. For it is a very serious matter indeed to restrict that fullness to the measures of an institution, and confound these institutional measures with the measure of the Mind of God.

Man's life, as I have said, is very largely sacramental, and especially his religious life. Indeed, we can best think of religion in terms of sacraments: signs of God's presence, channels of His communion with man, seals of man's relationship to Him. True sacramental religion practises the real presence of God everywhere and at all times, and so finds no difficulty in confessing His Real Presence on the altar and in the participation of hallowed bread and hallowed wine. And because of Christ's own institution of the Supper it expects a special fullness of His Presence in that Supper, and appoints a special ministry for its continuance, so that all things may be done decently and in order. But the certainty of the Presence rests with the Living, Loving God, and is therefore "real" beyond all doubt. If it depended merely on historic successions or ecclesiastical institutions it would be dangerously uncertain. The validity of all Sacraments, and not least of all of the Sacraments peculiar to the Gospel, is guaranteed by the Author and Giver of Sacraments and not by their ministrants, howsoever ordained. A duly ordered agency is meet and right—nay, even necessary—for the decent and effective ministry of God's Word and Sacraments; for without such an ordination vagueness and chaos would inevitably ensue. But to limit the validity of Christian Sacraments to one particular form of ordination seems to reveal a strange desire for the curtailment of the universal Fatherhood of God, the universal redemption through Jesus Christ, the universal presence of the Holy Spirit, and the all-pervading sacramental element in the ways and works of God and His gracious revelations and symbolic epiphanies to men.

The same strange spirit of institutional exclusiveness—of binding that which God has not bound and sectarianising things which ought to be Catholic—seems to pervade much of the ordinary, commonplace treatment of such questions as Fasting Communion, Evening Communion, the Communion as the Central Service of the Church, and the like. As I have already said, so long as Churches are satisfied to regard themselves as institutions, they have the same right as other institutions to make their own conditions of membership; but if they aspire to be distinctively Christian institutions, and unmistakable organs of Christ's Body, receiving their life and their movements from their Divine Head, then will they earnestly strive to represent His mind loyally and follow His will closely as revealed in the New Testament records, in order that they may be unmistakably and convincingly recognised by all men as members of His Body. And although the New Testament writings do not forbid morning Communion, or fasting Communion, or the making of the Holy Communion its central service by any Church that desires so to do—the New Testament leaving room for a large liberty in these matters,—yet it should be borne steadily in remembrance that the Supper was first instituted by the Lord in the evening, and that Corinthian corruptions cannot annul this fact; that fasting was especially enjoined by Christ when the bridegroom is absent, and therefore seems singularly inappropriate when the Bridegroom is especially present; and that, judging of the ministry of Christ as exercised by His Apostles, there is slight ground for supposing and much ground for doubting whether the administration of the Holy Communion was regarded by them as the central service of that ministry, and assuredly not as a separate service, apart from prayer and praise and prophetic teachings. The service of the Eucharist is sometimes described as “the Lord's own service,” or “the only service instituted by Him.” If by this is meant a liturgical service, then it may be observed that there is no evidence whatever that the original institution of the Supper was explicitly accompanied by liturgical forms, or even that such forms were implicitly contained in it, beyond the words quoted by St Paul in I Cor. xi. 23–26. In the Acts and elsewhere the celebration of the Supper is very simply described as “the breaking of bread,” and particularly in Acts ii. 46 as a domestic ordinance—“the breaking of bread from house to house, *i.e.* at home”—as distinct from ordinances conducted in the temple. It is difficult to imagine anything more foreign to the New Testament characterisations of the ministry of Christ than the notion that He intended

His Supper, inexpressibly precious though it be, to stand apart throughout the ages, as the Central Service of His Church. The Churches of Christ are doubtless within their rights, and not trespassing beyond their legitimate scope, in formulating beautiful and solemn liturgies to pay reverent honour to the administration of the Lord's Supper, so long as they do not relegate to the background other offices of His ministry; but to teach so as to lead the masses to suppose that any particular form of liturgy, least of all a liturgy in a language not understood of the people, or any other regulation whatever, is essential to the validity of the Sacrament, unless in accordance with Christ's words and example, is, to say the least that might be said, a remarkable display of inaccuracy in historical perception.

"The Mass for the Masses" may be a telling alliterative catch-cry. But it suffers from the vice common to catch-cries. Tested by experience it has been found *not* to work well. Through many centuries parts of the Christian Church have been devotedly trying it, yet, although backed by the confessional and every dramatic influence which gorgeous vestments, flowers, mystic bells, subdued lights, fascinating music, fragrant incense, and other arts can supply, it has not shown itself capable of regenerating on any conspicuous scale the people of the countries in which it has been practised. It often attracts crowds of a particular temperamental character to its celebrations; but in his *Essay on Superstition* Lord Bacon, no mean thinker and authority on such matters, has declared his conviction that superstitious religions may be worse than no religion at all.

Be these things, however, as they may, it is certain that all true religion, and Christ's religion fundamentally and pre-eminently, is essentially sacramental. Baptism and the Supper of the Lord are, as it were, the summit and climax of God's universal method of revealing and communicating Himself sacramentally; and the more clearly we realise the all-pervading sacramental element in nature, in history, in religious institutions, and in personal experience, the more highly shall we value these two peculiarly Gospel Sacraments as being God's most memorable and most precious evidence of the sacramental character of all truly religious life and all truly Christian service.

J. W. CARLIOL.

THE ORIGINALITY AND FINALITY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

PROFESSOR H. H. SCULLARD.

OF the causes urging us to reconsider the supreme claims of Christian morality, two are here selected as indicating lines of approach to an almost limitless subject—viz. the growing interest in the comparative study of religions, and the modern tendency to regard ethics from the scientific rather than the philosophical standpoint. Both these movements have powerfully affected popular opinion on the authority of Christian ethics, the former leading some to deny all originality to the moral teaching of Jesus Christ, the latter leading others to characterise that teaching as reactionary and ill-founded. If we were to look back a generation or so, I think we should admit that a considerable change has taken place in public sentiment with regard to this question. Whatever else in those days might be shaken, the unrivalled authority of Jesus Christ as a moral guide seemed to be left us. It is true that there were criticisms. Men like Francis Newman and J. S. Mill had indicated what they considered to be the defects of Christian ethics. But Mill, in particular, seemed almost as much an advocate as a critic of Christian morality. If he pointed out its incompleteness and urged the necessity of supplementing it from sources not exclusively Christian, he thought that the Apostle Paul had thus dealt with the ethics of Jesus; and with regard to Jesus Himself he made the memorable declaration that in our attempts to put the abstract principles of morality into a concrete form He was our most satisfactory guide. On the Continent too the man who spoke to the largest literary audience in Europe had declared in eloquent words that, whatever the surprises of the future might be, Jesus would never be surpassed. But the situation is not quite that to-day. The diffusion of knowledge concerning the religions of the world

has created a doubt in the minds of some as to whether there is really anything very distinctive in Christian conduct, and preoccupation with the methods of natural science has tended to obscure from others the larger universe of truth which belongs to the Christian moralist. What, then, is the present position of Christian ethics in face of the revelation which has come down to this generation from the records of the past, and of that which has risen to meet us from the field of natural science?

And first with regard to the non-Christian religions. I take up a recently published book and read as follows: "On these practical points," *i.e.* the kind of life the good man will lead, the qualities he must develop and the vices he must avoid, "the teaching is identical in Hinduism and Buddhism, in Zoroastrianism and Muhammedanism, in Judaism and Christianity." So Buddhism, *e.g.*, which depreciates the claims of the sensible order, leads to exactly the same type of character and mode of life as Muhammedanism, which exaggerates those claims and perpetuates them in a future life! The Hindu ascetic who renounces the good things of this life and the pious Jew who accepts them as tokens of Jehovah's favour are really following the same ideal and living the same kind of life! The good man, if he be a Buddhist, will not kill; so, says this remarkable theory, neither will the Moslem, Zoroastrian, Hindu, Jew, Christian! And it is not only theosophists who speak thus. In a book issued not long ago by the Rationalist Press, it is stated that the whole code of Christian morals is found in the Book of the Dead six thousand years before Christ; that the attitude and tone of the devout Persian were in no substantial sense different from those of the Christian; that Buddhism includes every virtue of the Christian code; that the whole of the moral teaching of the Gospels was the common property of the world into which Jesus was born, and that, as He added nothing to the ethical thought of His age, His claim to divinity falls to the ground. Nor is it in works of this class alone that we meet with similar ideas. In a volume of a series on the History of Religions, which contains many scholarly books, it is written: "Confucianism may be said to contain all the great ethical truths to be found in the teaching of Christ." The implication in all these assertions seems to be that there is nothing new in the ethical teaching of Christ. Now, why has this opinion gained currency? Firstly, no doubt, because there are a large number of resemblances, many real, some superficial, between the teaching of Jesus Christ and pre-Christian moralists. And this is only what was to be expected. Why should Jesus have brought an absolutely new morality

to mankind? What prospect was there that it would ever have been received or understood? Men can only understand something which is related to their previous ideas and customs. To be absolutely original is to be absolutely unintelligible. And there was a still better reason, religious rather than psychological: Jesus made two claims, each of which would have been imperilled had He brought an absolutely new doctrine of morals into the world. He claimed to be the Son of God and the Son of man. As the Son of God He came to continue and not to annul the Divine education of the race. "My Father worketh hitherto and I work." The idea that the Incarnation introduced a moral dualism into the Godhead is as fatal in ethics as in theology, and may lie at the root of some of the confused thinking of our time on the relation of the Christian to the State. But Jesus also claimed to be the Son of man. Was it not, then, inevitable that He should gather up into His teaching all the best thoughts and aspirations of the humanity to which He belonged? Had there not been a very close relation between the teaching of Jesus and all that went before, we should have been confronted by two apparently insoluble problems: Why was the teaching of Jesus so different from that of His Father? and why was it that the Son of man found no points of contact with the thoughts and sentiments of the humanity that He assumed?

But a second reason for the widespread opinion that Christian ethics contains no novelties is the narrow view taken of its scope. When men point to the Sermon on the Mount, or rather to parts of that Sermon—for that, I think, is what is generally done—when men point to parts of that Sermon, torn from their context in the Sermon itself, in the Synoptist teaching generally, and also in the whole revelation which Jesus Himself brought and was to men, they are likely enough to misinterpret those fragments which seem so clear to their self-restricted vision. Even the whole of the Synoptist teaching is only a first draft, a kind of interim ethic, eternal as every word of God is, but awaiting its final interpretation, expansion, and completion in the glorification of the Teacher and the opening of the Kingdom to all believers. In the transition period represented by the Synoptists, when the minds of the disciples were filled with carnal or at least theocratic notions of the Kingdom, how was it possible for them to comprehend fully the ethics of that Kingdom? It was only when they had risen together with Christ and were sitting with Him in the heavenly places that they understood. So it is to Peter after his conversion, and to John after his illumination, and to Paul after he

had been initiated into the mysteries of the Kingdom of Grace that we turn for the fuller exposition of the mind of Christ. This is not to prefer Peter and John and Paul to Jesus and make them the founders of Christian morality, for it was Jesus who made these men what they were. But it is to prefer the more enlightened to the less enlightened reporters, and the recipients of a completed doctrine to the conveyers of a teaching which Jesus Himself said was not yet complete.

We may recall the classical instance of these divergent views on Christian ethics. An enthusiastic African once said to a Christian teacher: "You do not really know what Christianity means, for you cannot tell a Christian when you see one. Here am I, for example: I have forsaken father, brother, wife, children, everything, in fact, for the Gospel. I have left off carrying money in my purse. I take no thought for the morrow. I am poor, meek, a peacemaker, pure in heart, mourning, hungry, thirsty, suffering persecutions for righteousness' sake, and you doubt if I believe in the Gospel?" And the Christian teacher continued to doubt, for to him had been given a deeper insight both into the human heart and into the things of God than to Faustus the Manichee, a member of the amalgamated society of Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and Christians, a society which still seems to have some modern representatives among the expositors of the New Testament.

But in respect even to this earlier draft of the teaching, can it be said that it is a mere compilation? If so, how did the parts come together, and from what sources were they drawn? Now, I think we ought frankly to acknowledge that, apart from the coming of Jesus Christ into the world, the age in which the Gospels were composed was one of the most notable, religiously and morally, in the history of the world. It seems as if all the world-religions and philosophies had been anxious to gather up their acquisitions and mobilise their resources. It was an age of consolidation. In China great events had been taking place, and under the monarchs of the illustrious Han dynasty there had been a revival of classicalism, and Confucianism was advanced to the dignity of a State religion. In the same country the other indigenous religion, Taoism, having been mainly a philosophy for the few and a practice of magic for the curious, was now reconstituted as a church. In India, Buddhism, having undergone many changes, was now subjecting itself to the most radical transformation, and so preparing itself for the conquest of the East. In Persia, King Valkash was interesting himself in the formation of the Parsee canon, and the teachings of Zoroaster found themselves side

by side with alien polytheistic and ritualistic ideas, thus gaining a wider appeal. The gods of Greece and Rome were dead, but other faiths were being imported into the Empire from the East; and in moral philosophy it seemed as if the last word had been said, so varied and finished were the systems which the schools inherited and perpetuated. All that seemed possible now in the way of novelty was brought about by selection and combination. Of this there was much; and the treasures of the past were widely diffused.

Now, is it possible to imagine that those who heard and collected the sayings of Jesus were entirely uninfluenced by this world-wide interest in religion and morals? Was Palestine so detached from the life of the world, and were the original disciples so engrossed with their thoughts about the end of all things, that they never felt a breath of what was stirring all around them? We who live in these days of rapid and world-wide intercourse are tempted sometimes to do less than justice to bygone times. If the watertight-compartment theory of national life was ever true, it breaks down hopelessly after the conquests of Alexander three centuries before Christ. Men in Palestine must have known something of what was going on outside their own borders. An eminent Jewish scholar has told us that at this time Jerusalem was "boiling over with theological and theosophical discussions." Simon Magus, whom Peter met in Samaria, was evidently acquainted with the teaching of Zoroaster. Some have thought, not unreasonably, that the Essenes were influenced by Buddhism, though, curiously, the later Essenes apparently, like the Sikhs in India, from being the most pacifist became the most belligerent of the sects. Even if one wished to do so, it would be hazardous enough to maintain that no fragments of Eastern wisdom were known to the fishermen of Galilee, and absurd to suppose that the traveller Paul was uninfluenced by what was so widely diffused in the different centres of population to which he went. But the actual use of such sources and direct indebtedness to them is a question of evidence; and those who have studied the matter most carefully are generally, I believe, least inclined to fall back upon a theory of extensive borrowing. Even with regard to the more purely Jewish sources the case is not very clear. How many hypotheses have been framed to fit the facts! If one were to try and explain Christian ethics, at any stage of its presentation to the world, as a mere republication of Jewish morality, one is met on the threshold with so many ways of stating the relationship as to suggest the impossibility of deriving one from the other. One of the

most popular views of the connection is that which makes the teaching of Jesus a continuation of the prophetic line. Renan thought that the eighth-century prophets anticipated the moral teaching of Jesus, and that the right of Jesus to be considered an originator in morals is the society which He established for the embodiment and diffusion of those moral ideas. This view commends itself to those also who regard the Kingdom primarily as an instrument of social righteousness. The Gospel of Matthew, I understand, was one of the pamphlets issued by Belgian socialists before the war, with the very significant omission, however, of the last chapter. But others have seen in Jesus more than the last of the prophets. They have said that we have in the Gospels a union of the legal and prophetic elements similar to that contained in Deuteronomy, with its magnificent insistence on the holiness and grace of Jehovah. Others have pointed to the Apocalyptic books as furnishing what is most characteristic of the teaching of Jesus, a view not without connection with the earlier theory of Essene influence. [That earlier theory in its extreme form appears to me quite grotesque. The fundamental ideas of Essenism are non-Christian and anti-Christian. They are not even Semitic. They are Indian, or at least Aryan.] Others, again, have said that the teaching of Jesus was a gathering up of the whole revelation previously given to Israel, and that the nation, having produced Jesus, lost all its power of moral initiative. Others, again, recognise in the moral teaching of Jesus an advance beyond that of Judaism. "Putting it crudely," says Mr Abrahams, "the Jew would perhaps admit that Christianity has absorbed, developed, enlarged, and purified the Hebrew ethics." One almost feels inclined to add, for the consideration of those who see no difference between the Old Covenant and the New, the statement of the erratic Nietzsche, that the greatest sin which literary Europe had upon its conscience was the inclusion of the Old and New Testaments in one volume. That, however, is an extravagance of an opposite kind, and one only possible for an uncritical mystic like Nietzsche.

These theories are quite enough, however, to show that the relation of Jesus to the life and thought of His own people is not quite so simple as some would make it. Jesus was no mere copyist, and the reports of the Evangelists show clearly enough that they believed they had something new to relate, and were not merely repeating the commonplaces of their age and country.

A detailed examination of resemblances and differences, either as regards Judaism or the other religions, is not possible here ; but a few observations may be made. It is unreasonable,

for example, to select an isolated undated saying of a Hindu book as necessarily representative of Hindu thought in general, or, taking it from its context, to interpret it in a Christian sense. Hinduism is a vast complex of the most varied elements, and is entirely lacking in that kind of unity which Christianity, in all its diversified forms, possesses. Again, it is not sufficient to single out a Christian maxim, let us say the Golden Rule, and point to similar sayings in China, Judæa, and Greece, to disprove the originality of Jesus. As a matter of fact, Jesus made no claim to such originality, as reference to Matthew's Gospel would at once show. The Golden Rule is quoted as a summary of pre-Christian morality, and not as something which He was the first to bring to men's notice. Then do not the deniers of the originality of Jesus forget the most elementary facts which the comparative method brings to light—that the same word has not always the same meaning, and that the same propositions in different contexts acquire a different and sometimes opposite value? Take the virtue of humility. We rightly regard this as a characteristically Christian virtue, and when we find it in Laotzu or Plato we are perhaps a little surprised. But it is only necessary to put the two qualities side by side to see how different they really are. The self-effacement of Laotzu and the meekness which Plato regarded as a component part of two of the cardinal virtues are not at all the same thing as the meekness and lowliness of Jesus. So with truthfulness, fortitude, magnanimity. Who would dream of identifying the magnanimity of Aristotle with the elevation and dignity of Jesus? Compared with the portrait of Jesus in the Gospels, the *μεγαλόψυχος* of the Greek is a very small, self-contained, and vain person. In one sense even love was not a new thing, when Jesus taught it. Love of friends, neighbours, enemies, mankind had been enjoined by other moral teachers. But Jesus gave a new intensity and quality to it when He said: "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another as I have loved you." It was born again when Jesus spoke the word, and lived the life, and died the death, which revealed to men its hitherto unknown length and breadth and depth and height. He made it a new thing when He filled it with all the fullness of His own infinity, and touched the lips of His apostles to declare its excellent glory. It was thus with every truth and fact of the moral life. Nothing remained unchanged. Among the few authentic sayings which go back to a probably authentic Laotzu, is the precept, so truly Christian in form, "Recompense injury with kindness."

But in the teaching of Jesus and His apostles it came to mean in practice the exact opposite of what the Chinese philosopher had desired. In the do-nothing, strive-for-nothing mysticism of Laotzu it meant, Confront the evil-doer by a mild passivity, a vacancy of mind, an unconsciousness as real as that of a man in a drunken swoon, and you will have returned good for evil. But in Christianity it means, By the manifestation of a richer and completer personality, of a life more intensely conscious, of a mind and heart and will filled unto all the fullness of God, confront the evil-doer, and you will return good for evil. Formally the same, the precepts are, as applied, direct opposites. The old Chinese sage had got hold of a principle, but he did not know how to apply it. In his hands it was taking the sap and vigour out of the manhood of China. In a similar way the Golden Rule was fastening the bonds of legalism and superstition all the more firmly round the heart of China. A low-thoughted or misguided man has only to practise the Golden Rule to be very mischievous. Reverence for law is an excellent moral quality, and lo, the Pharisee! Respect for one's parents has high ethical value, but in China and elsewhere it meant the suppression of other moral qualities equally valuable. In India, the idea of retribution, a necessary moral truth, was destroying the energy of the people; and sympathy, as necessary and valuable a moral quality, was leading to effeminacy and death. If Jesus had done nothing else than select now this ethical truth or moral quality and now that from the sacred books of the world lying open before Him, and transfer them into a new context where they would have a different meaning and efficacy, He would still deserve to be considered the greatest originator in morals the world has ever known. There is no proof that He had those books before Him, or that His teaching was the result of any kind of conscious synthesis. It was rather the outcome of His own moral insight, the spontaneous overflow of His own perfect nature. Just at the moment when the world seemed least able to add to its stock of ethical ideas, but most anxious to preserve them from oblivion, there appeared in an obscure corner of the earth a peasant who, in the opinion of those who thought themselves well qualified to judge, had never learned, who yet presented in His own character and teaching every virtue of every age and land in the purity, harmony, and unity of a perfect whole.

And that was but the beginning of the new creation. It was accompanied by an extension, positive and qualitative, of the ideal, "Be ye perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect"; by a complete transformation of the idea of human duty—

"the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus"; by an original conception of the society within which and by means of which the moral ideal might be attained; by a solution of the age-long problem of the reconciliation of egoism and altruism, individualism and socialism, and by the exaltation of personality to its rightful place in the thoughts of men. These are some, and some only, of the ways in which the originality of Christian ethics might be further illustrated.

But now let us pass on to a few observations on the second aspect of the subject—the finality of Christian ethics. For the two questions are closely related. It is the originality of Jesus, whether in gathering up and transforming or in adding to the riches of the past, that guarantees the finality of His teaching. It will never be surpassed. Though this cannot be proved, there are many reasons for believing it. The Christian ideal has been before the world for nineteen centuries, and, in spite of misrepresentations and betrayals, still commands the assent of men of every race. It gains adherents everywhere, and everywhere it wins from its adherents the confession of its sufficiency. Other moralities are local: this is universal. Even Buddhism and Islam do not make a world-wide appeal. Other moralities are partial: this is complete. A Christian, no matter whether he belongs to east or west, north or south, finds everything he needs in the moral teaching of Jesus. But the world over is there one Buddhist who is content with the teaching of Gotama and his disciples? There is among the religious-ethical systems of the world no possible rival to Christianity. Nor does it seem likely that any fresh synthesis of moral ideas will arise from the closer intercourse of men of different faiths. The possibilities in this direction seem long since to have been exhausted. There are limits to the union of incongruities, and those limits have often been reached, and the composite system has dissolved. Where are the signs of a vaster synthesis, of another grand international ethic resulting from the fusion of every ethnic faith? If it were to make its appearance, it would soon fall to pieces by the natural repulsion of its discordant elements. The saying of Theodoret seems as true of our day as of his: "The pagans have morals, but paganism has none."

Some, no doubt, would be willing to acknowledge this and confess that Christian ethics has no serious rival among the non-Christian religious systems, and yet have some misgiving as to its finality. It is the conclusions or methods of the newer sciences, and not the lure of the older religions, that has created doubt. It is science rather than religion, science rather even than philosophy, that challenges the finality of

Christian ethics. A short time ago Professor Parodi drew an interesting contrast between the twentieth century and the last quarter of the nineteenth. He maintained that now no one, except perhaps a few Kantians and Neo-Kantians, thought of establishing a purely rational and independent ethic. Freethinkers and Catholic Christians alike acquiesced in the dethronement of Reason, and looked elsewhere for the basis of morals, finding it in biology or in one of the social sciences connected therewith. Philosophical ethics is at a discount, and even Catholicism rests its morals not on dogmas but on its social instincts. There may seem to be something of exaggeration in that statement of current opinion, but there is also truth. Science has been in the ascendant, and everything, even morality, must somehow be based on the facts of natural science. For a good number of persons the question of authority would seem to have narrowed itself down to the simple alternative—Christ or Biology. What arguments or objections, then, has natural science to urge against the finality of Christian ethics? There is first of all the radical objection that Jesus and His apostles, by connecting the moral life with the idea of the Absolute, with God, have taken ethics out of the realm of experience and destroyed its scientific character. In his *Morale de Jésus* Lahy puts the objection quite bluntly when he says: "If Jesus in addition to His sentimentality had possessed the science of a Karl Marx, He would have secured the permanence of His work by founding it not on vague beliefs but on real experiences." One of those vague beliefs is the Fatherhood of God, which the writer regards as not only vague but mythological. Here we have as frank and clear a statement of fundamental opposition as we could desire. We must for the present simply acknowledge the chasm which separates us. The Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is for us no vague Absolute, but the most concrete, the most living, the fullest of all realities; and to attach morality to anything short of this ultimate reality seems to us a purely arbitrary proceeding, a deliberate preference of the abstract and vague to the qualitatively defined. We do not detach morality from experience when we associate it with God: we confirm and enrich and extend the experience by taking in a larger whole. What if, after all, the father of the inductive sciences should have been right when he said: "It must be confessed that a great part of the moral law is higher than the light of nature can aspire to"? The writer from whom I have just quoted finds that the Apostle Paul introduced several modifications into the teaching of Jesus, and some of these, notably in the

case of the family and the State, were an advance on the more mystical teaching of the Master, and helped to secure its adoption; but otherwise the Apostle fell into the same mistake as his Lord. He attached the whole body of moral precepts to the dogma of the Resurrection, an event which, if it ever took place, can never be repeated and so never experimentally demonstrated. Was Paul then wrong? To us it seems he was supremely right. That which was implicit in the earlier teaching of Jesus, the moral union of the believer with Himself, could only be secured and revealed by the resurrection from the dead. That of course was, according to our faith, an act which never could be repeated like an experiment in the laboratory of a chemist. He who was dead and rose again dieth no more. But the experience of the Christian, who by the grace of that Living One comes into contact with His life-giving spirit, is continually being repeated in the great laboratory of the Church. Another objection which the scientist makes is that the ethic of Jesus will not evolve. I suppose that means that the changes which Paul and others are said to have made were additions, and not in the nature of a true development. They were not evolved out of the teaching of the Master. Now, far from being disappointed with that verdict, coming from the source it does, it appears to me a valuable judgment. Here is a man whose training and habits are severely scientific, a man accustomed to take an objective view and to discriminate between things that differ, a man too who brings with him the incurable desire of the scientist to explain the later by the earlier, and he finds that he cannot explain Pauline ethics by the Sermon on the Mount. The two do not seem to him in the same line of development. And perhaps he is more correct than we are at first inclined to allow. Looked at from a purely objective standpoint as two presentations of morals, the Sermon on the Mount and the Epistle to the Romans may not at once be regarded as organically connected. If we compare the documents together simply as documents, their unity may escape our notice. It is necessary to recall the tremendous events which had taken place in the interval, if the chasm which undoubtedly separates the two classes of writings is to be bridged over. The Cross and Resurrection make all things clear. The ethics of Jesus would not evolve without the catastrophe of the Cross, but they did evolve. And were they any the less truly His after the agony and victory that had made that evolution possible? Assuredly not. Christian ethics is above all things the ethics of the resurrection life. And its finality resides in

that fact. The ethics of the risen life can never change. It has reached its apogee. It has been delivered from the law of sin and death, and come clean out of the sphere of nature into that of grace. The world of change is transcended in the endless life of God. The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has made it free from the law of sin and death.

This suggests a third objection to Christian ethics. Belonging to another order, it cannot meet the requirements of this. It does not cover the whole of man's temporal interests. It must be supplemented from other sources, from Greek art and Roman law and French sociology, before it is complete. But this objection surely misses the mark. You cannot patch these things on to Christian ethics without entirely altering its character. It is the distinction of Christian ethics that it does not include a treatise on art or politics or economics. The treatment of these subjects is part of the natural order, and must follow the lines of man's development according to time and place and circumstance. An absolute science of aesthetics or politics or sociology is continually being shown to be more difficult, improbable, and even impossible. If there is one truth more widely diffused than another, it is the relativity of knowledge, the non-finality of all scientific results. So it has come to pass that some scientific writers on ethics, of whom Lévy Bruhl may be taken as a representative, have denied the possibility of a science of ethics and have substituted a science of manners, which is a very different thing. Christianity does not profess to legislate for the natural man or for the changing forms of the world's natural life. These follow the laws impressed upon them by the order to which they belong. If it had been possible for the Founder of Christianity to anticipate the course of the world's life, and supply precept and precedent, law and direction, for every department of life in every age and country, it would have destroyed its distinctive character, and left the world in the bonds of legalism. That kind of thing was tried in part by Judaism, by Islam, and by the Society of Jesus, but it is not the Christianity of Christ and His apostles.

Some have thought that Jesus refrained from going into detail and from extending the scope of His instructions because He believed the end of the world was at hand. By this providential illusion He was prevented from stereotyping His moral teaching by fixing it down to one particular order and set of institutions, and secured its elasticity and permanence. This is a hypothesis which, so it seems to me, presents greater difficulties than any it is designed to resolve. It is not likely

that Jesus was ever in the dark as to the essential nature of His kingdom.

But still it may be urged that this apparent aloofness from, and unfriendliness to, the natural order on the part of Jesus and His apostles was a moral defect, and that possibly some further guidance might have been given without compromising the universality and finality of His teaching. Well, let us be sure that the apparent aloofness—and it was far from being absolute—was the result of unfriendliness, and not rather designed ultimately to serve the interests of that very order. It may be that the concentration of interest upon the supernatural was with a view to the ultimate redemption of the natural. I should be quite prepared to support the contention that the supernatural ethics of the Gospel have done more for civilisation than any natural ethic has done.

But what alternative have the biologists to offer? Is it the life according to Nature? But that is an ambiguous phrase. In the hands of the Stoics it meant the life according to Reason, and as such has had an immense vogue in ancient and modern times. But that is not what the biologist means. Again, the modern mythologist personifies Nature, ascribing to her such moral qualities as kindness or cruelty or indifference, thus making Nature, as it has been pithily put, “a shamefaced name for God.” But the biologist cannot mean that. From the purely biological point of view, the life according to Nature is a life denuded of every trace and semblance of morality. It is purely non-moral. From the nature of the case, biology can afford no justification for clothing the concepts of life and force with any moral attributes whatsoever. These things are simply outside its province. We know how diligently Herbert Spencer tried to deduce an ethic from biology, and how he confessed his disappointment. He need not have been surprised, for he was attempting the impossible. We remember how Huxley expressed his sense of the incongruity of the two spheres of thought, nature and morals, when he said that Nature was continually doing what a man would be hanged for doing. But the attempt to found morals on Nature is still made, and a recent one is Deshumbert's *Morale fondée sur les lois de la Nature*. This proceeds on the assumption that the universe is psycho-physical, that consciousness, mind, personality descend to the very lowest forms of organic life, and with them the possibility of possessing moral qualities. Paternal morality appears first in the bird, but maternal morality begins with the plant. The very bodies we possess are vast continents of infinitesimal living organisms, federated communities of infinitely

minute personalities, each fulfilling the behests of Nature more perfectly than the complex but unfinished personality of man. If this view were well founded, it would not be without attractiveness for the Christian moralist; for his contention too is that the natural man is not yet a complete moral personality, and that the moral universe itself, as commonly understood, is only a fragment. There is for the Christian a larger universe in which each part finds its function, and the whole its consummation—the new creation of which the alpha and omega is Christ. But the point here is that, whether true or false, it is not purely biological. It introduces concepts with which the biologist has nothing to do. And before he closes his book the author seems to admit that the will of man is partly at least outside the sphere of Nature. The little personalities of which he is composed perform the behests of Nature; but the total man is not always what Nature wishes him to be.

A more thorough-going representative of biological ethics would seem to be Novicow. Biology, he says, shows us that association with a view to the increase of our own vital force is the law of life. Egoism is the only principle which supports itself on Nature. If anything else is substituted or added, morality evaporates in a cloud of metaphysics. Not the smallest atom of love to one's neighbours is necessary in order to place morality on an immovable foundation. The categorical imperative of Kant is nothing but the instinct of life which urges every creature to prolong and intensify its existence. There is certainly a good deal of "evaporation" here. Love and duty, which have generally been considered of some value in morals, are dissolved into thin air. But what else could we expect? By no species of alchemy known to men is it possible to extract morals out of physics, or love and duty out of life and force. In view of utterances such as these, one is inclined to adapt the dictum of Theodoret and say that, while scientists may have morals, natural science has none.

A brief reference to two other biological moralists, or immoralists, the one a Frenchman, the other a German, each possessing a peculiar and pathetic interest, may further illustrate the uncertainties, if not the collapse, of biological ethics. The brilliant young Frenchman discovered, so he thought, the weakness of the evolutionary ethics of the English scientists. They seemed to him too mechanical, to allow too much to the influence of environment, and not enough to individual initiative. He was dissatisfied with a morality which seemed to promise something for the group, but little for the individual. He was struck also, I think, with

the incongruity of going back to earth-worms, or plants, or infusoriæ to discover what life really is in its essence. Why should he prefer to mark the behaviour of life at that end of the scale, when his own highly organised and sensitive nature was palpitating with life? So he turned to the manifestation of life that he thought he knew most about. "If I regard my soap-bubble, it is to discover there a ray of the sun." And what he did discover there was an inextinguishable craving for life, a life more extensive and intensive, a life in which the sympathies of the heart would find ample scope, as well as the activities of the mind. His ideal was, then, a high one. "Suppose that it were given you for a moment to be a Newton discovering his law, or a Jesus preaching love on the Mountain, the rest of your life would seem to you colourless and empty. You would buy that instant at the price of all." It was not mere physical life that he desired, but life of the highest quality. But Nature pointed out no way to gain his ambition. She assured him only that great risks would be run. The prodigality of Nature meant that—a million acorns, but how many oak-trees? Yet what did it matter? "This uncertainty pressing us equally on all sides is equivalent for us to certitude, and renders possible our liberty. Let us hope. Religion teaches us to say, 'I hope because I believe.' Let us say, 'I believe because I hope, and I hope because I feel within me the energies of an abounding life.'" But, alas for the hope that springs eternal in the human breast! The moments of anguish came to his sensitive spirit. "I have not sufficient faith in the objective reality or in the rationality of my joys for them to be able to attain their maximum." And he likens the modern man to a strange moving object sometimes seen in the morning mists on the mountains of Tartary, leaving behind it a trail of blood, and by and by discovered to be the form of an antelope with an eagle perched upon its head, ready to bear it aloft as soon as the creature is exhausted by its wounds and flight. The torment of the brain is caused by the bird of prey called doubt. At the age of thirty-three, the cup of life, of which he had already drunk rich draughts, was dashed from his lips.

Hardly less pathetic was the career of the immoralist Nietzsche. How he gloried in the exuberance of life! not, however, for its mere pleasurable quality, but for the sense of power it engendered. The secret of life was for him not a mere struggle to exist, such as with Darwin left the way open to a measure of altruism and at least group-morality; but exploitation, the will to power, what someone has described as "a mad misunderstanding of Darwinianism." Still, it is

confessedly biological, though it may be bad biology; and the tragedy of the situation was that Nietzsche himself was broken to pieces through his disregard of Nature's laws. No man could have assumed to the world, as he knew it, the hard, defiant, vehement attitude of isolation which Nietzsche so persistently adopted without losing his reason. Exploitation without any degree of adaptation is impossible in the world of Nature, as Nietzsche's studies in biology ought to have shown him. A short time before his final collapse he likened himself to a sick beast crouching away from the light, the enemy of all that mankind had revered, and an enigma to himself. Such was the originality of this strange creature, this apostle of revolt, who yet dreamed that he might be a connecting link between two thousand centuries. It is not given to any of us to look so far backwards or forwards, still less to assign to any man his place in so vast a span of time. But Nietzsche's own contemporaries have not had long to wait for a second refutation of his bad biology. The life of Nature is not mere exploitation; and war, even as a fact of Nature, is not merely that. But who can say that the wars of civilised nations are merely facts of Nature as interpreted by biology? In the year 1828, only thirteen years after the defeat of the French army at Waterloo, Victor Cousin delivered a memorable address at the Sorbonne, in which he declared that ideas and causes, not peoples, made war on one another, and asserted his belief that the nation that acts most morally and in the interests of civilisation always wins. The only conquerors at Waterloo were European civilisation and the charter. That may be going beyond even Darwinian biology; but its verification is now proceeding. Ought not one result of the present conflict to be the turning of many from the worship of the lawless, chaotic, unintelligent, and incompetent Life-Force of primeval legend and modern superstition, to the worship of One in whom there is life, and whose life is the light of men? It may be hard to sum up Christian ethics in a formula, but the almost impossible has been accomplished. There is one description of Christian morals which differentiates it alike from the legalism of the ethnic religions and from the non-moral view of life suggested by modern biology, which reveals the originality and guarantees the finality of Christian ethics. It is "the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus."

H. H. SCULLARD.

THE FESTIVAL OF LIVES GIVEN FOR THE NATION IN JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN FAITH.

B. W. BACON,
Professor in Yale University.

To the New Testament critic there is no more perplexing problem than the story of Eleazar (or, in the shortened Greek form, Lazarus), the culminating incident of that Gospel which is itself the chief battle-ground of critical research. It forms the principal incident of a group dated by the evangelist at the "Feast of Dedication," or, as the Greek and Hebrew name should properly be rendered, "of Renewal."

Restatement of the overwhelming objections to the incident as history is quite superfluous. To dismiss the story, however, as "fiction" is not enough; though one of the ablest defenders of the Johannine authorship of the Gospel feels compelled to employ this term. The fourth evangelist is no mere narrator of religious wonder-tales, like the authors of the apocryphal Gospels and Acts. His seven "signs" are carefully chosen with reference to their religious effect.¹ They have symbolic meaning. They advance progressively from the Epiphany miracle at Cana, wherein the Messiah "manifested his glory," to this culminating miracle at the close of the public ministry. Moreover, they are usually adapted in their symbolism to the series of feasts which form so distinctive a feature of the ministry in this peculiar Gospel. It becomes, therefore, the duty of the constructive interpreter of this chapter to pass beyond any mere demonstration of irreconcilability with Synoptic tradition, and to explain its symbolism. And this task may not be evaded because of complications produced by apparent displacement of material in the Gospel of John. It is true that

chapter v. (properly an incident and dialogue of Pentecost, the Feast of the Giving of the Law) seems to be transferred from before vii. 15 ff., and the allegory of the Good Shepherd in x. 11-18 from before its sequel in xi. 26 ff. In both these cases the dialogue continues on the original theme, while the intervening material covers important changes both geographical and temporal. The phenomena form part of a very extensive series, the whole proving to the satisfaction of an increasing number of critics that the Fourth Gospel is anything but the "seamless coat" it was declared to be by the criticism of a generation ago. On the contrary, it seems to have undergone very drastic revision and reconstruction, often to the detriment of the original connection and meaning.¹ This complication of the task, however, does not dispense from its obligation. In spite of the displacements, so close a relation still subsists throughout between dialogues and "signs," as, for example, at the Galilean Passover of chapter vi., and at the Feast of Tabernacles (celebrated by illuminations), when Jesus opens the eyes of the man born blind, and proclaims, "I am the Light of the world," that interpreters of every school are of one mind as to the symbolic intention. It is therefore extremely probable that the evangelist has a similar symbolic purpose in mind when in John x. 22 ff. he chooses for the occasion of his culminating miracle, and for the dialogue whose theme is "I am the resurrection and the life," the Feast of Dedication, or, to give it its true name, the Feast of Renewal.²

If, then, we seem at first to be going somewhat far afield in the endeavour to shed new light upon the story of Lazarus and the connected incidents and dialogue of the Fourth

¹ See Wellhausen, *Erweiterungen und Änderungen im Vierten Evangelium*; and the present writer's volume *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*, 1910, ch. xix., "Dislocations of Material." Two easily verifiable examples are the attachment of the so-called Appendix, chapter xxi., which follows the Galilean tradition of the Resurrection story as against the Jerusalem tradition followed in the preceding chapters, and the interruptions in the Prologue caused by the insertion of verses 6-8 and 15. Chapter xiv. coming before chapters xv.-xvi. instead of after them is another well-known example.

² As is well known, the feast commemorated not the dedication but the re-dedication of altar and temple by Judas Maccabæus after the great victories which enabled him to throw off the yoke of the persecuting tyrant Antiochus Epiphanes. The worship of Zeus was forcibly substituted by Antiochus for the worship of Jehovah in the temple on Chisleu (December) 25th, 168 B.C. Judas took the same date just three years after to purify the temple and restore Jehovah-worship. The name by which the eight-day feast then instituted (1 Macc. iv. 59) was usually known was the Hebrew *Hanukka*, literally rendered by the Greek *ἐγκαίνια*, i.e. "Renewal." As to the relation of name, date, and ritual to older observances, see below.

Gospel, let it be remembered that the method has already been abundantly justified by results whenever the symbolism of this Gospel has been brought into relation with the great religious festivals of contemporary Judaism.

The most brilliant page of Jewish history is the story of the Maccabean patriots and martyrs. But it is a page deliberately torn from the records by sectarian prejudice. Talmudic Judaism disdains to mention the exploits of the Maccabees. As Wellhausen remarks, Jacob, whom Judas the Maccabee delivered, would have forgotten him had not the Christian Church preserved the book.¹

Perhaps it was not in human nature, at least it was not in Pharisean nature, to forgive the bitter persecution suffered at the hands of the third generation of the Maccabees and their Sadducean supporters. For the dynasty raised in the person of Simon the Maccabee, brother of Judas, to the throne of David, and to the Aaronic high-priesthood by popular acclamation at the culmination of those days of marvellous deliverance, turned afterwards in the person of Simon's successors to designs of worldly ambition. Simon's son, John Hyrcanus, broke with the Pharisees. Alexander Jannæus, son of Hyrcanus, meted out to them the doom of traitors, because, the goal of freedom to worship God once attained, they had refused the further tribute of their blood for the mere aggrandisement of their rulers. Perhaps it was natural, after Titus in 70 A.D. had destroyed the last stronghold of the Sadducean priest-nobility, that the Pharisees should permit the name of the Maccabean heroes to be forgotten. After the overthrow of the temple Judaism had to be painfully reconstructed on the basis of the Synagogue. The temple, its ritual and its priesthood, were no longer more than a memory. Splendid as had been the story of its restoration by the heroic sons of Mattathias and of the rekindling of its extinguished altar fires, glorious as had been the victories which secured to the down-trodden Jews a century of independence under the Maccabean priest-kings in Jerusalem, their later history had been such that we can hardly wonder at Pharisean and rabbinic Judaism if it blotted the whole record from the pages of Jewish history.

One thing, however, even Talmudic Judaism could not obliterate, namely, the popular feasts commemorative of these great deliverances. The two feasts of the Maccabees were: (1) Nicanor's Day, observed for a brief period as the anniversary of Judas' greatest victory (13th Adar [February]), but soon

¹ *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte*, p. 243, note 2.

forgotten, or even changed to a fast; and (2) the Feast of "Renewal," the anniversary of the restoration of freedom to worship Jehovah. This earlier Maccabean feast was without taint of worldly interest. It became also the Memorial Day of the Maccabean martyrs, who had given their lives for the religion of their fathers and the deliverance of their brethren. Even Pharisaic Judaism did not wholly forget; but directions for the observance of these feasts, in particular the great Feast of Renewal, contain the only references of Talmudic literature to the most glorious epoch of Jewish history.¹

Hellenistic Judaism, however, atoned for the ingratitude of the Palestinian synagogue. The Alexandrian Jewish Bible not only gave honourable standing to its Greek translation of the story of national deliverance (our so-called First Maccabees), with its historical record of the institution (1 Macc. iv. 36-61), but added several other Maccabean books, at least two of which owe their very existence to the Feast of Renewal and to the desire to see it observed in full appreciation of its historic significance.

Among the five Maccabean books we need pause but a moment to consider Third Maccabees; for its very title to be called Maccabean has been challenged, since it has no mention of the Maccabees and their deliverance of Israel, but merely relates a deliverance of the Jews of Alexandria from wholesale martyrdom when Ptolemy Philopator (221-204 B.C.) sought to force them to the worship of Dionysus. According to the story, all who refused to abjure the faith were assembled in the hippodrome to be trampled under foot by maddened elephants. The beasts, however, were miraculously turned against the persecutors. The story is identical with that related by Josephus as a deliverance under Ptolemy Physcon (146-117 B.C.). Josephus also reports the annual celebration of this deliverance by a festival, so that Third Maccabees, whose story culminates in the appointing on 7th to 14th Epiphi (July 2-9) of a seven days' festival to commemorate it, is no doubt the legend, or *ἱερός λόγος*, of this festival and not

¹ As Wellhausen (*op. cit.*, p. 245) and others have shown, the ritual and the date of the feast (25th Chisleu = December) prove that it was not a new but an adapted institution. Judas the Maccabee when purifying the temple and restoring the worship doubtless took pains, as the sources represent, to make the day of restoration coincide exactly with the day of desecration by Antiochus three years before. But Antiochus was under no such limitation. He doubtless chose the winter solstice for the inauguration of the pagan rites because this was the day of the sun's "renewal." In fact, there is an intentional interval of ten days in 1 Macc. i. 54 and 59 between the building of "the abomination of desolation on the altar" on Chisleu 15 and the inauguration of the heathen sacrifices on Chisleu 25.

of the Feast of Renewal. Certain traits, however, indicate that it is not the mere accident of title which connects this Hellenistic Book of Martyrs with the rest of the group.

(1) While Third Maccabees is as Sadducean as First Maccabees in respect to the doctrine of Resurrection—a doctrine conspicuous, as we shall see, in the two books devoted to the Feast of Renewal—it does not altogether disregard it, but rather substitutes the idea of *national* deliverance, as appears in the following reference to the inauguration of the feast in the hippodrome:

Thus they who just before were abused and near to Hades, or rather had already descended into it, instead of meeting a bitter and deplorable fate, obtained a cup of salvation, and joyfully divided into tables of banqueting the place which had been appointed for their destruction and sepulture.

(2) The hero of the story is the venerable "Eleazar" who places himself at the head of the band of martyrs in the hippodrome and by his prayer of intercession obtains their deliverance from death under the trampling elephants. Now this Eleazar coincides on the one side in name and rank as "priest," as well as in the fate to which he is exposed, with the Eleazar of 1 Macc. viii. 34–46, the Arnold Winkelried of the Jewish war of deliverance, who, by a voluntary death, crushed under the elephant of Antiochus Eupator,

gave himself to deliver his people and to get him an everlasting name.¹

On the other side the Eleazar of Third Maccabees coincides, as respects his venerable age and relation to the people for whom he intercedes, with the Eleazar of Second and Fourth Maccabees, the venerable scribe who

left his death for an ensample of nobleness and a memorial of virtue, not only to the young but to the great body of his nation.²

For in Jewish and early Christian martyrology, from the Eleazar of Second and Fourth Maccabees down to the aged James,³ the 120-year-old Symeon of Jerusalem, and the nonagenarian Polycarp of Smyrna, the hero celebrated as martyr and intercessor is never a youth, prematurely robbed of the rich blessings of life, but always by preference the venerable patriarch of the flock. According to 3 Macc. vi. 1 ff. the leader is

a certain Eleazar, one of high repute among the priests who were settled in the land (Egypt), advanced in years to the period of old age and adorned throughout his life with every virtue.

¹ 1 Macc. vi. 44.

² 2 Macc. vi. 31.

³ Hegesippus *ap.* Eus., *H.E.* II. xxiii.

If the Jewish feast of the martyrs was but an adaptation of the primeval festival of the Renewal of the year, there would be the same reason for the tendency to make its representative hero a venerable patriarch as in the case of our own St Nicholas, or the conventional Old Year displaced by the New. Grounds for such a view may appear later as we trace the Jewish feast of the martyrs to its origins. Meantime it is instructive to place alongside the description in 3 Macc. vi. 1 ff. the two descriptions of Eleazar in the two books which make him the hero of the Feast of Renewal:

2 Macc. vi. 18 ff.

"A certain Eleazar, one of the foremost scribes, a man already far advanced in years (ver. 24, "a nonagenarian"), of most noble countenance" . . . acquainted of old time with the associates of the king, who vainly offer him a way of escape.

4 Macc. v. 3 f.

"One of the foremost of the troop, a Hebrew by the name of Eleazar, by descent a priest, in learning a scribe, and in age advanced in years, because of his age well known to many of the company of the tyrant."

(3) In 3 Macc. vii. 17-20 provision is also made for a supplementary annual seven-day feast at Ptolemais in commemoration of the same deliverance. It is possible that this second seven-day festival is enjoined with reference to the Feast of Renewal. In any event, Third Maccabees must be regarded as deflecting the themes of the other Maccabean books in the interest of some rival doctrine and observance.

Unlike Third Maccabees, Second and Fourth Maccabees are explicitly written to promote the celebration of the Maccabean feasts. Second Maccabees includes indeed in its scope the political festival of "Nicanor's Day," and concludes with the story of its institution (2 Macc. xv. 36); but Fourth Maccabees confines itself to the Feast of Renewal, repeating with further embellishments the incidents of the martyrdom of Eleazar and that of the seven sons of the Jewish mother which in 2 Macc. ii. 19-x. 9 constitute "the narrative" (*i.e.* the *haggada* or *ἱερός λόγος*) of this feast. Fourth Maccabees is in fact what Americans would call a Memorial Day address. It is a typical Jewish-Stoic diatribe, written "toward the close of the last century B.C.,"¹ rehearsing the story of the Maccabean martyrs as the basis of an exhortation to exercise the Stoic virtue of control over the passions, under the incentive of the hope of immortality.

Aside from Third Maccabees, we have in reality four primary documents for determining the significance in New

¹ C. C. Torrey in *Enc. Bibl.*, s.v. "Maccabees."

Testament times of the Feast of Renewal. For, in addition to Fourth Maccabees and that portion of Second Maccabees (2 Macc. ii. 19–vii. 42) which is composed by the author with special reference to this feast and its worthy celebration, the same writer has prefixed to his own work (written “near the close of the last century B.C.”)¹ as a kind of introduction two letters translated (probably by himself) from the Hebrew, of an official character, reminding the readers of the Feast of Renewal and its significance, and urging its celebration. The first letter (2 Macc. i. 1–9), which is barely more than a request that the feast be kept, is dated in 144–3 B.C.; the second (i. 10–ii. 18) is dated 124 B.C. As Professor C. C. Torrey has written of it, “The whole letter might well be entitled:—The Antecedents of the Hanukka (Feast of Renewal) in Jewish Sacred History.”² Strangely enough, the letter pays no attention at all to the significance of the feast as the Memorial of the Maccabean martyrs, which is the only point of interest for Fourth Maccabees, and forms the main theme of 2 Macc. ii. 19–vii. 42. It interprets the feast as purely and simply a feast of the Holy Fire. Moreover, it does not even treat the observance as originating with Judas Maccabæus, but describes it as coeval with the nation itself. As Professor Torrey remarks:

One feature of the writer’s demonstration deserves especial notice: namely, the extent to which it is based on the conception of the Dedication (*ἐγκαίνισμός*) as a *restoration of the sacred fire* to the altar and the temple. Evidently at that time this idea had a most prominent place (perhaps the central place) in current Jewish thought regarding the origin and meaning of this feast. . . . In the passage ii. 8–14 the nature of the writer’s argument can best be seen as he attempts to establish the series: Moses, Solomon, Nehemiah, Judas Maccabæus; each of whom was connected with the miraculous appearance or renewal of the sacred fire.

We are concerned with these letters of 2 Macc. i. 1–9 and i. 10–ii. 18 as the Jewish antetypes of what were called “festal letters”³ in the period when the Church in Jerusalem sent official encyclicals to Alexandria fixing the date for the celebration of Easter. They are addressed from “the Jews that are in Jerusalem and Judæa” to “the Jews that are

¹ C. C. Torrey in *Enc. Bibl.*, s.v. “Maccabees.”

² *Enc. Bibl.*, vol. iii. col. 2877, s.v. “Maccabees.”

³ From a very early period in the history of the Church in Jerusalem we find the custom observed, in imitation of the Jewish determination from Jerusalem of the annual cycle of feasts, that the bishop of Jerusalem transmits to Alexandria at spring equinox a “festal letter” determining the proper date for celebrating Easter (Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, v. xxiii.–xxv.). On the authenticity, date, and original language of these Maccabean letters, see especially C. C. Torrey, “Die Briefe 2 Makk. i. 1–ii. 18,” in *Z.A.W.* xx. (1900), pp. 225 ff.

throughout Egypt," urging them to "keep the days of the feast of tabernacles of the month Chisleu." In the language of the second letter,

Whereas we are now about to keep the purification of the temple in the month Chisleu (December) on the five and twentieth day, we thought it necessary to certify you thereof, that ye also may keep a feast of tabernacles and (a memorial) of the (holy) fire (given) when Nehemiah offered sacrifices after that he had rebuilt the temple and the altar.

The reason why the Feast of Renewal is here called a feast of tabernacles (*i.e.* booths of green shrubbery and branches) is that the two main features of its ritual, the carrying of the thyrsus (Heb. *lulab*) of myrtle and palm, and the illumination, were already features of the Feast of Tabernacles, or Booths (*Sukkoth*), properly so called, *i.e.* the feast of fruit-harvest at the year's end. The reason will appear later. The third feature of the ritual of Tabernacles also, the pouring out of water from Siloam about the altar (*cf.* John vii. 37 f.), has at least a curious resemblance to the legend of the Feast of Renewal as developed in a sort of appendix to this second festal letter. In its beginning (2 Macc. i. 10-30) the author proceeds at once to relate the legend of the holy fire given to Nehemiah :

For when our fathers were about to be led into the land of Persia, the godly priests of that time took of the fire of the altar and hid it privily in the hollow of a waterless well, wherein they made it sure, so that the place was unknown to all men. Now after many years, when it pleased God, Nehemiah having received a charge from the king of Persia, sent in quest of the fire the descendants of the priests that hid it. When they declared to him (text "us") that they had found no fire, but thick water, he commanded them to draw out thereof and bring to him, and when the sacrifices had been slain, Nehemiah commanded the priests to sprinkle with the water both the wood and the things laid thereon. And when it was done, and some time had passed and the sun shone out, which before was hid with clouds, there was kindled a great blaze, so that all men marvelled.

Those who have attended the ceremonies of the Giving of the Holy Fire at Jerusalem in the Church of the Sepulchre at Easter, when the two patriarchs in their robes enter the Chapel of the Angels and soon thrust out to the waiting multitude the miraculous fire with which at once the whole building is illuminated, will not need to be reminded of the almost inextinguishable persistence of ancient religious rites in the East across all barriers of creed and race.

After the description of the sacrifice, the prayer of Jonathan and the priests, after the example of Nehemiah, and after "the hymns" sung by the priests, the author proceeds to relate a further ceremony as coming from Nehemiah :

And as soon as the sacrifice was consumed Nehemiah commanded to pour on great stones the water that was left. And when this was done a flame was kindled; but when the light from the altar shone over against it, it spent itself. . . . And Nehemiah and they that were with him called this thing Nephthar, which is by interpretation Purification (καθαρισμός); but most men call it Nephthai.

We are less immediately concerned about the relations of this legend with the story of Elijah's sacrifice at Carmel and certain curiosities of modern rationalistic criticism, than about its attempts at etymology. The Persian marvel of liquid fire in the form of *naphtha* is made the source of the holy fire by a legend obviously independent of that in the body of the work (x. 3):

And when they had cleansed (καθαρίσαντες) the sanctuary, they made another altar of sacrifice; and, *striking sparks from stones and taking fire from them*, they offered sacrifices.

The legend of ver. 31-36 appears to be in fact a mere variant of that in the earlier part of the letter, in which the "thick water" is poured, as in Elijah's sacrifice, over the wood and the offerings on the altar. The point of interest for us, however, is the author's etymology of the word *nephthai* (naphtha), which he considers Persian and interprets to mean "*purification*": for, as the conclusion of the letter shows, the etymology is brought in, like that of *Purim* in Esth. ix. 26-32, as part of the sacred legend of the feast:

Seeing, then, that we are about to keep the Purification (καθαρισμός), we write unto you. Ye will therefore do well if ye observe the days. Now God, who saved all his people, and restored the heritage to all, and the kingdom and the priesthood as well, and the holy things—in God have we hope. . . . For he delivered us out of great evils, and purified (ἐκαθάρισεν) the sanctuary.

This merely reiterates the beginning (i. 18):

Whereas we are now about to keep the Purification of the Temple in the month Chisleu on the five and twentieth day . . .

Similarly the main narrative, which is taken up at this point, also begins by designating the feast that of "Purification of the Temple" and Renewal of the Altar.

Now the things concerning Judas Maccabæus and his brethren, and the Purification (καθαρισμός) of the greatest of temples and the Renewal (ἐγκαίνισμός) . . . which have been written by Jason of Cyrene in five books, we will assay to abridge in a single compend.

To these early "festal letters," the "narrative" abridged from Jason in the first half of the body of the work (2 Macc. ii. 19-x. 9), and the diatribe or panegyric of Fourth Maccabees, we

might add one further document to show the perpetuation of the ritual of the Holy Fire in even the medieval period. It is an extract subjoined by Professor Torrey in a footnote to his *Encyclopædia* article from chapter ix. of the Arabic "Second Maccabees" or *Josippus*, where the restoration of the temple-worship by Judas and his associates is described as follows:

Then prayed they the omnipotent God to let the holy fire appear which should thenceforth abide upon the altar; and fire came forth from one of the stones of the altar and consumed the wood and the offering; and there remained of this fire upon the altar until the third captivity.¹

It is this element of the ritual which seems to come out most strongly as we recede toward the earlier period of observance, and on this feature of the Holy Fire, rather than upon the commemoration of the exploits of the Maccabean martyrs and heroes, more light requires first to be shed. Thereafter we must return to the theme of "purification."

When Judas the Maccabee chose Chisleu (December) 25th as the date for renewal of the temple-worship in 165 B.C., the reason is explicitly stated:

At what time and on what day the Gentiles had profaned it, even on that day was it dedicated afresh.²

But we are left to our own inferences as to why Antiochus in his attempt to introduce pagan worship waited after erecting the heathen altar on Chisleu 15 until Chisleu 25, before inaugurating the worship. This date, however, at the winter solstice,³ and the nature of the ritual still practised as the distinctive ritual of the feast, give ample explanation of the delay. As further evidence we have the homonymity between the feast and that figure of Hebrew mythology who retains the most unmistakable traces of his primitive character as a hero of sun-worship. Enoch (Heb. *Hanuk*), who "walked with God 365 years," and "was not, for God took him," becomes the chief witness of resurrection and a denizen of Paradise in later Jewish legend. His name *Hanuk* is identical in meaning and derivation with the Hebrew name for the feast. It is safe then to say that the date of the sun's "renewal" (Chisleu 25) was not chosen by Antiochus without reference to ancient religious practice and belief. When the same date was

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 235.

² 1 Macc. iv. 54.

³ The Hebrew month being fixed by the actual appearance of the new moon cannot be made to correspond exactly with purely solar calendars; but Chisleu in the Greek period was for practical purposes identified with the Macedonian Ἀπριλλαιος = December, of which the twenty-fifth day was celebrated throughout the Græco-Roman world as the *dies invicti solis*.

adopted by Judas Maccabæus to celebrate the Purification of the Temple, ancient ritual and belief obtained a new application.

The distinctive utensil for the celebration of the Feast of Renewal is still the so-called Hanukka-lamp, with its eight candles, or wicks, whereof seven are successively kindled (or extinguished) from the first on successive days of the feast. The schools of Shammai and Hillel disputed whether the illumination was to proceed in the descending or ascending scale. The conjecture might be hazarded that the ceremony of the successive extinction of the seven Hanukka lights is not unconnected with the legend of the mother who witnesses the successive martyrdoms of her seven sons "not accepting deliverance, that they might obtain a better resurrection." However this may be, we have (*a*) the date of the Renewal festival; (*b*) the rekindling of the Holy Fire as its central rite, the ceremony imitative of the gradual waning and rekindling of the sun's rays at the period of the "straits" of the year;¹ (*c*) the use of the thyrsus, symbolic of the renewal of vegetation; and (*d*) the theme of the renewal of life, or resurrection, as the culmination of its symbolism—four distinctive features pointing with cumulative cogency to religious institutions of immemorial antiquity. Critics have been accustomed, it is true, to think of the features wherein the ritual of Renewal coincides with Tabernacles as borrowed from that harvest-festival, "the feast of ingathering at the year's end." But the intrinsic evidence points to ultimate derivation from the other side. There is no intrinsic reason why the vintage-festival should be celebrated by illuminations; but if we think of an immemorial festival of the Renewal of the sun at winter solstice as having been suppressed in the period of the prophets because of heathen connections, there will be nothing strange in the transfer of its symbolic rite of the renewal of the Holy Fire to the slightly earlier harvest festival, just as in modern Jerusalem we see the same rite actually transferred to the celebration of Easter. With the restoration of the Feast of Renewal the rite of the Holy Fire would remain a feature of both festivals. Water-pouring (symbolic of the renewal of the rains, on which in the East the life of vegetation and even of the animal world so manifestly depends) belongs to imitative ritual, and was traditionally supposed to promote abundant

¹ The stem from which both the name of the feast and the sun-hero Enoch are derived means primarily "narrowing," "straitening." The secondary sense, "to initiate," "to found," "to build" (*cf.* Gen. iv. 17, where Enoch initiates the building of cities) is based upon this primary reference to the renewal of the year after the crisis of "narrowing."

rain and a fruitful year. It might belong originally to the harvest festival as well as to the Feast of Renewal, for the rains begin in November–December. The use of the *lulab* or thyrsus, symbolic of the renewal of vegetable life, and of booths of green boughs, which Jewish interpretation connects with the dwelling in booths at the Exodus, might have appropriateness at either feast; but Plutarch, when he declared the ritual of Tabernacles to be Dionysiac,¹ had surely as much right on his side as those who consider all the borrowing to be on the side of the feast of the Purification of the Temple.

In its origin, then, the great feast of the Maccabean martyrs followed the example of the earlier Jewish feasts. Passover was not a fresh creation, but the rebaptism of an ancient feast of firstlings at the vernal equinox to commemorate the historic deliverance of Israel out of Egypt. Pentecost, the feast of grain-harvest, was rebaptised into a commemoration of the Revelation of the Law. Tabernacles was made to commemorate the dwelling in “tabernacles” (*sukkoth* = booths) in the wilderness. So also of the Feast of Tabernacles in Chisleu. The festal letter of 2 Macc. i. 10–ii. 18 is right in treating it as an immemorial festival of the Holy Fire. Antiochus’ institution in the year 168 B.C. was not so much an innovation as a restoration to the calendar of the ancient festival of the Renewal of the sun, and his institution was in turn superseded by Judas in 165 B.C. by the feast of the Renewal of Jehovah-worship and Purification of the Temple. Thus ancient ritual was rebaptised to symbolise a historical deliverance of Israel, and ancient mythology was translated into the half-historical, half-legendary tales of the martyrs. Like Enoch and Elijah of old, these were now declared to have been taken up into heaven, and to “stand even now before the throne of God,” a destiny which to ancient thought involved certain functions of profound religious significance. It is with these religious ideas that we are chiefly concerned.

Resurrection, as we know, is the central theme in the symbolism of ancient ritual connected with the renewal of the life of vegetation and of the sun. Jewish poetry of the post-exilic period is never weary of reiterating Ezekiel’s comparison of the restoration of its national life to resurrection from the dead. With the Sadducees the symbolism stopped at this point. With the rise of Pharisaism came the new doctrine of the restoration of life to *individuals* to share in the glorified kingdom of the Messiah. We trace the beginnings of the doctrine to the closing chapter of the Book of Daniel (Dan.

¹ *Symp.*, iv. 6.

xii. 2), a passage written with special reference to the Maccabean martyrs. The survivors of that heroic struggle could not tolerate the idea that those who like Eleazar had "given themselves to deliver their people" should have no share in the glory of the kingdom. It was not unnatural that the Feast of Renewal and of Purification of the Altar should become a Memorial Day of the Maccabean martyrs. It was not unnatural, considering the ancient associations of the festival and its immemorial symbolism, that *to the Pharisees* it should be pre-eminently a feast of the Resurrection.

But the Alexandrian literature of the Feast of Renewal carries us a step beyond Pharisaism. In Second but more especially in Fourth Maccabees we have the only clear survivals in the later Jewish literature of that doctrine of vicarious suffering, atonement, or reconciliation of the Divine favour by the blood of heroes willingly offered for the nation, which appears so clearly in the doctrine of the Suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah, and thereafter seems obliterated from synagogue teaching, awakening again to a world-wide significance only in the Christian doctrine of the Cross. The very word "atonement" in the Pauline sense of reconciliation (*καταλλαγή*) belongs nowhere in Jewish literature save in Second and Fourth Maccabees, the books of the Feast of Renewal. The seven martyrs of 2 Macc. vii. endure the torments of Antiochus in the hope that

The king of the world shall raise up us who have died for his laws unto an eternal renewal of life.¹

But even in Second Maccabees the youngest of the seven brothers declares to the tyrant that the suffering they endure is permitted by God only in part for their own sins. They also suffer that

If for rebuke and chastening our living Lord hath been angered a little while, yet shall he again be reconciled (*καταλλαγήσεται*) with his own servants. . . . For these our brethren having endured a short pain have now drunk of ever-flowing life under God's covenant; whereas thou, through the judgment of God, shalt receive in just measure the penalty of thine arrogance. But I, as my brethren did, give up both body and soul for the laws of our fathers, calling upon God that he may speedily become gracious to the nation, and that thou amidst trials and plagues mayst confess that he alone is God; and that in me and my brethren thou mayst stay the wrath of the Almighty which hath been justly brought upon our whole race.²

In Fourth Maccabees, which limits itself to the story of Eleazar and the seven martyred brethren, this theme of the

¹ 2 Macc. vii. 9. Cf. verses 14, 23, 29, and 36.

² 2 Macc. vii. 32-38.

“propitiation” (ἱλαστήριον) wrought by the martyrs, and the “purification” (καθαρισμός) wrought by their blood, is made central. At the point of death under the torture, the aged Eleazar prays:

Thou knowest, O God, that though I might have saved myself/I am dying under fiery torments for the sake of the law. Be gracious to thy people; be content with the penalty which we endure on their behalf; make my blood an offering for their purification, and take my life as a substitute for theirs (καθάρσιον αὐτῶν ποιήσον τὸ ἔμῳν αἷμα, καὶ ἀντίψυχον λάβε τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν).¹

The word of exhortation closes with this peroration:

Of a truth it was a divine contest which they fought. For on that day valour set up the lists, putting them to the test of endurance (ὑπομονή); and the prize of victory was incorruption in endless life. The leader in the fight was Eleazar, and the mother of the seven sons played her part, and the brethren were the contestants. The tyrant was their opponent, while the world of living men looked on. And loyalty to God won the victory. . . . Even the tyrant admired their valour and endurance, because of which they even now stand beside the throne of God (καὶ νῦν τῷ θεῷ παρεστήκασιν θρόνῳ) and are living the aeon of blessedness; for Moses himself says, “All who have sanctified themselves are underneath thy hands.” And these, therefore, because they sanctified (i.e. “devoted”) themselves on God’s account, have not only received this honour but also the reward that on their account the enemies of our nation were not suffered to prevail over it. The tyrant was punished and the fatherland was purified (τὴν πατρίδα καθαρισθῆναι); so that they became, as it were, a ransom (ἀντίψυχον) for the sins of the nation. And through the blood of those devout men and the propitiation (ἱλαστήριον) of their death, Divine Providence saved Israel which previously had been ill-treated.

The author ascribes a double prize to the martyr-athletes of his Pindaric ode. (a) They have been translated like Enoch and Elijah into the immediate presence of God, so that they stand “even now” beside the throne of God. (b) They obtained by their voluntary death expiation for the sins of Israel, so that their fatherland was purified (καθαρισθῆναι) and God was entreated for the land. The term “purification” is not employed by mere coincidence. It belongs to the very name of the feast, and occurs in the introduction as well as in the peroration. The martyrs “overcame the tyrant by endurance (ὑπομονή), so that the fatherland was purified through their agency” (ὥστε καθαρισθῆναι δι’ αὐτῶν τὴν πατρίδα).² As we have seen, the feast is a feast of Purification (καθαρισμός). In the other Maccabean books this means purification of the altar, or the temple. In the Hebrew celebration, down to the rubric of the Jewish Prayer Book of to-day, the feast celebrates “the purification of the sanctuary.” The peculiarity of Fourth

¹ 4 Macc. vi. 27–29.

² 4 Macc. i. 11.

Maccabees, the most completely Hellenistic of the writings concerned, is that the "purification" is a purification of *Israel* in the sight of God, so that the martyrs "became as it were a ransom for the sins of the nation." It is in this Alexandrian-Jewish conception of the fruits of "devotion," and not in Talmud or Levitical books, that we must look for the immediate antecedents of that Christian religious motive which a Deutero-Pauline epistle describes as the blessed hope of the Saviour Jesus Christ:

Who gave himself for us that he might redeem (λυτρώσεται) us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a people for an own possession (καὶ καθάρισή ἑαυτῷ λαὸν περιούσιον).

The motive of Intercession, on the other hand, which becomes so prominent in Third Maccabees, is scarcely apparent in the panegyric. It stands closely connected, however, with the doctrine whose beginnings can now be traced back to Fourth Maccabees itself, that martyrs for the faith do not await the final resurrection, but "have part in the first resurrection," passing immediately into the presence of God. It is this access to the Divine audience-chamber which makes Enoch an intercessor sought by the fallen angels in *Eth. Enoch* xiii. 1, to whom he replies in xv. 2 "You should intercede for men, and not men for you." This rests upon the principle expressed in *En.* xlvii. 2:

The holy ones who dwell above in the heavens unite with one voice and supplicate and intercede with . . . the Lord of Spirits on account of the blood of the righteous which hath been shed, and the prayer of the righteous that it may not be in vain before the Lord of Spirits, that judgment may be done unto them, and that they may not have to suffer for ever.

These "holy ones" of the Book of Enoch who in heaven intercede on account of the blood of the righteous are doubtless actual angels, not translated human beings. For we have also the practically contemporary witness to this idea in *Test. Levi* (ca. 107 B.C.) iii. 5:

In it (the sixth heaven) are the archangels, who minister and make propitiation to the Lord for all the sins of the righteous; offering to the Lord a sweet-smelling savour, a reasonable and a bloodless offering.

But Fourth Maccabees extends this immediate access to the presence of God to the martyrs who had "sanctified themselves" in self-immolation, because in Deut. xxxiii. 3 Moses had written, "Thy sanctified ones are underneath thy hands." Obviously the step is short indeed to the New Testament idea of the *martyrs* making intercession in heaven, and pleading

their own blood as a motive for hastening God's intervention on behalf of his suffering people. Rev. vi. 9-11 gives a representation quite as truly Jewish (though not Rabbinic-Jewish) as Christian:

And when he opened the fifth seal I saw *underneath the altar* (cf. Deut. xxxiii. 3) the souls of them that had been slain for the testimony which they held: and they cried with a loud voice saying, How long, O Master, the holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth? And there was given them to each one a white robe; and it was said unto them that they should rest yet for a little time, until their fellow-servants also and their brethren, which should be killed even as they were, should be completed (in number).¹

In Rev. vii. 9-17 the Christian apocalyptist beholds in vision the completed number of the martyrs of the faith out of every kindred and tribe. They are arrayed in white robes and carry the thyrsus of palm. The angel explains why these have had no need to wait for the general resurrection:

These are they which come out of the great tribulation, and they washed their robes and made them white (by participation) in the blood of the lamb. Therefore are they before the throne of God (cf. 4 Macc. xvii. 18); and they minister to him day and night in his temple.

Even the primitive Roman Gospel of Mark shows a remnant of the belief in a special place of honour in heaven for the martyrs, and a share in the "first resurrection" at Messiah's coming. For in Mark x. 35-45 the fate of the two martyr apostles James and John, who are assured that they shall drink the cup of Jesus and be baptised with his baptism, is assumed to give them in men's eyes a presumptive claim to sit at the right hand and the left of the Christ in his glory. The Q source (Luke xxii. 28-30 = Matt. xix. 28) extends this special share in the glory of the coming Judge to all the twelve as "they that have held out with me in my trials (*διαμεμενηκότες μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐν τοῖς πειρασμοῖς μου*)."

Indeed, since we have attestation surpassing all possibility of denial that Jesus by word and symbol alike impressed indelibly upon his disciples that his body was voluntarily given to martyrdom for their sakes, his blood poured out "as a ransom" "for many,"² it becomes mere wilful blindness to ignore the relation of this symbolism of the Supper with the themes of "expiation" of the sins of the many, "purification of the nation," "appeasing" of the Divine

¹ With ver. 11 cf. Heb. xi. 40.

² The Gospel of Matthew adds at this point the clause, "for the remission of sins," a correction of Mark i. 4, where it is appended to the description of the baptism of John. The transposition is in line with John i. 25-29, and reflects very early feeling as to the efficacy of the sacrament (cf. Heb. ix. 11-15), but is, of course, not authentic with Jesus.

wrath, "ransoming" of the people by the willing offering of the blood and lives of the martyrs in the literature of the Feast of Renewal.

But it is not in Synoptic literature, which in spite of the tinge of Paulinism in the Roman gospel reflects as a whole Palestinian rather than Hellenistic tradition, that we should look for the continuation of these ideas. We should look first of all to Hebrews, the most distinctively Alexandrian writing of the New Testament, then to the epistles current among the Greek-speaking churches, and from these backward to the Epistles of Paul, and finally forward to the Johannine Gospel and Epistles, which represent the doctrine of these Hellenistic churches in the second generation after Paul.¹

Rabbinic Judaism, as we have seen, repudiated the Maccabees. As Dalman, Oesterley and Box, and many others have proved, it showed jealousy from the first of the ancient conception of vicarious suffering, so easy of misapplication in an antinomian sense. In particular it reacted in the extreme against Christian development and application of the doctrine of the Suffering Servant, historically a doctrine of *Israel* as the nation of witness (martyrdom) for God. In the Palestinian (Synoptic) Gospels, with their strong reaction against the antinomian tendencies of their period, we must expect to find the smallest possible remainder of the type of Jewish doctrine perpetuated in the Alexandrian books, in particular those which teach a doctrine of "atonement" by the blood of the martyrs, the "purification" of Israel by the self-immolation of the Maccabean heroes, and their intercession in the heavenly temple and "before the throne of God." Even Paul, "a Pharisee of Pharisees" in his training, is not the man to admit the crude doctrine of *substitutionary* atonement represented in Fourth Maccabees. He avoids the use of the preposition *ἀντί* ("instead of") in such expressions as "a ransom instead of many" (λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν, Mk. x. 45), a "substitutionary offering" (ἀντάλλαγμα), a "substitution of life for life" (ἀντίψυχον, 4 Macc.). Paul is careful to restrict himself to the use of *περί* ("concerning") and *ὑπέρ* ("in behalf of") when speaking of Christ's suffering "for sin" or "for us." He employs the phraseology of Is. liii.: "When thou shalt make his (the Servant's) life an offering for sin (περὶ ἁμαρτίας)," and joins with it the phrase, "a sacrifice to God for an odour of

¹ The continued belief in the atoning value of the sufferings of martyrs appears not alone in the remarkable utterance of Paul in Col. i. 24, but in *Hermas*, *Sim.*, IX. xxviii. 3 (martyrdom atones for sin), and Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.*, xi. (absolution by martyr-confessors).

a sweet smell" (Eph. v. 2), which was current in such references, as we have seen from *Test. Levi* v. 3. But Paul *never connects the sacrifice of Jesus' life with the Levitical ritual*. He never directly rests his own doctrine on the Isaian passage about the Servant who "died for our sins," though he does inform us that it belonged to the primitive gospel which he "received" at his conversion (1 Cor. xv. 3). Contrariwise, many passages attest the fact that it is as the Isaian Suffering Servant that Paul depicts to himself the character and career of Jesus. But no more to Paul than to the author of Hebrews is our "justification" obtained without the *intercession* before the throne of God of the risen Christ. There Jesus can meet the charges of every accuser of the brethren as a heavenly Advocate, and thus Paul conceives it (Rom. viii. 33-39). The ascension to the right hand of God is to Paul even more important for salvation than the martyr death of Jesus; for if Jesus was "delivered up for our trespasses," he was still more clearly "raised for our justification" (Rom. iv. 25), so that the Gospel is not the mere word of the Cross, but "rather" of a Christ "that is risen again." Paul can even say to Corinthian questioners of Christ's actual presence before the throne that unless this be so, "your hope is vain (because) ye are yet in your sins."¹

It is in the writings that come to us "out of the great tribulation," the suffering of the Greek churches under the persecution of Domitian, writings such as First Peter and the Revelation of John, that we obtain (not unnaturally) clearer echoes of the primitive teaching of the atonement effected by martyrdom, the application to the death of Jesus of the doctrine of *expiation of sin* through willing witness unto death, the doctrine which reflects the Isaian song of the Suffering Servant. But earliest of these writings of the period of persecution stands the conspicuously Alexandrian Epistle to the Hebrews, a "word of exhortation" (λόγος παρακλήσεως, Heb. xiii. 22) written seemingly on the very eve of the overwhelming catastrophe (85-90 A.D.), to admonish to patient endurance (ὑπομονή) "resisting unto blood." Here it is that we find the chief Christian renewal, in form, in spirit, and even in language, of the great Alexandrian panegyric of the Maccabean martyrs. Here too "the final roll-call of the heroes" (as a modern critic has designated the speech of the martyr-mother at the close of Fourth Maccabees)² becomes the climax of the book; the Captain of their salvation is

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 17.

² Townshend in R. H. Charles' *Pseudepigrapha*, 1913, p. 655.

Jesus, "who endured the cross." In this epistle the Maccabean martyrs themselves take their rightful place, as those who "from weakness were made strong, waxed mighty in war, turned to flight armies of aliens." The story of the mother and her seven sons refusing deliverance from the torture is not forgotten (Heb. xi. 35).

Women received their dead by a resurrection : and others were tortured, not accepting their deliverance ; that they might obtain a better resurrection : and others had trial of cruel mockings and scourgings, yea, moreover, of bonds and imprisonment : they were stoned, they were sawn asunder, they were tempted, they were slain with the sword, they went about in sheepskins and goatskins, being destitute, afflicted, evil entreated (of whom the world was not worthy), wandering in deserts and mountains and caves and the holes of the earth.

But, as the Christian writer adds, "they were not made complete without us." The lists are still set and the world looks on. "Let us also therefore run with endurance (ὑπομονή) the race that is set before us," like Jesus, the Captain of our faith.

According to Hebrews, Jesus is the eternal High-priest after the order of Melchizedek. But this Intercessor enters into the heavenly holy of holies, pleading his own atoning blood. For unlike the blood of Abel crying from the ground of vengeance, the blood of Jesus speaks the "better things" of peace and forgiveness. Ps. cx., from which this conception is developed, is repeatedly referred to by Paul, and in two instances (1 Cor. xv. 25-27 ; Eph. i. 20-22) Paul also had combined the opening lines with similar expressions of Ps. viii., exactly as Hebrews develops the two in combination. We have, therefore, every reason for admitting an influence from Paul on the Alexandrian writer. But the development of the conception of Christ as the interceding High-priest, obtaining forgiveness for the sins of the world by entering in within the veil through a voluntary self-immolation, and making intercession there, cannot be derived from the mere hint of Rom. viii. 34. Exegetically it is based upon Ps. cx., *the coronation ode of Simon the Maccabee*.¹ But the doctrine is of course antecedent to the proof-text, and this is not derived from Paul. It is as universal in the primitive Church as the sacrament itself, though in Palestinian circles it tends to become obscured with the growing dread of antinomian laxity. In Hebrews, however, the central point of the author's whole theology is that of the Alexandrian panegyric on the Maccabean martyrs—the "purification of the nation," the atonement wrought by the

¹ The psalm is an acrostic of which the initial Hebrew letters spell the name of Simon.

self-immolation of the martyrs, the propitiation of their blood offered by themselves with intercession "before the throne of God" in the heavenly sanctuary.¹

The doctrine of faith in Hebrews might be cited as a further link of connection with Fourth Maccabees, for (as Townshend justly declares) the term "faith" is "used in a distinctively religious sense" in Fourth Maccabees, and this is to him characteristic of the book. We might even connect what Harnack claims as the "feminism" of Hebrews with that which Townshend designates the determination of the author of Fourth Maccabees "to get in his point about female virtue." The characteristic is of course common to every "book of martyrs" from Pamphilus down. The story of the Maccabean martyrs is not complete without its weeping mother, her own heart pierced by the sword, yet enduring with even greater heroism than her sons. The trait appears for the same reason that in Christian art the Crucifixion scene is not complete without its "Stabat mater dolorosa." Woman's suffering and heroism, so often greater than that of those who take a man's part in the conflict, is not likely to be forgotten so long as this type of literature endures. But why need such minor agreements be laboured when the whole theology, purpose, structure, form, and content of Hebrews prove it what we should call a Memorial Day Address of the same type as the Alexandrian panegyric of the martyrs? The same question arises regarding Hebrews as critics raise concerning Fourth Maccabees, whether it was an actual discourse subsequently committed to writing, like the orations of Demosthenes; or from the first a literary product in rhetorical form. In either case there is identity of literary type. Nor is the type unknown to the Talmud itself. The collections known as *Pesikta* and *Pesikta Rabbathi* consist of nothing else than just such festival discourses (*piskoth*). Of these *Pesikta* contains one for Hanukka, one for Sukkoth, and two for the New Year—an analogy to be borne in mind by students of the origin of the Fourth Gospel. *Pesikta Rabbathi* has no less than seven *piskoth* for Hanukka and seven for the other feasts.

If the so-called Epistle to the Hebrews is the first of extant Christian "exhortations" of this type, it was far from being the last. The Maccabean martyrs were practically discarded by the Synagogue; and in its celebration of the Feast of Renewal, purification of the temple and altar took the place of purification of the nation, intercession descended

¹ Cf. the author's "chief point," chapters viii.—x.

to earth, and the memorial and glorification of the Maccabean martyrs faded out of sight. But they came to their own in the Christian Church, especially in its Greek-speaking branch. August 1st, instead of December 25th, became the day of their annual commemoration, and the works of Gregory Nazianzen and of John Chrysostom furnish examples of "Orations on the (Maccabean) Martyrs" perpetuating the ancient type. Even the argot of Paris retains in its expression *un machabé*, meaning an ill-treated corpse, a probable trace of the medieval observance of Maccabean Martyrs' Day. Of peculiar interest is Gregory's designation of Eleazar as

the first-fruits of those who suffered before Christ, even as Stephen was the first-fruits of those who suffered after.

This is but the reflection of 4 Macc. xvii. 13, "Eleazar was the leader of the fight," which Townshend also echoes in describing Eleazar as "the proto-martyr" of the book. Eleazar-Lazarus had become by 100 A.D. a name inseparable from the theme of heavenly glory after suffering upon earth.

Our long survey of the history of the Feast of Renewal comes to its close. It began with those elements of the ritual which point to an immemorial observance of the season of the sun's renewal, and carried the record down to the period of the Maccabean books when the feast receives its historic elements as commemorative of the Maccabean martyrs with Eleazar-Lazarus at their head. We have seen how it came to stand sometimes for the "purification" of the altar and sanctuary, sometimes for the "purification" of the nation; at all times for the "renewal" of the worship, and of the bonds which unite Israel with God. This survey should prepare us to find in the Hellenistic Gospel, the Gospel of Ephesus, an inclusion among its great feasts symbolically interpreted by miracle and dialogue, the Feast of Renewal also. And we are not disappointed. The story of the raising of Lazarus begins at John x. 22 f.

Now it was the Feast of Renewal (τὰ ἐγκαίνια) at Jerusalem: it was winter, and Jesus was walking in the temple in Solomon's porch.

The succeeding verses (24-30) contain, it is true, one of those evidences of displacement so frequently observed in this Gospel. The words

Ye believe not because ye are not of my sheep. My sheep hear my voice and I know them, and they follow me; and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand

imply that the parable of the Good Shepherd who gives his life for the sheep (ver. 11-18) does not belong to the preceding occasion, months before, at Tabernacles, where it now stands, but belongs in the immediately preceding context after ver. 25. The motive for removal was combination of the parable of the Good Shepherd with the parable of the Gate of the Sheepfold (x. 1-10), wherein the scribes as false *teachers* are compared to "thieves and robbers" who enter not by the door but obtain access to the sheep over the wall of the fold. The "thieves and robbers" of the parable of the Good Shepherd, however, are not heretical or incompetent *teachers*, but unworthy *rulers*, as in Ezek. xxxiv., a chapter which is paralleled in every feature by the Johannine discourse, *if we add after x. 10 verses 26-30*. The confusion caused in John x. 7-10 by the editorial combination of the two parables is so conspicuous (since Jesus must now as the true Shepherd enter by himself (!) as the Door) that the Sahidic version actually changes "door" to "shepherd" in verse 7, of course without fully removing the difficulty.

Making the necessary transposition of verses 11-18 after verse 25, the outline of this closing section of the Ephesian Gospel's story of the public ministry becomes the following:

- (a) At the Feast of Renewal Jesus stands in the temple and answers the demand of the Jews that he tell them plainly if he be the Christ by uttering the parable of the Good Shepherd who gives his life for the sheep (x. 22-25, 11-18, 26-39).
- (b) Withdrawing for safety beyond Jordan, Jesus returns, in spite of the exposure to stoning (xi. 7-10), to the home of Mary and Martha, who are lamenting the death of Lazarus. After a dialogue on the theme, "I am the resurrection and the life," Jesus restores Lazarus from the tomb (x. 40-xi. 44).
- (c) In consequence of the effects of this miracle, the Sanhedrin decide to put Jesus to death, Caiaphas, by virtue of his office as high-priest, giving unwittingly the real significance of the scene in the prophetic words, "It is expedient for you that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not" (xi. 45-54).

The original author of the section has done his best to interpret for us the significance of the series of events which he connects with the Feast of Renewal, not only by prefixing Jesus' own "plain statement" of his claim to be the Christ in

the parable of the Good Shepherd, but by appending at the close his own explanation of the words placed in the mouth of Caiaphas :

Now this he (Caiaphas) said not of himself ; but being high-priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation ; and not for the nation only, but that he might also gather together into one the children of God that are scattered abroad.

Considering what abundant means we have for knowing that the resurrection faith took its start from the words of institution, "This is my body which is given for you ; this is my blood which is shed on your behalf," and that from the beginning the Risen One was thought of, not as returning from the underworld, but as already ascended¹ and coming from "the right hand of the majesty on high"—considering that primitive apologetic never thinks of connecting the death on the Cross with the Levitical rites of the Day of Atonement, or with the sacrificial ritual,² but always with the Suffering Servant, and the reconciliation (καταλλαγή) wrought by the atoning death of the martyrs—considering that "justification" is not regarded as complete without the ultimate act of intercession in the presence of God, where the victim "pleads the merits of his blood," it is strange that Christian scholars should still be turning the pages of the Book of Leviticus to find the origins of this earliest Gospel. True, the Gospels which are primarily based on Palestinian tradition obscure almost to the point of obliteration the doctrine of the Suffering Servant and the gospel of forgiveness through the blood of Christ. Rabbinic tradition in the Synagogue has run a parallel course. But just as the Alexandrian canon has preserved to us in the books which restore the ancient Feast of the Renewal of the Year to new significance as a Feast of Resurrection, commemorating the victory of the martyrs, so our one Hellenistic Gospel preserves to us in its story of Lazarus and the events and discourses of the Feast of Renewal a sense of the primitive values of the gospel of Jesus' death and resurrection, an appreciation which otherwise could scarcely have survived.

BENJAMIN W. BACON.

¹ According to the *Ev. Petri*, the ascension takes place from the Cross itself after the "great cry" (*Ev. Petri* v. 19) ; according to *Ep. Barn.* xv. 9, "on the eighth day" (i.e. Easter Sunday?) ; according to Luke xxiv. 5 (*vera lectio*) and Acts i. 2, 4-11, on Easter Sunday ; according to John xx. 17 ff., the same. The dating forty days later is due to misunderstanding of Acts i. 3.

² The process begins with Hebrews and is carried forward by *Ep. of Barn.*, but obviously as an outgrowth of allegorisation of Scripture.

PROCLUS AS CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHER.

JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., D.D., F.R.S.E.

THE inspiration of constructive minds to-day must be largely sustained by study of the great constructive thinkers of the past. Of these, one of the most constructive, but too much neglected, is Proclus, one of the great Hellenistic philosophers. He was the re-modeller and systematiser of Neo-Platonism, and, according to his biographer, Marinus, a model of theurgical and philosophical virtue. A deeply religious spirit, he mastered everything relating to the mysteries, the Orphic hymns, and the mystic ceremonies of pagan worship. He thought the philosopher should be priest of the whole world, not devotee of the cult of a single people. Metaphysical pantheist, mystic, and ascetic, all in one, he grafted on his metaphysic—which we shall presently gather—a mystical psychology, in which ecstatic illumination, and the deification of the soul through polytheistic practices, formed the base. Love, truth, and faith are the modes of reaching these, according to Proclus; especially the last, which transcends all reason, in his view. Hence there was, as Zeller remarked, “an ecstatic departure from the domain of conscious mental activity.” Proclus was more influenced than Plotinus by formal logic, and by the latest Hellenistic theosophy. “But he distinguishes himself entirely from Plotinus by the fact that, with him, the Neo-Platonic philosophy, as a whole, has at least reached a more systematic order, and also a more developed form” (Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 435, Eng. edn.). For Proclus was as deeply speculative as he was religious, and “his philosophy is an intellectual system” (*ibid.*, p. 435). Cousin has said: “Proclus was illustrious as an astronomer; he was the first among the philologists of his age; he had so comprehended all religions in his mind, and regarded them with such

equal reverence, that he was, as it were, the hierophant of the whole universe: nor was it wonderful that a man possessing such a profound knowledge of nature and science should have this initiation into all sacred mysteries." Again, Schultze has remarked (in his *Philosophie der Renaissance*) that Proclus had systematically to order the complete content of Neo-Platonism, just as Scholasticism had to do for the content of the doctrine of the Church, bringing it into logical accord with the positions of Aristotle.

Proclus, with whom we are here concerned, began, like Plotinus, with the One, but without deducing it immediately from the Intelligence. Strictly speaking, his beginning was with unity, rather than with pure Being, like Plotinus. The One was, for Proclus, inexpressible and unknowable—above all reason, life, goodness, and even above being, so far did his ultra-transcendence and abstractiveness go (Prop. cxxiii. of the *Metaphysical Fragments*, in the American translation by Thos. M. Johnson). The One, however, communicates with the Many, and the multitude with the One (Prop. v. of the *Metaphysical Fragments*). But the multitude is posterior to the One. The one ultimate reality was, for Proclus, a self-subsistent essence and eternal principle of movement. Its creative movement or thought was the cause, yet not cause—proceeded from the cause, and returned to the cause. That which proceeded from the cause, and that which returned to the cause, were regarded as being all the time altogether in the cause (Prop. xxxv. of the *Metaphysical Fragments*). The position of Proclus was that there is but one real principle of things—the principle of unity. This, by going forth from itself, but without losing unity, produces everything by triads, for everything is threefold. This triadic march is, in fact, the dynamical idea of his philosophy. Proclus was the first distinctively to affirm triplicity in unity as the essential character of all spiritual reality. In working out his demonstration of this position, the main notions used are those of:—abiding in the producer or unity; the going forth of the produced difference, or duality; and the return to a state of unification. This dynamic monism is, for Proclus, the law of the world. For him, the fundamental things are—*esse*; life or production; and understanding, leading back to unity. His trinity is not the triad of Plotinus, which latter was—the All-Father, the Logos or Mind, and the world-soul. The three moments, in the Proclus connection, are—the One; the Infinite; and the Limited. This means, persistence, procession, and return; in other words, identity, difference, and union. These

are the three momenta of the dialectical process; they are the triad which explains the world, as an emanational development. The use of a triadic form of thought has been well exemplified in our time in Royce, who not only resolves the Divine Nature into Omniscience, Will or Love, and Personality, but seeks to establish an "organic connection" between these two latter and Omniscience (see *The Conception of God*, p. 349). The Many were regarded as the negative of the One, but with movement back to the One; and God was, for him, the Being without negation or limitation. Both he and Plotinus drew largely from the Eastern Magi, as well as from Plato; and if their philosophy "went out in a paroxysm of mystic transcendentalism," it had its important uses and its imposing features, for all that. I do not now dwell on the fact that he took offence at the Christian doctrine of the Creation of the world, nor on the fact that he wrote on Providence, Fate, and Evil, on the last of which he ably argued that evil does not spring from matter, but from the limitation of power. Nor do I dwell on the fact that, in his treatise on the soul and on spirits, he makes these latter (as Burton, in his famous *Anatomy of Melancholy*, vol. ii. pp. 215-216, expresses it) "the middle betwixt God and men," and ascribes to them all offices affecting men. What I am concerned with is, his deep study and dialectic skill in respect of the Platonic theology. For Proclus thought Plato pre-eminent in scientific method, as compared with Orphic symbolism and Pythagorean figurativeness. Proclus says that if Plato shows that the First is not Many, this is because the Many proceed from the First; if he shows it is not a whole, it is because the fact of being a whole proceeds from it. Every whole is, to Proclus, a certain being, but not every being is a whole (Prop. lxxiii. of *Metaphysical Fragments*). The mode of negations is to be taken, it has been said, "as perfection which remains in unity, issues forth from everything, and is in an inexpressible and ineffable preponderance of simplicity." It is from these negations, in the view of Proclus, that God is to be derived, else there would be no Notion of them—and no negation. It is out of the negative that Proclus wins his affirmative determinations, and reaches positive significance. All differences are run back by him into unity. But his is not a unity like that of Plotinus, which was, more finely, reserved for pure reason, but a unity of existence, rather than a unity reached through knowledge. But he kept his hold, such as it was, on the absolute unity, which is not of the nature of multiplicity, though the Many partake of the unity, as we have seen.

His mystical tendencies did not keep him from applying all thought-relations to the sphere of entity.

The Platonic insight, it should be noted, had resolved itself into these propositions: that the Good is super-essential; that Intellect is an "impartible and immovable" essence; and that Soul is a self-motived essence, subsisting, it was said, between intellect and the nature that was round about bodies. To demonstrate and develop such positions was the aim of Proclus, along the lines already indicated. In so doing, he was greatly influenced by the *Parmenides* of Plato, who brings determinatives out of the negative in the way which I have described. Of the *Parmenides* it may be noted that Gomperz comments on "the construction of this work, perhaps the most remarkable of those which Plato wrote" (*Greek Thinkers*, vol. iii. p. 149). It was certainly significant enough for Proclus. It finally laid down "that whether the One is or is not, both it and the Other, in relation to themselves as well as to each other, both are and are not, seem to be and seem not to be." In subtleties of this sort Proclus revelled. But Neo-Platonism advanced from mere subtleties to positions of real suggestiveness for subsequent thought. It sought to bridge the antithesis between God and the world, between spirit and matter, between thinker and thought. In so doing, it passed from the region of the abstract to that of the creative, where the One became marked by a superfluity of potentiality in its creative outgoings. Even in Plotinian thought there was express idea of superfluity in Deity, or radiation of potencies from the Divinity. The idea of continuity haunted the system, as thought became held by the problem of estrangement. The return of man to God was involved in these problems of reconciliation. Emphatic teachings that all is of God, the Primal Source or Unity, and that to Him everything must return, could not but tend to remove clefts or chasms between humanity and the essence of Deity. It would, however, be rather extreme and unwarranted to credit Proclus with any of those later forms of idealism—at least in any real or thorough-going sense—in which the gods and the universe have been supposed to be created purely out of a process of inner thought or dialectic. Neo-Platonism took all motion to proceed from the truly existent, from which it was a going outwards, and presented more a downward view than the upward struggling process of certain forms of modern evolutionism. This is not meant, of course, to exclude certain ascending scales of life, when the visible world came to be dealt with, on the emanational development. Emanational explanation is the Neo-

Platonist resort in respect of the world-process. It may surely be said that such a system as we have from the hands of Proclus is indeed remarkable for its constructive breadth in many ways : it has room for every divinity, a place for every cult, a view of world-process with no inconsiderable claims upon thought, and, behind all, its ultimate First and One, the cause of all the Manifold. But it has the obvious drawback that in it, as a system, all is, and nothing is to be. There is no far-off divine event to which Creation moves ; for there is no final purpose, no background of the Beyond. So it has been maintained, and not without truth ; but it should be remembered that Proclus has a doctrine of his own of the soul's immortality. And, unlike Plotinus, he inclines to rate the soul more highly than the reason.

Again, in dealing with the theology of Plato, Proclus formulates the further determination of the Idea as a triad or trinity. The nature of the triad or trinity I have already specified ; what is of interest is, that Proclus tries to redeem the Neo-Platonist triune conception from abstractness, and that he surpasses Plotinus in clearness and distinction. Much in the way of detail we must forgo here, as not necessary to our present purpose. Enough that the triads determine themselves as Being, Life, Spirit, and that, to Proclus, only the intelligible world is taken for true. It should, however, be noted that the trinity of Proclus, unlike that of Plotinus, is a threefold one ; for each of the three principles is itself a triad, similar and complete as such. Proclus in some sort takes the logic of thought to be the logic of the universe ; the very centre of existence is grasped by thought ; whence it follows that to know the nature of one's mind is to know the nature of the universe. Life is thinking. Being is, to Proclus, just what is thought. Such is his constructive idealism, which, however, it would be easy to take too seriously as an idealism. Later forms of idealistic thought are only too easily read into such a system, whose realistic elements are also to be realised and recognised. It is hardly possible to doubt that, to Proclus, God and the universe existed before his thought about them. In his triads are, "Beauty for order, Truth for purity, and Symmetry for the unity of what is joined together." In all this, the influence of Proclus for subsequent speculation, especially for Hegel, who does him excellent justice, is apparent.

It is somewhat curious that Dr Edward Caird should have been content to close his second volume on *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* with a treatment of

Plotinus, but without reference to the system of Proclus, so important for the work he had in hand. It is also rather strange and incongruous that Mr Benn, in the second volume of his *Greek Philosophers*, while according Proclus "a rare subtlety in the analysis of ideas, and an unsurpassed genius for their systematic arrangement," yet thinks him "one of the most melancholy examples of wasted power to be found in the history of thought." A somewhat extreme and insupportable view, in my judgment, unless indeed philosophers like Hegel and Spinoza are to rank largely in the same category. Mr Benn thinks Proclus might have been "the Laplace or Cuvier of his age." I express thankfulness that he was neither, but the Proclus of all time. It is only partial truth to say that his "immense energies" were devoted to "lifeless abstractions." Even Mr Benn is compelled to admit that æsthetically, if not scientifically, the system of Proclus is "the most comprehensive, the most coherent, and the most symmetrical work of the kind that antiquity has to show." That is to grant all I ask for my present purpose. He even allowed his great desire to give the best expression to the mind of Platonism to overbear the personal propounding of original ideas or opinions; but his originality found scope in the scrutiny, the elaboration, and the perfecting of Neo-Platonism as a system. I have spoken of his logical rigour, but his praise of mysticism was so great as sometimes to seem to conflict with logical severity, especially in respect of his favour shown to forms of mystical theurgy. And his estimate of human reason was not so high as that of Plotinus. It was, nevertheless, by his notional and syllogistic style of exposition that Proclus reached the highest degree of precision attained among the Neo-Platonists. This is not to say that he managed to keep free of arbitrary and assumptive positions, for that is not always the case. His system is thus far from self-consistent. His procedure is, however, more consequential than that of Plotinus, whose scruples of mind he on occasion courageously casts aside. His notional divisions are not, for all that, always carried to strict logical success. More important, however, than the result of Neo-Platonist method was the issue of its aim or end. It hoped the highest from the internal meditation of reason, and yet it allowed itself in the end to relinquish the highest aim of philosophy as unattainable; this it did when it treated what it most wished to know—the One—as unknowable. Now we know in part, but no unwisdom is so great as the undervaluing of the part that we know. Yet that was what Proclus did when he made

the Supreme Reason and Essence incommunicable and out of all relation.

The Neo-Platonic School at Athens, of which Proclus was the latest master, was closed by Justinian in 529 A.D. But the seeds of Greek philosophic thought which it sowed sank into intellectual soil, and helped fertilise the arid fields of mediæval speculation. Their influence is present and potent in the world of thought to-day. For the questions of Proclus—the character of the creative world-process, its dynamic monism, the conception of the transcendent One, the relation of the One to the Many, the notion of unity in triplicity—are still our questions. In the course of history, the terms of error have doubtless been reached and expunged. But the Neo-Platonism which culminated in Proclus has had its truths taken up and assimilated in later growth once and again, and in ways which greatly ministered to the progress of philosophy. One great and obvious gain was the breaking through narrow anthropomorphic forms of polytheistic thought, and the reaching after the One as the immeasurable Source of all things. God was the absolute Universal. With this, there was the further advantage of the procession of the imperfect from the perfect as a necessary and eternal process, wherein the destiny of the individual is realised in return to the Infinite. On the other hand, the idea of the world as a physical or logical necessity of the unfolding Divine Essence came so far short of the idea of Creation as an act of Divine Will as to be in sharp antagonism to Christian philosophy. There was the further drawback of the One being set forth in ways that made Him a Being really unknown, and beyond the reach of all predicates. Such a Being serves no purpose in philosophy, and does not help faith with needed strength. Still, this drawback was lessened by the Neo-Platonic effort to cognise God by mystical exaltation of mind. The theosophist inquiries of Neo-Platonism, however, expressed the attempts at definition at times to such a degree that construction became resolved into constriction. The Neo-Platonic teachings of Proclus left an indelible impress on John of Damascus, Scotus Erigena, Bernard of Chartres, and William of Champeaux, to say nothing of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Bishop Westcott, in his *Religious Thought in the West*, seems needlessly halting as to the indebtedness of Dionysius to Proclus, both in his treatise *On the Divine Names*, and in his conception of the orders of the gods. The teachings of the Jew Avicbron, which exercised a powerful influence on Scholasticism in the thirteenth century, were substantially those of Proclus. Pure

Neo-Platonism persisted in the schools of the Arabic philosophers, whose interpretations took Neo-Platonic cast, though neither Plotinus nor Proclus had professed followers among them. The genius of the Arabian philosophy was due, as Renan pointed out, to Oriental mysticism, and in particular to Persian Sufism. The influence of Proclus is seen, too, in Bruno and Spinoza. The Cambridge Neo-Platonists of the seventeenth century, headed by Cudworth and More, but numbering also Whichcote, Culverwell, and John Smith, were all, in varying degrees, influenced by Neo-Platonic teachings. The Neo-Platonic influence on Hegel and Schelling needs no emphasis. Though the influence of Proclus on subsequent speculation may not have equalled that of Plotinus, yet it has been greater than some important historians of philosophy have supposed. The great issues that have come down to us from Proclus, through such a long stream of influence, I do not propose to discuss within the limits of this paper. My main burden is to insist on the spirit and power in which their discussion must be carried through, namely, the power of constructive intellect, the insights of reason, and the formulations of intelligence.

The necessary confidence in reason or intellect, for the highest constructive tasks, has been weakened in many minds to-day. Thinkers so different as Bradley and Spencer have made pronouncements that tend to this weakening of faith in reason. Then there has been the Bergsonian depreciation of intellect. Further, many minds have been decoyed from the search after the truth-determinations of reason into the discussion of questions of value, which, as such, have really nothing to do with truth. The philosophy of values has its place and its importance. But it is another matter when the One is treated merely as a value—even though it be as “the supreme value,”—for true philosophy and sound theology then gravely suffer. When we so make God only a value, as is done in some recent philosophies of religion, we make Him merely a means to human end, not the Infinite and Eternal One who is in and for Himself and not merely for our valuations. It is in this timeless, unconditioned One that the true and absolute fruition of life must be found. As for much praised intuition, it, too, has its worth for intellect, waiting not for Bergson, but evident and recognised since Aristotle. But I yet insist on the prime need of reason or intellect, for the new constructive tasks of our time—a need not less great than in the days of Proclus or of Hegel. They, like other great constructive thinkers generally, sought objective truth—truth that exists

whether the knowing subject makes it his own or not. The whole territory of the objects of knowledge lay before them, as it lies before us; and there must be no mistrust of reason in the building of our ideal constructions. "*Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen.*" The whole world of spiritual reality, with its profound and perennial problems, lies naked and open to the man whose developed reason believes in the possibility of universally valid forms of knowledge. In such knowledge, but also in the realms of religion and of morality, the precise and pressing need of the time is to find in reason the impulse to unity. Reason has for its content the ideal, the necessary, the universally valid. No finer example of constructive reason at work could be desired than is furnished in the last and redeeming chapter of Dr Frederic Harrison's recent work on *The Positive Evolution of Religion*, wherein are portrayed the splendid persistence and amazing concentration of the philosopher Comte in the production of his great masterpiece. Neither a Hegel nor a Spencer presents a more inspiring spectacle of sacrificial devotion by the constructive spirit to a great task. The case of Proclus is perhaps more difficult, but his splendid dominance of reason or intellect was attained through severest self-discipline, the most unwearied laboriousness, and no lack of trouble and persecution. (See Ritter, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, vol. iv. p. 639.) It is by the universal ideals of reason we are lifted away from and above the particular, the provincial, and the institutional, to heights of feeling, thought, and freedom, with ampler æther and diviner air. In such an atmosphere the conceptional or constructive spirit moves and has its being. Not surprising is it, therefore, to find Proclus, in his forty-second year, saying to himself in these lines:—

"Lo! on my soul a sacred fire descends,
Whose vivid power the intellect extends;
From whence far beaming thro' dull body's night,
It soars to æther deck'd with starry light;
And with soft murmurs thro' the azure round,
The lucid regions of the Gods resound."

The dialectical spirit has its dangers, which Proclus did by no means escape. But he was no merely negative thinker, for rarely has so much of the positive been, so to speak, extracted from the negative; and justice to the negative has always been the lack in philosophy. His depth of insight saved him. He knew how to draw from the strength of Plato on the Good, and from his unsurpassed treatment of the dignity of the soul. We do not escape the "unearthly ballet

of bloodless categories " in Proclus, but we yet find in him much essential truth drawn from the idealism of Plato, and expanded and presented after the forms of his own speculative intellect. Proclus, like Plato, is prone to leave the world of living reality for a universe of thoughts or concepts. But his constructive genius could not, for all his idealistic moods, get wholly away from the world of reality, when he came to build up his system ; for aspects of the universe fall as first objects on the thought of man. And Reason is no lawless thing, but source and spring of the rational universe. Proclus is a striking example of the unifying, judging, and constructive powers or functions of the human mind, whereby he was constrained to run all things back at last into the Primal Unity. Because the constructive elements of the One true Presence are light and love, Proclus did not neglect "the Good." As a thinker, he found in reason the supreme guide of life ; his purified reason heard the whispers of the Divine Goings, and went out to meet them. His problems were problems of the reason: these reason alone can solve. That is what the constructive thinker must not be betrayed into forgetting to-day. His thought-structure, even if it be idealistic, must keep close to palpitating reality, and spring from appreciation of fact ; but his knowledge and insight must find expression in terms of reason. For there is nothing higher in man than reason, and reason cannot transcend itself. But it can know reason other than itself, reason above itself, but still only as reason like itself. It can know the Absolute Reason, always and everywhere the same ; and if it could not so know God as the Supreme Reason, it could not know anything in the unity of a rational system. .

JAMES LINDSAY.

IRVINE, Ayrshire.

STUMBLING-BLOCKS.

MRS A. C. OSLER.

WRITERS of religious tracts must always, it would seem, appeal to a very limited audience, inasmuch as they show an amazing ignorance of the existence of any but one class of unconverted, to which their exhortations are invariably addressed. The objects of their missionary efforts are assumed to be either criminal, vicious, or, at best, self-seeking, pleasure-loving materialists—scoffers at all inward and spiritual grace.

Among this section of humanity, religious revivalists find their most promising harvest field: beyond it they do not often trouble to explore. A typical convert, describing his previous unregenerate condition, says, "The only God I knew was the god of materialism, a creature of man's vain imagination. I had no knowledge of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." Those whose minds and hearts have never been quickened to a perception of the higher purposes or responsibilities of existence are peculiarly favourable subjects for sudden emotional awakenings or seizures of repentance. In such cases the appeal of the ordinary religious tract, though less effective than the passionate human sympathy of the Salvation Army worker, may at any favourable moment supply the kindling spark to aspiration.

Yet by far the greater proportion of modern scepticism lies altogether outside these limits and has its roots in some of the finer aspects of human nature. It is probable that human love, compassion, and goodwill are responsible for as much doubt and loss of religious faith as what the Litany describes as "hardness of heart and contempt of Thy word and commandment."

To a keenly sympathetic and pitiful nature, solicitude for the sufferings of others, which it is powerless to alleviate, may so outweigh personal blessings as to effectually darken and embitter an otherwise happy existence; to a selfish and narrow

nature nothing matters greatly as long as it does not touch his individual life. Loss of faith in omnipotent goodness and wisdom is far more likely to attack the former than the latter nature: yet which of these is the nearer akin to the spirit of Jesus and to the Father whom he revealed?

Without subscribing to the optimism which believes that the world is getting better every day, it may be admitted that religion is decreasingly troubling itself about personal salvation, and increasingly solicitous for the general well-being; less concerned with the tenets of Christianity than with its spirit; less quick to proclaim the wickedness of the world than to leaven it to greater virtue; less occupied with imagining an unimaginable hereafter, than with ameliorating the lot, here and now, of humanity.

It may without difficulty be maintained that except by the cumulative results of knowledge mankind does not progress morally or intellectually, that in actual reasoning and thinking powers we exhibit no advance over the great Greeks or the Oriental philosophers and seers of two thousand years ago. It is, however, indisputable that human nature, whether or not it advances, changes, from century to century, its estimate of the relative importance of ethical standards; and also that the last few centuries have greatly increased the regard paid to human suffering and the value of life. In exceptionally debased individuals we occasionally (through the revelations of Societies for the Protection of Children and Animals) encounter an abnormal instinct of cruelty and even a mania for inflicting pain; but anything approaching the wholesale torture permitted, and even approved, in the Middle Ages, is to-day inconceivable. For the greater security of life, for the partial conquest by science of bodily pain, and for the greater luxury and softness of civilised existence, humanity has paid by a loss of endurance power, an over-sensitive imagination, and a highly developed nervous system. Pain, whether our own or others', looms ever larger in our outlook on life, and accounts for much of that sombreness and pessimism which is undermining the gaiety of men in the Western World. To this sensitiveness is probably partly due the rapid advance of democracy and socialism, which finds only a half-hearted resistance among the classes who have most to lose by it, and whose self-interest is undermined by their sympathy with, and shrinking from, pain and poverty.

What thoughtful observer can fail to be struck by the changed note in the criticism of labour unrest to-day, from

that of thirty years ago, when revolt by the workers against the hard conditions of industrial life was generally regarded as merely criminal and calling for nothing but repression?

This impatience and intolerance of suffering has entered into the sphere of religion as well as of politics. That for which we arraign our social system, our governors, even ourselves, we resent also in the government of the world. And, as the rebellion of the actual sufferers is met and reinforced by the sympathy of their more fortunate fellows, so it is the sensitive and altruistic natures, pondering on what they behold around them, who are chiefly impelled to doubt and challenge.

Thus it comes about that not the selfish and pleasure-seeking, but the honest and sympathetic minds find themselves intellectually unable to accept or retain a religious faith which postulates an omnipotent and beneficent ruler of the universe—the “heavenly Father” of Christianity. A personal God, they say, with a direct love and benevolent regard for his creatures, and supreme power to ordain the conditions of their existence, would not permit the widespread continuance of pain, struggle, and suffering.

At the present time, when the aggregate of human suffering exceeds perhaps that of any other epoch, this challenge to religious faith is making itself felt and heard with persistency. While a certain body of opinion maintains that the tremendous experiences of war are quickening religious emotion, another section asserts that they are causing a revulsion to scepticism, due to the obvious difficulty of conceiving a beneficent and also omnipotent Deity who could permit the earth to fall into such chaos. The somewhat facile shuffling off of human responsibility implied in the latter view would seem, however, only possible to those who deny to humanity all free will and choice of action; and must logically cancel our right to arraign or condemn our enemies, who, equally with ourselves, become the helpless and predestined victims of Fate. But whatever force such a theory may exercise over some minds, it assuredly does not dominate or direct the lives of the majority of mankind. We accept responsibility for our own actions, albeit with a secret indefeasible hope that somehow and sometimes we may escape their consequences.

It is perhaps possible to conceive of a world brought into being without the slow processes of evolution, perfect and complete in every part; and even a state of conscious being in which all suffering and change should be unknown—a world with no adaptation of means to ends (for no ends

would exist), and where every organic or inorganic unit would be of equal and unvarying importance, no part being subordinate or sacrificed to another. But has such a conception any value, any attraction for us? Our modern ideals, even of a future life, are conceived in terms of evolution, of progress, and we no longer desire the old-fashioned heaven of our ancestors where, as it was graphically described by an American, "you just float round like jujube paste."

Our conception of Deity is necessarily anthropomorphic. In each age it embodies the human qualities most esteemed by man. In the dark age of superstitious fear, Deity manifests itself through witchcraft and magic; in the age of savage conquest, as a god of war; in the age of Christian pity, as a philanthropist: each successive conception excludes to a greater or less degree all attributes which militate against the characteristics temporarily regarded as worthiest.

To the present generation, cruelty—pitilessness—insensibility to the misery of others are perhaps the most repellent characteristics. May it not be that modern scepticism is largely due to the need of a readjustment of our ideas concerning the God we worship, rather than the outgrowing of that need for worship which characterises all human history?

An attitude of mere negation is rare. In most minds one ideal survives until displaced by another. A rationalistic revolt from religious faith is not infrequently followed by an amazing credulity in some other direction.

It is therefore worth while to examine the theories of man's relation to the universe embraced by those who discard religion.

As an explanation of human history and evolution, blind chance is seldom accepted. More often some guiding force is postulated, under the names of a world-spirit, a formative tendency, a mighty impulse, or the like; and the conclusion is drawn from the study of evolutionary development that this tendency is, on the whole, towards good and not evil. It has been argued that mere adaptation to environment is not sufficient to account for progress from the lowest to the highest forms of life, and that the lowest are actually better adapted to their surroundings than the highest; that some intelligent impulse is necessary to account for selective progress. Without attempting to enter the domain of science, let us assume the tendency to good, and ask ourselves what idea it conveys to us, in connection with humanity.

It implies, surely, truth, wisdom, power, beauty, love:

these attributes so balanced, harmonised, and interfused that they shall not result (as we too often find them doing in human beings) in neutralising or destroying each other.

It is this conception which is our stumbling-block. Because, in human nature, wisdom may conflict with love, truth with beauty, therefore we can discern no possibility of their reconciliation and unity in a Divine Being. Supreme wisdom could have devised a world without suffering; supreme love seems incompatible with pain, ugliness, and waste.

True, the world-spirit or formative tendency which we find it comparatively easy to believe in, and even to acknowledge as predominantly good, still presents these same stumbling-blocks. If the facts of existence are irreconcilable with omnipotent goodness, why not with a "good" formative tendency?

Moreover, those facts include not merely the direct effects upon man of his environment, but the reactions of man himself upon the world, such as the response of pity to pain, and the natural indignation and impulse to retrieve the situation stimulated by wrong. These far-reaching actions and reactions, proving man to be an integral part and agent in the scheme of things, indicate intelligent intention, which hardly finds adequate description as a "good" formative tendency.

If goodness means truth, beauty, and love, it means these whether found in a tendency or a personality: nor can we escape the problem by deprecating any claim by a "tendency" to human veneration and devotion, since it is the attributes themselves which make this claim on us.

We are ready to acquiesce in the ultimate "rightness" and justification of the forces of struggle and suffering through and by which evolution works; we acknowledge the good results which may frequently be traced to the most appalling catastrophes: the spreading wave of human pity and helpfulness which follows some overwhelming calamity, and draws together the hearts of peoples of alien and even inimical sentiments; the impulse to mental effort, forethought and invention stimulated by a disastrous shipwreck or mine explosion; the national inspiration of the death of a hero in the performance of duty; the scientific discoveries which respond to the needs of agonised humanity. Few of us, had we the power, would dare to haggle, retrospectively, over the aggregate price paid for the advance of civilisation. The sufferings of maternity, of war, and slow disease are frequently cited as among the stumbling-blocks to faith in omnipotent benevolence. Yet the conception of a method of reproduction as unconscious

and impersonal as that of the vegetable world, and a relinquishment of life as simple as the blowing out of a match flame, with the extinction of the sympathy and responsibility born of the two most impressive of human experiences, leaves us at once on the level of the vegetable and inanimate kingdoms, and incites us to cry with Ruskin, "It is not less sensation we want, but more." . . . We find no difficulty in loving and venerating, as a type of justice and benevolence, that great English Governor (Lord Lawrence) who declared, "Mercy to the individual may be cruelty to the race." We admit, in short, the justification of the inexorable law of sacrifice—the one for the many—the many for the whole; and for faithfulness to this law we exonerate from blame either an infallible "formative tendency" or a fallible human ruler. So far we have suggested no appeal to faith or trust, but merely to our reason on the facts before us. Can we extend our conclusions from the acts of man to the acts of God?

The varying conceptions of Deity held in successive epochs are an acknowledgment that none can be more than an approximation, that all conceptions must be bounded by the narrow limits of our intellectual and spiritual apprehension. Recognition of the kingdom of God within us does not imply that our finite minds can contain infinite truth. What, then, is gained by substituting such terms as "world-spirit" or "formative tendency" for the comprehensive "God"? Is it easier to conceive a vague tendency, without conscious purpose, towards some unformulated end, than to believe in a directing and beneficent intelligence? Is it more reasonable to attribute to a "tendency" a character wholly good, than to extend to Divine Fatherhood our sanction of the temporary denial of happiness by an earthly parent; the deliberate sacrifice of life permitted by a General in command; the ready self-immolation of the patriot or martyr for an idea?

Sir Oliver Lodge has pointed out the absolute inability of ant consciousness to conceive the existence of the human power which dominates the lower forms of life; and Professor William James illustrates the same idea by the domestic animals—dogs, for instance—who are *in* our life but not *of* it, unable to comprehend the bearing and meaning of what they see and experience. He adds that the conceivable assent of the dog's mind to sacrifice and suffering (even such suffering as that involved in vivisection), if the purpose could be understood, throws a light on the problem of human suffering.

If a distinction be drawn between the sacrifice of self, and that of others, it may be answered that the ideal personal

relationship between man and God expressed in the words, "I and my Father are one," obliterates the distinction, for if, in any infinitesimal degree, His being is ours, our sacrifice is also His.

Insistence on the indivisibility of cause and effect—the operation of the law of consequences—is indeed the main distinction of a wise educational system. What intelligent, conscientious parent has not yielded to, or suffered acutely in resisting, the prompting of affection to shield her child from the natural consequences of error or wrongdoing? She yields in the hope that tenderness may atone for unwisdom; or she resists in the faith that the child's intelligence will eventually justify her, as indeed it often does, in the assent of maturity to the discipline of its own youth.

A similar assent to the Divine Will, and the complete subordination of happiness (our own and others') to ultimate good is actually possible to human nature. A great soldier, unable himself to reconcile faith in God with the conditions of the world, could yet boast of his absolute reliance on his fellow-man; and in starting on a perilous military enterprise expressed his confidence that in any crisis the Viceroy who had despatched him would assuredly support him. Yet, if some higher consideration of imperial safety or advantage had demanded his abandonment, he would undoubtedly have acquiesced in that sacrifice.¹

A similar self-abnegation is on record in the famous declaration of Sir Thomas More: "If my father stood on one side, and the devil on the other, and his cause just, the devil should have right."²

A personal religion thus demanding unconditional allegiance to our highest conceptions; which comprehends our wonder and veneration for wisdom, our delight in beauty, our inspiration and aspiration through love—is far indeed from leading us back to the old idea of the private possession of a supreme patron saint whose special task it is to concern himself with the desires and prosperity of an individual, a sect or a clan.

Prayer also—the irrepressible fundamental birth-cry of humanity—must change its form many times in the evolution of every soul. The categorical statement of simple and selfish

¹ *Within*, by Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.I.E., LL.D.

² Compare, as a further illustration of a certain type of modern thought, the ideal of a fallible and finite God, evolved in Mr H. G. Wells' luminous study—*Mr Britling Sees it Through*. Again we are driven to ask why it should be easier to yield allegiance to such an authority than to one less clearly comprehensible but immeasurably higher?

requests which constitutes the prayers of little children, demands in natural sequence the addition, "Nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt"; and with the spiritual coming of age, and the subtle transference of our supreme allegiance from the Ego to the Alter, there comes, to many, an instinctive avoidance in prayer of the pronoun "I," in favour of the more embracing "we." We hesitate increasingly to proffer petitions for personal safety and advantage, or for the realisation of our dearest hopes; the very outpouring of our gratitude for personal happiness may be at times tinged with shame, that we should rejoice while our fellows weep: even the irrepressible, agonised appeal, "If it be possible let this cup pass from me," breaks in the inarticulate moan, "Into Thy hands, O Lord—into Thy hands."

"God's scheme for us," wrote Florence Nightingale, "was not that He should give us what we asked for, but that mankind should obtain it for mankind."

Thus prayer becomes increasingly a conscious effort for communion and harmony with the spirit of unified love, truth, and beauty—the merging of our own will in a wiser and safer will than itself. In this fusion of the human with the divine, achieved, it may be, only in the glowing furnace of suffering, lie the consolations of religion—"the peace which passeth understanding."

Impossible as it is to decipher the ultimate purpose of creation, the mere happiness of sentient beings is an even less satisfying solution of the problem than the evolution of ideal personalities, which, if seldom realised, are at least conceivable to us, and the nearest approximations to which are less frequently developed by ease and happiness than by the admixture, if not predominance, of adversity and suffering. Pain, even the extremest pain, may remain an inevitable adjunct of life; but discord and bewilderment of soul (what in daily life we call worry) may disappear; as, looking from a mountain top, we perceive the relative insignificance of the obstacles which wounded our feet and exhausted our strength on the upward climb. It is true that those who easily forget the toils may equally overlook the joys and compensations of life: in most natures there would seem to be a special sensitiveness to one or the other aspect, and of all spiritual endowments there is perhaps none for which we have such reason to be grateful as for a cheerful temperament. No thoughtful observer (especially one who has attained an intimate knowledge of many lives) would maintain that the happiness or misery of any man depends mainly on his outward environment, circumstances,

and experiences. The paradox is undeniable that the most sorrow-full life may also be the happiest, and *vice versa*. And albeit the variations of "temperament" may incapacitate us for drawing up a profit and loss account of our own or other lives, the fact remains that only an infinitesimal number of us make the deliberate choice of refusing to live, and these not deliberately, but under some sudden stress of bewildering calamity.

"We hide our eyes
And think all ended. Then, Life calls to us
In some transformed, apocalyptic voice,
Above us, or below us, or around :
Perhaps we name it Nature's voice, or Love's,
Tricking ourselves, because we are more ashamed
To own our compensations than our griefs :
Still, Life's voice ! still we make our peace with Life."

E. B. B.

"We make our peace with Life." But does that peace imply more than a stoical acceptance? Something more than this is meant by the consolations of religion. This is a point indeed at which we pass beyond the domain of argument into that of emotion; no religion is possible without love. And "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen"?

Although few lives are lived with absolutely no knowledge of love, yet it has as many characters and degrees as the analogous term religion. There is a love born of mere propinquity, and a love which is largely reflective and responsive; and there is a love which can create and sustain joy in our souls by the mere fact of its mutual conscious existence, independent of the stimulus and satisfaction of presence and intercourse. Human love not infrequently demands from us what might be called blind faith, trust in some action or inaction which we cannot, for the time being, explain or interpret; and tried by this touchstone, how few characters emerge triumphantly from the ordeal! Most of our imaginative stories and dramas would lose the chief elements of their plots were human hearts more trustful; but there would be fewer needless tragedies in real life. Souls which are capable of the highest human trust are capable of it also in their union with the Divine; but it does not follow that they will attain it, nor even that they will be conscious of any need or desire for it. Some few of the strongest among us may find in their faith in their fellows and themselves the requisite strength and support for life's battles; but if this be not merely the self-confidence of untried strength, destined to

fail them under the burden of maturity, their outlook on life will be one of stoical sadness rather than of serenity and hope. But surely to the majority of average men and women the abiding sense of secure dependence on a wisdom beyond their own; of an unchanging faithfulness of purpose and understanding on which to rest; of an inexhaustible fountain of strength and refreshment at which to renew inspiration and courage—constitutes the central fundamental blessing and support of existence.

Supreme and unfathomable love—the dim reflection of which in humanity can alone suggest to us a solution of the mysteries of existence—is the only key to that peace which the world cannot give. Science, philosophies, creeds, “arguments about it and about,” leave those mysteries unilluminated: only through the most common and universal of all human experiences do we grasp for fleeting moments a clue to the unknowable.

The glorious audacity of the astronomers who predicted—nay demanded—the discovery of the planet Neptune, as alone able to account for certain celestial phenomena, finds a spiritual parallel in the demand of reason for a purpose in human destiny. Nothing less than Divine Love can justify or account for the stupendous problem of suffering:—

“Oh you
Earth’s tender and impassioned few!
Take courage to entrust your love
To Him so named, who guards above
Its ends, and shall fulfil,
Breaking the narrow prayers that may
Befit your narrow hearts, away
In His broad loving Will.”

E. B. B.

CATHERINE C. OSLER.

BIRMINGHAM.

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS IN AMERICAN COLLEGES.

CARL HOLLIDAY,

Professor of English, University of Montana, Missoula.

WHAT are the present generation of college students thinking about church, religion, and God—or are they giving the subject any consideration at all? It would astonish the average non-academic layman to know how frequently this topic is in the minds of the young men in our universities—non-sectarian universities at that—and how seriously and sometimes profoundly they will discuss the theme when occasion arises. Indeed, fifteen years' experience in the classroom has convinced me that the average college man is giving far more thought to the question of religion than the average non-college man of the same age, and far more than most of our clergy are willing or able to comprehend.

Of the college girl I cannot say so much. Undoubtedly she goes to church far more frequently than does her collegiate brother; but my numerous discussions with students of both sexes lead me to believe that the girl accepts with but little thought the old and conventional standards of creed which perplex or even prompt absolute denial on the part of the young men. In fact, in my conversations on this topic with scores of my students, I have seldom found a college woman who showed unmistakable signs of having thought deeply at all on the essence of God and religion, while among the men I have found scores who have struck boldly out into the ocean of doubt and reflection and have reached havens of positive and decidedly unique belief. Indeed so unorthodox are some of their conclusions that one is reminded of Coleridge's reply to the question to what church one of his doctrines belonged. "Sir," said Coleridge, "that is the doctrine of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Infallible Church, of which I am at present the only member."

Certainly one of the doctrines of these young intellects is that the preaching heard in the churches does not square with the conclusions of the laboratories and the expressions of the poets and philosophers in the university library. Of this these college men seem positive, and they prefer to believe the experiments, the poets, and the philosophers. Indeed, it must be admitted that they imply, if they do not openly express, considerable scorn for the average preacher, whose training in literature and especially in the sciences strikes them as scarcely on a par with that of a sophomore, and whose delivery and keenness of thought are not equal to those of many of the professors whom the students hear daily.

There was a time when the preacher's voice was the voice of God; to this generation of college students it is the voice simply of a man whose intellect, training, knowledge of the laws of life, and ability to interpret are no better than those of the students themselves.

Hence, the average man student strikes out for himself in the matter of beliefs. And what are these beliefs? Undoubtedly he has concluded that there is a God. In fifteen years of college work I have not found an infidel among students; their studies have led them to agree with the Lecontes that all science must take for granted a First Great Cause, call it God or what you will. Nor have I found a student who did not believe in a Hereafter. And as to the character of this Eternity they are indeed far more positive in their conclusions than the average outsider. As many have expressed it to me, their "sense of fairness" demands a Heaven and a Hell, but I have found very few students who considered these other than *states of conscience after death*. As one said, "I believe that every mortal who has done wrong must pass through a condition of conscience known as hell before entering the opposite condition of conscience known as heaven." In all my experience as a teacher I have found but three male students who believed in an *eternal* hell; but I must confess that I have found a fairly large number of young college women who have never doubted it. Various reasons for their own belief have been advanced by the men, but in the main these were summed up in the two conclusions: "A perfect God could not countenance eternal torture," and "God could not be considered victorious and perfect as long as suffering and rebellion existed in His universe."

Therefore these college men, as I have known them, are almost unanimous in the doctrine that *all* souls will finally reach the condition known as heaven. These young thinkers do not doubt that some souls shall experience this condition

later than others; for, as they argue, because of the very nature of the human conscience which has been outraged here on earth, the period of chastening and learning and evolving must be much longer for some spirits.

How do these young men *know* these things? They simply answer that they have thought it out this way. Often the college girls have replied to my inquiry, "The Bible says so"; but seldom indeed has a college man answered me thus. And this leads to the second point, "What are college men thinking of the Bible?" It would surprise some pessimistic preachers to know how appreciative many a college man is of the Bible as a keen, deep, subtle, and beautiful *expression*. In my teaching experience I have found innumerable young men who spoke with enthusiasm of the Psalms, the Book of Job, the Sermon on the Mount, as marvellous *expressions* of the human heart; but that the book is *infallible truth* from cover to cover—there your young college man takes issue. I have found that he is more than willing to consider it the best guide yet written for living, and that its writers were inspired—just as Confucius, Socrates, and Emerson were inspired—to the extent that God granted them such keenness of vision that they were able to see more deeply into the meaning of life than can ordinary men. But that the divine message has never been misinterpreted or perverted through human weakness, prejudice, and racial environment, seems, so far as I have been able to judge, incredible to upper classmen who have done any original research in sociology, history, and literature.

My conversations with students in several sections of America convince me that the fact that they consider many portions of the Bible merely folk legends, similar in origin to the King Arthur legends, does not in the least decrease for them the value of the Book as a guide for life. To the strictly orthodox this may seem nothing short of a distinct breaking down of faith; but I make bold to say that many of these more serious-minded students reveal a faith in the gradual unfolding of a divine plan that I have not found in many strict church members. In fact, a number of these young men—some in Southern colleges and some in the Middle and Far West—have declared confidently that God is still speaking directly to the world through sincere thinkers, writers, and scientists, and that greater revelations than He has yet given the world are to come.

In the doctrine of original sin the modern college student puts little or no faith. The declaration of the New England Primer,

"In Adam's fall
We fellèd all,"

strikes the thinking college student as too unfair to be of divine origin; because Adam sinned, many of them have said to me, is no reason for my being sinful. Indeed, not a few of the more advanced students have maintained with considerable indignation that *man has never fallen from grace*; but that, on the contrary, all history shows that the race has gradually toiled upward, slowly, and through infinite suffering, toward the spiritual, and that its goal is nothing short of spiritual perfection. Perhaps in the grip of a harsh and rather selfish world these young enthusiasts may gradually shed this faith in man's evolution; be that as it may, I am simply recording what intimate conversation with these products of our colleges has revealed to me.

As to Jesus—I have yet to hear one college man among all the thousands I have taught speak but in admiration of Him. And yet their views, in the main, have certainly not been of the evangelical type. These young men believed that He lived and that He was the profoundest ethical teacher the world had produced; many of them have declared to me their absolute belief that He was actually chosen by the Creator before all other beings to show men how to live; but that he was very God, this I have found the majority unwilling to believe. I have had them point out to me that He never claimed to be God; that he declared Himself to be *the son of man*, and declared all of us to be *sons of God*. I have had many a college man state to me that undoubtedly Jesus was nearer perfection than any other human being before or since His time; but I have been astonished to find how many seriously believe that through concentrated effort *any human being* could approach the same perfection. It is perhaps this faith in the intrinsic excellence of human nature that causes so many college men to listen respectfully and not to sneer, as their forefathers did, at the teachings of Buddha, Confucius, Mohammed, and other ethical leaders.

Therefore these young thinkers seem very willing to concede, what too many pulpit leaders are not willing to concede, that several religions beside the Christian are, in many essentials, sound and decidedly helpful.

The attitude of many modern college students on the subject of prayer would make the ghosts of Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards hold up their hands in horror. And yet the modern student will cite you as many proofs from his studies in psychology, sociology, and science as ever Jonathan Edwards did from his metaphysics and theology. Scientific training has convinced many a college man that *no prayer for*

the answering of which the natural laws of the universe would have to be modified will ever be answered. Again, I have found no small number of students who hold that all prayers for *material* blessings, such as food, clothing, rains, crops, etc., are useless in so far as the effect on the economic supply and demand is concerned, and in support of this theory some have quoted the words of Jesus, "Your Father knoweth what things ye have need of before ye ask Him."

What, then, orthodox thinkers may exclaim, is the use of prayer? Do these young men consider it utterly worthless? By no means. As some of them have expressed it to me, prayer has an *immense psychological value*, so great a value, in fact, in its effect on the mind and spirit of the praying one that it may almost cause miracles. For through prayer one concentrates passionately on one's needs, wants, desires, ambitions, and ideals, and the psychological value of this concentration cannot be overestimated in its stimulating effect upon the will-power and in its ability to give self-confidence. For if an ideal be once accurately pictured and set firmly in the consciousness, a long step has been made toward possession of that ideal. Again, students have spoken earnestly of prayer as a means of gaining a closer relationship with the Divine, in other words, as a *source of potency*, just as though one had gained electrical power from a mighty dynamo. It is not a bad idea, this view of prayer as a daily tapping of the Universal Energy for one's own strengthening, and some churchmen who go about prayer in a perfunctory manner might well consider the theory.

A few students whom I have met have seen that the natural conclusion to be drawn from such theories on prayer would be that the only perfect prayer is either an absolute demand based on the mutual intelligence and justice of God and man, or an absolute acquiescence to the Ruling Spirit, summed up in the simple words, "Thy will be done." After all, are these not the two elements in the so-called Lord's Prayer, dictated by Christ himself? One student pushed his conclusions a step further, and declared to me that, since the value of prayer was psychological and that the natural laws of the universe could not be changed through prayer, then *in actual results* prayers to an idol, an ancestor, a saint, a Messiah, or a God would be of equal value, or even that prayer to *one's self* would be of equal value as a strengthening act and concentration on ideals.

That these views hold for the majority of American college students I am not prepared to assert; I can simply offer what

my experience with college men in ten states—South, East, and West—has shown me. That these young men do not discuss such theories more openly outside the academic atmosphere is not surprising; for they know the attitude of the outside world toward heretical views in religion. As one of my students wrote in a class theme, “We know that these doctrines are not suited to the nature of the majority of present-day beings; for the average man is still half pagan and requires a religion of personal authority, not unmixed with fear.” Doubtless, however, he considered the doctrines nevertheless true; for truth exists independent of the acquiescence of mankind or of its usefulness to present conditions.

Let no one think, however, that religion is a dead issue in American colleges. Now and again in the fraternity houses it comes in for serious discussion; one hears snatches of conversation about it of evenings on the campus or in the dormitory; at times, in spite of the instructor’s instinctive avoidance, it will bob up in the class discussions of literature, biology, or philosophy.

It is not the old-time evangelical religion; it is more individualistic probably than ever before; but yet it seems to be infused with the spirit of service for mankind. Unlike the old-time religion, it does not demand that morality and religion be one; for many a college man to-day looks upon morality not as the child of religion, but as the result of collective habits and social instincts, and as something that may exist independent of religion. Religion to the average modern college thinker is a matter of man’s relationships to the Divine, and the expression of those relationships in service to mankind. I believe that the sentiment is growing among students that we cannot really love an abstraction such as God, but that the nearest approach to it that can be expected of us is love of God’s creatures, love of Nature, love of our fellow-men.

There is a vast amount of magnificent spiritual energy lying dormant and practically useless in the great college student-body of to-day. That it is not engaged in definite activity may be laid at the door of sticklers for creeds which to thousands of these young men seem untenable and positively unworthy of belief. Religion is a natural thing; theology an invention of man. If ever this youthful religious thought finds a broad and sympathetic leader, the spiritual world may leap forward as it has never done before.

CARL HOLLIDAY.

IS LIBERTY AN ADEQUATE IDEAL OF STATE ACTION?

HENRY W. CLARK, D.D.

IT is nearly always time, when some particular word has so thoroughly commended itself to great numbers of men as to become a catchword, and to be accepted as standing for the beginning, middle, and end of the highest good—it is then nearly always time for some cautions concerning its use to be put in. For a term which truly represents the *summum bonum* under one set of circumstances may fail to do so when circumstances have changed: sometimes it may be the partial obtaining of the *summum bonum*—the partial success of action taken under the catchword's inspiration—which brings about such changes that the old term, though it stood properly for what was the *summum bonum* over against the old conditions, no longer stands properly for what is the *summum bonum* over against the new; and besides, from a constantly repeated word implications are dropped which used to be taken as understood. What it comes to is that we may lose hold upon an old ideal, or upon much of its meaning and content, simply by clinging to the old word or words, phrase or phrases, which embodied the whole of it once.

Which may serve as a preface to the not profitless inquiry, Does the word "liberty"—the word incessantly and hoarsely shouted from hundreds of thousands of throats—suggest a sufficiently high and inclusive ideal for men and women to aim at as the result of their political activities? Is the giving of liberty—of liberty so to say bare, and sheer, and not looking before or after—the supreme ministry of the State? And is the winning of such liberty the supreme aim which the units composing the State should set before themselves when they make their contribution to the collective action of the whole? Further, if the term, properly understood, and as mayhap it was once understood, does suggest an ideal sufficiently

inclusive and high, does it make an equally complete suggestion as it is commonly understood and employed to-day? Of course, in asking these questions we take moral ends into our reckoning and look at the matter from the moral point of view. From that standpoint, how does the thing look? Is "liberty" a sufficient end and aim for a manhood which wants to make the most of itself in the loftiest sense of all? If not, then with what qualifications, additions, or implications must the word be used if it is to be accepted as giving all we need?

I.

An elementary consideration which is often forgotten may well furnish the point from which the discussion sets out, the consideration being this—that liberty is in itself a purely negative thing, signifying nothing more than the absence of restraint. A man is not free when, either through being deprived of something to which he has a legitimate claim or through being oppressed under *force majeure*, he is unable to send forth his activities along lines he desires to conquer; and with the supply of what is lacking, or with the removal of the hampering tyranny, liberty comes. The essential point is that the obtaining of liberty is only the preliminary to something more, that the glow with which liberty shines is light reflected from the glory of a positive ideal to whose realisation liberty opens the way. Liberty is the breaking of barriers which have dammed back the stream—a breaking done with the consciousness that there *are* behind the barriers fretful waters waiting for their chance to run down towards the sea, and that there *is* a sea which the waters are to reach at last. Liberty presents itself in the final analysis as being valuable, not in itself, but because it subserves the attainment of some further end. In itself, it means nothing more than a clear field. And always, close upon the idea of freedom *from* something, we have to face the idea of freedom *for* something or freedom *to* something. Freedom is merely the opening of a possibility, the throwing down of a forbidding signboard on which "No thoroughfare" has warningly stood out before.

Taking a step upward, now, from this quite elementary consideration, we find ourselves confronted at once by a question like this: What, in the last resort, is the line of action for which liberty (the final liberty into which by successively won subordinate liberties, so to call them, we are brought) is to set us free? What is the supreme use to which freedom—the freedom won by a nation from alien

oppressors, by a people from a tyrannical Government, by unfairly weighted classes of society from a dominant caste, by workers from unjust employers—what is the supreme use to which freedom can and ought to be put? The answer must surely be this. We need to be free for the development of personality along moral lines towards moral ideals—free to realise ourselves, not of course in the sense of giving unlimited play to every wayward impulse or to every instinct which may for the moment seek to usurp regnant power, but in the sense of giving to our own personality its true worth and place in a universal scheme of things which is moral in its original design and at its inmost heart. Whatever may hinder self-realisation in that loftiest sense, we want (and ought to want) to shake off all those weights of circumstances, be they social, political, or what they may, which are mere impertinences thrust upon us under a warrant not really binding because it is only in the interests of an artificial system that it has been forged; and it is, ultimately, for the sake of that moral scheme wherein our own morally cultivated personality has some part to play that protest against the hindrances should be made; and we need to make the most of ourselves in order that the moral scheme may obtain the utmost possible out of us and find us, for its own ends, of the utmost possible worth. The only noble pursuit of liberty is a pursuit of it which knows, even while the panting race for liberty is being run, that this is not the end; which holds the true prize to be, not liberty itself, but a moral self-development and culture made, not by any means inevitable, but at least possible, when liberty is won; and which calls for the bursting of fetters, not chiefly that the released prisoner may go out and annex the earth, but that he may lift his heart and head to heaven.

But this implies, is indeed only another way of saying, that men need to be free in order that they may submit to and obey the supreme authority of all. Freedom *from* means freedom *for* and freedom *to*; and in the last analysis this means that the quest of freedom, if the quest is to be redeemed from meanness and to possess any worthy quality, must carry a sense of obligation at its heart, and that those who pursue it must seek to be free only in order that they may be truly and worthily bound. Apart from a positive ideal, liberty is meaningless; but that is not all. For although, when you draw a circle round this or that department of life, you may say that within each narrow circle man needs freedom in order that he may reach an ideal which *he demands*, yet when you

draw your circle round the *whole* of life and inquire as to the ideal for whose sake the *whole* needs to be free, the reply is that man needs to be free in order that he may reach, not an ideal which *he demands*, but an ideal which *demands him*. Man's claim for liberty is only a preface to a claim which he does not make, but which is made upon him. In the last resort, man's struggle for liberty, any help his already more favoured brethren may afford him, any demands for liberty which he may present to the community as a whole and any enactments whereby the community as a whole may respond to those demands—in the last resort, all these things must be dominated by the idea that man is to be free for obedience to ultimate moral authority, free for all procedures and processes which moral authority enjoins. Otherwise, indeed, perfected freedom would be anarchy, neither more nor less. Distinctly religious speech would put it, of course, in some such way as Tennyson adopts when he says "Our wills are ours to make them Thine"—would put it that man wants freedom so that he may be the more completely captive to God and to all the spiritual ideals His name suggests. But short of distinctly religious speech, we may put it that man wants to be free so that he may make the most of himself—and this means, in the end, that he wants to be free so that the authoritative moral order may make the most of him and claim him for its own. Other things must cease their interference with him so that moral authority may interfere with him the more. And it is that consummation that all struggles for liberty and all grants of liberty alike must look to and help on.

II.

All this will hardly be disputed by anyone who looks beneath the external surface of things. And yet, as a matter of fact, it is not in the interests and for the sake of a subsequent moral culture under the guidance of a moral authority that those who clamour most loudly for liberty desire their prize. Liberty *for itself* is the cry—the cry which all parties in the community listen to with respect and seek to satisfy, differing only as to the extent to which compliance with it is safe and wise. It is forgotten that freedom *from* has value only as it introduces freedom *for* and freedom *to*; and in the circumstances of social progress much of what has been just laid down drops out of sight.

Nor, unfortunate as the consequences of this forgetfulness may be, is it difficult to understand how the forgetfulness itself

comes about. For at first—the glance of history, as it sweeps across the past, lights upon many a point of proof—liberty is so obviously absent that the mere getting of it, irrespective of the use to which it is going to be put, is the evident thing to strive for. The record of social and political advance unfolds itself from the starting-point of monarchies which have tyrannised over their subjects, of aristocracies which have oppressed the rank and file, of wealth which has ground the faces of the poor; and each new chapter of the story begins with an awakened consciousness as to filched privileges and stolen rights on the part of those held down. The flagrant fact of the situation—the fact which stares them in the face until its reproach or its mockery or the self-pity it engenders goads them to revolt—is not the fact that their restraint at the hands of man forbids them to work out their own moral possibilities in the light of moral ideals, but the restraint (and the injustice of it) itself. It is the impertinence to their manhood, not their manhood's moral loss, that stands out for the major matter in their eyes; and the repudiation of the impertinence, the assertion of manhood's rights against interfering man, is clearly enough the immediate duty of the hour. Nor is this said in any wise by way of blame. What else but the chains he wears, and the cruelty of the hand which has loaded them upon him—and what delight it would be to see them snap and hear their fragments fall upon the prison floor!—what else but these things could any man think of when the galling of the fetters is at its worst? In the nature of the case, liberty must present itself to man, at any rate for a time, not as an angelic messenger telling of something greater yet to come, but as the veritable god. Freedom is, as has been said, a purely negative state; but it is from the *negation* of that *negative* state that social development begins; and the negation of the negative state means the *positive* fact of oppression on the one side and of being oppressed on the other; and for the positive state of being oppressed freedom discloses itself as the *positive* cure. “Enlargement,” “scope,” “self-assertion,” as against positive hostile pressures—these words embody the total need of the hour.

But in this way the formula “liberty for itself” acquires permanent authority, and “liberty for itself” comes to be taken as being through all stages up to the final and through all time up to the end—what for particular stages and for particular times it was—the one all-sufficient boon. For there is nothing in the successful flinging off of restraint after restraint that automatically suggests the development of

personality under moral authority to a moral goal as the proper consequent of such a progressive deliverance: indeed, the mere delight of enlargement is as likely as not to become an intoxication which satisfies all desires except the desire to experience it again; and the idea of liberty *for* or liberty *to* will still—however frequently the prize of liberty *from* be won—remain hidden behind the veil that concealed it at first.

And therein lies danger—sure disaster too, unless at some point or other, and that at a point not set too late, the State pulls itself up, and declares in the persons of its responsible guides that its very quest for liberty, its very bestowal of liberty upon its members, is to be inspired, if need be limited, by some worthy conception of an ulterior and ultimate purpose for which freedom should be used.

III.

For with the removal of positive oppressions and disabilities in this department and that, there comes a time when the idea of “liberty for itself”—in other words “liberty *from*”—has, on a strict interpretation of it, been carried as far as it will go. If now the idea of liberty *to* fails to supplant the earlier idea of liberty *from*, if the habit of seeking liberty for itself persists as the controlling habit after its vocation has been fulfilled, how will the habit work out? “Enlargement,” “scope,” “self-assertion”—if these are still the watchwords, if these still embody the total need of the hour, even though the positive hostile pressures which formerly justified them are gone—what is the programme the terms will suggest? The only way in which, under the given conditions, I can drive the method of liberty for itself still further is by imposing restrictions upon other people, following up the successful checking of their interference with me by an interference with them, assuming that any particular wherein they excel me in possession or comfort or privilege is an offence and demanding its abolition. The impulse towards liberty for its own sake, having inspired and carried through a struggle for the removal of positive pains, can afterwards inspire nothing else than a struggle for the removal of inferiorities of any and every kind, since these, to the man whose entire theory of life is merely one of scope for self, constitute now the visible barriers which he is not allowed to pass. One may put it, perhaps—instead of saying that the idea of liberty *from* is not supplanted by the idea of liberty *to*—that at some point the idea of liberty *from* *must* be supplanted by the idea of liberty *to*, and that if the

idea of liberty to the loftiest moral development of personality be not enthroned, the idea of liberty to my own selfishness will reign. It will be sufficient to make me chafe if this man or that, though not doing me any actual harm, stands in wealth or position upon a higher level than mine, so suggesting or revealing limits beyond which I am not "free" to step. I shall take every favouritism of fortune, shown to somebody else, as if it were the deprivation, from *me*, of something to which I have a right. In fact, the spirit which is bent upon "liberty for itself," upon mere "scope," must, when it is taken as the energising inspiration of life,—inasmuch as it can only act against definite causes of offence, just as it is only against some definite resistance that the edge of a knife can cut—invent such causes when they do not exist; and the passion for freedom, noble as it may have been in the courage wherewith it dared its earlier conflicts, must drop down into the meanest passion of all, a mere sullen and jealous resentment that anyone should receive a start in the race of life, or, having started level, should be able to run more swiftly and win larger prizes than the rest. Such a spirit will be ready, precisely because its "freedom" is nothing more than "self-assertion," to violate and circumscribe another's freedom in the interests of its own; and the theory of "liberty for itself" comes by a perfectly natural development to mean in the end that while no one must interfere with me, I may and must and will interfere with others whenever a positive or a fullness in their lives suggests a negative or an emptiness in mine.

Disastrous as is the dominance of such a spirit in the individual, its dominance in the State, the acceptance of it as the guiding spirit in legislation, is necessarily more disastrous still. The following out by the State's responsible leaders of the "liberty for itself" theory, once that theory has reached the development indicated above, means, not of course that those leaders will themselves be possessed by the spirit which looks upon larger possessions or higher social status or any kindred "superiority" as an offence, but that this spirit is the one to which they must and will give effect for the sake and in the interests of those who have put them in their place and whom they represent; and so legislation must inevitably come to be in great part a mere abolition of the indicated "superiorities," or a mere transference of them from those enjoying them now to those who look upon them with jealous eyes—and this quite apart from any moral obligation on the part of the possessors to surrender them or any moral claim in those who loudly demand them for their own. Nor is the

matter altered—unless indeed it be altered for the worse—because the whole thing may so easily be clothed in a moral appearance and so plausibly spoken of as if it embodied a practical application of moral and religious and even Christian ideas. Undoubtedly when the State is making it its business to extend hands of profuse generosity to all who ask, it is performing what looks superficially very much like an exercise of Christian charity; and it is accordingly possible for transported enthusiasm to declare that now at the long last the State has adopted the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of all mankind and is making an effort at the construction of a Christian social order. In point of fact, what has really happened, under the given conditions, is that the machinery of the State has been captured by those for whom extension of liberty has come to mean that, while they must not be interfered with, the right of interference, whenever they find themselves at any sort of disadvantage, is most certainly theirs; and it is this spirit, not at all the spirit of Christian brotherhood and love, that State action now embodies and represents. It may not dominate the political leaders of the hour, but it dominates those for whom they stand. What we have is not at all the majority of the State's members bestowing benefits upon the State as a whole, still less the majority of the State's members bestowing benefits upon a hitherto disadvantaged minority—in either of which cases something might perhaps be said for the moral quality of the act. What we have is the majority in the State *seizing benefits for itself*—a matter quite non-moral, even if necessary, though the fact that the majority works representatively and through a Government whose members are not necessarily themselves designed for advantage under the policy they carry through may give it for superficial observation something of a moral or even a Christian hue. The matter becomes clear if we remember that the moral character of any course of action enjoined by legislation must be read, not as that which it seems to bear in those who legalise it or in those on whom it is enforced, but as that which it actually bears in the majority which calls for it and from which its ultimate sanction is derived. Passing from this, however (or rather, stating it in another form), the fact remains that when once the idea of “liberty for itself” has come to mean for the individual, not freedom from interference, but unhampered licence to interfere, and when once this same idea has come to dominance in the State, then State-action, as embodied in both the administration and the making of law, will be to a large and ever-increasing extent the working out

of that idea by a process of mere transference to the "have-nots" of "superiorities" taken from the "haves." For to say this, is simply to say that the action of the State embodies and reveals the ideas and spirit of the majority, and of the individuals who make it up.

No attempt is made here at deciding how far the situation thus sketched corresponds with the actual situation of our day, or how far particular legislative programmes are directed by the spirit thus described. Behind what is said, however, there lies, it may be admitted, a conviction that the actual situation is at any rate approximating to the hypothetical one, and that into current legislative processes the indicated spirit is at any rate by degrees making its way. And it is, let it be noted, this gradual approximation and this gradual intrusion against which a watch needs to be kept. For there is no definite point of time which can be fixed upon as the point at which the pursuit of "liberty for itself" changes from a resentment against being interfered with to a desire to interfere—at which the passion for liberty *from* becomes, in the absence of an adequate conception of liberty *to*, a mere jealousy of unpossessed superiorities; nor, for that matter, will the transition take place coincidently in all the fields of social struggle and advance. And precisely because it is thus slowly and by marches of unlevel front that the various advances of the dangerous spirit are made, should a specially alert guard be maintained both by the community's individual members and by the community's responsible heads. Else it may be found some day that the position has passed into the dangerous spirit's mastery, while those who should have been the watchers slept or looked away.

And the result? Obviously the dominance of this "liberty for itself" doctrine, in its later and inferior development, can only lead to an incessant see-saw of privilege, an incessant passing to and fro of "superiorities," between one set of men and another, not to any progress of the entire community toward a worthy goal. We have seen that those who start, under that dominance, with a perfectly legitimate revolt against oppressive tyrannies, reach presently, as freedom from positive oppression is won, to a stage at which the passion for mere scope and self-assertion can be satisfied only at the expense of, and by limiting, what others have and are—a stage at which mere non-possession, while others possess, is taken as an abridgment of natural human right; and, in so far as effect is given to this principle, it means that those formerly oppressed have in greater or less degree become oppressors

now. Carry the policy far enough, let the process of transferring "superiorities" from the "haves" to the "have-nots" pass beyond a certain line, and positive tyranny begins once more, changed though its agents be: the old play is staged once more, only the actors have reversed their parts; and in their turn, now, those whose liberty is impaired will chafe, to translate their resentment, when they have grown strong enough, into successful revolt. Under the "liberty for itself" idea, nothing but such recurring cycles of movement and counter-movement can be looked for: it is to nothing else that the consistent application of the idea can lead. Of course it is not within the span of any single life that the thing will be worked out; and the sweep of the circle is so vast that travellers upon any one of its segments may easily imagine, unless they employ for the determining of their direction instruments set by very distant stars, that they are moving, not along a circle's track, but straight ahead. Moreover, it is always to the interest of so many—now of some, now of others—to refuse to see. Yet the thing is undeniable by any who face the facts. It must always, under the suggested conditions, be a case of one part of the community ascending and the other dropping down; and it must always be a case of strength to resist transforming itself, when the possibility is open, into strength to overbear; and the "freedom for itself" theory, having started as a protest against mistaking strength for right, has for its curious final result the thrusting of us back under the rule of the strongest again.

IV.

Liberty for and in itself, therefore, constitutes no adequate conception of State action, whether on the part of the State's individual members or on the part of the State as a whole through its responsible governmental heads. And from what has been said the true and alternative conception can easily be deduced.

Man's highest use of freedom is to employ freedom for the development of his own personality along moral lines to moral ideals: he needs to be free in order that he may give to his own personality its true worth and place in a universal scheme of things which is moral in its original design and moral at its inmost heart. The State's work, accordingly, is to confer such freedom as man requires for the achievement of these superlatively important ends—in other words, the State is to liberate

men for the pursuit of a destiny which cannot be fulfilled within the State sphere at all. And the real worth of every political suggestion is ascertained when we ascertain whether the freedom *from* which its carrying out would secure helps or hinders a subsequent freedom *to*; whether it be needed in order to further that moral development of personality, founded upon submission to moral authority, in whose interests alone freedom can be rightly used. Whatever in the existing social or political order retards that development, whether positively or negatively, State action must set itself to remove. But it is in the laws and limits of what subsequent freedom *to* calls for that the State's pursuit of liberty must find its bounds.

This by no means implies a return to mere *laissez-faire*. One might, indeed, quite legitimately counter any such criticism by saying that the net result of the present tendency, in spite of multiplied State interferences and State regulations, is to mere *laissez-faire* for the State *as a whole*; because, while at countless points the mutual relations of various constituent elements in the State are reduced to rule, the progress of the entire body politic is not adjusted to or corrected by any standard outside itself. It is as though you provided formulæ whereby the internal machinery of some clock were brought to regular movement, but which did not correlate that movement to any sun. It is possible enough most vigorously to seek some internal State ideal and ensue it, and yet to be working on a purely *laissez-faire* method, so far as the whole State is concerned, all the while—which brings us back to what was said before as to the “see-saw” history whereto the “liberty for itself” theory must lead. But to say that the State's business is the establishment for its members of freedom to be bound to moral authority and to pursue moral ideals—all the freedom, and no more than the freedom, required for these ends—is by no means to advocate *laissez-faire*. It does indeed supply certain tests under which many gay and glorious visions might turn out unsubstantial as the mirage, many programmes that flaunt themselves as “progressive” be revealed in their nakedness as retrograde. But, on the other hand, it may mean that State interference will be necessary at many points where the natural man would at first resent it, only accepting it in the end because—a merely “natural man” no more—he recognises that the limitation of his freedom may be the sole means whereby both he and others can become free in the highest sense and for the highest ends. It may even be that, with the better conception of State action and its ultimate aims recognised, the State as a whole would adopt and live by many of

the programmes which the "liberty for itself" theory inspires—only, then, they would be suggested from quarters on which they are now imposed, and offered *to* quarters *from* which they are now presented as a clamour and a threat. Such "superiorities" as those previously spoken of might be "transferred" still; but they would be transferred because those in possession, certainly the majority of them, felt that by surrendering their "superiorities" they were enlarging moral possibility and moral scope both for themselves and for the rest; and the whole process would stand for brotherly kindness instead of conquest, for love fulfilling itself instead of triumphant wrath. At any rate, the substitution of "liberty to moral ideals" for "liberty for itself" is far from meaning *laissez-faire*: if it involves the abridgment by some of their long list of demanded "rights," it compels the State to give to each individual member everything that, for the sake of a true development of personality, he can legitimately demand; and it must lead, as the substitution becomes effective and complete, to changes in the social order, in the distribution of wealth and profit, throughout the whole range of men's mutual relationships.

To the self-styled "practical" temper—which a just appraisal would probably call "materialistic" rather than "practical"—all this may well seem the wildest of idealisms and the emptiest of futile dreams. For the hour, certainly, the doctrine of "liberty for itself" holds the field, as giving the true ideal. It is indeed the god of the nations, the one god in whose worship all the democracies find themselves at one. Whether it is to be for more than the hour that it holds its place is a question on which much may depend. For as the gods of the nations have been found idols before, so they may be found idols again.

HENRY W. CLARK.

HARPENDEN.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1916, p. 799, and October 1916, p. 150.)

My defence of scientific materialism in the April and July numbers of this Journal has brought replies from Sir Oliver Lodge, Professor James Hyslop of New York, and (in so far as I criticised Bergson) from Dr Wildon Carr.

My purpose was to state the doctrine of scientific materialism *as a philosophy*: not to limit it to that physiological region where it has become a platitude to nearly all those engaged in this particular branch of science, but to extend it to all spheres of knowledge embraced by the term philosophy; to represent it as a system in itself, based no doubt upon physiology, but in definite opposition to all other systems of philosophy, and of course *a fortiori* to every system of theology. Sir Oliver Lodge accordingly commences his criticism with the expression of a doubt whether "materialism as a philosophy exists any longer, outside Germany, in the sense of being sustained by serious philosophers." Passing over this elegant compliment to myself, I cannot help wondering why he should regard as the home of philosophic materialism a land which has always been the final stronghold of spiritualistic philosophy, and that too without a word of reference to the somewhat elaborate repudiation of this common journalistic error of fact contained in my April article. Let me inform Sir Oliver, then, that scientific materialism is not a "policy" as he alleges, but a "philosophy"; that is to say, it is put forward wholly as the result of a vigorous search after truth, and totally regardless of any consideration of popularity, of public utility, of æsthetic beauty, or of any other conceivable element of "policy."

My statement that the principle of mechanism is a corollary from the law of causation Sir Oliver describes as "farcical." Why it is farcical he does not explain: he merely affirms it to be an "independent postulate" (a view which with equal right I may term farcical). He is astonished that

"any sane person" can deny purpose in the Universe. Though I have little predilection for language of this character, I am driven to express *my* astonishment that "any sane person" can affirm it. I am in any case at a loss to understand how the question is affected by the astonishment of Sir Oliver. Continuing, however, Sir Oliver says we "call upon humanity to shut its eyes to any facts of common experience which render such an assertion [*i.e.* mechanism] ridiculous." I note, in passing, that Sir Oliver Lodge cautiously refrains from mentioning any such facts of common experience. But on the point immediately at issue I may perhaps be permitted to dismiss the question by referring him to Professor Hyslop, who will no doubt carry greater weight with him than I could, and who affirms on the next page to Sir Oliver that "scientific materialism is absolutely invulnerable, judged from the standpoint of normal experience." Where our spiritualists do not agree, who am I to intervene between them?

Finally, Sir Oliver thinks it "necessary to say clearly that such extravagant generalisations [as mine] profane the modesty of science." I do not know how many people may be influenced by this oracular pronouncement; for it is not the *modesty* of science that is the true thesis of Sir Oliver: it is the *impotence* of science which he desires to establish. He partitions off one corner of human experience, and says effectively: Here science shall not enter—we may indeed acquire knowledge of it, *not* through the medium of science, but through the medium of spooks alone. I admit, as we all must, many subjects of human curiosity which are beyond the range of science. But if I endeavour to deal by the methods of physiology with a sphere earmarked by Sir Oliver as a playground for spooks, I am entitled to the view that, if *any* knowledge is possible, it is knowledge of a scientific order. Sir Oliver admits that knowledge *is* possible in this sphere: very well then, I claim for science the right of entry, with the confident belief that, if nothing else can be done, the spooks at least can be utterly routed and put to confusion. It is not immodesty on the part of science, but it is the right and, further, the duty of science to enter any and every region of human experience where the possibility of knowledge is still open.

And now, what about the "extravagant generalisation" itself? We find in all our experience of nature that things hang together in a certain way, described under the general title of mechanism. The laws of physics and chemistry are, in so far as our experience extends, universal laws: there is nothing, which we know outside them, to which they do not apply. The history of science is very largely filled with the records of opposition set up to the application of those laws in one sphere or other—an opposition which has always ultimately been defeated. In the sphere of life the opposition has been unusually virulent: the subject-matter is so immensely complex that it is not often possible to indicate the precise mode of action in physico-chemical terms; but the history of biology establishes the clearest and most unmistakable relation between knowledge in that science and a belief in physico-chemical factors, accompanied by disbelief in spiritual factors. From the point where we now stand there diverge many million roads of inquiry into the landscape of nature. Down huge numbers of these, men of science have trodden in the past; and invariably, without exception, they have found the composition to be of a certain character. At the beginning of many, spiritualists have stood

warning men of science that here the road is of a different composition ; but no sooner have our explorers succeeded in passing along than they have found it to be the same as the rest. And now we are struggling at the entry of new roads : Sir Oliver Lodge assures us that these at least will be found to differ from the others, and to assume otherwise is an "extravagant generalisation." Well, we have heard all that many times before ; and we reply that it is at all events far less extravagant than the law of gravitation. Mechanism is sustained by *every* fact of experience in *all* departments where the subject-matter can be analysed : it is *not* traversed by any single item of experience, notwithstanding the deep popular desire to find an exception. Gravitation, on the other hand, is based upon the phenomena of a single department of experience only. Mechanism rests upon a wider induction than any single law of physics.

A more interesting point arises with reference to Sir Oliver Lodge's citation of ether as refractory to dynamical theory. He must surely have understood, however, that I use the word materialism purely in opposition to spiritualism, and without the smallest desire to enter into any valuation of exclusively physical conceptions. In point of fact, ether is an entity, different indeed from matter, but constructed by putting together certain qualities belonging to matter, and certainly not belonging to spirits. Thus, it occupies space ; it is susceptible of being thrown into a ripple (to account for light) ; it is capable of displacement (to account for electromagnetism) ; it behaves as though it possessed inertia ; and various eminent physicists, including, I believe, Sir Oliver himself, attribute to it a certain high density. All these are qualities abstracted from our experience of matter ; they are not the qualities ascribed to spirits, which can scarcely be regarded as liable to displacement or strain. Moreover, ether is not arbitrary and outside physical law, as spirits necessarily are assumed to be ; it is on the contrary formulated in mathematical laws ; and the utility to physics of the conception of ether depends wholly on this very characteristic, which renders it useless and even obnoxious to spiritualism. When Sir Oliver mentions ether as refractory to dynamical theory, he ought surely to have added that it is born wholly of dynamical theory, and that the very purpose of its creation in the minds of physicists was to preserve the integrity of dynamical theory. Ether is a wholly materialistic hypothesis ; scientific materialism is not committed to any special theory of physics or mechanics ; it insists only that our explanations shall be of the objective as opposed to the subjective type.

Finally, Sir Oliver criticises my denial of purpose in the universe on the ground that "a broad denial always needs more logic than a specific assertion." Surely his reputation for logic can never survive such a statement as this. Supposing I suggest that a teapot revolves round the sun between the orbits of Jupiter and Saturn in a period of 15 years, 11 days, 6 hours, 5 minutes, and 18 seconds. There is a specific assertion. Does it require less knowledge than its denial ? I think a schoolboy could safely deny it ; whereas its assertion would require a knowledge far beyond our powers to attain. But let us take Sir Oliver at his word. My doctrine is not negative but positive. I affirm positively that living functions are physico-chemical in character ; I affirm that, by the unbroken record of experience, the universe is regulated by physico-chemical-mechanical laws ; and I only pointed out that this excluded purpose, lest vitalistic prejudice should slur over that obvious circumstance without seeing it. Now it is

Sir Oliver who denies, not I. He says that living functions are not physico-chemical in character, albeit that physiologists say they are. Very well then, "a broad denial always needs more knowledge than a specific assertion." Has Sir Oliver more knowledge of living functions than the physiologists?

Professor Hyslop thinks that my arguments are susceptible of easy refutation, and yet that my doctrine, or something of the sort, may be established by other methods. Well, I have no right of priority or anything else in mechanism; and so long as he admits it to be true, I need not inquire too closely into the methods by which he reaches it. He thinks that scientific materialism rests largely on the absence of evidence for the continuity of mental states after death. That, on the other hand, seems to me a minor and philosophically unimportant point. Its interest is purely humanistic. What I want to know is how things hang together in nature; and that cannot be settled by discussing the evidence about a single point, however vital that point may be to ourselves. This is a question of applied science rather than pure science. Physics cannot be mastered by a study of steam-engines; nor can mechanism be established by an inquiry into the evidence for "life after death."

Dr Wildon Carr adheres to his proposition that the Germans are on the side of "matter" and the British on the side of "life." In reply to my criticisms, he now confesses that this is merely an analogy. For matter, we are to read "right of might"; for life, we are to read "ideal of national freedom." Why, then, use an analogy of so recondite and un-illuminating a character? Is the whole of Bergson's philosophy also an analogy? That philosophy, we know, stands for "life" against the "matter" of materialism. There are but two alternatives: either this analogy about the war is totally devoid of any point whatever; or it is used in the tacit hope that the great public will connect Bergson's philosophy with all that it holds right and pious, and the materialistic philosophy with all that it holds in horror and abomination. That theme is good enough for journalists; but the philosophy which descends to discredit the views of its opponents by a direct appeal to popular passion (and that too in an analogy which Dr Carr admits might have been used the other way) may indeed purchase the suffrages of the many, but only at the cost of the contempt of the few.

HUGH ELLIOT.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

IN *The Modern Churchman* (November–December 1916) a number of papers are printed, which were read at a recent conference of Liberal Churchmen in Oxford. The common theme is ethics, the readjustment of our conventional estimates and methods in the light of Christianity and in view of the present situation. But Dr Rashdall's closing pages on "Theism or Pantheism?" take a wider sweep. He realises that such questions go back to the conception of God's nature. After referring to the silliness of some English or Anglican people who explain the present war "as due to Luther's neglect of Episcopacy, as a punishment for Welsh disestablishment, or for the prevalence of German liberal theology," he points out that the moral and religious stress of these days emphasises the desire of the religious consciousness for a God who is more than mind in general, or an unconscious Will, or a Higher Unity. The alternative to a crude, ultra-anthropomorphic conception of God is not a de-personalised idea of the Deity, such as even M. Loisy tends to share. The religious consciousness requires us to believe in a God who consciously wills moral ends; and if we frankly admit that His power is in a sense limited, and at the same time that He is revealed "not merely in some imperfect way by myriads of imperfect and partially conflicting consciences, but in some supreme manner by our conscience," that is, through Jesus Christ, we are entitled to claim that "full-blooded Christian Theism with (as it were) a background of confessed agnosticism is a far more philosophical attitude than a Pantheism which professes to know and to explain everything, but does so only by the use of language which on closer examination turns out to be self-contradictory or unmeaning." This plea, that the religious consciousness involves theism, and theism of the Christian order, may be illustrated by a reference to Mr R. R. Marett's paper on "Origin and Validity in Religion" in *The American Journal of Theology* (1916, pp. 517–535). The title is more comprehensive than the contents, for the essay is not a discussion of this important subject from the historical or philosophical point of view so much as a description of what primitive religion is to an anthropologist. Mr Marett defines it as a sense of "sacredness," the sacredness which manifests itself as supernatural, as sacred in distinction from what is profane, and as esoteric;

positively, it is powerful, personal, and good. The result is that we find a universal belief that man is able to "draw upon a power that makes for, and in its most typical form wills, righteousness, the sole condition being that a certain fear, a certain shyness and humility, accompany the effort so to do." But this does not take us very far. Even if validity is to be taken in a relative sense, as Mr Marett argues, and not as equivalent to absolute truth, the moralisation of this common element is seen in the evolution of religion. Time tests the relative efficiency of the forms which this primitive belief assumes. The fittest survive, on the whole, and the theologian, that "suspect" person in the eyes of the anthropologists, is surely justified in analysing the qualities which this process of religious struggle brings out as really vital to a theistic belief of the highest order. Mr H. L. Stewart, who approaches the same problem in his essay on "The Religious Consciousness as a Psychological Fact" (*Constructive Quarterly*, September, pp. 567-581), agrees that the original element is not religious opinions or beliefs, but the instinctive impulse which prompts these in all their variety, whether that impulse is defined in terms of Mr Marett's hypothesis or as a mixture of curiosity and fear. And the objects of this faith? Well, he points out that philosophy has not disproved their existence. On the contrary, "all really creative minds to-day commend theories of the universe which find ample room for a personal God. It is not the opposition of theologians, it is a quite independent philosophical criticism which has antiquated the anti-theistic schools." He goes on to argue that this religious instinct is still to be trusted, if only for the reason that speculative repudiations of religion which attempt to conserve moral values find themselves in increasing intellectual embarrassment. The general tendency of both articles is to say of religious people and of theologians what Hazlitt once said of poets and reviewers: "It is the business of reviewers to watch poets, not of poets to watch reviewers." But to say this is to not to say everything.

Some attention has been paid, of late, to the theology of the Fourth Gospel, especially in connection with the so-called "mysticism" of its tendency. It is significant to read a couple of critical notes by Dr Swete in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (pp. 371-378), in which he openly admits the difficulty of identifying the beloved disciple of the Fourth Gospel with John the son of Zebedee ("the beloved disciple was not a Galilean, but a well-to-do inhabitant of Jerusalem or its vicinity, who belonged to a class socially superior to that from which the Galilean disciples of Christ were drawn"), and the fact that early Christian evidence does not appear to yield "any convincing proof of the identity of the Apostle John with John of Ephesus, or even of the residence of the former at Ephesus towards the end of the first century." But the theology of the Fourth Gospel is independent of its authorship. Professor E. F. Scott (*American Journal of Theology*, pp. 345-359), in a lucid paper on "The Hellenistic Mysticism of the Fourth Gospel," notes four points which differentiate the Johannine transformation of Christianity into a mystical doctrine from current Greek movements: the absence of crude, astrological, occult elements, the freedom from pantheism, the close union of the mystical with the ethical, and especially the preservation of a historical basis. It is important to keep these criteria in mind, when the religion of the Fourth Gospel is compared with the Hermetic mysticism, for example. Dr H. A. Watson's Hulsean Lectures on *The Mysticism of St John's Gospel* (R. Scott) do not

enter into the question of its historical origin. They develop the thesis that "mysticism is the belief in an intimate relation between man and God, and the practice of this belief," which is a description of religious inwardness rather than of mysticism in the specific sense of the term. Dr Watson takes the Incarnation as the Johannine method of expressing the Christian relation between man and God; mysticism is the practice of the Incarnation, because the Incarnation is the revelation of a relation, it is "an initiation into the mysteries of the Divine nature and process," which is both practical and contemplative. The origins of this are sought, so far as regards the prologue, by Dr Rendel Harris (in a series of essays beginning in the *Expositor* for August) in the praises of Sophia described by the Jewish "Wisdom of Solomon"; and in a study of "The Semitic Element in the Fourth Gospel" (*Expositor*, May) Professor Frank Granger calls attention to the echoes of the Genesis-prologue which haunt the gospel, and also to the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs as a witness to the currents of thought in the circle of Jesus and his disciples.¹ "The Semitic race has been transparent to inspiration, and this transparency became complete in Jesus. Its spirit spoke through Him as its voice most clearly. But He was not simply a vehicle of the Divine meaning. He was that meaning." The accompanying argument that the Johannine view is more authentic than the Synoptic conception of the mind of Jesus towards dæmons, for example, does not seem so tenable, nor, indeed, is it necessary to what is vital in Professor Granger's thesis.

The other great theological type in the New Testament has also elicited some special discussions. To begin with, a small point of literary interest concerns St Paul's use of Epimenides. In an interesting paper (*Irish Church Quarterly*, July, pp. 180-193), Dr H. J. Lawlor accepts the result of Dr Rendel Harris's recent investigation into Acts xvii. 28 and Tit. i. 12. Both seem to be quotations from the *Minos* of Epimenides, from a passage which denounces the Cretans for the sinful falsehood of denying that Zeus was immortal, a falsehood implicit in their claim that he lay buried in their island. The passage ran:—

"A grave has been fashioned for thee, O holy and high One—
The lying Cretans, who are all the time liars, evil beasts, idle bellies'
But thou diest not, for to eternity thou livest and standest,
For in thee we live and move and have our being."

Dr Lawlor sets himself to explain the relevance of both quotations, even of that in Acts, though he thinks that Luke himself failed to recognise it as a quotation. This is a detail, however. Mr R. H. Strachan's *Individuality of St Paul* (London: James Clarke), which belongs to a series entitled "The Humanism of the Bible," is a popular study of the Apostle's mind, written out of wide reading and careful thought upon the subject. The line followed is that Paul was a Paulinist against his will, that "his theological system—often baffling and sometimes repellent to the modern mind—has its roots in his own experience of Jesus, reacting upon his missionary environment." Professor H. A. A. Kennedy similarly argues (*Expositor*, July) that the Apostle's conception of the divine Fatherhood, as redeeming love and as love reinforced by majesty, is a true interpretation of the teaching of Jesus upon sonship towards God. Mr Strachan notices St

¹ Cf. Frey's essay in *Revue Biblique* (1916, pp. 33-60) on "Dieu et le monde d'après les conceptions juives au temps de Jésus-Christ."

Paul's environment now and then, though he is less disposed than some recent critics to allow much for the Apostle's indebtedness to the mysticism and sacramentalism of the cults. Another element in the environment is marked by Mr C. W. Emmet, who aptly calls attention, in a paper on "The Fourth Book of Esdras and St Paul" (*Expository Times*, Sept., pp. 551-556), to the fact that the author of the Salathiel-Apocalypse (c. 100 A.D.) was handling in his own way some of the same problems about Jewish nationalism, the purpose of creation, and the spread of sin, as troubled St Paul when he was writing Romans. The significance of this has already been observed; but it needs reiteration, for, as Mr Emmet remarks, it is greater than might appear at first sight. Such problems did not bulk largely in rabbinic Judaism. An interest in them cannot be assumed as normal for a Jew of the first century. He concludes that this fact supports Mr Montefiore's general thesis that the Judaism in which St Paul was trained was not the ordinary rabbinic Judaism of the age, that the Salathiel-Apocalypse "is our best representative of the kind of Jewish thought with which St Paul must have been in sympathy in his pre-Christian days. Had he not become a Christian, he might have written just such another book as 4 Esdras." In addition to these studies, we have to note the appearance of three editions of separate epistles: Mr R. St John Parry's edition of 1 Corinthians in the Cambridge Greek Testament—a compact little work; Lagrange's *L'Épître aux Romains* (Paris: Lecoffre), which in method and scale resembles his masterly edition of St Mark's gospel; and Loisy's *L'Épître aux Galates* (Paris: Nourry). Lagrange's work is strong in philological exegesis; he uses the phenomena of the *diatribe* to illustrate the argument repeatedly, and not without effect. Loisy's volume is less conservative, as we might expect, and less tied to the minute discussion of verse after verse; it forms, in his own words, "une esquisse préliminaire de l'évangélisation chrétienne en ses débuts" rather than a complete commentary on the epistle. He takes the North Galatian view of the epistle's destination; is fond of calling the epistle "un plaidoyer"; questions the ability of a visionary like St Paul to represent the fact of a situation clearly; and brushes aside all attempts to harmonise its point of view with the later representation in Acts. If the treatment of Lagrange tends to minimise the antinomies of Paulinism, Loisy is apt to exaggerate them; but he would not come under Renan's verdict on the Tübingen school as "esprits sans tact littéraire et sans mesure."

In a criticism of Van Hoonacker's Schweich Lectures on *Une Communauté Judéo-araméenne à Éléphantiné en Égypte aux V^e et VI^e siècles avant J.-C.* M. René Dussaud (*Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 1916, pp. 324-332) argues against the Belgian scholar that the community was composed of real Jews, not of a mixed population; the type of Judaism was one still untouched by the reforms of the fifth century. He also differs from Van Hoonacker in regarding the goddess 'Anath-Yaho as native to Palestinian Judaism, although he admits that the traces of her worship can hardly be deciphered in the present O.T. text. Such secondary deities were taken over by the Israelites after their entrance into Canaan, and suppressed by the later monotheistic tendency of Judaism. In the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, pp. 26-53, Gressmann criticises kindly but severely a French translation of Naville's *Archæology of the Old Testament*—which is like slaying the slain. He points out, incidentally, that so far from criticism being silenced by the discovery that the Hebrew text rests on

Babylonian cuneiform, the Babylonian literature itself shows traces of a fusion of different sources or traditions. "Le temps n'est sans doute pas éloigné où la littérature babylonienne sera soumise à la même critique que la littérature israélite." Mr Handcock's *Archæology of the Holy Land* (Fisher Unwin) is a serviceable and well-illustrated handbook to the subject, which digests the recent results of excavation. On the inner side of the Old Testament, we have to chronicle a suggestive exposition of *Ecclesiastes, or the Confessions of an Adventurous Soul* (Macmillan), by Rev. Minot Devas, and M. Giran's *A Modern Job* (Chicago: Open Court), an essay on the problem of evil, in dialogue form. Mr Devas does not obtrude his scholarship, but it underlies his applications of the free-thinking religion of Ecclesiastes. He assumes the unity of the book, and makes good use of his hypothesis. From the literary point of view M. Giran's dialogue is not remarkable. His Job is a prosperous citizen of Amsterdam, who suffers cruel misfortunes in his family and business. His friends discuss the trouble in twentieth-century terms, but, although the book is written with pathos and directness, even as a study of evil it fails to do much more than re-state the eternal question.¹ The dialogue is a difficult literary medium, and the difficulty is doubled when a modern reproduces an ancient. Dr J. E. M'Fadyen's *Psalms in Modern Speech* (London: Clarke) is less ambitious and more helpful. It is not a paraphrase or adaptation, but a modern translation of the Psalter, done by a Semitic scholar who has taken account not only of the Hebrew text but of rhythmical form. A few notes are added, but the translation is left to speak for itself. It will enable English readers to understand the original meaning of the psalms as our modern versions and even the Vulgate, for all their devotional associations, fail sometimes to do.

The long-debated problem of Buddhistic influence upon the New Testament has recently been passing into a phase of criticism which is disposed to be increasingly sceptical of the evidence for any traces of Buddhistic legends in the gospel narratives. Simultaneously, two scholars have summed up against the older thesis, Dr Karl Beth in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (1916), pp. 169-227, and Dr Carl Clemen in *The American Journal of Theology* (1916), pp. 536-548. The former study is the more important and incisive of the two; Dr Beth goes into considerable detail, and may at least claim to have made out a good case for the "non-proven" verdict.

One or two fresh contributions to the study of John Wesley's character have been made. Among these we regret that we cannot count President Wilson's pamphlet on *John Wesley's Place in History* (New York), which is thoroughly commonplace. But another American estimate is of real importance. As the title indicates, Dr S. P. Cadman's *The Three Religious Leaders of Oxford, and their Movements* (Macmillan) covers a wide range; he is more sympathetic with the men than with their movements, upon the whole, and this is particularly true of Newman, the least democratic of the three. It is not easy to say much that is fresh and relevant upon Wiclif, but Dr Cadman contrives to re-set each of the three leaders for a modern audience, and his critical study of Wesley is not the least attractive part of the book. To supplement this, we are now fortunate enough to have a good selection of Wesley's *Letters* (Hodder & Stoughton), edited

¹ Dr Inge's essay on "The Justice of God in History" (*The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1916) is a really positive and satisfying discussion.

by Mr George Eayrs. The selection has been made, in order to elucidate the various facets of Wesley's religious character and method, and the letters, some of which are published for the first time, are carefully edited, with several facsimiles. It is possible from these letters to understand Wesley's abhorrence of sentimentalism in religion, which is by no means a common feature in revivalists; but then Wesley was an organiser as well as a revivalist, with an administrative ability which the Roman Church would have probably been able to employ, had he belonged to that communion. It is remarkable, by the way, to find him warning a Nova Scotian Methodist against what he regarded as the trinity of evil: "Of Calvinism, mysticism, and antinomianism, have a care, for they are the bane of true religion; and one or other of them has been the grand hindrance of the work of God, wherever it has broken out."

The year has not passed without losses in the ranks of theological scholarship on its historical side. We mourn the death of M. E. C. Babut, a brilliant younger pupil of Duchesne, who had specialised in the fourth and fifth centuries. His essay on *Priscillien et le Priscillianisme* and his revolutionary monograph on *Saint Martin de Tours* had won him particular distinction. He had an independent mind, which was prevented from swerving into eccentricity by his sound historical training. He was only forty-one when he fell in the fighting ranks of the French army¹ near Ypres last February. "Manibus date lilia plenis!" Those who know and value his work will hope that the historical study on which he is understood to have been engaged when the war broke out, *L'adoration des empereurs et les origines de la persécution des chrétiens*, may yet be given to the public. In the death of Dr H. M. Gwatkin, the Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Cambridge, we mourn a veteran. He too was working up to the very last, but he had lived to carry on the best traditions of the Cambridge ecclesiastical school, though his interests were not confined to history. His *Studies in Arianism* broke fresh ground, and his history of the Early Church was characterised not only by comprehensive learning but by that spirit of equity which Dr Hort before him had so signally manifested. As an author and editor, he served many beyond his own Church. While he lived, Englishmen could point to a Church historian of their own who might be named side by side with Duchesne.

Scotland, as well as England and France, has lost a very distinguished Church historian from her ranks. Dr A. R. MacEwen, Professor of Church History in the New College, Edinburgh, who died last November at the age of sixty-five, had a brilliant career at Oxford, where he laid the foundations of his subsequent work in history. His standard *History of the Church in Scotland*, the first volume of which was issued in 1913, is left unfinished, but by his earlier monographs and his abilities as an incisive and successful teacher he has given an impetus to the study of Church history in the North and won grateful admiration from his contemporaries.

JAMES MOFFATT.

¹ I take this opportunity of calling attention to an extremely suggestive study of French literature during the war, by M. J. Calvert in *The Constructive Quarterly* for September (pp. 582-612).

REVIEWS

Concerning Prayer: its Nature, its Difficulties, and its Value. By the Author of "Pro Christo et Ecclesia," Harold Anson, Leonard Hodgson, C. H. S. Matthews, Edwin Bevan, Rufus M. Jones, N. Micklem, R. Collingwood, W. F. Lofthouse, A. C. Turner, and B. H. Streeter. —London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1916.

THE effects of the war upon character are probably various and complex; and we must suppose that the contradictory statements which are put forward are due to the narrow range of personal experience. Sometimes we are told that there has been such an awakening from the lethargy of luxury and materialism into a noble devotion to duty and religion that we are inclined to thank the Kaiser for having saved England from moral ruin. Others tell us that faith has been shaken to its foundations, and that men hitherto religious are wandering in a wilderness of doubt or despair. And lately we have read with dismay that young Canadians returning from our camps regard England as a sink of iniquity; and one who has had considerable opportunities of observation reports that the "*direct effects*" of the war "are brutalising, degenerative, and emphatically anti-religious," and that "men of good social standing and refined upbringing take to bad ways."¹

The present volume, though of universal scope, is particularly addressed to the intermediate class, those who "respond to a call for high service," but have no faith in the value of prayer, and those who, while "more religiously minded," are perplexed on the subject of providence and of prayer.² The difficulties, though perhaps awakened for the first time in many minds through the horrors of the present war, are of old standing; and to the student of history it is no new thing that the power of inflicting the most fearful suffering and ruin upon the human race has been permitted to violent and cruel men. The present time, however, demands a sincere consideration of the age-long problem; and eleven contributors, not all of one denomination, have combined their efforts to produce a series of remarkable essays, bearing on various aspects of prayer and collateral subjects.

The day is probably past when anyone would wish to test the efficacy of prayer by experiment, as in a chemical laboratory. From such a method the spiritual man instinctively shrinks, not because he doubts, but because the whole subject lies outside the sphere of physical science, and the action of prayer cannot be formulated in precise laws, and in every attempt to use prayer as an experiment the spirit of prayer would evaporate, and of

¹ Rev. E. Glyn Evans, R.A.M.C., in *The Free Catholic*, p. 151.

² Introduction, p. ix.

necessity the result would be negative. Nevertheless, the belief in prayer, though not open to experiments which might be repeated by the unspiritual, rests upon inward experience, and the man who habitually prays knows that he is very different from what he would have been without prayer. But he does not pretend that his petitions are always granted. Nay, he remembers that Jesus Himself prayed three times that the cup of agony might pass from Him, but it did not pass; and that St Paul thrice prayed for the removal of a thorn in the flesh, but it was not removed.¹ Yet the latter exhorts his brethren, in everything, by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving, to make their requests known unto God; but then he assures them, not that their petitions will be granted, but that the peace of God will keep their hearts and minds.² Prayer is to the spiritual life what breathing is to the physical; and as men breathed for thousands of years without understanding how their lives depended on it, so our hypothesis about prayer may be quite mistaken, and nevertheless God may in some mysterious way make it productive of our noblest aspirations and endeavours. Much will turn on the view which we take of the real nature of prayer. None of our authors regards it as a magical formula by which we can deflect the Divine Will into the channel of our own desire. One of our writers defines the essence of true prayer as "the contemplation of things eternal" and "realisation of God's love and power."³ The Rev. W. F. Lofthouse says that "prayer is our word for the intercourse of the soul with God."⁴ And Professor Rufus M. Jones, in his deeply interesting essay on "Prayer and the Mystic Vision," writes:—

"Religion is primarily, and at heart, the personal meeting of the soul with God. If that experience ceases in the world, religion, in its first intention, is doomed. We may still have ideas about the God whom men once knew intimately, and we may still continue to work for human betterment, but there can be living religion only so long as the souls of men actually experience fresh bubbling of the living water within, and know for themselves that a heart of eternal love beats in the central deeps of the universe within reach.

"To give up the cultivation of prayer, then, means in the long run the loss of the central thing in religion; it involves the surrender of the priceless jewel of the soul."⁵

The authors rightly perceive, however, that "the perplexities men feel as to the nature and value of Prayer" demand at least a provisional solution; and they have three qualifications which entitle them to a respectful and sympathetic hearing. First, it is evident that, owing to their own experience, prayer is to them a reality, with its foundations deeply laid in the religious nature of man, and that no failure in their hypotheses would banish from them this instinctive movement of the spirit. Secondly, along with this inward certainty, they are quite sensible of the rational difficulties which beset the entire subject, and, addressing themselves to the problems which seem, in the opinion of many, to reduce prayer to a superstition, make a serious endeavour to bring back a reasonable assurance to tottering faith. Those who are in perplexity, or have even given up the habit of prayer, may read the volume without feeling that they are met with airs of assumption and superiority; and if their doubts are not always allayed, they must acknowledge that they have been treated

¹ 2 Cor. xii. 7-9.

² Phil. iv. 6, 7.

³ Introduction, p. xi.

⁴ P. 61.

⁵ P. 123.

with courtesy and a serious desire to help. This is not saying that the solutions are always satisfactory or easily grasped, or that the views of the different writers are always consistent with one another. The essay on "Intercession," for instance, presents a subtle metaphysical argument, which the untrained thinker will not find it easy to follow. And lastly, the writers are liberal, in the sense that they frankly admit what seem to be the established results of modern investigation in regard to both the Old and the New Testaments; that they aim at reaching truth, and not at the establishment of traditional dogma; and that some of them at least are prepared for extensive reforms, and indeed criticise rather severely some prevalent usages in the Church of England. One writer even affirms that "the great mass of sincere doubt is mostly the revolt of intellectual morality against the spiritual infidelity of Christians."¹ In another essay, although, or rather because, the author is deeply Christian, it is declared that "prayer can be both genuine and exalted even if nothing is known either of the Jesus of history or the Christ of theology. . . . In all true prayer the spirit is one and the same."²

On one or two points we may make a few remarks by way of criticism. The problem of sin is confessedly not to be solved by the hypothesis of a devil, which, even if admitted, would only relegate the difficulty to a more distant and mysterious region. Nevertheless, evil (correctly, as it appears to me) is regarded as something real and positive, standing in opposition to the will of God. But, while there is agreement on this point, different views of the source and nature of sin appear in the volume. In the essay on "The Devil" the whole burden is thrown upon the freedom of the will, which is presented in its extreme form. The writer says: "The truth is that evil neither requires nor admits any explanation whatever. To the question, 'Why do people do wrong?' the only answer is, 'Because they choose to.' To a mind obsessed by the idea of causation, the idea that everything must be explained by something else, this answer seems inadequate. But action is precisely that which is not caused; the will of a person acting determines itself and is not determined by anything outside itself. . . . An act of the will is its own cause and its own explanation."³ Still, he maintains "that the immense majority of crimes are done under a kind of self-deception."⁴ This view seems to leave no room for St Paul's experience of some hostile power driving him against his will. But surely this experience is not fictitious. It belongs to men of strongly passionate nature, who under a vehement impulse do things which they afterwards bitterly lament; and such men feel, not that they willed the evil deed, but that they did not exert their will sufficiently to prevent it. Anger unrestrained will strike a cruel blow; and if the will steps in, it has a severe struggle to master the vindictiveness which clamours for the perpetration of an acknowledged wrong.

The author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia* takes a different view, and extends the reality of sin far beyond the limits of the individual will. In the essay on "Repentance and Hope," sin is classified as racial, personal, and corporate; and accordingly sin is defined as "whatever man is or does which differs from God's ideal of what he ought to do or be." Objection is taken to the fact that "we nowadays connect the sense of guilt only with sin in its second aspect, as the conscious, personal violation of any known duty."⁵ It appears to me that some distinctions and limitations

¹ P. 404.

² P. 61.

³ P. 459.

⁴ P. 466.

⁵ P. 140 sq.

are required. I agree with the author that it is convenient and reasonable to include under a single term the whole range of moral evil, and consequently to regard as sin whatever in us is opposed to holiness, justice, and love, even though under the restraint of a consecrated will it should never manifest itself in action; and I believe that our prayers for pardon and help, in the great majority of cases, refer to this inner defilement, and not to any overt acts of wrong. We seek for pardon because the evil in us disturbs our communion with God, and we may not have striven sufficiently against the insidious working of its poison. But we pray still more for the healing grace which will cleanse the fountains of our life, and make us so conscious of God's love that all evil desire will die within us. Still, there is a wide difference between this diffused sinfulness and deliberate wrongdoing; and it is to the latter alone, I think, that we properly apply the term "guilt." It is for that alone that we sincerely and fully *blame* ourselves. We do not blame ourselves for having inherited an impure or irascible nature, any more than we praise ourselves for having arms and legs. So far as we can see at present, our animal passions are an inheritance from our animal origin; and these passions, which in the lower animals are innocent and beneficent, have become sinful in us because our rise into self-consciousness has increased their power and stained them with impurity, and we survey them against a background of Divine holiness. Nevertheless, I think we must distinguish between propensities, such as selfishness, envy, malice, and revenge, which are intrinsically evil, and, if unchecked, necessarily bring forth evil fruit, and those imperfections which hold us back from our ideal, but are not characterised by any positive wrong. These latter do not seem to have the nature of sin, and are quite inevitable in a world based on the idea of progress.

Lastly, in this connection, we must ask, whence comes the ideal by which we judge ourselves, and which always floats before us as something which we have not yet attained? It seems strange that the author whom I have ventured to criticise says that "everywhere we see the choice between good and evil left to man, and victory dependent on his initiative."¹ Professor Rufus M. Jones appears similarly to leave the initiative to man, when he writes: "I have perhaps spoken of mystic vision—the experience of intercourse—as though it were an experience which just 'comes,' like a wind blowing where it lists, man knows not how; but that is far from the truth. When it 'comes' it is to a soul prepared for it and expecting it."² It seems to me that the initiative is always on the side of God. The ideal which woos us is not of our own creation, but is, for the Christian, "the high calling of God in Christ Jesus."³ Did Saul the persecutor, hastening with hot zeal to Damascus, "expect" the mystic vision which changed in a moment the whole current of his life? Doubtless he was "prepared" for it; yet the preparation was through the hidden working of the Spirit, so that even there the initiative was with God. Paul himself declared, "By the grace of God I am what I am"⁴; and another disciple confesses, "We love him because he first loved us."⁵ Yes, and in these latter days the vision of God sometimes comes when men have neither sought nor expected it, and they have seen the vastness and the glory of the spiritual life, the Divine Power and Beauty penetrating all nature, the Holy Spirit hidden and pleading in the heart of man, even a buried grandeur in the most sinful

¹ P. 179.² P. 122.³ Phil. iii. 14.⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 10.⁵ 1 John iv. 19.

and repulsive, a grandeur which evokes a reverent awe and loving pity. All this may come, not as an anticipated gift, sought with prayers and tears, but through the power of a Divine call, which has spoken with voice so clear and thrilling that the deaf ears have been pierced and the dead heart has leaped into unimagined life. Still, as of old, "it is not of him that willeth or of him that runneth"; and even if in prayer we have sought eternal things, it is because the Spirit has already borne witness with our spirit to the existence of a supreme Reality and an ideal life, so that all boasting in our own initiative is precluded. It remains with us to refuse or to accept the Divine call; but even if we accept it, the spark of love in our hearts is not of our own kindling, but is a tiny ray from that infinite Love which dwells eternal in the heavens.

I have noted some other subjects for remark. Especially I wished to enter a gentle protest against the confusion, which is becoming too common, of the legitimate rhetorical use of such words as "sacrament" and "sacerdotal" and the strict theological use, a confusion which perplexes thought, and has the strange result of establishing quite opposite conclusions by the same argument. But I have already exceeded due bounds; and I trust sufficient has been said to commend to the readers of the *Hibbert Journal* this valuable and suggestive volume.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

OXFORD.

A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson. By Gustavus Watts Cunningham, A.M., Ph.D.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1916.

Two things are evident at once to the reader of this interesting study. The first is the sympathy which the author everywhere manifests for the philosophy he criticises. The second is that every criticism is brought forward in regard to what is fundamentally important in the doctrine itself. The result is a study which takes us at once to the heart of the philosophical problem.

To discern the direction of a philosopher's criticism of a philosophical theory, the first essential is to know the standpoint from which the criticism is made. Bergson's theory of Creative Evolution is opposed to two antithetical interpretations of the nature and principle of Evolution. The first is the mechanistic interpretation, associated with the Darwinian theory, and widely accepted by biologists. The other is the finalistic interpretation, associated with the Hegelian and other idealist theories which conceive reality *sub specie æternitatis*: it appeals mainly to philosophers. Professor Cunningham writes from the Hegelian standpoint, and he defends Hegel's theory against the charge that it involves the unreality of time, or that it confronts us with what Professor James named a "block universe," or what Bergson has described as a universe in which *tout est donné*. On the contrary, he maintains not only that both the great principles for which Bergson contends, the reality of time and the open universe, are conserved, but many positive inconsistencies in Bergson's doctrine are cleared away, by a right understanding of Hegel. He would substitute therefore a theory he names Creative Finalism for Bergson's theory of Creative Evolution.

I imagine there are few now who regard the once prevalent idea of

Hegel's philosophy, that it was an attempt to reduce things to pure thought about things, and to evolve a factual world out of self-consciousness by the pure agency of discursive thought, as anything but a most superficial caricature. There are still many, however, who hold that the Hegelian system involves as its essential principle a theory of the Absolute which negates the reality of change. If it does not, and if the view that it does be due to a misunderstanding of Hegel, then there undoubtedly is a striking appearance of identity between Hegel's concept of mental activity and Bergson's concept of a vital impulse which externalises itself in intellectual frames. And this seems to have struck several philosophers of late as well as the author of this book. Lord Haldane has called particular attention to it in the paper read last December to the Aristotelian Society on "Progress in Philosophical Research" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1915-16). And the Italian philosopher Croce, quoting Bergson's description of an intuitive knowledge "qui s'installe dans le mouvement et adopte la vie même des choses," remarks: "Was not this just what Hegel demanded, and the point from which he began—to find a form of mind, which should be mobile as the movement of the real, which should participate in the life of things, which should feel 'the pulse of reality,' and should mentally reproduce the rhythm of its development, without breaking it into pieces or making it rigid and falsifying it?" (*Philosophy of Hegel*, English trans., p. 214; see also *Logica*, p. 388).

Professor Cunningham, however, appears to hold that this apparent identity is an illusion, and that Bergson's theory of intuition implies a position which is the antithesis of the Hegelian standpoint. The ground of this judgment is not anything Bergson has said directly bearing on Hegel,—for, as the author points out, Bergson has given no evidence in his works of acquaintance with Hegelianism either in the form in which it is presented by Hegel himself or in that which it has taken in the so-called neo-Hegelian movement (and this I believe is true),—the ground for it is purely the implication in the acceptance of Kant's doctrine that intelligence cannot grasp reality, and the corollary that if there be another form of knowledge it must be non-intellectual. This in Professor Cunningham's view is a grave defect in Bergson's doctrine, the full meaning of which will be clear if we now examine his particular criticisms.

The first and quite the most important of these concerns Bergson's theory of the nature of intuition and its claim to be the distinctive method of philosophy. Two inconsistencies are charged against Bergson, and their effect is, so it is held, to confront him with a dilemma from which escape is impossible. The two inconsistencies appear to me very different in the degree of their importance, probably because one rests on a difficulty about the doctrine which I do not feel, while the other refers to a difficulty in the doctrine itself which I do feel. There is an aspect of Bergson's doctrine of intuition which requires elucidation, and which has not, so far as I can discover, been explicitly dealt with by Bergson himself. It may be that when it is elucidated it will bring the doctrine even nearer to the view which Professor Cunningham holds to be that of Hegel. Briefly, the first inconsistency is that Bergson proclaims intuition to be the special method of philosophy, yet in his own philosophising he never makes, and cannot make, use of it, but relies wholly on scientific, that is, intellectual, method; the second is that he combines under the term

intuition such wholly different meanings as the instinct of the hymenoptera and the artist's vision.

In regard to the first, let me say at once that I make no complaint of the manner in which the case against Bergson is set forth. Bergson does teach that "intelligence must be supplemented by another form or type of knowledge. We need a new method which will bring us into direct touch with the vital impetus and which will enable us to deal with the tension of reality. And this is the method which the new philosophy undertakes to define for us; it is the method of intuition." What really puzzles me is to imagine the sort of expectation which the announcement of this new method raised in Professor Cunningham's mind. Some two or three years ago, when Sir J. J. Thomson demonstrated the existence of an atom with an atomic weight till then unknown to chemist or physicist, it was pointed out to him by a prominent theosophist that his discovery had already been forestalled, that an atom corresponding exactly to that which he had discovered had been proved to exist by methods quite different from the crude materialistic experiments made in his laboratory. It was quite true. I wonder whether Professor Cunningham expected some such announcement as this from Bergson. I do not think so; but supposing he did, supposing he understood Bergson to have claimed to have discovered new truth by a new method, surely he did not expect him also to communicate the new truth by the new method!

What is this new method, different from the method of science, and peculiarly fitted to be the instrument of philosophy? Well, to me there is nothing mysterious or cryptic about it at all. It is a method which, unlike that of science, does not seek by greater abstraction to gain greater precision, but turns at once to the concrete even at the sacrifice of precision. It not only turns to the concrete but it grasps it in its immediacy and not by logical progression through negation. Has Bergson given us no example of this method at work? What is the doctrine of the intellect itself but a case in point? By the intellect alone we cannot know what is more and greater than the intellect. If then the intellect can appear as a luminous nucleus, it must be because philosophy grasps immediately the significance of the penumbra.

The second inconsistency charged against Bergson's theory of intuition is more grave, for it concerns the doctrine itself. Professor Cunningham describes it (p. 47 *et seq.*) as a contradiction between two views about the nature of intellect: according to one view the intellect is the opposite, the antithesis, of intuition; according to the other, which is implicit, not explicit, the intellect is a degree of intuition, continuous with it and derived from it by a process of shrinkage or condensation (the "luminous nucleus" idea). There is a difficulty here which needs elucidation, but I think it can be shown to involve no inconsistency at all. It may, however, require an elaboration of the theory of intuition. I should like, therefore, to state the problem in my own way and in terms, not of intellect, but of intuition. Bergson represents intuition and intellect as the two branches of a dichotomy tending in their development to become ever more completely dissociated, and each, as it progresses towards perfection, tending to emphasise the characters which distinguish it from the other, and to discard as encumbrances the characters which it shared with the other in the original impulse before the dichotomy manifested itself. So we have in the world two types of mental activity pronounced in their mutual

opposition, the instinct of the hymenoptera and the intelligence of man. This is one view of intuition, there is another. The intellect is a concept-forming faculty. It moulds or shapes the content of experience. But what is this content which flows into intellectual moulds, this flux which intellect fixes into shapes and static forms, and then binds together by class-concepts? It is the reality as we know it by intuition. Intuition apprehends reality in its actual living flow; it is life itself coming to a consciousness of its own activity. Intuition is the artist's way of apprehending reality. The artist's vision is an intuition, and so far as we all have intuition we all are artists. The rare souls who are artists *par excellence* differ from us vulgar souls only in the degree of their power to penetrate the veil which intellect has dropped between us and reality (Bergson, *Essay on Laughter*, p. 150). But then the artist's vision is a creation, a carving out or shaping of reality, which because it is intuition expresses itself in particular images and not in intellectual concepts. This is the other view of intuition. Are the two views inconsistent? Does the term intuition mean the same, connote the same fact, in each case? Can intuition be at once an immediate apprehension of flowing, ceaselessly changing life, and so the antithesis of intellect, and also an image-forming activity distinct from but yet continuous with the intellect to which it supplies the matter of its concepts? This is the problem.

The key to its solution lies, it appears to me, in the distinction between instinct as an innate knowledge of things, and intelligence as an innate knowledge of relations (*Ev. Cré.*, p. 159). The word innate means that the activity of knowing is a natural and not an individually acquired disposition. If now we regard these two activities from the standpoint of philosophical analysis of knowledge—and this is Professor Cunningham's standpoint, the standpoint of Hegel—then what impresses us is their complementary characters. If on the other hand we regard them from the standpoint of evolutionary biology, as two developing tendencies, then we are impressed by their antithetical characters. There is no inconsistency but a difference of standpoint, and both standpoints are equally necessary and equally important.

This, however, merely touches a formal difficulty; let us come to the substantial problem. Bergson represents the function of the intellect to be immobilisation—the shaping, fixing, moulding in static forms a reality in itself flowing ceaselessly. And he represents the function of intuition to be the apprehending of the flowing in its flux and as a flux. But in this case the artist's vision will fall under intellect, not under intuition. For though his outlook be on the flow and not trammelled by conceptual forms, yet his vision takes shape, his activity is forming images, which later he will fix in material works of art. He may differ from the man of science and the philosopher in the greater ductility his forms possess, he may be nearer the unfixed flux or better able to see its nature, but in so far as his mind is active it is working intellectually, if to work intellectually is to give fixity. Yet further, if intellect be the innate knowledge of relations (universals) and intuition the innate knowledge of things (particulars), then not only are intuition and intellect equally necessary, but the intellect is dependent on intuition. This seems to me to be the basis of Professor Cunningham's objection. Intuition, I understand him to say, so soon as we really come to close quarters with it, turns out to be not antithetical to, but identical with, intellect. He suspects, and suspicion

grows into conviction, that Bergson assumes that "forming an idea of an object and forming an image of it are one and the same thing" (p. 66).

We seem to have a paradox, but it is only a seeming paradox, and an analogy in the physical world will at once come to mind. The positive and negative poles of the magnet are non-existent in abstraction and antithetical in union. But in the case of intuition it is clear that a new distinction is called for, a distinction between æsthetic intuition and metaphysical intuition. Either may be pure intuition, but the metaphysical intuition is a limiting concept, while the æsthetic intuition is fact. If over against intellectual knowledge, or knowledge of relations, we represent a mental activity or intellect, a concept-forming activity of the mind, then over against intuitive knowledge, or knowledge of things, we must represent a mental activity of imagination, an image-producing activity. It will then become clear that while intuition may stand alone, presupposing no other form of activity on which it depends, intellect is wholly dependent on intuition.

This is the doctrine Croce has expounded in his theory of art (v. *Estetica*, ch. i.). There are many points of difference, and the differences are important, but in the essential doctrine that the artist's vision is intuition both Bergson and Croce appear to me to agree, and their agreement is not verbal but substantial. The distinction between image-forming and idea-forming, on which Professor Cunningham bases his criticism, is nowhere, so far as I remember, explicitly drawn by Bergson, but it seems to me everywhere implicit in his theory.

Let me now turn from Professor Cunningham's account of Bergson to his account of Hegel. The charge against Bergson is that his "intellect" is simply the Kantian *Verstand*, and that he argues as though the concept of Kant were the accepted modern standpoint of intellectualism, unconscious of the wholly different and wider meaning of the Hegelian *Begriff*. "Thought as Hegel defines it is regarded as capable of entering into the heart of reality and of seizing it in its mobility" (p. 77). "It is the life of the mind which finds expression in conscious experience as a totality" (p. 91). "The true, the good, and the beautiful are expressions of it; for it is our very self-consciousness" (*ib.*). Now this and much more serves to prove that Hegel uses thought in the same sense in which Bergson uses intuition—intuition as the whole which holds within it intelligence as a luminous nucleus. This seems to me true and well said. Hegel saw as Bergson sees that the intellect is not the whole mind. But is this all, and is there no difference between the two doctrines? Bergson's notion of the intellect as a mode of activity evolved to serve the vital needs of the organism is nowhere to be found in Hegel, nor the doctrine of the mutual adaptation of intellect to matter and matter to intellect. Bergson's theory of knowledge is at the same time a theory of life, and on this rests his claim to have made a clear advance in philosophy and an original contribution of permanent value.

I will merely notice Professor Cunningham's two objections to the theory of duration because neither of them seems to me to grip, and one of them seems to me a misapprehension of, or at any rate a failure to appreciate, an important doctrine. The first objection is that Bergson's notion of duration is a wholly irrational concept which can only be predicated of an essentially unintelligible process. This he calls an *a priori* objection. The other is that the analysis of conscious experience, on which

the idea of duration is based, is not exhaustive; it omits something, and what it omits gives a markedly different aspect to the process. Of the first of these objections I shall say nothing, because it is clear that duration is unintelligible only in the narrow sense which Bergson gives to the intellect. Were it unintelligible in the absolute sense, Professor Cunningham could not have been able to give the lucid account of it which he has given. The second objection is that the whole work of conserving experience and making it unitary falls on the dynamic memory, and no place is left for dynamic imagination, which is an equally essential factor in the unity of consciousness. In other words, Bergson takes no account of the forward-looking aspect of consciousness. This criticism amazes me. One of Bergson's most characteristic doctrines is to my thinking essentially what Professor Cunningham seems to mean by dynamic imagination—the doctrine of "attention to life." And, indeed, are not things for Bergson a product of imagination? They are our virtual actions, the reflection to the mind of a certain influence it might exercise.

Both the foregoing objections are, however, probably only meant to lead to the main objection to the whole theory of creative evolution, the objection that it rejects a teleological explanation of the universe. Bergson rejects finalism as an interpretation of the world-process because, he says, like mechanism it makes time unreal, for it presupposes that all is given, it confronts us with a block universe in which change and novelty are strangers (p. 134). On the other hand, Bergson acknowledges an element of truth in finalism, for the world is the expression of one principle and is therefore unitary and harmonious, but the principle is an impulsion not an attraction. The harmony therefore is imperfect, existing in principle, not in fact. This is the doctrine of the open universe.

Professor Cunningham urges that a teleological or finalistic interpretation of the universe does not involve either of the concepts which come under Bergson's ban. The plausibility of Bergson's argument rests, in his view, on a false disjunction. This is, that evolution must either reproduce an eternally fixed and changeless plan or else be a process whose unity is only a *vis a tergo* (p. 146). The disjunction rests on a separation of intelligence and will, and this is the basis of the theory of creative evolution. Against this view Professor Cunningham presents the Hegelian doctrine. "The will is a special way of thinking; it is thought translating itself into reality; it is the impulse of thought to give itself reality" (Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, p. 11). He interprets this as meaning that intelligence is *rationalised will*, and formulates another doctrine which he wishes us to call *creative finalism*.

The essence of creative finalism is that the directing ends constitute the organising principle of the process of experience, that these ends are essentially dynamic, and that the principle of which they are the elements is growing and changing, is in fact creative, and we must predicate this principle of reality in general.

But is this indeed different from, or rather at variance with, Bergson's doctrine? It depends. The sting lies in the author's application of the term dynamic to the ends. The meaning is, if I do not mistake, that the ends of our actions determine the form of our present activity in precisely the same way in which the acted past determines it. Is this conceivable? It seems to involve the contradiction that an end, not yet itself determined, can yet be determinative. Bergson's theory is clear.

The acted past is organically preserved in the acting present, determining the form of the activity. The past is unchangeable, not because it has ceased to exist but because it is already acted. The future is open, not because it is empty,—it is full of our virtual actions,—but because the actions which fill it are not yet acted. I cannot see how Professor Cunningham can hold that future ends determine present activity in the same dynamic sense in which past actions do, and himself escape the disjunction,—either the unacted ends are, like the acted past, fixed and unalterable and the universe eternally complete, or the ends are changeable and so unlike the acted past.

I will conclude this critical notice of a most welcome study of Bergson's philosophy by saying that, though I am unable to agree with the author in his particular criticism of the theory of creative evolution, I am fully in accord with him in the general aim. I share with him the feeling that injustice is done alike to Bergson and to the philosophers who in contrast to him are called intellectualists, by the presentation of the new philosophy as an anti-intellectualism, a romanticism, a pragmatism, and the like. Such epithets obscure the philosophical problem. What often gives an appearance of inconsistency in Bergson is just what to many of his followers gives the peculiar stimulus of his philosophy, its non-reliance on system. I have always felt that there is a strong fundamental basis of agreement between Hegel and Bergson, but, as Croce has shown so clearly, in Hegel there is much which is no longer living, but dead: in Bergson, I am tempted to add, there is much which has hardly yet come to life.

H. WILDON CARR.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

Elements of Folk-Psychology. By Wilhelm Wundt.—Authorised Translation by Edward Leroy Schaub, Ph.D.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1916.

THIS work differs from the larger and well-known *Völkerpsychologie* in that, while the latter dealt with the main forms of expression of the folk-mind, separately and more or less in the order of their historical development, this endeavours to show the relation of the various processes to one another and to indicate the manner in which they co-operate in the development of mankind as a whole. An attempt is here made, in fact, to give in outline a history of the development of mankind in terms of folk-psychology, and, as one may gather from the concluding remarks of the book, Wundt thinks that in such a psychological history alone is to be found the basis of a sound philosophy of history. By folk-psychology is not meant a science which deals with the mental characteristics peculiar to different peoples or races and distinguishing them from one another, but really what in England would presumably be called social psychology, whose problems relate to those mental phenomena which presuppose the interaction of many minds and which are inexplicable in terms of the individual consciousness alone. Preference is given to the term *Folk* (*Volk*) as being comprehensive and including within its scope many minor social groupings, such as families, clans, etc.

The method pursued consists in taking, so to speak, transverse sections in the course of development described by folk-psychology, with

a view of discovering the main phases or stages of that development. Wundt thinks four such stages can be distinguished, the last not being yet completed. These are: (1) the Primitive Age; (2) the Totemic Age; (3) the Age of Heroes and Gods, or, more briefly, the Heroic Age; (4) the Development to Humanity.

Wundt's treatment of the Primitive Age seems to be based upon the information furnished by anthropology upon peoples usually regarded as belonging to the lowest level of culture, such as the Semang and Sakai, the Negritos, the Veddas, and the Pygmies. The Australians being possessed of an elaborate social organisation are relegated to a higher level. Though his discussion in this connection, as indeed throughout the volume, is full of interesting and instructive suggestions, it must yet be admitted that Wundt was not sufficiently impressed with the difficulties of interpretation that confront the investigator of social evolution in its earlier phases. Generalisations such as Wundt wishes to establish presuppose an exhaustive morphology or phaseology, which in the present stage of anthropology we are far indeed from possessing. Certainly this volume abounds in general statements for which no adequate evidence is offered, at any rate within the limits of the book itself. Thus, for example, it is urged that a closely guarded endogamous monogamy was the exclusive mode of marriage in the Primitive Age, and that the development of the family may be described as having proceeded from such monogamy, through a union of polyandry and polygamy, to the so-called group-marriage, thence to polygamy, and finally back to monogamy. Now, the evidence for the prevalence of monogamy in the Primitive Age is based upon the accounts of the Veddas given by the brothers Sarasin; of the Semang and Sakai, by Martin; and of the Negritos and Pygmies, by authorities not stated. Wundt himself admits that the Bushmen, who certainly belong to this age, are polygamous, though he explains this exception as due to the influence of the surrounding Bantu peoples. Closer investigation shows that Martin is far from clear as to the Sakai or Senoi, as he calls them; whilst, according to Skeat, polygamy does exist among them, and Wilkinson tells us that the morals of the Semang are lax. As to the Pygmies, we are told by Sir H. H. Johnston that they are polygamous, indeed that they seem to approach very near promiscuity and even incest in their marital relations. Further, we learn from the *Annales du Musée du Congo belge* that the Batua Pygmies practise polygamy, though in some localities they are monogamous. On the whole, the evidence does not make for the special association of monogamy with the lowest culture. The most that can be said is that there is more of it under the conditions of forest or jungle life. Nor can proof be offered for the exclusive prevalence of endogamy in the Primitive Age. Here Wundt relies upon the Sarasins' account of the Veddas. The existence of clan exogamy among the Veddas has, however, been clearly shown by Dr and Mrs Seligmann. Sept-exogamy exists among the Andaman Islanders, whilst of the Negritos of Negros we are told by seventeenth-century observers that marriage within the horde was forbidden, and that wives could only be obtained by capture from other tribes. Local exogamy too is alleged for the Sakai. It should also be noted that Wundt offers no evidence for the peculiar association of polyandry with a definite stage in the development of the family. So far as the evidence goes, it seems to occur sporadically throughout all levels of savage life.

Objections of a similar kind can be raised against Wundt's descriptions of the religion of the Primitive Age. He may be right in denying to primitive man a belief in a supreme God and in explaining all cases of alleged monotheism as due to external influence, but one may legitimately question the assertion that "primitive" religion consists exclusively of a belief in magic or demons. Cases of belief in higher Gods and culture-heroes are undoubtedly found among peoples of a very low level of culture. According to Sir H. H. Johnston, the idea of a supreme spirit of the sky is held by the Pygmies. The Sakai, according to Skeat, believe in certain greater spirits who are very likely gods. The Veddas, according to Dr Seligmann, believe in Yaka, who, if not gods, have certainly attained the position of heroes, and in a Kandi Yaka, a Lord of the Dead to whom lesser spirits have to apply for leave to obtain offerings and help their relations. The Negritos of Zambales believe that the spirits of all who die enter one Supreme Spirit whose abode is in a rock. These facts and many more which could be adduced are sufficient to indicate the danger of generalisations, in this connection.

Coming now to the Totemic Age, it should be noted that by totemism Wundt understands not merely a complex of mythological belief, but also a unique form of tribal organisation affecting all social institutions, which, it is alleged, remained constant throughout this age. Here too the discussion is learned and instructive; but it may be doubted whether the desire for logical connectedness has not often led Wundt to impose the conception of totemism upon the facts rather than deduce it from them, and whether the evidence warrants us in saying that at one time totemism everywhere prevailed and that it deserves the name of a transition stage in mental development.

One illustration may perhaps be given of Wundt's method here. This is taken from his analysis of the religious beliefs of this age. Reverting to a well-known distinction of his between a soul that is bound to the body or a corporeal soul and a free soul or *psyche* which may leave the body and continue its existence independently of it, Wundt shows that the latter form of soul-belief comes in the Totemic Age to have a decided predominance. At first the soul is held to be embodied in the so-called "soul animals." Gradually other animals are added, and even plants, especially those which have a close relation to man. The introduction of plants into the realm of totemic ideas mediates the transition from the totem to the fetish. Finally the totem animal comes to be an ancestral animal, and with the greater prominence assigned to the memory of human forefathers, with the rise of culture, the animal ancestor changes into the human ancestor. Fetishism and ancestor-worship are thus claimed to be logical developments of totemism. Ancestor-worship is taken to be one of the turning-points to the new era of Heroes and Gods.

The chapter dealing with the Age of Heroes and Gods is perhaps the most suggestive in the book. Here Wundt discusses the rise of political society, the differentiation of classes and vocations, the origin of cities, the development of the legal system, the origin of gods. In the main it is the peoples of civilised antiquity that are referred to here. In many cases the contrast between this and the preceding age is drawn in a somewhat sharp manner. Thus, to take an example, the "political" society of the age is sharply contrasted with the "tribal" organisation of the Totemic Age. A careful review of the available evidence would show, however, that

there is a more or less continuous advance in organised government as we ascend from lower to higher cultures, and there can be no doubt that in the higher phases of even the savage world we find societies which can no longer be called tribal. There are many instances among African peoples, for example, among whom government has become so centralised, that local divisions have lost their independence, and local chiefs have become heads of districts appointed by king or council. Such societies can surely no longer be called tribal, but are political or even national. In this as in many other respects it may be doubted whether Wundt's three "Ages" really sum up such definite characteristics of social evolution as would entitle them to be described as genuine stages in the development of mankind.

In the concluding chapter Wundt gives a rapid survey of the factors operating in the fourth phase of social evolution, the Development to Humanity. He points out that, though progress is neither inevitable nor continuous, but subject to deviations and retrogressions, yet in the main the development to humanity forms a connected whole explicable in terms of psychological law. It is not until after the Age of Heroes and Gods that the notion of Humanity in the sense of a demand for an ideal condition in which appreciation of human worth shall have become a universal norm, and universal rights and duties shall belong to all men as men, comes to play a rôle of importance. Several factors are involved in this development to humanity. The first is the rise of the idea of a *World-Empire*, which brought with it the consciousness of a unity embracing the whole of mankind, and which resulted in an enormous extension of the institutions of law and administration. World-empire prepared the way for *World-Culture*. The Græco-Roman world-culture was characterised by cosmopolitanism united with individualism. The growing appreciation of the value of personality was accompanied by a growing indifference to the State. In the Renaissance the cult of the individual reached its highest point. But in certain respects the Renaissance world-culture had characteristics all its own. It was characterised, namely, by a heightened political and national interest. The Renaissance may be said, in Wundt's view, to have laid the basis for a form of world-culture which remains the ideal of civilised mankind to-day, *i.e.* the combination of humanistic and national endeavour, and the recognition that true humanitarian world-culture does not mean the suppression of national freedom and initiative.

As one of the last of the creations possessing universal human significance *Universal Religion* makes its appearance, and in connection with it the striving for universality is far keener than in connection with world-empire or world-culture. Finally, world-religion and world-culture form the basis of *World-History*—a very important factor in the collective consciousness of mankind. Wundt draws attention to the noteworthy fact that, from the time of St Augustine up to the eighteenth century, religious development was regarded as establishing the only connection between the various periods of history. The idea that Christianity was destined to be a world-religion and that it originated historically, meant on the one hand, that it was independent of the limits of a single people, and on the other that it was subject in its development to law. But though it followed that the course of human history was teleologically determined, yet the plan and the goal were imposed from without and known to mankind only

through revelation. In the age of the Enlightenment the idea of history as the education of mankind was substituted for the notion of a supernatural revelation, and in Lessing's writings this in turn is transformed into the notion of self-education, or development determined by the laws of mental life. Then Herder did away with the restriction of the history of mankind to religious development, and substituted for the latter development to humanity. Thus the way was cleared for the fundamental conviction of nineteenth-century philosophers that history is the result of laws immanent in historical life itself. This view received its fullest expression in Hegel's works. The fundamental defect of Hegel's philosophy of history lies, in Wundt's view, in the fact that it was guided too much by a logical schematism which was often imposed upon history rather than deduced from it. Wundt is of the opinion that the direct approach to a true philosophy of history is to be found in a psychological account of the development of mankind, presumably of the kind now supplied by him. In connection with this whole discussion a striking omission should perhaps be noted. No reference is made to the humanitarianism of Comte and the Positivists.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

The Divine Aspect of History. By John Rickards Mozley.—2 vols.
xx + 407, x + 509.—Cambridge University Press, 1916.

THIS is a beautifully printed book, written by an author who bears a distinguished name. Wide reading and careful scholarship are displayed on every page, and both the standpoint and the reverent tone of the work cannot fail to impress the reader. The scope of the work is immense, for it is nothing less than a review of the whole course of natural and human history down to the year 1915 A.D., in order to prove that divine guidance can be discerned throughout nature, and in all periods of human history. It contains much sane thinking, and its attitude is altogether optimistic. The book reminds one of *The Nature of Man*, by Metchnikoff, and *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, by Houston Chamberlain, which between them cover much the same ground, but are pessimistic in their outlook, and give a verdict against religion. That the author, though reverent, is fearless in his quest after the truth can be seen from the following quotation: "It is as immoral to be influenced against one's conscience by the fear of hell as it is to be influenced against one's conscience by the fear of death" (vol. ii. p. 182).

The divine element in human history is interpreted as spiritual force rather than light (vol. i. p. 215), and we must keep our moral judgment awake as a condition of discovering this force. The essence of religion is described as trust, and prayer is indispensable for its vitality. Prayer, however, is the intercourse of the human spirit with God, Jesus, and the saints, these being the Trinity in so far as the author is able to accept that dogma as containing an element of truth. He is sympathetic towards religious symbolism, but places the emphasis on moral rectitude as the one thing that finally determines the worth of a man's religion. The miraculous element, excepting wonderful acts of healing, is excluded from religion. The resurrection of Jesus is not excepted, and the continued

presence of Jesus with his Church after his death is, in his judgment, in no way invalidated by a denial of his physical resurrection. He defines a Christian, however, as one who accepts the real government of Jesus over us, and his real direction of us now (vol. ii. p. 447). He rejects the dogma of consubstantiality in the Nicene Creed, and the pre-existence of the Christ, but at the same time fails to accept the Arian distinction between the divine nature of God and that of Christ. His position is that all can share in the divine nature, but that Jesus is pre-eminent in this respect. The subtlety of Church theology offends him, and he pleads for open-mindedness on the deep things of God. With regard to the canonical Scriptures, he belongs to the school of scientific criticism; and while the book displays a very careful study of Biblical criticism, the author does not claim to be, and is not, a specialist in this department. He is able to read more history into the stories of Abraham, Moses, Joshua, and Ezra than the present state of Biblical criticism warrants. The prophets and the psalmists of Israel are treated with insight and sympathy, and this part of the book is really a valuable contribution to the subject. In our opinion the author has made good his theory that Zerubbabel must be dated a century later than the generally accepted date. His treatment of the Synoptic problem and of the Johannine writings is too sketchy to be satisfactory. The conclusions arrived at may be the correct ones or may not, but the marshalling of the evidence leaves so many important points untouched. The author believes that John the Apostle wrote the kernel (which was later edited and added to by an Ephesian follower or followers of the Apostle) of the Fourth Gospel. He claims Irenæus as a safe witness to this view, but he overlooks the fact that Irenæus always calls this John "the disciple," and never once "the apostle." This point should be discussed, for it may reflect a tradition of another John. The tradition of John the Apostle being put to death soon after his brother James in Jerusalem is likewise overlooked. It is natural to expect an exaggerated respect for the Church Fathers in one brought up in the atmosphere of the Church of England, and we ought, perhaps, to congratulate the author for having burst the traditional fetters to the extent he has done; but the apparent docile acceptance of the traditions in early Church writings about John seems to us inconsistent with the author's strong critical attitude throughout the rest of the work.

The book excels in its treatment of the great leaders of thought and of action in the world's history. What is said about Socrates, Zoroaster, Gotama Buddha, Confucius, Peter, Paul, Luther, and many others is admirable; but the field covered is so vast that many important aspects of the religions dealt with are ignored. The part played by the idea of the nature-god dying and rising up again in the religions of Egypt and of Babylonia is only hinted at; while the singular fact that in all the Babylonian liturgy no trace of spiritual joy is discernible is not even mentioned—and, in passing, may not the presence of the *bull* on Babylonian lyres suggest a better explanation of the golden calf in Israel than is given in vol. i. p. 269? With regard to China, again, very scanty attention is given to the popular religion of the country, which gave birth to both Confucianism and Taoism. The treatment of the religions of the non-Christian world is not so full as the space allotted to the great leaders might lead one to expect.

A similar criticism must be offered with regard to Plato, Aristotle, the

Stoics, and the modern philosophers generally. The peculiar contribution they made to the progress of thought and of civilisation is briefly stated, but not with sufficient fullness for the general reader, whose acquaintance with philosophy is superficial, to appreciate our debt to them; and it is for him, rather than for the specialist, that the book has been written.

The central theme of the whole work is Jesus and the society which acknowledges him as its leader, viz. the Christian Church. Reviewing the prophecies so long employed to buttress Christianity, he offers an explanation of the *maiden* passage in Isaiah which is wonderfully attractive and convincing, and it will be more difficult to dissociate the *sign* from its context and contemporary events, for the reader of this book, than it was before. He finds only one prophetic utterance which had a governing influence on Jesus, and that is the famous delineation of the "Suffering Servant," by the unknown exilic prophet, now found in Isaiah liii. As to Jesus, his submission to John's baptism proves that he was, like other men, conscious of sinfulness. The only other alternative to this is to deny his sincerity in submitting to a baptism of repentance. He, however, believes that Jesus died sinless. His position in religion is well stated in the following: "That which binds us to him is the love, faith, and courage which enabled him to transcend the visible sphere, and not only to grasp eternity as his own heritage, but to give all mankind the same heritage as their own" (vol. ii. p. 94). The great prophets of religion and the founders of Christianity were Jews, and yet "the Jewish nation has had the unparalleled misfortune of not being reckoned honourable through the virtues of the great men which it has produced" (vol. ii. p. 170). Christianity, he argues, is something more than Judaism expanded. It has a vitality of its own which it has imparted to modern civilisation in a way Judaism could never have done. His review of the first three centuries is of exceptional interest, and unbiassed.

The assumption of despotic authority by the Church in the name of its founder he considers a misfortune, but its power to organise society is a divine element. The Church possesses this ability to an eminent degree, and herein lies its promise for the future. At the back of this power is the instinct of brotherliness which is so defective in Islam and in non-Christian religions. The author traces the growth of the influence of the Church in Europe with a masterly hand to the time of Luther's great rebellion. Justice is done to Luther, and his position is lucidly examined. The author, however, does not seem to have studied the works of Troeltsch on the later developments of the Reformation beyond the confines of the Lutheran Church, and this may account for his inadequate insight into the true nature of the Calvinistic form of Church government, which was the secret of its strength in Europe and America. The Anabaptists are justly dealt with by Troeltsch and Lindsay, but in this book they are mentioned once as active rebels, while the great leaders of the Socinian movement are not even mentioned.

The subject is too large to be adequately treated within so narrow limits. Notwithstanding, the book is one of the signs of the times. It breathes the spirit of toleration. It bespeaks a faith which can live and save men by appealing to their own experience of goodness, and consciousness of reality. Mutual love and trust in God, our author thinks, will save mankind from all its ills, and we heartily agree. We failed to trace the quotation in vol. ii. p. 171, "*hostes humani generis*." Tacitus has "*odio*

humani generis," which may have a different meaning. The other quotations are faithfully copied, and "Zarathushtra" in vol. i. p. 104, from Prof. Moulton's Hibbert Lectures, proves how conscientiously the author has laboured.

MORRIS B. OWEN.

THE PRESBYTERIAN COLLEGE, CARMARTHEN.

The Commonwealth of Nations: an Inquiry into the Nature of Citizenship in the British Empire and into the Mutual Relations of the Several Communities thereof. Part I. Edited by L. Curtis.—London: Macmillan, 1916.

THE preface to this volume contains a statement as to the activities of the Round Table group which is to be held responsible for the investigations presupposed in the opinions expressed by Mr Curtis. Since 1910 such groups have been working at problems of administration within the British Empire. The volume now before us is a more detailed review of the historical conditions in the formation of the Empire which have been summarised in *The Problem of the Commonwealth*; and it is to be followed by further history and an analysis of the present situation, with suggestions for its improvement. *The Commonwealth of Nations*, Part I., deals with the development of the British Empire until the year 1783. It is entirely devoted to political history, and it emphasises chiefly the crises which have divided or secured allegiance to a central government. The limits of the subject treated are therefore very clear: political history is involved only so far as politics may be identified with problems of administration; and the passions or needs which result in this or that system of administration are viewed generally from the standpoint of a person who is interested chiefly in effective administration.

The history is admirably rendered, especially if we refer to that part of it which deals with the British Empire. For the author does indeed tend to write a history of all creation, and his preliminary review of early political development has all the faults of special pleading. He accepts the old contrast of East and West, the East being essentially theocratic; he identifies the Greek *polis* with the modern state; and he apparently imagines that the development of political liberty and justice was handed on directly and exclusively from Athens and Rome to the British Empire. But, since a discussion of such issues is really beside the point, we may consider only the author's history since Edward I. of England. Mr Curtis must know that it is dangerous to use universal history as an argument for political reform in a single state. Spencer and Marx did it as well as it could be done; and there is a certain Houston Chamberlain who thought that Adam was a German. But this is not history, this is pamphleteering.

Let us therefore confine our attention to Mr Curtis's British history. This is rendered in the terms of what is sometimes called constitutional, but should perhaps be called parliamentary development. The first great turning towards a new world-situation in politics is expressed as the assertion by England of the freedom of the seas for herself (p. 141), and much prominence is given to the contrast between the forms of government in the different European states at the time when Europe expanded over the world (p. 164 *sq.*). The backward races of the world seem necessarily

to fall under the power of Europeans, and the only practical issue is that of the method by which this power is to be exercised. The English have so far established a far greater ascendancy than any other race; but Mr Curtis repudiates the idea that the comparative success of colonisation by the English was due to any racial characteristics. It was due, he thinks, to the capacity for adaptation in the institutions under which the English had lived. "The English system gained by the freedom it left to private adventures, for schemes were launched by a number of people for a variety of motives at many different points and in many different ways. The state was not identified with the success or failure of any particular venture, and in case of disaster the loss was limited in extent. Settlements took root wherever the choice of the district and method was happy, and once established were capable of an indefinite growth in time to come" (p. 213). The situation at present, however, can only be understood by giving full recognition to the rivalry between all the states of Europe during the late Renaissance; and one state, at present powerful, did not then exist, the German Empire (p. 221). The Commercial System is ably reviewed by Mr Curtis, and so is the interplay of political with economic passions, although he seems to avoid any new estimate of the old tendencies. The union with Scotland is the next theme; and it is said to have been based upon the desire of the Scottish Parliament to secure the opening of English markets to Scottish commerce, but in the end the balance of interests had to be controlled by some single authority, and the control was exercised by the English Parliament (p. 303). Then came the crisis which is for Mr Curtis the most important, the problem of the American Colonies. When the new situation brought underlying differences of outlook into prominence, "the tendency in English political circles to make human instead of material standards the measure of colonial values was too weak and came too late to save the situation" (p. 311). Thus the more primitive view of the issues involved was more effective in the direction of policy. The crisis in America was precipitated by the Indian rising in 1763. "The British Ministry and its officers thus found themselves paralysed by lack of the powers and revenue which could only be derived from a single legislature, and instead of addressing themselves to the constructive task of creating an appropriate legislature, sought what they needed from the existing legislature of Great Britain" (p. 343). The result was materially affected by the general idea that a schism was fore-ordained (p. 363), and the division of the Empire began. The struggle in America was one between two minorities, while the majority were not prepared to risk anything for either cause. But neutrality proved impossible, and the Empire of that day was finally dissolved. Then follows a review of the relations of Ireland to the British Commonwealth which is in the main a reproduction of Lecky's *History of Ireland*. Some chance phrases, however, allow a larger issue to be seen than should be possible in polite history. At the French Revolution, "on the Continent no worse oppression had been endured at the hands of Autocracy than the Irish had suffered under the rule of the British Commonwealth" (p. 496)—so Mr Curtis tells us. And he emphasises the point by such sentences as these:—"Ireland is the one spot in the British Commonwealth where anarchy has continuously flourished" (p. 508); "Martial law was enforced, in 1798, with frightful barbarities . . . house-burning, executions without trial, massacres, and even torture were the order of the day" (p. 509).

The last part of the volume deals with the American Commonwealth, by which the author means the United States of America; but he is so enraptured with centralised government that he cannot leave unchanged the usual name of that experiment in federation, lest we might forget the special advantages of the scheme which he is maintaining. Then follows a chapter on the schism of the Commonwealth in its after-effects; and the volume ends with the expression of regret for the lost opportunity of a single state including the present United States in the present British Empire. The solution of our difficulties in administration, it is suggested, will be found by extending to all those of Mr Curtis's race the power over and responsibility for foreign policy.

A few general criticisms may be made on the very large thesis with which Mr Curtis has dealt. There is great ability in his statement, and a very wide knowledge is implied in his treatment of Imperial History. Given the limitations he has himself imposed, the development of the present situation is truly rendered; and the volume is one which no intelligent British citizen can afford to neglect. It is unfair perhaps to quarrel with the many assumptions which are implied in the author's judgment of political issues; and we must resolutely avoid reference to the complete misrepresentation of the attitude of Socrates, which after all need not affect Imperial problems. But the fundamental fault of Mr Curtis is provincialism. The variety of the lands and peoples and times to which he refers does not prevent his being essentially a political thinker of the ringed-fence school. He desires obviously to have as many people as possible within the same excellent fence; but outsiders are no concern of his. This has sometimes amusing results. He is, as is already generally known, a state-absolutist of the school of Hobbes, and when he wishes to imagine the relation of his Empire to the human race in general he uses a preposterous map to show that London is really the centre of the world (plate ix. p. 179), although he is exact enough to say that the real centre of the land hemisphere is just outside the mouth of the Loire. Are we intended to conclude that the Executive in Whitehall should arrange the administration of the whole habitable globe? Or has Mr Curtis not yet heard the open secret that the political world has no centre? His geography would have to be revised for an American edition of his book; and perhaps even his history is tainted with the same provincialism of outlook. Indeed, one imagined that it was quite an obsolete superstition that the British Constitution had developed in isolation. And yet influences of the finer kind passing from France or Germany are not given their due place in Mr Curtis's record. Outside his fence are only people against whom we must defend ourselves; and inside his fence he desires more and more effective administration only in order that such "defence" may be overwhelming. The sum of our criticism is this: there is ability in the marshalling of facts and the urging of a political programme, but the moral attitude implied is ingenuously primitive.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

LONDON.

Reflections on Violence. By Georges Sorel.—English translation by T. E. Hulme.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1916.—Pp. xiii + 299.

M. GEORGES SOREL has been called "the philosopher of Syndicalism." His *Reflections on Violence*, now adequately rendered into English by Mr T. E. Hulme, owed their origin very largely to his acquaintance with the remarkable activities and efforts of French trade unionism from the year 1902, when the *Confédération Générale du Travail* became, through the coalescence of the older C. G. T. with the *Fédération des Bourses*, a fighting force, down to the time when the *Reflections* were published, as articles in *Le Mouvement Socialiste* in 1906, as a book in 1908. The characteristic of this period in trade union history is the presence of the *revolutionary* strain, with its belief in direct action and its ever-ready weapon of the strike. With these things, in a semi-philosophical, semi-psychological way, Sorel's book deals. In other countries besides France, not least of all in England, the opening years of the twentieth century witnessed subtle and significant changes in the temper, the aspirations, and the methods of organised labour. A distinct breach was made with the steady-going *political* methods and political traditions of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There was a rapidly growing tendency on the part of organised workers everywhere to abandon their trust in politicians and in methods of reform by legislation, and to fight industrial battles on the industrial field alone, pursuing on all occasions the direct policy of a refusal to work—in other words, going promptly on strike at a sign or suspicion of grievance. Somewhat unfamiliar gospels were preached in workshops, trade union branches, and elsewhere, and many of the younger generation of workers learned lessons and received inspirations which they will never forget. In France all this kind of manifestation received the designation "revolutionary syndicalism"; in England people described it simply as "syndicalism," and then proceeded hopelessly to misunderstand it.

For philosophers and others it is interesting to notice that all this relatively new order of revolutionary activity in trade unionism coincided with appearances of an allied and similar spirit in other directions—in art, for example, in the headlong breaking away from traditional form; in religion, again, in the recrudescence of mysticism and personalism; in philosophy, in the attack on intellectualism and the praise of instinctive action. The whole seething situation signified, in reality, that mankind generally, the human spirit, was on the verge of a new discovery of inward freedom and personality, and ready to break the bondage of mechanism which modern civilisation had meant for it up to that point. Sorel is, in a way, conscious of all this throughout his reflections, though it is not his main theme, and only indeed in some penetrating *obiter dicta* does he openly touch upon it. Had he seen fit to develop it, and make of it his chief study, his book would have possessed more permanent value. As it is, reading the book again after a long interval, and in the midst of such startlingly altered world-circumstances, we do not feel at all certain of its enduring worth. Much of it, indeed, strikes us now as singularly ephemeral, and some things might very profitably be removed altogether. There is too much smart journalism and too little serious literature all through. There are allusions to, and

covert attacks upon, prominent French politicians, especially socialists, which, though caustically witty and amusing enough, add nothing to the book's value. Particularly do the frequent, and almost invariably disparaging, references to the luckless Jaurès read badly now. And, though doubtless Sidney Webb will be glad to learn, in English, that "he has a mind of the narrowest description, which could only impress people unaccustomed to reflection" (p. 132), still we protest that this kind of thing, loose journalistic writing, belongs to a vanished moment, and never at any time helped the socialist movement, though for a period it distinctly impaired the value of some of the best and most constructive socialist writing of recent years. Those who would bring in the Revolution should have no time for personalities; and if, as Sorel himself quite truly says, "socialists must be convinced that the work to which they are devoting themselves is a *serious, formidable, and sublime work*" (p. 152), then every socialist must learn from the outset a large ability to rise wholly superior to merely personal jealousies and spites. There is, however, something more serious than this tincture of cheap journalism that seems to us to impair the value of Sorel's work to-day. To this we return at the close.

The book is divided into seven chapters, with an introduction in the form of a general explanatory letter addressed to Daniel Halevy, and an appendix, consisting of a very brief contribution made to *Le Matin* in May 1908, entitled "Apology for Violence." The most interesting sections in the book are those on class war and violence, the decadence of the middle (capitalist) classes, and the proletarian strike, in which is sketched the theory by which Sorel is best known, that of the *general strike* as a myth. Sorel would claim to be an orthodox Marxian, and his knowledge of the master's work is undoubtedly great. Some of the best things in the book are his *résumés* and discussions of the chief views of Marx. In revolutionary syndicalism Sorel believed there was to be found the only true descendant of orthodox Marxian socialism, and he set out to understand, philosophically and psychologically, the underlying character of the revolutionary strain in syndicalism. To achieve this purpose he declares it necessary to go back to Marx, and especially to that writer's idea as to how the transition from capitalism to socialism is to come about. Socialists, Sorel thinks, must hold fast to the extreme theory of the class-struggle and the catastrophic end of the capitalist régime. They must abandon all attempts at inducing an enlightened capitalist class to prepare *politically* "the transition to a more perfect system of legislation." Socialists are not going to succeed in their aims at all by political means and the methods of "social peace." Hence Sorel's uncompromising hostility to parliamentary socialists, liberal progressives, and all similar "reformers." The capitalist system will not give way to reform, but—and this is orthodox Marxism—will generate within itself its own negation. The negative element must take the form of a *revolutionary proletariat class*, highly organised, disciplined, and intelligent. The sole business of socialists, therefore, is to explain "to the proletariat the greatness of the revolutionary part they are called upon to play. By ceaseless criticism the proletariat must be brought to perfect their organisations," they must "form ideas which depend solely on their position as producers in large industries," and they must "acquire habits of liberty with which the middle classes are nowadays no longer acquainted" (pp. 85, 86). The

two antagonistic classes, proletarian and middle, must be clearly defined and openly hostile to each other. Unfortunately for this doctrine, the progress of civilisation since Marx has, so Sorel believes, produced a complication which that great man never anticipated. The class which, on the theory, should be sternly and rigidly opposed to the proletarian has become decadent, lost its energy and virility, become "stupefied by humanitarianism." Sorel joins the host of pre-war Jeremiahs! Still worse, owing to the machinations of ubiquitous parliamentary socialists and traffickers in "social peace," believers in arbitration, conciliation, and so forth, this degeneracy had begun to infect the proletarians in like measure, so that the Marxian dogma seemed in a fair way to being rendered futile, through failure of the class war. Such a state of things is, for Sorel, deplorable. Only, he says, "a growing and solidly organised working class can compel the capitalist class to remain firm in the industrial war; if a united and revolutionary proletariat confronts a rich middle class, eager for conquest, capitalist society will have reached its historical perfection" (p. 91), and, *ipso facto*, the time of its catastrophic fall into socialism will be at hand. The Marxian theory is providentially saved, the balance restored, and, further, the whole of modern European civilisation set on the way toward regeneration, by the appearance of "proletarian violence." Sorel professed to believe that Europe could be saved from decay by two things only—either a great war, which he regarded as impossible, or the recrudescence of a "crass and brutal" class struggle within societies, the signs of which he found in syndicalism. "Everything may be saved, if the proletariat, by their use of violence, manage to re-establish the division into classes, and so restore to the middle class something of its former energy"; for this reason, "proletarian violence, carried on as a pure and simple manifestation of the sentiment of the class war, appears as a very fine and very heroic thing," preserving "the immemorial interests of civilisation," and saving "the world from barbarism" (pp. 98, 99). Such is the point of view; when one has it, one has the whole book, with the exception of the myth-theory of the general strike. Those who care to do so can trace the influences at work in producing this point of view. There is Marxian socialism, Bergsonian philosophy, with its notions of some instinctive, creative, violent *force of life* breaking out to the progress of humanity, and its implied praise of *action* rather than *thought*; there is also, we think, a little of Nietzsche with his "Dionysiac element," there is the familiar restiveness against modern mechanical existence, and there is, of course, the fact that French, and other, trade unions did begin a greater use of the method of the strike at and about the time Sorel wrote.

The notion of the general strike as a "myth" is probably familiar to most people who have read English books on syndicalism. Under the form of a general and universal uprising of the workers, the proletariat class everywhere envisages, not intellectually, but *intuitively* (this is Bergson again), its present feeling of unrest. The notion of the general strike is not a rational anticipation of a determinate series of future events; it is, in Sorel's words, "a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society." It is the *myth* in which socialism is wholly comprised (p. 137). The presence of this notion means a revolutionary background to every effort after freedom made by the workers. It ensures the requisite amount of proletarian violence to keep

the class war going until the apocalyptic end of capitalism. Sorel's favourite analogy is the Second Coming, or, more strictly, the part he thinks the idea of that event played amongst the early Christians. The workers, inspired by the notion of the general strike, will see in every little strike a miniature semblance and foretaste of the end; failure will mean simply that they were not adequately prepared, and *therefore*, still driven by the intuitive inspiration, they will do what they have to do, namely, continue along the way of organisation and solidarity, learning heroism and the will-to-endure. It is all very interesting, and, in amplifying the idea, Sorel says much that is worth considering; but it seems probable, as G. D. H. Cole has suggested, that Sorel started with a misunderstanding of the *raison d'être* of the ordinary strike, and in any case the proletariat seems more ready to find inspiration to direct action in lack of adequate wages, or desire for more freedom, than in any semi-religious, semi-ethical myth.

One is inclined to wonder, in the end, whether the main theme of these articles of Sorel has very much value to-day, or will have any more in the future. Sorel's translator is optimistic. He boldly claims Sorel as "certainly the most remarkable socialist since Marx," and holds that his point of view and general attitude have still their day to come. Not in England, we think: and probably not in France. The war has intervened. Movements towards social democracy in the future will bear a character but little resembling that from contemplation of which Sorel drew his reflections. There is no *construction* in the book; there was little in syndicalism. That outburst did its work, and all that was valuable in it, which was *not* "proletarian violence" and the myth of the general strike, has gone into the most genuinely constructive and far-reaching ideas in the socialist world to-day, those, namely, associated with what is usually called Guild Socialism. Of "revolutionary syndicalism" we shall not hear much more; but of National Guilds we shall hear, and these constructive views are not complicated by any Sorellian philosophy. It is ten years since Sorel wrote his articles, and, whilst we admire the praiseworthy industry of Mr Hulme, who has done his work well, we remain in the end with the feeling of having perused a book given to the English public sadly out of its time.

STANLEY A. MELLOR.

LIVERPOOL.

The Life of Robert Hugh Benson. By C. C. Martindale, S.J.—
London: Longmans, 1916.

ALTHOUGH the late Mgr. Benson may not, in his biographer's words, have done "anything externally massive or officially important," there is no doubt that the man was infinitely greater than his work. There can be no question that the most striking feature of this book is the revelation which it gives of the extraordinary many-sidedness of Robert Hugh Benson's character, coupled with certain limitations which Father Martindale does not endeavour to conceal; and it is almost impossible for us to realise the record of his work—his literary output, his constant preaching—in Europe and America, his immense correspondence, and his many-sided interests outside the Church.

This life by Fr. Martindale, S.J., is an exceptionally good piece of

biographical writing, which is not only a record of real value to admirers of the deceased priest, but to students of modern religion. The author is a man of remarkable intuition, keen judgment, and broad-minded charity. The distinguished Jesuit tells us he had no desire to compose a panegyric, but simply to paint the real man largely by Benson's own words, and the recollections of those who were brought into close contact with him. In every way he is discreet and judicial, and writes with excellent spirit to show the curious streak of genius, the feverish activity, the many faults of waywardness, idiosyncrasies, and interests of the well-known convert. *En passant*, the happy and appropriate quotations at the head of each chapter are a pure delight. Scattered through the pages of the volumes are passages of great power and charm, and the final chapter is one of singular beauty.

The vanity of human hopes and ambitions was seldom more strangely illustrated than in the youngest son of Edward White Benson, Archbishop of Canterbury. Born in 1871, he was received into the Church shortly before his thirty-second birthday. From the Anglican communion he had a year of study at Rome, then the priesthood and a second year of preparation for active work at Cambridge. The remaining nine years we see him not as a great man, not a linguist or a theologian, a scientist or philosopher, but simply as a much sought-after priest. "You are burning the candle at both ends," a friend said to him, shortly before he died. "What matter if it gives more light?" was his reply. This was thoroughly characteristic of the man.

Many converts have had the terrible trial of misunderstandings with those who are nearest and dearest to them, but this Hugh was spared. His mother knew he was following God's call as she watched with discerning sympathy, timely encouragement, and wise guidance his path to Rome. His love for her was the closest of all ties that bound him to this earth, and he consulted her upon everything, as these volumes eloquently testify.

His literary art won for him a wider audience than perhaps any Catholic writer since Newman. His novels were more than tales; they were treatises on aspects of Catholic truth in its bearing on human life. A large portion of the *Life* is devoted to a careful analysis of Mgr. Benson's novels in relation to his own character and on general psychological grounds. He was the René Bazin of modern English literature, and was at his best when dealing with the realities of everyday life. But when he writes to help some inquirer struggling towards the truth, or to give spiritual direction to a Catholic correspondent—then he is all deep earnestness. It is true that his books are of unequal value; their author himself used to say that he did not care much for some of them, though as each was completed he was full of delight in his latest work. The activities that crowded his life left little time for social intercourse, and as the years went by he became more and engrossed in his work; and consequently his spirit of detachment and that undercurrent of longing for solitude were adverse to the making of many friends. Yet no appeal for guidance and counsel was ever neglected. He lived and thought and spoke and acted with passion, and in that passion was created his own character.

He loved roaming, but he wanted to roam at the end of a string. He wanted to wander, but to be stopped if he was wandering into danger. What strikes the reader is the picture of him as a man holding his faith

with the strength and simplicity of a child. Hugh Benson was of a highly nervous temperament, such as often goes with artistic genius. The astonishing thing is that the Roman system failed to impose the discipline that would have brought him within the reach of greatness and would in all probability have given him a long and fruitful life. As a child he delighted to play the *enfant terrible*, and in the last decade of his life we can at least admire the generosity, the enthusiasm and cheerfulness, with which he made his contribution to the agelong controversy. He held that humour was almost a virtue, and like Sir Thomas More (with whom he had much in common) his passion was that of obedience to the Church he joined. After a lapse of twelve years he confessed that "what to him at first had been a source of relief and gladness in finding his proper spiritual home, had now become an all-absorbing enthusiasm and devotion; he lived for nothing else." And if his passion for Catholicism was the cause of his premature death, let him have at any rate the heroism of dying for an ideal, whatever may be the view of those who do not share his faith. Hugh Benson, as a priest, gave himself quite simply to his religion: he pressed on to one goal, he minded one thing.

The *Life* is admirably produced, but we regret that it does not contain a bibliography. We should like a few more portraits, and there should certainly have been a facsimile of a letter, or even a postcard, to show Mgr. Benson's characteristic caligraphy. The book certainly challenges attention, and as a literary effort it secures for Fr. Martindale a high place in the ranks of contemporary letters.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

LONDON.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

SCIENCE IS ONE OF THE HUMANITIES.

PROFESSOR J. B. BAILLIE,
Aberdeen University.

THE current controversy regarding the claims of Science and those of the Humanities in a scheme of education rests in the long-run on a deep-rooted prejudice or conviction, which both parties to the controversy share, that in some way or other the aims of science and the aims of humanity are essentially opposed. Such a conviction arises from an opposition deeper still, and which is as old as Western civilisation—the opposition between the course of nature and the interests of human life. For the sciences in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term are devoted to the study of outer nature, and their results are held to bear the character of the realm to which they refer. Nature is outside man, careless of his peculiar concerns, always apparently indifferent, sometimes openly hostile, to his ideals and his welfare. Science in explaining or interpreting the processes of nature seems merely to give good reasons for regarding as irremovable the opposition which in practical life is in so many ways all too evident. Man is by instinct half afraid of nature; the sciences of nature amply confirm his fears; science shows man to be a puppet under the control of forces alien to himself. Man can be pitiful; nature is ruthless in undeviating obedience to laws which take no account of man's pity or man's purposes. Man claims to be the lord of nature, in a sense its most admired and consummate achievement; science recognises no pride of place among the component factors of nature, and dissolves prestige into a system of complex elements and interrelated aimless agencies. Man's spirit is finely touched to the fine issues of beauty and of

goodness ; in the alembic of science beauty is distilled into an arrangement of atoms whose outer form, however intoxicating to the human eye, is in every sense superficial and of no more significance than the interior structure of the composing substance ; while goodness is found to be but the last and subtlest expression of the guileful instinct of self-preservation which equally, though with unequal success, guides the wasp to its victim and the saint to the Holy Grail.

The question at issue between the Sciences and the Humanities seems indeed a serious one if in the light of the former man is viewed as the most prominent marionette in the mechanism of nature, while the latter regards him as the chief hero in the drama of the world. Science indeed may claim to be the crowning glory of the life of man, the most triumphant fulfilment of the powers of his mind. But if humanity must give up its hopes and aspirations at the bidding of science, if it draws its inspiration from ideals which science either cannot justify or can only explain away, the triumphs of science are no compensation for the loss of so much that gives vitality to human life ; the truths of science become themselves but dust and ashes.

Unless the outcome of science is the enrichment and fulfilment of human life, the diadem which science would place on the brows of humanity may be but a mockery, and the crown of man's life but a crown of thorns. On the other hand, it seems equally evident that, however important man's place may be in the scheme of things, unless man pursues his ends along the paths of intelligent order, rigorous coherence, and consistent rationality, such as science alone can claim to secure, he may find himself among the waste places of the world alongside the ape and the tiger.

Is it possible to reconcile these conflicting interests and opposing claims of "science" and "humanity"? I think it will be found on analysis that the opposition arises from a misconception of the meaning of nature and of the procedure of science ; that there is no solid ground for supposing that science is anything more than a special channel through which the human mind seeks to express its activity ; and that in origin, character, and aim science is essentially anthropomorphic.

The apparent opposition between the interests of science and those of humanity is due to an initial mistake in the scientist's conception of nature. Nature is the general term used to designate the object or objects dealt with by the physicist, the mathematician, the chemist, and the biologist ; and for historical reasons the meaning of the term has been

mainly influenced by the peculiar nuance it receives from the physicist and the mathematician. Nature is that which is beyond and independent of the individual mind, occupying the outer realm of space, and apprehended by the senses of sight, touch, and hearing. The aim of science is to investigate and interpret this independent realm of existence in such a way that the laws discovered and the scientific truths obtained will bear the same character of independence of the individual mind, and hold good regardless of human interests or desires. Man has to "learn from nature," must bow before its laws, appear before nature as a vassal or servant to hear the commands of a master.

It is evident, however, that man himself is part of this very realm of nature. He occupies space as much as does a grain of sand; every breath he draws proves him to be a part of the physical world; he is an organism amongst other organisms. But, if so, he is not independent of nature; and nature cannot be what is independent of him, since he is a part of nature and he cannot be independent of himself. Nature cannot be outside man, if man is himself one of the beings constituting nature. The initial view of nature with which the scientist starts is thus transparently absurd. The misconception, or confusion in the conception, is so obvious that one can only wonder how it ever came to be adopted by the scientist, as it unquestionably has been and is still adopted.

The origin of the error is not difficult to explain. Nature as something given to the individual mind is certainly external to the individual, and is rightly regarded as outside him: it is outside in space. This character of externality to the individual is entirely relative to the individual mind; and nature in this sense does not contain the individual mind, for by hypothesis nature is outside the individual. When, however, the term nature is generalised, this relation to the individual is omitted, and the limitation in its meaning—that nature does not include the individual—is forgotten. Nature thus becomes what is independent of all individuals whatsoever. The next step is simple: since human individuals are also independent of one another, nature is said to contain all individuals within its sweep. Thus the generalisation of the term nature so as to include human individuals gives the term a meaning precisely the opposite of what the term connoted in the first instance. For there is no sense in speaking of nature being outside unless by contrast to an inside: if nature is both inside and outside at once, it is neither the one nor the other exclusively.

If this procedure is illogical and absurd, we must give up the view that nature is something before which man must bow in submission, and that the science of nature compels us to accept truths which are independent of and indifferent to ourselves as human beings. For if we are part of nature, in accepting these truths we are admitting truths about ourselves; and it is meaningless to say that we bow and submit to ourselves. If on the other hand we draw a distinction between human nature and outer nature, then this again involves no submission on our side; for the human mind will thus be interpreting another form of nature, which is indeed distinct from human nature but not necessarily either opposed to man or indifferent to his interests.

Passing next to the procedure of the scientist *pur sang*, the usual view of how science conducts its operations and interprets its results is equally indefensible. In the investigation of nature scientifically, the human mind is commonly regarded as a kind of still mirror in which the processes of nature are merely reflected, and the function of which is just to keep itself clear and steady while these processes pass before it. If it fulfils this condition, nature will, as the phrase runs, reveal its own secrets, and the individual mind will have nothing to do but note them carefully and write them down. The scientist, in short, is to be a peculiarly made reflector endowed with the powers of a stenographer. This is no caricature of the accepted scientific procedure in dealing with nature: it has been and still is seriously maintained.

A moment's consideration will suffice to expose the absurdity of such a naïve and uncritical view. We do not find the laws of nature by simply opening our eyes; they are not given to us as a present; and even in using our eyes we have deliberately to exercise the whole mind if we are to make something intelligible of outer nature. As Mach put it in his *Science of Mechanics*, "A competent view of the world can never be got as a gift; we must acquire it by hard work." What does this mean? Simply that from the beginning of our investigation of outer nature to the very end, the whole energies of the individual mind must be engaged to secure what we call the truths of science. These truths are products of mental activity and of mental activity alone. There is no still mirror set to watch outer nature: the mirror is alive, a concentrated focus of spiritual energy, directing itself by its own ends and in its own interests. Nature does not tell its own story to us: we construct the story of nature in terms of our own thought; we build up the truth about nature in

the sweat of our brow; if necessary we win the kingdom of truth by violence, we dissect, we experiment, we twist and turn the forces of nature rather than allow their meaning to escape our grasp. Outer nature is certainly in a sense, as we have seen, indifferent to our minds; but it is the business of science to overcome this indifference, to woo and win nature into harmony with our thoughts. If we have to stoop to nature in the course of our investigation, we do not stoop in order to submit and humble our minds before it—we stoop to conquer.

This is seen in the very earliest stages of scientific investigation. We begin by drawing distinctions amongst the facts of outer nature—distinctions which mark off range of fact from range of fact, and mark off also different elements within the same sphere of fact, *e.g.* atom from molecule, lines from points. In actual fact nature contains all its parts and elements in inextricable interdependence with one another. The position of every grain of sand helps to determine the centre of gravity of the earth; and the mists that gather on the icefields of Greenland are in part determined by the vegetation of the Tropics. The distinctions and separations we make in the world of nature are made for purposes of scientific investigation, *i.e.* in the interests of our own thought and in order to facilitate the effective working of our own minds. In that sense they are artificial relatively to nature, though they are inevitable and necessary for our peculiar kind of intellect. The very fact that our own thought compels us later to give up these separations in order to acquire a completer view of nature shows how temporary and provisional they are. In thinking out the processes of nature, or interpreting nature, it is our thought and its ends which determine our procedure from first to last. The mind in science works with thoughts; and it is about as true to say that nature dictates to us what our thoughts are to be, as to say that the printed page of a book makes our ideas what they are.¹

Not merely do scientists begin their investigations by making artificial distinctions to suit the ends of their own thought, but the conceptions by which they proceed and the

¹ Not all scientists can accept this, as I know. I once made the above observation to a distinguished chemist; I tried to assure him that in dealing with his elements, resolving and combining them, he was really seeking to satisfy the demand of his thought all the while. His reply was, "But, my dear sir, we can photograph them." The *naïveté* of the remark for the moment left me silent in astonishment: he apparently seemed to suppose that somehow he had his elements actually inside his head, or perhaps his head inside his elements.

laws at which they arrive are equally constructions of their own minds. This can be illustrated by any chapter from the history of science. I do not refer to the obviously animistic and theological views which affected and infected early scientific thought, even that of the ablest scientific minds; nor need I refer to the residual influences of such primitive thought which survive in the formulation of laws of outer nature up to the present time. The term "attraction" of particles of matter employed in the formulation of the law of gravitation, and the term "affinity" employed in formulating chemical processes, sufficiently indicate the anthropomorphic or human origin of these ideas. But in all science, even the most abstract, the operation of the specifically human intellect is plainly evident. The conceptions of quantity, force, mass, weight, etc., are not given to the mind by outer things, and they do not come out of the skies or by special revelation. They are won by toil and are deliberately created by the scientific intellect to grasp the character of the facts presented to its notice. They are manipulated so freely by the same intellect just because they are defined for its use according to the laws and conditions of intellectual activity. If our intellect were moulded on a different plan we should use different concepts, just as, if we had more or different senses, we should apprehend the outer world in other ways than we do at present. That not even all human intellects have the same structure is seen from the fact that not all human intellects are capable of grasping the concepts employed by science, and in some sciences only a very few intellects can develop the concepts to the highest degree of their articulation. It is impossible for some minds to grasp a complex differential equation, or even to understand what quaternions are all about. Nature does not provide us with such knowledge: it is a creation of a certain kind of human energy as much as a work of art or a steam-engine. Such knowledge, it is said, can be tested and proved by an appeal to the outer world. In certain cases it can; but even so, the very fact that it is, or has to be, "tested," shows that it is a human device to begin with. What Poincaré says of science in general is unquestionably true, and obviously so in the more abstract sciences: "we can only think our thoughts," he says; "all the words we use to speak of things only express thoughts."

The logical necessity with which the intellect develops its concepts, exerts indeed all the apparent compulsion on the mind which outer things possess. But this merely means that the human intellect has a definite structure with a definite kind

of function all its own; and it is in pursuance of the laws of this structure with its corresponding function that its method of procedure secures the necessity characteristic of scientific abstract thought. Our minds are so made that they work in one way towards logical coherence, and in one way only; and hence we are compelled to accept the result. The concepts of science are our mental ways of working, their laws of connection are the method of our mental procedure. Neither the concepts nor their logical connection is arbitrary; but they are both relative to the human mind.

We can put the same view in another way. The processes of scientific thinking are to begin with tentative and experimental: whether we seek to explain a fact of outer nature or to solve a mathematical problem, we try now this direction and now that, to see, as we say, how it turns out, or how it "works out." Many of our lines of thought lead nowhere; many are inaccurate and have to be discarded, some are entirely untrue. We go from hypothesis or suggestion till we strike the true theory. Now, all these tentative efforts surely and without question take place within our minds. There are no hypotheses in outer nature: nature works no experiments for us and contains none of our errors.

If the process of carrying on our thoughts in this manner is entirely our own, if it is guided by the laws of our own intellect and directed towards satisfying our minds, we cannot possibly maintain that at a certain stage it ceases to be ours and suddenly becomes something independent of our minds. If the process belongs to our mental procedure, the result must likewise be our own achievement. When the result is false or inaccurate we never hesitate to ascribe it to our own thought. But equally, if the result is true, it must be the outcome of our thought, otherwise the specific function of the human intellect would be to make mistakes. Why should an erroneous process of thought fall entirely within our mind, and a true process of reasoning fall outside it? Since the condition in both cases is the same, the effect must be the same. Once again, therefore, it is evident that the concepts and the connections of scientific concepts are from first to last nothing but the operations of our human intellect and do not come to us from without. Scientific truth is the creation of the scientific mind and not of outer nature. This is still further confirmed by the fact that much that has been discovered in science has been due to the effort of what can only be called individual genius, whether it be the genius which consists in a stubborn attempt to master the facts, or that which consists in a successful

and inspired intuition. For such discoveries the outer world clearly gives no direct assistance whatever; their source and origin are solely the individual human agent.

The supposition that mathematical science is an exception to this general character of all science—its relativity to the human mind—is a mere superstition. The argument usually put forward to support this contention is that mathematical truth compels such absolute assent from the intellect, and is so universally true for all space and all time, that it must be considered independent of every individual human mind altogether. The argument is a fallacy. It asserts that because a truth holds for every mind it is therefore independent of all minds. But if a truth holds for every mind, this just means that it cannot be independent of all minds: it must be the way all minds work when they think logically and coherently on the subject. To suppose that, because it must hold for every mind, it is therefore independent of any given mind, is indeed an accurate statement, for a given mind may not yet have understood it; but what we imply is that if it did understand the truth, the truth would be admitted. The supposition that, when a truth holds good independently of a given mind, this truth is true independently of all minds whatsoever, is like saying that though Jones is absent from a dinner-party, the dinner is none the less good, and indeed is good though nobody eats it at all. The peculiar convincingness of mathematical truth is due to the peculiar character of mathematical concepts. They are so abstract, and deal with such universal aspects of human experience, that all must accept them. But this, so far from proving them to be more than human, only shows how completely they are bound up with the very structure and life of the human mind.

The more concrete the objects are with which a science deals, the less difficult is it to see how entirely our thinking about such objects bears the stamp of our humanity. Thus in biological science, which is admittedly one of the most concrete and difficult of all the sciences of outer nature, the very clue to the mystery of living process has to be sought in what, as human beings, we find life to be in our own case. We cannot even imagine what the mental life of animals is except from what we are pleased to call the analogy of our own mentality. All the language used in describing the ways and doings of animals is drawn directly from the habits and modes of action of human individuals. The conception of evolution arises from, and depends ultimately for its meaning on, the idea of human progress. The conception of adaptation to environ-

ment, so familiar in the interpretation of living beings, is partly ethical, partly artistic in its origin; that of division and co-operation of functional activity is drawn from the economic order of human society. As everyone knows, Darwin derived from Malthus' study of the relation of population to food supply the suggestion that the whole course of evolution was determined by the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, both the terms, "struggle" and "fittest," being clearly anthropomorphic in character. Further illustration of the same human origin of the main biological concepts need not be given.

Again let it be said there is no ground for supposing, because these conceptions are derived from human life, that they are on that account invalid or even inaccurate. On the contrary, it seems self-evident that if we are to interpret life we must start from life at its highest, and, for human beings, human life is the highest form of life we know. If we wish to understand what the human individual really is, we must look at him from the point of view of society, where we find human life fully expressed: if we wish to know all that a rose may be, we shall find what we want in the La France of our gardens better than in the dog-rose of the hedgerows. So, to understand the elementary forms of life we rightly take as our clue the more complex type of life which man presents. But the point of interest for our argument is that the procedure of biological science illustrates in a peculiarly striking and unmistakable manner the human origin of all scientific concepts on which we have been laying stress. In biological science the source from which they come can not only not be outside us, but is even frankly acknowledged to be that of human life. I would urge that just because this procedure is thus inevitable when we are dealing with the most concrete order of natural objects, the procedure is the same in the case of the other sciences. This is merely concealed by the abstractness of their method, but becomes patent to the eye of impartial analysis.

The analysis of the character of the concepts of science leads us, then, to but one conclusion: science is through and through anthropomorphic; it is, if we care to put it so, a human invention. Another and entirely different line of thought leads us to the same conclusion. Its importance cannot be sufficiently emphasised. It is this:—The scientific attitude to the world is historically but a specific expression of the life of humanity as a whole. Science, as we understand it, is an historical phenomenon like Mohammedanism or the

French Revolution. It is only found in certain races of mankind, and is indigenous to peoples inhabiting certain circumscribed geographical areas of the globe. It is in a very real sense dependent on climatic conditions, as well as on racial qualities; and these two are inseparable. It surely gives cause for reflection that the scientific spirit was planted and has grown to maturity on European soil—and indeed only in certain portions of Europe. Its domicile seems as much restricted to specific localities as a botanical or an animal species. The native habitat of the modern scientific spirit has been primarily the middle region of Europe, extending from the north-west to the south-east, and forming a kind of rough triangle whose apex lies in Italy, and whose base stretches from the southern shore of the Baltic Sea across Scandinavia to Scotland. There are regions outside this area in which occasionally science has been in some degree found; but these are either exceptional, or are traceable, directly or indirectly, to the influence of the central region of Europe. The mood of science finds its peculiar climate in this region,¹ meaning by science the deliberate and continuous prosecution of the study of the world for the purpose of attaining a coherent logical interpretation of facts. The vast continents of Asia and Africa and non-Europeanised America have no scientific areas. The inhabitants of these non-scientific regions have indeed knowledge of their own, and a wisdom of their own; but it is not science. Asia and Africa, especially the former, are mainly religious and ethical in their frame of mind, not scientific. Science is a creation of the European West.

This geographical limitation of science is indeed a remarkable fact, the importance of which our familiarity with the scientific mood and our insularity of mind constantly tend to obscure. We talk glibly of science uniting all mankind in the bonds of truth. This is a mere academic representation. Laughter will hold people together better than logic. We should not forget that millions of human beings have no interest in the scientific mood at all, and seem by constitution to have no capacity for it. Scientific truth is not their way of truth; it merely seems to them a matter of astonishment, a curious manifestation of the life of a race strangely different from their own. Some individuals among these non-scientific peoples may, and do, assimilate the science of the West; but experience seems to show that such acquisition is at best a mere accomplishment, and leaves the racial structure and

¹ For a remarkable array of facts to establish this proposition, see De Candolle, *Histoire des Sciences et des Savants*.

composition of their minds unaffected.¹ In other words, it does not create in them the scientific mood. There is as much difference between this assimilation of science and the scientific frame of mind as there is between learning the technique of dancing on a tight-rope and learning to walk. The non-scientific peoples take up science as they put on Western clothes: one may change one's clothes, but there is no changing the skin. The fact is that the scientific mood arises from a peculiar attitude of the mind to the world found amongst certain peoples of the globe, and without this attitude science will always appear a curiosity or an irrelevance. The attitude may be shortly described as due to a sense of the detachment of man from the world as something alien and external, to a sense of the supremacy of his aims over the processes of outer nature. This is quite peculiar to certain peoples, and is not found in all. In the East, for example, man seems to feel no sense of alienation; he seems to feel himself as much a part of the universe as a plant is inseparable from its environment. So much is this the case, that man's life is felt to be part of the very current of the stream of the vaster life of the world. He realises his state best when he is absorbed in the larger being of the universe. His individual life is literally to him no better than a flower of the field; his mind is as a shadow produced by his finite substance intercepting the light of the world. This profound difference between West and East is probably ineradicable; it is constitutional and climatic, and not accidental. It is the cause of the emphasis or over-emphasis and predilection for science in the one case and religion in the other. Science is thus but the consequence of a peculiar frame of mind which characterises certain Western peoples. It is neither universal to humanity nor essential to all mankind.

It is in a sense but an historical incident in the vaster history of the human race. It is a factor, but no more than one factor, in the complex system of aims and forces which make up human civilisation. Greater than any science or any number of sciences is the stupendous and awe-inspiring spectacle of human life on the planet. So limited is science in significance that it even requires a certain level of temperature for its successful prosecution. It is not for want of leisure that the peoples of very warm or very cold climates have not the scientific mind. They have leisure in abundance, the leisure of the timeless forests or the timeless wastes. It is rather that the mental energies will only undertake the peculiar labour of

¹ Whether Japan will prove an exception to this statement remains to be seen.

impartial investigation of science for its own sake either where the equilibrium between man and nature is fairly steady, or where the advantage is preponderantly in favour of man's supremacy. Where the powers of nature, heat, and cold, seasonal changes, and the resurgence of nature's forces, overwhelm man's life, science is not a possible mood for man at all. The human mind merely accepts the situation and becomes acclimatised in every sense.

Science must keep to its peculiar geographical region of the globe if it is to be carried on and if its ends are to be realised. Nor need we wonder or complain at this state of affairs. There is indeed, we may say, a division of labour amongst the races of mankind as there is a division of labour amongst the individuals of a society. One race takes over one task, another race takes over a different task ; and all combine, more or less unconsciously it is true, to fulfil the whole purpose of human life on the earth.

We but exaggerate the importance of our own interests and point of view when we imagine that our peculiarly scientific turn of mind is the best, or the standard to which all human life should aspire. Such an exaggeration is little better than the vanity and conceit of insular self-satisfaction. The scientific mood is important ; it is not all-important. Even where it is prosecuted, it is primarily an attribute of the masculine mind rather than of the feminine intelligence ; ordinarily speaking, a woman regards the scientific mind with a mixture of good-humoured consideration and detached indifference. But no sane person would consider or desire the feminine intelligence to be merely a duplicate of the male mind : each is radically different from the other, and each is extremely important for the realisation of human life as a whole. Nor need we suppose that the scientific mind has all the advantages on its side, and the non-scientific all the disadvantages. There are advantages and disadvantages in the possession of the scientific mood and in the prosecution of scientific interests. I need but recall in this connection the pathetic regret of Darwin that his over-cultivation of the scientific attitude destroyed his power of appreciation of beauty in art and literature. In the same connection it is worth observing how the over-indulgence in the luxuries of science seems to destroy a man's balance of judgment in other realms of experience, practical and religious. So much is this recognised, that the very name "scientific expert" is almost a by-word for general intellectual incompetence. Specialisation, so essential to science, distorts the mind to the verge of indiscre-

tion and unreliability ; it produces cloistered lives that have lost touch with the complex richness of a full humanity.

This brings us to the last question I should like to consider : how are we to connect the claims of science with those of humanity, so as to do justice to both ? I have indicated some reasons for maintaining that they cannot be really opposed. I hope it has become evident that since science is itself one of the activities of mankind, the so-called opposition of science to humanity as such is in principle absurd. What part, then, does science play amongst the activities that make up human life ? What, in a word, is the relation of the ends of science to other ends which man pursues ?

We are accustomed to distinguish three primary ends in human life under which all its various aims can be grouped. These are truth, beauty, and goodness. The distinction is convenient and useful, if it does not lead us to cut these ends off from one another. We shall avoid this mistake if we look upon them as but different ways in which man seeks to realise the unity of his individual life, the primary colours which make up the divine light which illumines his experience, the main avenues of approach to supreme self-fulfilment and to supreme reality. They refer to the three component factors of his mental constitution : the fulfilment of the claims of his intellect is the attainment of truth ; the fulfilment of the demands of feeling is attainment of beauty ; the fulfilment of will is the accomplishment of goodness. They deal with the three aspects of the world with which he is concerned—the aspect of order, the aspect of sensibility (including sensation and emotion), and the aspect of sociality. The articulate consciousness of unity in the form of order is what we mean by truth ; the articulate consciousness of unity in the form of sensibility is beauty ; that of unity in the form of sociality is goodness. The deliberate and exclusive pursuit of truth creates Science and Philosophy ; the deliberate and exclusive pursuit of beauty creates Art and Literature ; the deliberate and exclusive pursuit of goodness creates Morality and Social Institutions.

The important point to grasp is that these ends, separately and together, are ways in which the individual spirit of man realises itself, and thus maintains its place in the universe. In Wordsworth's language, they are ways in which man discovers—

“ How exquisitely the Individual mind
(And the progressive powers no less
Of the whole species) to the External world
Is fitted : and how exquisitely too
(Theme this but little heard of among men)
The External world is fitted to the mind.”

They are none of them merely accidental expressions of his life; they are all necessary if he is to be himself and become aware of what his life consists in. They are pursued for his own sake in the first instance, because man in the first instance lives to himself. But this does not mean that he makes the world what he likes. The life of man is as much a part of the constitution of things as the existence of beings independent of and different from him. Human nature is as real as any other kind of nature, and has laws and conditions of its own. Man's business is to fulfil human nature and to follow the ends by which that is realised. The ends which regulate his life dictate the course he has to take. In obeying them he is thus realising his place in the world, and in living to himself in this way he finds he is living for the whole world at the same time. To be himself completely he has to become conscious of the order of the world, conscious of its beauty, conscious of goodness. He undertakes the journey of his life pursuing his own ends, follows whither they lead him, and, in following them, finds, like Saul, that he has gone out apparently on a casual errand and is led by his destiny into his kingdom—a kingdom which is his own and is more than his own, a kingdom whose foundations were laid at the dawn of time and whose dome catches the white radiance of eternity.

These ends are all necessary if man is to rise to the full measure of his stature; and they are all inseparable from one another and from the integral life of the individual. We get the richest form of human life where all are pursued in perfect freedom, and where one is not allowed to interfere with the other. We do not find all peoples and nations on the earth cultivating these ends. Most people lay greatest stress on the requirements of social fellowship, and treat with comparative or complete neglect one or both of the other two. The one most generally neglected, as we have said, is that of truth for truth's sake, the cultivation of the scientific spirit. There are perhaps few communities of men in which we do not find a certain development of artistic interest, sometimes indeed to a high degree, though the conditions of their social life may be very simple. In other words, in most communities we find two of these human ends pursued; a very few pursue all three; in fewer still are all three ends pursued with equal disinterestedness and freedom. We may with justice find here perhaps the best criterion by which to arrange the various civilisations amongst mankind on a scale of value. Those communities in which these ends have found freest expression seem to be the highest; those in which any one is hampered or excluded will

be lower according to the extent to which this takes place. Hence it is that the excessive development of science is not an effective criterion of a high civilisation; the cultivation of the scientific spirit is not alone a guarantee of a high level of humanity—a conclusion which has been painfully brought home to us at the present stage of human history. In the same way the intensive cultivation of the arts is not enough to bring human life to fruition: it is found indeed to be consistent with the ignorance, narrowness, and even the degradation of humanity. Ancient Greek society is not an unfair illustration of this type of civilisation. Similarly, exclusive emphasis on mere goodness does not bring out all the resources which make man's existence precious, powerful, and secure; it too often leads to the impoverishment of life physically and mentally; it encourages obscurantism and ignorance; while the neglect of the cultivation of beauty commits the spirit of man to the acceptance of ugliness, gloom, and joylessness. The ancient Hebrew society is an historical illustration of this type. The adoption of the point of view of this society by so many of the inhabitants of Scotland has in the past produced, as everyone knows, results which can only be regarded as baneful and disastrous in their influence on our fellow-countrymen.

What we cannot too carefully observe is that the cultivation of all three even to a slight degree tends not only to the mutual furtherance of one another, but to the enrichment of human life in its entirety. The cultivation of goodness is intensified if the intellect is liberated into the ways of truth: the cultivation of truth becomes deeper, more inspired and inspiring, when it increases the sense of community and fellowship between human beings—when, in other words, it goes hand in hand with goodness. In Bacon's princely language, "It is heaven upon earth when the mind moves in charity, trusts in Providence, and turns upon the poles of truth." Similarly, the pursuit of the beautiful in art, whether it be poetry and music, painting, or sculpture, acquires an added value when it adorns, refines, and dignifies the life of a community; and, conversely, goodness becomes gracious and winsome, richer in substance and dearer to men, when human life is arrayed in the garment of joy which is woven at the loom of art.

We need not therefore suppose that these three ends are either independent of one another or all of precisely equal importance. Neither in practice nor in principle is either of these positions defensible. When these ends are pursued in independence, the result invariably is that one is taken as the

only real end ; the others become looked on as secondary or of no account at all. We find such exaggerations constantly made in practice, and they are in every case the mere mental consequence of special predilection and excessive interest. Thus many scientists and some philosophers say that truth is all in all, and everything else a mere means or a mere incident in life. In the light of facts, and after what has been said, this will be seen to be the contention of the mere partisan. The artist, again, is apt to hold that beauty is all in all—that, in Keats's language, "beauty is truth, truth is beauty, this is all we know on earth and all we need to know"; or, in Wordsworth's more carefully formulated statement, "poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge, the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science." These are intelligible but obvious exaggerations of a special bias. Neither Keats nor Wordsworth knew much about science. Similarly, the enthusiast for human welfare declares that mere goodness is everything, that the only end of life is to love your neighbour. Here, once more, we have another form of exaggeration: it is dull work loving your neighbour if there is nothing else to do.

In principle, however, there is no room for such extreme views. Each is not independent of the other. Nor are all equally fundamental. What is first in importance (though again let me say not *exclusively* important) is sociality whose controlling end is goodness. This is first because all the ends which man pursues are in the long run for the sake of man, and man's fellowship with his kind is the governing interest of the human species. From all this his interests proceed, to this they must ultimately converge. The human species is more concerned with its own maintenance and furtherance than with anything else whatsoever. This is not merely an instinct, it is in the nature of the case; for all other kinds of beings exist by the same condition, whether they be planets or plants or protozoa.

This complete socialisation of human life must not be conceived in any narrow sense. It must not be interpreted in a form which makes so-called practice and practical considerations predominant over so-called theoretical or ideal considerations. Practice and ideal aims, whether in science or art, both lead and contribute to the same result, as indeed is plain to any careful observation of the facts of life. Human beings are brought into fellowship, not merely on the basis of practical action, but on the basis of community of thought and feeling. Indeed, as history shows, even erroneous theories

and convictions can hold people together and intensify their living interest in one another; the earlier theories of the origin of man's life and of the central position of the earth in the planetary system sufficiently illustrate this point. Similarly, mistaken practical enthusiasms can bind human beings into a common fellowship which seems to magnify human welfare, as the pathetic history of the Crusades well shows. If false theory and mistaken practical aims accomplish so much, how much more is it certain that the pursuit of verifiable truth, of ideal beauty, and genuinely real practical ends will further and increase the fellowship of man with his kind! All men's ends whatsoever, practical and ideal—if we must make this questionable distinction,—contribute in the long run to the socialisation of human life; in the realisation of this result they find their fruition and fulfilment; in this achievement all the efforts of individuals find their amplest reward. If we may recast the somewhat grandiose language of an archaic document, we might justly say that man's chief end is to make life glorious through beauty, truth, and love, and to enjoy this consummation all his days—an end which is great without being grandiose, and accessible without being any the less magnificent.

It requires no deep insight to see the bearings of the principles which have been sketched on the practical problems which confront us at the present time.

For one thing, we can see at once the absurdity of making an opposition between the requirements of practical social life and the interests and aims of science. It is as false to take immediate practical social needs as a standard to test the value of science to human life as it would be to try to determine the truth of a biological law or a proposition in geometry by an appeal to the conception of justice between man and man. If we say it is ridiculous to make goodness a criterion of scientific truth, it is equally absurd to regard immediate social welfare as a test of the worth of science to humanity. If we take long views, and maintain a wider outlook on human life, we cannot fail to see that all science in the long run conduces to human welfare in the full sense. Indeed, the history of the relation of scientific discovery to the betterment of social conditions amply shows how inseparably social life and science are connected, how closely even immediate practical needs and scientific pursuits are bound up. It is safe to say that some of the most difficult problems which face the social reformer at the present time would be in a great measure solved if we could intellectually penetrate further into the secrets of electro-magnetism, the life of the cell, or chemical energy.

The supposed cleavage between so-called practical social needs on the one hand, and scientific pursuits unfettered by considerations of pence or prejudice on the other, has been one of the most baneful misunderstandings from which human life has suffered in the past and still suffers in the present.

It is an opposition which has produced the most futile opinions and the most futile quarrels. And the quarrel has not been all on one side. For it takes two to make a quarrel as it takes two to make love; and scientists have often stated their case as absurdly as the so-called practical people. Scientists sometimes speak as if the improvement of society depended on the attainment of correct scientific conclusions, as if society should be controlled by scientific experts, and as if society existed mainly or solely for the advancement of the ideal interests of science. Such claims are preposterous and absurd. They provide a curious parallel to the mediæval conception of human society, according to which society was held to exist solely to further the ideal interests of religion. Science does not by itself improve man as a social being at all; this can only be done by the cultivation of good-will between man and man. And why should society exist for, or be controlled by, scientists any more than by artists? Society no more exists simply to produce the means for scientific research and to establish a corporation of scientific bureaucrats, than science can only justify itself if it gives us more or better bread-and-butter, or gets us quicker from one place to another. Truth must be pursued for its own sake, and untrammelled by social prejudice or social ambition, if its full human value is to be secured; and until we are prepared to pay for it and to pursue it in this sense, we are traitors to our own best interests and depriving ourselves of the full heritage of humanity. Both to scientists and to those who care for practical social welfare alike we should say, let them mind their own business and consider the best interests of mankind.

Similarly again, the supposed opposition between the Sciences and the Humanities is one of the most grotesque of popular fallacies. Science, as we have seen, is itself a creation of humanity alone, and exists solely for humanity. Science properly understood is literally one of the Humanities, one of the factors that express, raise, and enrich human life. We too narrowly use the term "Humanities" when we restrict its application to the literatures which have been created by the artistic imagination; and to apply the term solely to the literatures of Greece and Rome is simply an abuse of language. Literature alone does not even give all that

is best in the arts which have dignified and adorned humanity. Sculpture, music, and painting have expressed man's sense of the beautiful quite as much as, and to some peoples even more than, literature. It is one of the great defects of our Scottish curriculum that this has not been properly realised and appreciated. In only one university are there chairs of Music and of Fine Art. Certainly literature and the other arts, along with history, in a peculiar way deal with human life: they are in a sense all about man primarily or entirely, and moreover about man at his best as well as at his worst. The cultivation of the Humanities in this wide sense is thus in a special way humanising, *i.e.* it expands our acquaintance with human beings, their peculiar aims and their peculiar interests. But they deal with only certain phases of the life of humanity: literature, *e.g.*, uses as its material, and seeks to articulate, man's emotional responses to nature and to his fellows; history, the forms and course of his political and social life. These, however, do not exhaust man's human nature or his human concerns. The cultivation of these studies is therefore not all that man requires if he is to know himself, and if he is to be himself. Exclusive devotion to them, or excessive emphasis upon them, narrows the outlook on man, and narrows human life; and these two go together. Man has more to think about than himself: he has to think about the world around him. Doubtless the "proper study of mankind is man," or at any rate the study of man is a very proper study. But man is only man in the full sense when he knows something more than himself; for he only finds himself when he becomes conscious of the world in which he lives and moves and has his being. In science he becomes aware of the resources of his *own* nature quite as much as of the objects he investigates: he finds the rationality for which his spirit craves. In a word, the scientific study of the world and of man himself draws out his humanity—humanises him. To speak of a conflict between the Sciences and the Humanities is thus as ridiculous as to speak of a conflict between the earth and the moon. Both are parts of the same stellar system, both are creatures of the same solar body.

It follows that an education which is solely indebted to the humanities, or solely indebted to science, is neither complete nor satisfactory. For education is surely the realisation of the potencies of human life to the fullest extent of which the individual is capable. One individual may have taken all science to be his province, and still be an uneducated man; he may have absorbed the literature and the history of mankind,

and still feel himself a stranger in a world which should be his home and not his hiding-place. A scientific mind unilluminated with the light of art is little better than an intellectual factory ; an artistic mind unenlightened by scientific thought is but an articulate picture-gallery. Neither the one nor the other alone can produce a truly educated mind. Nor indeed, for that matter, can the two together bring out all that the spirit of man requires. Science and art, truth and beauty, detached from the cultivation of man's living relation to his fellows, are the wine of life without the guests at the feast. We have probably all known, or known about, first-class scientists and scholars who were little better than social curiosities : men of first-rate artistic sensibilities who were undesirable aliens in their own community. Unless art gives grace and refinement to the human character, it has failed of its complete purpose : unless science makes the whole life intelligent and tolerant, it has not succeeded in its aim : unless the one adds sweetness and the other adds light to the spirit of goodness, neither has justified its existence.

J. B. BAILLIE.

ABERDEEN.

PUNISHMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION.

L. P. JACKS.

OF the many tasks that await us hereafter the chief will be that of outliving the stain which the German method of conducting war has cast upon the reputation of man. It is of course upon the Western races that the stain falls deepest. The Eastern races have doubtless drawn their own conclusions, which confirm an opinion previously formed. They have never conceded the claim of the West to moral supremacy. How can they be expected to concede it hereafter?

Foul deeds, of treachery, faithlessness, and cruelty, have followed in rapid succession. As each in turn has failed in its object of terrorising mankind it has been followed up by a worse, and so rapidly that time has hardly been given for judgment on the first to become articulate before its successor was in the field. On an immense scale we have witnessed the working of an inner necessity which belongs to the nature of crime, whereby the criminal is compelled to a continuous expansion of the scope of his guilt. We see him relentlessly driven on to the commission of greater crimes, in the vain hope that the greater will retrieve the consequences of the less. The drama alone can depict the process; and this it does by tracing the psychology of guilt through ever-widening circles of devastation until the wave suddenly returns and overwhelms the malefactor himself. It is thus that the history of the Great War will be finally written. The fifth act will show the punishment of the guilty.

We are now at the fourth. The criminal has reached the point when, thanks to the forces his own crimes have summoned into being, he is fighting for his life, holding all means justified which may help him to avert his doom. Control over himself or his own actions has been lost; he is the mere victim of the

powers to which he has sold himself, and must do their bidding to the very last. And the same holds true of the avengers. They, too, have no alternative. Their mission is laid on them by the very nature of things. Unless they do their work, life will be to them, as it is to the criminal himself, "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Better that all should perish together than that the toil of the ages should come to such a close.

From this point of view the punishment of guilt is a duty laid upon a civilisation whose very life depends on its being able to vindicate the distinction between right and wrong. As a guarantee of the power and the will to maintain law and order it is the indispensable foundation of a lasting peace. And not of peace alone, but of the whole catalogue of reforms, reconstructions, and regenerations for which peace is to provide the means and the opportunity, and from which it is hoped the world will derive compensation for the frightful sufferings it has now to endure. I will endeavour to set out the reasons which lead to this conclusion—a conclusion from which men naturally shrink so long as other alternatives remain open.

A flood of schemes, programmes, and proposals for reconstructing the world has been pouring forth from the press, and gathering volume, ever since the war began. A whole literature of reconstruction, distinct in its general character, has come into being. It is the chief literary product of the war. To the future historian it will provide a theme of endless meditation, accompanied by emotions of many kinds. Centuries hence specialists will devote themselves to its study, and the labours of a lifetime will hardly suffice to cover the ground.

By this time it would appear that everything in the heavens above or the earth beneath, which man believes himself able to control, is to be "reconstructed" after the war. Religion naturally receives the chief attention, and syndicates of theologians have already issued their programmes for its reconstruction. Society is to be rebuilt from top to bottom, on various models. Leagues of peace are to transform the spider's web of international relations into a steel net. Great nations, combining their forces for the purpose, are to compel each other to rest content with the greatness they have already attained, and the little nations are to be equally content with their littleness—which is nothing less than a reconstruction of the course of history. Governments are to be abolished

or reformed. Politics are to be regenerated. Property and marriage are to be governed by new ideals. Manners and domestic life are to be improved. The arts are to be revived. Women are to have a different status and children to be treated more wisely. Man is to become a new being. According to Mr H. G. Wells, God himself is to be reconstructed.

That many of these programmes will never be rehearsed, in the form their authors give them, is of course certain. But taken in their totality they are profoundly significant. They indicate a widespread belief that civilised communities will find themselves, at the end of the war, ready and eager for an immense task of self-reformation, and that the requisite fund of moral force will be in existence to accomplish the task. It is to the last of these beliefs that I wish to draw attention. For the war may conceivably have an issue which will shatter the moral forces of the communities mainly concerned and leave them in a condition of indifference, depression, or even despair. This would be fatal not only to the particular self-reformations proposed, but to all others whatsoever.

Reading this literature piecemeal, as we commonly do, in our daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly press, and in the books which appear from time to time, its significance may escape us. Viewed in the mass, it is amazing and portentous. It reveals the infinite dissatisfaction of man with the achievements of civilisation up to date—a dissatisfaction which the war has brought to a head, and of which, for the first time, it has made us fully conscious. Not until we view the programmes of reconstruction in their enormous totality does this fact strike us with its full and proper force. Then only does it come home to us, with a certain salutary shock, that the whole of this immense structure of hopes, dreams, programmes, and ideals would tumble to the ground like a house of cards—if the Germans were to win the war. Viewed in that light, every programme of reconstruction is a gamble with Destiny.

This truth is obvious. If we permit ourselves for a moment to entertain the thought, however unpleasant, of a German victory, we shall see the justice of the adjective.

To begin with, a German victory would leave us in such a state of moral depression and material weakness that neither the will nor the means would exist to carry these proposals, with their immense demands on hope, faith, and energy, into effect. Take, for example, the God whom Mr Wells proposes to substitute for the Christian Deity. To believe in the God of Mr Wells one would need to be in high spirits. In the event of a

German victory we should be in low spirits and nobody would take the slightest interest in Mr Wells's God. Moreover, it is highly doubtful if the German rulers would permit us to worship a Deity so unfriendly to their own Kultur, even if we were otherwise disposed to worship him. Or take education. A reformed education demands, and rightly demands, an enormous public expenditure. Saddled with the burden of a great indemnity, our navy and mercantile marine at the bottom of the seas and our national industry completely crippled in consequence (according to the latest project of the German Chancellor), where, in plain terms, is the money to come from? And who would feel that any of these things was worth while? We are little likely to undertake the immense task of reconstructing our life unless we are ardently and enthusiastically convinced that our life is worth reconstructing. Under a German victory we should have no such feeling; we should doubt whether life were worth living at all.

This should be especially noted by those philosophical reconstructors, like Mr Bertrand Russell, who are "above the battle." With the rest of us, Mr Russell is unconsciously speculating in an issue of the conflict favourable to the British side. Not one of his "Principles of Social Reconstruction" would have the faintest chance of being acted upon, except by hermits, in a world dominated by Germany. Mr Russell would substitute "creativity" for "possession" as the aim of our common life; and the Literature of Reconstruction contains no more pregnant suggestion. But if Germany wins, "possession" will be placed on a firmer throne than ever, and "creativity" will be crushed into the mire. Under that dread hypothesis no Englishman would have the heart or the will to create anything at all—except, perhaps, his own coffin.

With the literature of reconstruction in Germany I am not acquainted, but who can doubt that it shares at least one characteristic with that of our own country? It assumes that the side to which its authors belong is going to win the war.

Nor do I know what part this assumption is playing, or what degree of prominence it has, in the minds of German writers on reconstruction. But in our own country the universal habit of taking our victory for granted has the effect of obscuring the importance of the assumption, or at least of leading us to regard it as of secondary importance to the reconstruction in which we are interested. Absorbed in our schemes for building a new world, we are apt to forget that the prospect of their success is contingent on an event the issue of which rests with the men on the sea or in the trenches,

and perhaps with the gods—an event whose nature is at present unknown.

But here we are confronted with what, to those who take broad views of the situation, must appear by far the most perplexing of its aspects. A community broken in heart and shattered in resources is in no condition to undertake a vast enterprise of reconstruction. That would be the condition of one half of the civilised world, our own half, if the Central Powers were to succeed in overwhelming us. But obviously, the same would hold true of the other half if the conditions were to be reversed. Let victory come to whichever side it may, it would appear that one half of Europe will be impoverished, humiliated, and broken-hearted. A condition more unfavourable to the birth of a new and better age could hardly be imagined. The exhilaration of the one side will only serve to measure the depression of the other. Even domestic reform among the victors would be checked by the presence on the outskirts of vast sullen populations, and by the imminent dangers thence arising. The international situation would be more difficult, and perhaps hopeless. The dream which embraces all Europe, and perhaps the whole world, in its scope—the dream of a reconstructed civilisation—would have to be abandoned. The dead weight of half a continent brooding on its woes, nursing its anger, plotting its revenge, would condemn such an enterprise from its birth. Reconstruction, on any terms, would be next to impossible.

This formidable difficulty has been foreseen by many thinkers both in belligerent and neutral countries, and has been emphasised by those who, in their own eyes, are “above the battle.” These thinkers, with some show of reason, have argued that the only way to avert an issue which, whatever form it take, involves ruin to the hopes of good men, is to put a stop to the conflict before either side can claim the victory. That is not the position of the present writer. So far as it is possible for a civilian to make the claim, he is “in” the conflict and has no desire whatsoever to be “above.” For reasons into which it is here impossible to enter, he believes that any issue short of a clear vindication of the principles for which the Allies are fighting would be an irreparable disaster to the human race, the prelude to further conflicts worse than the present. Great as are the difficulties which would supervene upon the victory of the Allies, the difficulties which would attend a “draw” are almost infinitely greater. The war has definitely raised a question the answer to which carries the fate of civilisation. To that question the war must give the answer, yea or nay.

Are we then to sit down before an insoluble deadlock? Must we accept the certainty that the definite victory of either side will leave the other side so broken and humiliated, so angry and revengeful, that the regeneration of Europe, which can only be effected by the high-hearted and willing co-operation of all concerned, will be impossible?

The answer depends on what we mean by "victory." Victory may be conceived in many forms; and of most of them it may be said without hesitation that they leave us in presence of the deadlock aforesaid. But does this hold true of all of them? Of victory, as of most other things, the point lies in the application. Is there then no form in which we can conceive our victory—the victory of the Allies—to be applied such that the effect would follow of vindicating the essential principle for which we are fighting, *without* that of leaving our opponents morally crushed and consciously humiliated? Can we by any stretch of imagination—and imagination is perhaps our best helper at this point—construct the image of some definite application of victory which would work in this double way; so that—paradoxical as it may seem—our adversaries would share, and consciously share, with ourselves in its fruit?

Imagination can construct such an image. Whether the means can be found for bringing the dream to fulfilment is another question. Most assuredly the difficulties are great. But to those who emphasise this, I would answer by reminding them of the problem before us, and ask them to produce an easier solution than that which I shall presently suggest. The problem is the regeneration of Europe—that is, of starting with general hope, confidence, and energy on some new and better path than that which has brought us to the present state of affairs. How is that to be effected if we assume that one half of Europe—*which* half does not matter to the argument—is the sullen victim of the other half, crushed, humiliated, depressed, and recalcitrant? Unless this be avoided, the position of affairs after the war will be worse than it was before, let victory come to whom it may.

For ages past the life of man has been darkened and blighted by the presence in the world of a class of criminals who under many names and disguises, and by various arts, have first befooled and then exploited the nations who tolerated them. In earlier ages these men stood forth nakedly in their true character; they were known as tyrants, hated as such, and put to death whenever their victims got the chance. In

later times they have learnt to shelter themselves behind some "philosophy of the state," and, aided by science and the immense powers which science gives to bad men, they have contrived new arts for the betrayal of mankind. In spite of all the efforts which the nations have made, some of them partly successful, to rid themselves of the pest, these criminals, thanks to their cleverness in adopting new disguises, have managed to survive. To them, to their characters, habits, traditions, and ambitions, the world is indebted for the measureless catastrophe of the present hour. It is a vain thing to explain the war in terms of "ideas," "tendencies," "historical forces," or other such abstractions. Its cause lies in the characters, and the positions, of a small group of exceptionally dangerous men. Their chief representatives to-day are well known to the whole world—best known perhaps among the very people whom they have befooled and betrayed. They are responsible for the war, and for all the faithlessness, cruelty, and general moral imbecility which has surrounded the conduct of the war with the darkest crimes of history.

Concentrating attention on this obvious truth, a vision begins to form itself of an ending to the war which would be nothing less than a general victory for all Europe—indeed, for all the world; a victory in which the Central Empires themselves would be the chief sharers and could hardly fail to recognise themselves as such. It is, I frankly confess, a vision of punishment, but of punishment so solemn, so deliberate, so just, and so universally approved that it would shine to future ages as one of the most sacred deeds in the history of man. Let these malefactors, then, be informed, by methods which admit of no misunderstanding, that the time has come at last when their presence, and the presence of their likes, is no longer to be tolerated on this planet. Let them be called to account for their crimes, solemnly judged, and effectually disposed of by the human race. A victory which takes that form will be a victory for all mankind.

As we contemplate the victory of the Allies, the only desirable ending of the War that we can contemplate, an immense catalogue rises up of wrongs that will have to be set right—reparations, restitutions, guarantees innumerable. In so great a multitude of wrongs we are apt to lose sight of the chief wrong, the fountainhead of all the rest, which is what I have said. So long as that is suffered to exist, the others, which are its derivatives, are bound to recur. The most effectual guarantees, Leagues to Enforce Peace, or what not, will be no more than brief palliatives or mitigations, and may

even in the long run become, as previous arrangements of that kind have become, mere instruments for astute villains to make use of. Until these men have been removed, and all that they stand for finally discredited by the manner of their removal, the path to a regenerated Europe is blocked.

Their removal would bring into the moral life of all nations that breath of exhilaration, that sense of freedom, that feeling of unity, which are precisely what is needed to start civilisation on a new career, and without which, it may be confidently said, the new start cannot be made. We might be well content to leave all other proposals in abeyance for the time being and to concentrate upon this as our essential aim in the war. Much that we are now trying to arrange, much that was mentioned in the Allies' statement of their aims, would arrange itself if the chief obstacle were out of the way. On the other hand, it is plain that many of these questions—questions that touch the most intimate rights both of belligerents and neutrals—can never be solved so long as the chief obstacle exists, or even promises to return.

The idea of a regenerated Europe which is to start its career with 160 million of its inhabitants in a state of punishment is not only an absurd notion: it is an insane notion. And yet the truth remains that no regeneration can begin until the guilty have received their deserts. It is merely a question of identifying the criminals. This can be done. Probably their total number does not much exceed that of the better men than themselves who are killed and wounded in a "quiet" day of trench warfare. They are the chief enemies of mankind. So long as they are suffered to remain where they are, peace, progress, civilisation will stand in perpetual jeopardy.

Finally, I would beg the reader to consider the alternative and to face the consequences. Let him conceive the war coming to a conclusion, in the victory of either side, or of neither side, which will leave the darkest crime of history—a crime committed against the whole human race—unpunished. This would mean an open confession that civilisation, as it exists to-day, or as it would exist when the war came to a close, was powerless to vindicate the distinction between right and wrong; and the knowledge of this powerlessness, and the memory of it, would be the starting-point of the new era. Is it possible to conceive a more disastrous beginning for a great reformation of public morals?

Let us further conceive that the chief criminals are left in possession of their present place and power. On these con-

ditions the notion of "lasting peace," no matter how guaranteed, is the limit of absurdity. Is it not a vain thing to suppress crime by organising police, if at the same time half the police, and conceivably the whole, are to be under the orders of the criminals themselves?

There is nothing new in these ideas. They must have been present all along to the mind of every man who has attentively considered the *fons et origo* of the war, and of the worst features of the war. Nor need we hesitate to believe that they are as plain, or nearly as plain, to the intelligence of our enemies as to our own. But something has yet to be done, perhaps, to secure for them their right place and importance. Their place is at the beginning and their importance is primary. By concentrating attention upon them it may yet be possible to find a common ground on which the *peoples* of Europe, now at war, may amicably discuss their common interests and their common destiny—questions which, in the absence of the prime condition aforesaid, will remain at a deadlock and become an endless source of future strife. Whatever be the issue of the war, all dreams of a peaceful and regenerated Europe are worthless unless they have, as their starting-point, the condemnation and final removal of the military autocracies. That given, the rest might follow. I predict nothing, and am well content that this should be regarded, not as the most hopeful, but as the least hopeless of the prospects before us.

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

BUSY people who do not wish to be troubled with investigations into subjects lying outside their present scope can hardly help being aware that certain phenomena are being asserted and discussed, which are received with more or less legitimate scepticism by the scientific world. It has been so with many discoveries and novelties. It seems to represent an inevitable stage in the process of assimilation by the human race. And though the fact that strange assertions meet with a hostile reception certainly cannot be claimed as evidence in their favour, it cannot, on the other hand, be regarded as conclusive against them.

Knowing, as I do, that discussion about certain things is going on, it seems to me desirable to show that they are not so entirely detached from present knowledge as may at first appear, and that they need not land us in superstition, any more than other facts which at first seemed extraordinary but were subsequently found to be perfectly natural. The lever of custom, use and wont, is often the strongest influence that can be brought to bear in favour of a given proposition. We have grown accustomed to a quantity of things which we do not really understand,—from the falling of a stone, to the formation and activity of a human body.

I have myself studied what are sometimes called “occult” subjects so long that I have grown accustomed to them, and it may assist students to realise more clearly the reasonable way in which these things appeal to me if I reproduce the substance of a paper which I read and amplified to a Discussion Society in Liverpool, called the Philalethians, in 1892—a quarter of a century ago—but which was not written for publication or ever published, and add the comments of my present thought.

The principal difficulty in introducing the subject of psychical research is to know whether to discuss evidence for facts, or whether to assume the facts provisionally and discuss their possible explanation. For myself I rather doubt whether actual evidence can be profitably discussed. All serious evidence requires study, and after such study it will by each person be felt either sufficient or insufficient to establish for him a reasonable probability in favour of the facts. The amount and kind of evidence necessary must depend largely upon the previous training of the individual, and no amount of mere argument apart from facts is likely to have much effect.

To some, no evidence whatever would suffice to establish certain things of the impossibility or absurdity of which they feel *a priori* assured. Others may feel that some conceivable evidence might be satisfactory; but if they try to formulate such evidence, and if in the process of time that required evidence is forthcoming, they will probably still feel the intrusion of some flaw; they would like something still more decided; and so on *ad infinitum*. This, I believe, is a not infrequent habit of mind; and I think it not unreasonable, up to a point.

A minority, however, will probably decline to look seriously at any evidence in support of novel facts out of their own beat and for which they feel no sympathy. And this group may contain philosophic thinkers of a reasonably sceptical turn of mind. Their scepticism and hesitancy indeed are liable to reach beyond byeways which are recent and crude, lanes "unadopted" so to speak;¹ and extend to some of the paved and lighted highways, the thoroughfares of recognised branches of science.

When a physicist explains the motion of scraps of camphor on clean water as due to tension in a molecular surface-film of specified thickness, when he calculates the sizes of atoms and says that there are as many molecules in a teacupful of water as there are teacupsful in the whole Atlantic Ocean, when he estimates the age of the earth or the duration of the sun, when he explains light as due to an electrical vibration or magnetic tremor in an omnipresent insensible medium—the ether, at the rate of five hundred million million quivers every second (five hundred times as many as the number of farthings in the recent war-loan); the average philosophic thinker and

¹ Privately owned roads not yet taken over by the Corporation, and frequently in a bad state of repair, are in Liverpool labelled "unadopted": a tacit apology for their condition.

ordinarily educated man probably only half, or less than half, believes him. Explanations which are lucid to the physicist, and fill him with a sense of insight and inspiration, are probably to those who have not gone through the same training a dull collocation of words with an intolerable deal of guess-work to a modicum of truth.

The same may be said about many of the regular processes asserted to be occurring in our bodies by the physiologist. Outsiders only a quarter understand, and only one-eighth believe, the doctrines of science. Why should they believe? Their belief or disbelief makes no earthly difference. It leaves everything precisely as it was. If they think they believe, it probably only means that they are willing to put themselves in the attitude of a learner and take assertions for granted. A usefully critical attitude implies considerable interest in the subject, as well as aptitude and leisure for pursuing it. The bulk of the human race can never have aptitude or leisure for pursuing intricacies. If they are to believe, their belief must be born with them, or must have been acquired in infancy or gained unconsciously from their fellows. I doubt if mankind at large is ever converted by argument.

The human race has ceased to be Ptolemaic and has become Copernican (to take the hackneyed illustration); but the change has been accomplished not by the conversion, but by the replacement, of individuals.

The Society for Psychical Research, however, is not representative of the majority of the human race in these respects: it has definitely realised, from the first, the need for laborious and careful inquiry. Anyone sufficiently interested in abnormal and experimental psychology to study the evidence for an obscure class of facts will find plenty of material in the literature of the subject, and will find it accompanied by judicious sifting in the publications of that Society.

It would be absurd for me to adduce detached fragments of that evidence: it must be dealt with comprehensively and as a whole, but I may briefly summarise those facts to which the process of time has constrained my own self to accord a respectable measure of credence.

1st, Then, I hold it proved by direct experiment that ideas aroused in one person can be faintly perceived and described by some other sufficiently sensitive or attuned person in the neighbourhood, without any ordinary known process of communication.

(The latest first-hand testimony to this kind of thought

transference is given in Professor Gilbert Murray's Presidential Address to the S.P.R., reported in its *Proceedings* for December, 1916; and the whole account is of much interest.)

2nd, That between persons at a distance also this apparent sympathetic link may exist, so that a strong emotion or other appropriate disturbance in the mind of one person may repeat itself more faintly in the perception of another previously related or specially qualified individual, even though separated by thousands of miles.

(A two-volume book, *Phantasms of the Living*, contains scores of well-evidenced instances of this kind of telepathy.)

3rd, That during natural sleep, or at least somnolence, the sensitiveness to telepathic impressions is rather higher than when the cerebral hemispheres are in full action.

(Dreams and half-waking visions are familiar enough. Occasionally, though rarely, they are veridical, *i.e.* truth-telling, or in correspondence with some event going on at a distance.)

4th, That, either by varying the blood-supply of the cerebral hemispheres or otherwise, a person may be brought into a dream-like or somnambulist condition in which he is peculiarly susceptible to suggestions made to him, even though these be absurd or repellent.

(The hypnotic state can be produced even in animals, though doubtfully in idiots and feeble-minded persons.)

5th, That this susceptibility to suggestion in the hypnotic state is not limited to suggestions received through ordinary sense organs, but extends also to those made by the telepathic processes labelled 1 and 2 above.

(Dr Pierre Janet has testified to the fact of suggestion transmitted from a distance, as carefully observed by him among his patients.)

6th, That individuals can place themselves in this sensitive condition without any operator (by staring into a glass globe, for instance), and that they may then receive impressions concerning facts and events normally unknown to them.

(Mr Andrew Lang has recorded many striking cases of this crystal vision, a faculty familiar to students of folklore and often associated with superstitious practices in the past.)

7th, That exceptional kinds of epileptiform seizure, and some forms of more normal and less pathological trance, may occasionally leave a patient so thoroughly in the sensitive state that his organism reacts for a time as if under the control of a mind other than his own.

8th, That under these circumstances a so-called secondary

personality sometimes makes its appearance, for a longer or shorter time, and has a character entirely different from the person's normal self.

9th, That the secondary personality of the trance state is occasionally, for some reason or other, more lucid or clairvoyant than the normal self, as if it possessed some additional sense, some abnormal means of acquiring information.

(The classical case of this kind in the *Annals* of the Society for Psychical Research is that of Mrs Piper, observed by them for a period of thirty years, and recorded in many volumes.)

10th, With some reserve I am prepared to admit that the facts known to me render it more probable than not that occasionally the "minds other than their own" above spoken of, are not limited to those still associated with material bodies on this particular planet.

(The extension of telepathic influence to the discarnate, *i.e.* to those ordinarily designated "the dead," is an extension requiring stringent examination and rigorous criticism before it can be accepted.)

Having made a list of the things which I have gradually been constrained by experiment and observation to accept as fairly established and true, I now propose to summarise a few facts which I am not yet prepared to accept, but for which there is much recorded evidence, some of it good enough to make the asserted facts worth formulating:

A. That persons in the clairvoyant condition not only seem freed from the ordinary restrictions of space, but appear incompletely hampered by the limitations of time; so that not only distant but occasionally future events are caught a glimpse of.

(This is called travelling clairvoyance and prevision.)

B. That material bodies or particles may be moved, through the influence of mind or will, without what is ordinarily called contact, and under circumstances unfamiliar to us.

(This is called telekinesis.)

C. That material particles, under certain rare conditions, may be subjected to unconscious organising or constructive power, and may be thus aggregated into the semblance of a person, who can move about and even speak for a short space of time.

(This is called materialisation, and save for the strongest evidence is quite incredible.)

D. That a fixed locality is capable of stimulating the sense perceptions of sufficiently sensitive persons in an unusual manner, so that an image or apparition is created in their minds and in some dim fashion apparently impressed upon their vision.

(This is called haunting.)

These last four statements I say I do not yet accept, though I am aware of a considerable body of evidence in their favour. With me at present, however, it is not (or was not in 1892) first-hand, and even now these phenomena demand more study before they can be definitely formulated and accepted.

Now the special point that I want to bring forward concerning all these asserted phenomena is that the numbered things are to some extent modifications or varieties or extensions of processes already, as we say, "well known." Take them seriatim :

1. Thought transference between near people is common enough, but is usually accomplished by speech, *i.e.* by physiological acoustic instruments, and by vibrations of air constituting a code which has to be laboriously learnt.

2. Something akin to mind-reading or pseudo-telepathy across great distances is usually accomplished by letter or telegram—again utilising the code called language. These distant methods of conducting correspondence might seem mysterious and evoke superstition in a savage.

3. Veridical dreams may in some cases be attributed to telepathic susceptibility of the dreamer.

4. The hypnotic state, with enhanced power of receiving and acting upon suggestion, may be passed without comment, as for some reason or other it is not now denied by the Medical Faculty, though in my youth it was by most people scouted as absurd.

5. Hypnotic telepathy can be granted without difficulty as soon as telepathy itself is regarded as proven.

6. Crystal gazing, and other forms of "automatism," may be regarded as possibly something approaching very slight self-hypnotism, plus telepathy. But this explanation is doubtful. The fact is well evidenced, however it be ultimately explained ; though admittedly it seems to savour of superstition and to recall mediæval practices. But that is characteristic of all these things, viz. that if true they cannot be really new to the human race ; only they have never been properly studied, but

have been relegated to the dust-heap, with results not conducive to cleanliness and respectability.

7 and 8. Duplex personality, sometimes called "possession," is an extension or invasion of simplex personality, and seems like a temporary abrogation of personal identity.

9. Clairvoyance may possibly be an extension of sense perception: a central cell being somehow disturbed or influenced without stimulus of peripheral organ, and perhaps sometimes by psychic rather than by physical means. But the subject is obscure, and difficult to discriminate from telepathy.

10. The presumed agency of discarnate minds contemplates a possible independence between mind and brain, so that the mind can persist as a continuous real entity apart from the physical organism with which it had been associated; and it appears that in this condition it can still retain its occasional power of influencing, telepathically or otherwise, the minds of still incarnate persons.

(The chief point at issue here is the nature of the linkage between mind and brain, about which there is a good deal to be said. Some of it is said in several of my books, *Life and Matter* among the rest.)

Note also that something normal may be said even of the four less thoroughly established phenomena:

A. Premonitions, if they ever go beyond reasonable or unconscious inference, apparently involve a notable step, viz. a modification of our idea of time. We may be forced to this—but not without resistance.

B. Motion of matter by mind, with the aid of proper physiological mechanism, is really of very frequent occurrence, as when an arm is moved in accordance with will; for it can hardly be claimed that anything akin to "contact" exists between mind and body. If this is too obscure, it can be remembered that every architectural and engineering work is a result and illustration of the movement of matter at the behest of mind. The designer need not touch a stone.

C. Materialisations, in one sense, are also very frequent,—as in the bodily structure of plants and animals, the shape of which in no way depends on the identity of the material particles composing them, thus differing *toto cælo* from crystallisation.

D. Fixed local apparitions, if they occur, may correspond perhaps to an action of matter on mind analogous to that exerted through a statue by an ancient sculptor, a painting by an old master, or a symphony by a deceased musician. But anything like explanation of this difficult and doubtful

branch of the subject must await further study. Some cases of so-called haunting may have to be referred to head C, especially if the appearances are ever sufficiently objective to be photographed, which at present I find it extremely difficult to believe, knowing how easily photographs may be faked by ingenious persons.

Now the question arises, Can we of our "certain knowledge and mere motion" take a firm stand against any one of these things, and decline to consider it, as we decline to consider propositions in a more familiar region of knowledge—claims about a flat earth, for instance, or perpetual motion. Without dogmatism, I am sure we cannot. Our knowledge in this region is insufficient. It is a puzzle how mind can act on matter at all; but it does, when we move a finger. It is a puzzle how foreign terrestrial particles can be agglomerated, from bread and beef and cabbages, into the likeness of a human being, and remain so accreted, with incessant change of particles, for a period of seventy years or so; but they are.

If you are willing to pass these things as facts, the slight variation or extension of them pressed on one's credence by the urgency of observation and experiment need not excite an unreasonable and unwholesome amount of resistance. Through the furnace of scepticism they must of course go. Nothing is worth believing that will not stand a separation of the dross from the pure metal; and a plentiful hammering out and straightening must follow afterwards. But it is one thing to subject an unlikely-looking stone to chemical and mechanical treatment; it is another, jubilantly and confidently to assert that nothing so unlike aluminium or mercury as are their respective ores can possibly yield either of those metals.

The first step to be taken in a new direction, the first chapter to be opened in this new volume of science, is Telepathy. If we grant telepathy, the main difficulty about apparitions of the living disappears. They can be provisionally explained as due to indirect and purely mental stimulus of the brain cells usually stimulated through the optic nerve. Apparitions of the dead must be either deferred telepathy, or must be telepathy under head 10, or must be relegated to either C or D.

To myself the steepest steps, among the better evidenced ones, are those numbered—

9. Clairvoyance.
10. Action of discarnate minds.
- A. Premonitions.

The evidence for this last, *i.e.* for the faculty of prevision, is singularly hard to disentangle from a simple consequence of a more perfect knowledge of the present. In other words, plenty of things that seem like premonitions or predictions may be really unconscious *inference*. That is why, in spite of so much evidence, I place it among the, to my mind, as yet unestablished things.

Here ends the substance of what I said privately twenty-five years ago. I will add a few additional comments.

The item which will generally excite most repugnance, in the above collocation of statements, is probably that where mind and brain are postulated as not inseparably and essentially or for ever connected. It is too large a subject to enter upon here; but I must urge that on those who hold that a chemical process in a brain does always and necessarily accompany every possible activity of mind or consciousness the burden of proof rests.

That a chemico-physical process accompanies every manifestation or demonstration of mental activity here and now, may be considered proved by common experience. If the brain is injured, the power of expression is weakened; if the brain is destroyed, the whole power of expression or manifestation is lost. These are facts of common as well as of exact knowledge.

They show that the brain is the necessary intermediary or instrument of connection between the psychical and the physical states of being. For life or mind to manifest itself on this planet, a bodily organism is essential. But things like the Ether can exist without being directly manifest at all. Demonstration is one thing, existence is another. Discarnate mind and memory may exist without being able to display themselves to us who are only accessible through physical means.

But if demonstration or manifestation is impossible, how can we ever learn the facts about existence or non-existence of discarnate mind? We must learn about them indirectly, as we learn about the Ether; and, as in that case also, for the purpose of learning we must certainly make use of material instruments or a suitable organisation. And here comes in a singular fact, namely, that though an individual brain is usually associated with one single personality, certain facts of multiple personality are known, which are suggestive of the utilisation of a single organism by more than one mental control. That is at least the appearance; and the fact has a bearing on another set of observations, and may possibly elucidate the

phenomenon of mediumship. A brain, let us say, is necessary for the expression of a thought or the demonstration of a given mind among terrestrial surroundings, but apparently the individual brain originally belonging to that particular mind is not the only one that can be utilised. What looks very much like vicarious use of brain, turns out to be occasionally possible; and it appears as if evidence of persistent identity can be given, though with difficulty, through other than the old individual organism.

This needs proof—yes, indeed, much proof,—facile belief in such a statement would be unreasonable. It is a statement that should only be made after long examination and careful scrutiny of evidence. There are many things about the interaction of mind and body that we as yet do not understand, consequently we are not in a position to dogmatise theoretically on the subject; we must very carefully examine facts, and see what is established and what is not.

But, it will be said, how can mind act at all if it is discarnate? how can thoughts exist save in association with a brain? Well, I not only deny that the absolutely necessary connection between individual mind and individual brain has been so thoroughly established that facts of a broader character cannot even be considered, I go further and deferentially deny that the universal concomitance between mind and brain in general has been rigorously proved, even here and now. It is indeed vehemently asserted, and it is not at all improbable. The assertion plus the probability are supposed to do instead of proof. But they will not do instead of proof if trustworthy facts can be adduced to the contrary. Nor would the admitted present concomitance necessarily involve a permanent concomitance.

The brain is manifestly a temporary aggregate of terrestrial particles, mostly water particles, and it lasts some seventy years or so, barring accidents. For that time a certain individual consciousness—the one that has unconsciously constructed it—makes use of it, and manifests itself to those other consciousnesses who happen at about the same time and place to have provided themselves with similar means of communication.

That is clear enough. But note this. Any assertion that because the brain is terrestrial and finite, therefore the individual consciousness is terrestrial and finite, and that the two necessarily begin and cease together, though it may conceivably be true, is perfectly gratuitous. If true it must be proved, and the proof will not be easy. Discarnate mind is a possibility which must be faced.

We are only *accustomed* to find mind associated with brain: we do not in the least understand the association. Nor have we any grounds for maintaining that nothing like mind can in any part of the universe exist without brain.

Neither way is the proof or the argument complete; knowledge must be founded on a basis of definite experience, and theoretical assertions either way are perhaps equally gratuitous. We must explore and be guided by facts. If the discarnate can ever be definitely proved to be communicating with us, and therefore proved to be still existing, then it becomes clear that mind can exist without the ordinary physiological organ to which our experience here and now has rendered us accustomed.

We need not suppose that any mind can actually commune with us—certainly not with our conscious self—without in some way producing an impression on our brain; but if telepathy is a psychical or hyper-physical reality, we may suppose that a discarnate mind can operate on our minds telepathically, and so influence or stimulate our sense-perception. Or if we have not the faculty or receptivity ourselves, the impulse striving to get through may make use of some other more sensitive person's organism, and, by operating on the mind or on the brain nerve and muscle mechanism of a medium, may enable us to receive messages at second hand. This is the kind of operation contemplated in mediumship, and is to my mind the most probable explanation of the series of facts narrated in my book *The Survival of Man*, and in my more recent book *Raymond, or Life and Death*. It has been likened to the process by which we are accustomed to receive messages from inaccessible persons through the intervention or mediumship of a pair of uninterested telegraph-operators who are provided with appliances concerning which neither they nor the people who employ them to transmit messages have more than the most superficial understanding. Making use of a process is very different from understanding it, else most of us would find it a hard matter to digest our food.

The whole moral is contained in the advice, to all those who care to be students of the subject, patiently and critically to examine facts, and not be led into premature negation by prejudices born of mistaken and over-limited theory, or by any infallible certainty about our power of judging beforehand what is possible and what is impossible in this vast and complex universe.

OLIVER LODGE.

AMERICA'S SELF-REVELATION.¹

PROFESSOR HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER,
University of Nebraska.

I.

"WHAT can I say to my son, in the years that are to come, of the honour of his country in these years? I ask myself this question again and again. What can I say to my son of a country, great in strength and influence, that looked upon the bullying of Serbia with indifferent eyes, that permitted the rape of Belgium with no word of protest, that hardly ventured to raise its voice when its own citizens were massacred upon the high seas, and that could only listen 'with sympathetic attention' to the death-cries of more than half a million unarmed people? To the vain struggle for liberty of the Germans of '48 America responded with a full heart; the Magyar Kossuth was with us almost a national hero; but in the years 1914-15 we saw people after people deprived of happiness and of liberty and of life itself, and remained unmoved. Oblivious of our great Declaration, forgetful of the meaning of our nationality, we put cash into our coffers, and, like cowards, surrendered the nobility of our birthright. It is this that we must tell our sons and our sons' sons."

The above is the concluding paragraph of a letter which the writer of this article published in a Nebraska daily at the time when the Armenian massacres were at their apogee. President Wilson, said the dispatches of the day, was listening to the reports "with sympathetic attention"; but nothing was done, as nothing of moment had been done on any of the many previous occasions when the feelings of thousands of Americans were deeply outraged by the drunken barbarity of Germanic warfare.

¹This article was written before the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany.—EDITOR.

Thousands of Americans, shocked at the crimes against humanity, felt their nation's honour to be at stake, and they called for, and expected from their Government, action that never came. For they were not the thousands that represent the sentiment of the United States to-day; Anglo-Saxons, for the most part, they were, children of the makers of the United States, and no doubt they represented, and represent, the ideals in which the nation was founded, and the traditions which it has created; but the nation as it exists to-day is something far other than they had so quaintly dreamed it to be, something far less simple, far more complex, with an inner monstrosity which no brief period of years can remove.

The War has brought self-revelation to each of the contending nations; and if one may judge by the expressions—religious in their enthusiasms—coming from the peoples of these nations, the War is bringing also to each its purification of character, its *katharsis*, which, however tragic, is still noble. To the United States the War has also been the occasion of self-revelation, so that we see ourselves with disillusioned eyes; but the day of the purification is beyond the ken of our generation.

Friends of America, especially in France and England, have been quick (almost too quick) to explain us to ourselves, and to condone, in a measure, what seems to so many, among them and among us, our national turpitude. But even when the interpretation comes from so sympathetic and gifted a writer as Professor Gilbert Murray,¹ in our ears it rings thin and remote. Americans—and I speak now for those who represent America's literate tradition—are not happy about their nation's conduct, and most of them are in a daze about the nation's self. We *are* not what we had supposed ourselves to be; and the great problem which confronts us, as a people, is to discover what manner of spiritual being our country has.

II.

The second autumn of the War had come. Here in Nebraska it was hard to realise. Nebraska is a land of glorious sunlight in the autumn months, and the granaries were heavy with wheat, and the fields thick with ripening maize. Everywhere men were building, bettering, beautifying homes and properties; everywhere there was plenty, honest work and hearty food. In the centre of a great continent, walled by a thousand miles, in every direction, from the perils

¹ *The United States and the War* (pamphlet), London, 1916.

of the sea, and by great seas from the contentions of nations, Nebraska was safe and prosperous—the top o' the world!

It is true that to many of us the noise of the War came faintly, and its red horror loomed, mirage-like, beyond the seas' horizons; when we greeted one another there was a reservation behind the smile, and welcomes were classified by sympathies that burst into expression where the company was congenial—for the great War in Europe has socially divided Americans as internal issues rarely do. But all of us had our daily tasks—the tasks of peace—to perform; and routine readily dulls emotion. Sops to our conscience were raising funds for the Belgians, making Red Cross supplies, and boxing comforts for the French soldiers; but even these activities fell in the intermissions, so to speak, of the normal forgetfulness of occupied lives.

It was on one of the brightest of these autumn days that I drove down the country to revisit the village where I had lived as a boy, and which, as a youth, I had left twenty years before. As I recalled my boyhood, I could not but contemplate the changed appearance of the countryside. In my earliest recollection of it there were miles and miles of rolling prairie, grass-grown and treeless. Such had been the land for countless centuries before my father and the men of his generation had come into it, to change its face once for all. I could remember, too, how beautiful in those early days the prairies looked of autumn nights, banded in every direction by moving ribbons of fire; for the homesteaders were adventurous rather than provident men, and they cleared their land for tillage with the easy extravagance of pioneers. The country was still very beautiful, but in a new fashion: the virgin prairie was all gone; in its place were tilled fields and secluded pastures, and the rolling hills were varied in every direction by upstanding groves and orchards planted by the hand of man. And what the country had become one realised that it must remain for centuries, aye, for millennia, to come: a generation of men, armed with hammer and plough, had swept over its surface, and converted the hunting grounds of the countless past into the farmsteads of the not less countless future. They were great adventurers, these men; and they left their mark upon Time.

They were not the generation whose children were to inherit the land they transformed. I can remember, as a boy, how all the boys of the village and the country round about grew up with the idea that as men they were to go "out West" to make fortunes for themselves; it never occurred to us that we

might remain where our fathers had settled: had not these fathers, in their day, gone West in the search of fortune? And should the sons do less? It was the normal feeling that life is a matter of pioneering, and I am sure that any boy who entertained the notion of settling once for all where he was born was openly despised by his comrades.

And, as a matter of fact, most of them did go West, boys, and girls too. They went to the higher plains, where men fight drought; they went to the mountains; they went to the western sea. Their homes are in the Rockies, on the Pacific Coast, in Canada, Alaska, Mexico, South America, while Hawaii, the Philippines, Porto Rico know them, not a few,—boys, and girls too, for the spirit of the quest is born with no sex; it is of the blood and of the race.

The village of my boyhood was peopled mostly by Anglo-Saxons. There were New Englanders, like my father and my two uncles; there was a colony from central New York, with beliefs about spirits and spirit-rappings; there were Southerners—Carolinians, Missourians; and there were men born in the Middle States when these States were frontiers. I remember an eccentric Frenchman, probably a *habitant* from Quebec; and I remember the old man who kept a tavern, the nucleus of the village, in the days when freighters and Indians were the interests of life: he used to open the polls on election days with the cry which the Norman heralds used at the Mediæval tourneys—"Oyez! oyez!"—though I am sure that he had no more understanding of the term than I.

But even then the Germans were coming in, and as I grew up I saw the Anglo-Saxons steadily giving way before them—the Germans, with their closer thrift and, as we felt, inferior way of life. The men who had broken the soil were not to reap its harvests; and in 1915, when I revisited the village, I found just two old men, retired from activity, of the American stock. Externally the village appeared much the same, except that the trees were more grown and the houses looked, as it were, better seated. But internally, said the old men, it was a different place; there was no longer any of that visionary magnification of mind which in the old days made its citizens feel that theirs was a town of destiny, that must one day become a metropolis; there was no longer any inner agitation. The village had settled down to be just what it is, a country hamlet—a *German* country hamlet. I asked my friends how lay their sympathies in the matter of the War; they answered, "Oh, we are for the Allies, strongly; but we say nothing about it; here everyone is the other way."

III.

The village which I have described is in a significant sense typical of the country. Here in Nebraska we have German communities, Bohemian communities, Danish and Swedish communities; but one pricks up one's ears when one gets word of an American community, and if a village or district is so spoken of it is likely to turn out to be in the western part of the State, where pioneer conditions have not yet faded away. Not that all Anglo-Saxons are pioneers, even when born to the tradition; thousands of them are in the larger towns and cities, and still more thousands form a perpetual drift through the settlements of the less shifting elements. On the whole they control the literate expression of the country, and doubtless they represent its greatest property interests. But even if our Fifth Avenues and Back Bays are Anglo-Saxon in character, this does not argue that our social substructure is of the same stuff. In the cities, no less than in the country, the homogeneous quarters are given over to stranger peoples; there are Italian, Jewish, Irish, German, Polish quarters; there are Syrian, Chinese, Japanese centres; but one never hears of an American centre or quarter. Of course, one will say, "But the whole is American"; and so it is, in its polyglot fashion; but so it is not in the sense that it is governed by, or even comprehends, the ideals that America has hitherto represented. The Anglo-Saxon element is our pioneer element, but, like a thin foundation wash, it is being gradually obliterated by the masses of solid colour that are to form the ultimate picture. If it serve the purposes of the wash to give unity and harmony to the whole in the day of the completion, it will have done the most that can be expected.

These foreign-born communities, each after its kind, tend to become centres of distinctive ideas and ideals. Partly these are acceptations of American thoughts and ways; partly they are adaptations to the new requirements of life in an adopted land; partly they are transplantations from the Old World. Mid the currents and counter-currents of their fluid Anglo-Saxon environment these local solidarities are slowly abraded, slowly transformed; but their resisting powers are great, reinforced by differences of language and religion, and often by the leadership of intellectuals—pastors and editors—whose ideal is the maintenance of Old World traditions, upon which, indeed, their own office depends.

In States, such as those of the Union, having easy naturalisation and a republican government, such communities need not be numerous in order to hold the balance of electoral power. Their very homogeneity and seclusiveness give them political unity; the Anglo-Saxon idea of the ballot as fundamentally a certificate of freedom is hard to master, especially when the foreigner is taught (usually by politicians of his own race) that this ballot is an instrument to be used in his self-interest. In America we speak of the Irish, the Italian, the German, the Bohemian vote, but never of the Anglo-Saxon vote; and out of the condition so indicated springs the fact that in our representative government it is the Anglo-Saxon alone who is never represented. It becomes the whole art of the politician to play to the foreign vote which in his particular district holds the balance of power; and as this play must be not merely preliminary to office, but must be maintained in office, it transpires that everywhere the foreigner finds representation of his "interests" easy. It happens, too, that the expression of opinion by the press and by the literate public (literate, I mean, in the native American tradition) becomes relatively less important: its apparent value is always much greater than its real value,—at least, so far as political conduct is concerned. It is surely a feeling for this truth that underlies President Wilson's remark before the Gridiron Club, in February 1916: "I would a great deal rather know what they are talking about around quiet firesides all over the country than what they are talking about in the cloakrooms of Congress. I would a great deal rather know what the men on the trains and by the wayside and in the shops and on the farms are thinking about and yearning for than hear any of the vociferous proclamations of policy which it is so easy to hear, and so easy to read by picking up any scrap of printed paper." Democracies are notoriously suspicious of literacy; printed paper seems to imply studied reflection, and the *vox populi* never expresses itself so,—at least, not when the language is King's English.

IV.

All this represents a change in American society, and a complication of it. Not the least important phase of this is the diminution of the importance of the British tradition. I can remember, in my boyhood, how orators were still "twisting the Lion's tail," and to the exhilaration of all. That is long since passed, and not wholly to England's advan-

tage. The Anglo-Saxon American comprehended and enjoyed the trope; it fitted in with his conception of the importance of Britain, magnifying the daring of his own country. To the newer American the figure is lost; he comes from the Continent, with respect to which the British Isles are "outlying"; nor is the American Revolution for him a speaking symbol: he remembers the far bloodier wars of the Old World. There is no longer political capital in the old-style oratory, and the "Lion's Tail," along with the "bloody shirt," belongs to the past.

England has diminished in American eyes with the passing years and the rising tide of Continental immigration. But Europe as a whole has increased in moment. Europe has always been for us Americans—though we be for three centuries native born—what Rome was for the Mediævalist, a seat of higher intelligence and hoary marvels. Just as, as boys, we grew up with the expectation of going West to seek our fortunes, so, as schoolboys, we imbibed the hope that—the fortune once made—we might go some day to "Europe" to "get culture." Americans are not conceited about their attainment in the refinements of life, however much they may believe in the adventurous opportunities of the New World. And in this respect the later immigrants are like the earlier. Indeed, they are sometimes almost officiously ready to instruct us of the more native stock, presuming on their own more recent contact with the fount of culture; and in particular to free us from the notion that insular Britain represented any essential part of the European gift. Even before the War had spawned *Fatherland*, Mr George Sylvester Viereck had announced himself as the emancipator of American letters from Puritanism, and as the apostle of a free and unabashed Continentalism in art; while since the War began, Hugo Münsterberg more than once tactfully reminded us that he remained upon our shores, not from heart's choice, but as a missionary of culture, self-exiled from the land of its realisation: "It was an exquisite pleasure to meet this English minister . . . in the twinkling of his eyes was all the time that harmless, delicious superciliousness which the cultured Englishman in contact with another educated European never forgets when he talks about America." The "other educated European" was, of course, in this case Hugo Münsterberg.

It is by the Germans most that the lesson of culture has been given us, partly because of their upstanding conviction that it is theirs to give, partly because so many Americans, especially of the teaching class, have been educated in Germany

and share the German conviction. But other nationalities have not been backward in showing us ourselves as they see us,—not backward, nor always delicate. I remember meeting a Scotsman once: "Ah, you have a Scot's name," said he; and I, responding with shy geniality, "Yes, and it is from Scotland." "Your father?" he asked. "No," I acknowledged, "it has been here for some two hundred years." "Oh," said he (and I cannot forget the fine tone), "the good of it's long since gone!" I know, too, of a group of American college girls taking boat at Rotterdam; an English boy, with his father, on deck as they embarked, remarked to the father, "I didn't know we had taken passage on a cattle-ship!" Happily one of the girls had an English cousin whose fine hospitality had given them a better insight into British character. Not all Americans are so fortunate; and I am of the opinion that among thoughtful Americans generally the French are, of all Europeans, the most highly esteemed,—for the French never insult us; though they may look upon us with a polite amusement, of which we are neither unconscious nor resentful.

But there is another reason for our liking for the French, and I think a more fundamental one. With much truth, and probably with some exaggeration of the truth because of America's association with France during the Revolution, the American feels that the ideals in which his government was founded are French in parentage,—the doctrine of the rights of man, the creed of freedom and equality, the whole political humanitarianism of the eighteenth century. There is no great European country which is represented among us by a thinner stream of immigration than is France; in the United States we never hear of a "French vote,"—or if we hear of it, what is meant is the vote of the descendants of the French colonists in Quebec or Louisiana, as long in America as any of us. Yet France has probably a stronger hold on us than has any other European nation, and for the reason that we feel that we share her ideals more than those of any other. No doubt our Government is actually more English than French, but partly the manner in which the United States were born and partly the fact of the English monarchy have prevented the realisation of this. In any case, the element of interest in our ideal history is the gradual strengthening of our sympathies with France and the weakening of our sense of dependence upon England and England's culture. Blood is certainly thicker than water; and to-day Anglo-Saxon blood in America beats with the hope of British victory. But

year by year America is less and less Anglo-Saxon; the blood thins and fuses. Yet there is a bond which is stronger and more lasting than the tie of blood-kinship, and this is the bond of common ideals. It is the bond which in the past has held us to, and drawn us closer to, France; it is the bond which in the future will surely draw us and hold us to all those nations that love justice and freedom and respect human rights; and it is a bond which, stringent in our midst to-day, is holding us in division,—for, in the hour of our self-revelation, we have discovered that many who call themselves citizens of the United States and share the rights of our polity have no respect for the tradition in which it was founded, no faith in the principles for which it has stood.

V.

It took the great War to bring us our self-revelation. The chasm in our midst existed, no doubt, long before; but I think neither party realised it, for the native Americans were naïvely unsuspecting, and it was to the interest of the newcomers to acquire an understanding of the native Americans; to the difficulties in the way of such an understanding, it was easy to credit all the differences that were felt. As a boy, raised among German boys, I was dimly conscious that their sport was not quite on the same plane with that of their American playfellows; and in later years I noticed something of a similar feeling among men in politics,—but boys and men alike ascribed this to slowness and dullness and Old World conservatism, regarding it as an infirmity rather than as an intention. It is true that we were aware that the Scandinavians, for example, “Americanised” much more rapidly and whole-heartedly than the Germans; and this might have caused reflection. Certain other events might have aroused us: the incident of Manila Bay,—but the Germans in America, though grieved, were loyal, and we never really took the Kaiser seriously. More significant, perhaps, were internal incidents. In a city of the Middle West, environed by many German communities, an annual “German Day” was set as a fête, the celebration being given into the charge of the local branch of the German-American Alliance, though the thing was made possible by cash grants from the commercial club of the city. The fête was celebrated with music, with orations in German and in English, and with a street pageant consisting of floats representing Teutonic knights in armour, squires in blond wigs and velvets, dames and peasant girls,—

Siegfrieds, Loreleis, and Marguerites, all a bit tawdry and dusty, and all set off with the red, white, and black, and with imperial eagles. Naturally the celebration seemed exotic and unintelligible to native Americans, and the commercial club, in order to save it from utter ruin, approached the German-American Alliance with the proposal that the fête be changed into a "Day of all Nations" for the immigrants from every country. The proposal was indignantly rejected: the day was to be "German Day," or the Germans would have no part in it,—and so the fête was discontinued. That was a year or so before the War. But nothing of all this really affected us; since, for one thing, we all knew scores of men of German birth and descent who were, and are, as complete Americans as any of us. It took the War to bring to us any real sense of the division in our midst.

Since the War has come German-Americans among us have been wont to ascribe the American sympathy with the Allies quite as much to our "prejudice" against them as to "English lies." If the prejudice existed, Americans, I am sure, were utterly unaware of it. No nationality in the United States has been more continuously and fervidly praised, by politicians, professors, and press in equal measure, than have the Germans; and I think that this praise represented a real respect for the economic value of the German communities as well as for the reputation of German learning. Indeed, when the War broke out it came to us with a shock of incredibility; in spite of talk, we believed the Germans incapable of it; and the guilt of Germany, in forcing war, was only conceded when Belgium was raped and the diplomatic correspondence (German and English) made the case palpable to all reason. The flood of pronunciamientos and propagandist literature from German sources which immediately followed, dispelled the last lingering doubt that here we were face to face with a theory and conduct of statecraft which we had supposed impossible for a civilised people.

But a second and even more shocking revelation was in store for us. With a naïveté which now seems pathetic we turned to our German-American fellow-citizens with the full expectation that they would view the crime as we viewed it. In numberless cases this expectation was justified, but not at all for the great mass of the Germanic population: the local conservative communities, with their own press and their own pastors, were on the other side. We began to hear strange rumours. A German laundress tells her mistress that her pastor says the Americans must be brought to their senses,

if the Germans have to use force for it. Another asks if it is really true that the Germans and Americans are to fight; and soon there are quite ridiculous tales of armouries in the basements of Lutheran churches. Of greater moment were the expressions of the German press and of German leaders: public men were assailed with a venom far beyond anything that is aroused by our internal politics; professors who expressed sympathy with the Allies were lectured, with ill-concealed threats; and perhaps most significant of all, these leaders of Germanism ceased speaking of themselves as "Americans": "those Americans," they would say, with obvious sense of their division from their fellow-citizens. When the *Lusitania* was sunk a German-American who had been for many years a voter in the United States and a political leader among his own people was heard to say: "I hope every American aboard was drowned."

To be sure, there is another side to the picture. An old German farmer, Prussian by birth, was prodded by his neighbours for seeming apathy in the cause. He answered: "What has the Kaiser ever done for me? Hard work and little pay; America has given me a home." A lawyer overheard a group of German clients, in his ante-room, scoring the Americans. Finally, one who had kept silent broke out: "You men are fools! What did you come to America for? I came here to live and to be an American. I do not even let my children talk German, and my wife and I, we try to talk English in the home." The rest were silenced. I know two German professors of German. One of them came to America as a youth, and he has since visited Germany. He says: "I am an American. All *that* is behind me. They do not understand us over there." He is deeply grieved for the Fatherland, which he deeply loves, but he feels that reason and righteousness demand an Allied victory. The other is the son of a German of '48, who came to America to escape militarism; he has never seen Europe; but German blood and German literature have won him altogether to the cause of the Empire: "It has taken the War," he told a colleague, "to make me realise that I am not an American." Still another is a professor of science, German by birth and education up through the doctorate: "Of all countries," he said, "I prefer to live in America; next come England, France, Italy; I prefer Germany, I think, to Russia." I know American sons of German-American fathers and American brothers of German-American brothers, but these are only symbols of the division that cleaves the nation,—as are, too, those occasional Anglo-

Saxon Americans, men educated in German science or art, whose sympathies are with the Central Powers.

VI.

The division exists ; the War has made us realise it ; what, then, is its true character and meaning ? Partly, no doubt, it is the reflection of a wholly natural veneration for the land that was the home of one's ancestors and the parent of one's own aspirations. "If blood is thicker than water," there is surely no reason why German blood should be thinner than English blood ; and in the hour of the Fatherland's stupendous effort, what German heart can fail to be thrilled by it ?

If this were all, Americans would have no cause for a deep uneasiness : a few years of peace would heal the division. But it is not all. The thing that stirs us is the discovery of a radical divergence of political and national ideals. As I have said, the United States was founded, and has been nurtured, in the humanitarian tradition—the tradition which, through France, harks back to the republicanism of Rome and the democracy of Athens. The Germans come to us with the tradition of feudalism and aristocracy unbroken, and with the addition of a modern and conscious philosophy of the State. What that philosophy is in its European expression, all men now know. What it is in its New World reflection I may best indicate by illustration. Shortly after the opening of the War I gave several public talks on the issue as it appeared to me, and on its consequences and meanings for America. After one of these, I received a letter from a leader among the German-Americans—a man of the finest German type, cultivated in taste, read in history and letters, an attorney by profession and acquainted with the development of the law. I quote from this letter :

" . . . I have read several of your recent addresses and letters, and have been agreeably touched by the seriousness and sympathetic thoughtfulness of their tone. I discover in them also a note of depression, of doubt, of mournfulness, that indicates the ferment you are undergoing. You seem to be passionately striving to rise out of the tragedy into peace, to escape from the sad minor into the triumphant major. In mingled doubt and hope you turn your eyes to Christianity.

"The question arises, What do you mean by that term ? Lessing once said that Christianity had been tried for eighteen hundred years, but the religion of Christ never. Traditional, historic Christianity, that patchwork, that motley garment, seems to me much more man-made than war. War is simple, elemental, intelligible. Reasoning inductively, one finds it as natural as other forms of human activity. In fact, if we admit the necessity of the State, I do not see how we can escape admitting the

necessity of war. The State has no soul to save. Power is its aim, its need; force its *ultima ratio*. Pitt said, 'English diplomacy is English trade.' He was a great man and spoke bluntly, as great men do. What he said of England in Napoleon's time is just as true of England to-day, though English statesmen of to-day have not Pitt's size and bluntness, and pretend that England entered upon this war as the champion of morality and democracy. . . .

"There has been more agitation in the last dozen years in behalf of peace than in all times preceding, and we see it followed by the greatest war in history. Put so-called Christianity to the proof, and ask yourself then what you have a right to expect of it. It has caused many, many wars; so far as I am informed, it has not prevented one. . . ."

"Power is the aim of the State, force its *ultima ratio*." To Americans this is a strange-sounding doctrine. In our day we have sinned in the employment of force, as other nations have; but we have never been led to this employment by a philosophy of force; and I think we may point with pardonable satisfaction to one notable instance in which we have resisted the temptation to take all that our strength might claim: I mean the case of Cuba after the Spanish War. We had then with us two parties: one claiming the economic good of conquest, the other asserting the inward good of honour,—and the latter won. To-day we have two similar parties, whereof the one is proclaiming that the final reason of States is power, while the other insists that justice and the law are for the curbing of the arrogant and the protection of the weak.

VII.

To the future belongs the issue,—an imperialistic or a democratic United States of America. To the present belongs the problem of a start toward the solution of this issue. It is small wonder that Americans of every complexion to-day find their country full of division and complication, uncertainty and puzzle. Nothing could better illustrate this than the spotty and enigmatical election of 1916. Of the two Presidential candidates, the one stood for a record that had pleased neither party (I mean neither of the *real* parties in the land, the sub-political parties); the other stood for an attempt to please all diversities of opinion. Numberless voters were in doubt as to how to vote even within a few days of election, hoping that something decisive would put one man or the other squarely upon one side or the other. German-Americans were anxious to prove their strength, and *Fatherland*, fearful of prediction, comically argued that if Hughes were elected it would be because of punishment meted out to Wilson by

German-American votes, that if Wilson were successful it would be because Roosevelt was the millstone that had drowned Hughes. In Nebraska, I heard say, the German-Americans were instructed to vote for Hughes ; but the State went tremendously for Wilson,—for the reason, as rumour hath it, that the German farmers roundly asserted that Wilson had brought good prices and good times with his administration, and for Wilson they would vote.

But the election has settled nothing, and Wilson is President by happy chance, so far as men can see. What he will do with his second administration none can foretell. But one thing seems evident, that, like most Americans, he is puzzled by the political environment ; and many of us think, too, that his conception of his own office is fatally weak. "I do not know what they [the people] are thinking about," he said in May 1916. "I have the most imperfect means of finding out, and yet I have got to act as if I knew. That is the burden of it, and I tell you, gentlemen, it is a pretty serious burden, particularly if you look upon the office as I do—that I am not put there to do what I please. . . . I am put there to interpret, to register, to suggest, and more than that, and much greater than that, to be suggested to."

Undoubtedly in an ideal democracy, where the national conceptions were homogeneous and division only existed on the minor question of the ways and means of realisation, such a theory of the executive office is complete and satisfying. But in a nation such as is the United States, made up of communities and elements having disparate and unamalgamated ideals of the task of the nation and the meaning of nationality, no notion of office could be more mischievous. In moral issues we must have leaders and partisans, for moral ideals are the creation of thinking men, not of collective groups,—Socrates, Plato, Savonarola, Lincoln—such men create ideals in expressing them. President Wilson was far better inspired when he said (in the month following the above): "I have not read history without observing that the greatest forces in the world, and the only permanent forces, are the moral forces." This is essential truth. Its supplement is that moral forces are called into expression by moral leaders, and are actualised only under the inspiration of moral leadership. The deep need of the United States to-day is for moral leaders.

HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER.

NATIONAL HATE.

A. D. McLAREN

(For seven years resident in Germany, and late prisoner of war at Ruhleben).

FOR two and a half years the continent of Europe has seen whole peoples concentrating their energies on the work of destroying others. It is a work inevitably accompanied by expressions of strong feeling, for the struggles and aspirations of nations, their loves and hates, are as real things in 1917 as they were when Athens contended with Sparta, or Rome with Carthage. But though a state of war intensifies national emotion, it is not an essential condition of its existence. Long before the conflagration kindled in August 1914, as I travelled over Europe, read the Press of various countries, saw the schoolmaster and professor sowing their seed upon virgin soil, and mingled with people of every class, I observed clear traces of collective sentiment.

Goethe said that national hate is a special kind of hate. "It always displays the greatest strength and energy in the lowest stages of civilisation (Kultur). But there is a stage at which it vanishes altogether."¹ There are, nevertheless, factors in national character which refine the features of hate without mitigating its intensity. It is of interest to the student of national psychology to note that in 1836, only a few years after Goethe's utterance, Edgar Quinet, who knew his Germany so intimately, and whose admiration of some aspects of the Teutonic mind was so profound, spoke of German hate as something peculiar in the category of national antipathies. It struck its roots deep into history, and was often coloured with that idea of racial superiority which has lately assumed such fantastic shapes in Germany. He returned to the subject six years later. A "corrosive hate," he said, lay beneath an ardent

¹ Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe* (14th March 1830), p. 684 in Höfer's edition.

desire for power and for wider recognition of Germany's greatness, and kept the whole nation in a state of fever. Saint-René Taillandier, who was still more philo-Teutonic, as a student at Heidelberg in 1840 noted how the "odious crescendo" of anti-French calumny gradually culminated in Becker's *Rheinlied* and a veritable "fever of hate." According to him, the two salient features of the Germany of the time were (1) an implacable hatred of France, (2) a general tendency to negation in the domain of thought. What he emphasises, however, is that this hate was strongest "in the noblest representatives of the German mind." In the Germany of the stormy '48 there was already one great unifying force—the hatred of France common to monarchic and democratic parties alike. For decades the word *teutonisme* in France signified a bombastic patriotism in which national hate and military power were the chief ingredients.

National hate is not a simple emotion. It has the complexity of the emotional nature in a sensitive personality, and something else besides. The extent to which it becomes fixed in the national experience depends upon the nature of the ground on which it works, and the thinking processes there cultivated. All forms of it seem to spring out of some moral distemper, some *malaise* of the kind described by Quinet. We hate Prussian militarism, the German hates those national types that stand in the way of *Kultur*, and however its causes and manifestations vary, in each case the presence of hate indicates the desire to get rid of something, to remove the object that excites the *malaise*. No one who has spent the past decade in Germany would say that national hate has found its most characteristic expression in the lowest classes of the community. We must seek it in the professors, historians, and writers. The Olympic mind which held sway in Weimar in 1830 knew that the mass-instincts can never be so refined as those of a certain few in any community, but he knew also that every age produces its own *Kultur*. Our conscience rather easily regards Germany's *malaise* in the present crisis as due to "materialism," and the national hate for some of us is little more than commercial jealousy. Yet the old lights were not entirely extinguished. Idealists have been in Germany all the time, even when the Germany has been one grown strong and united. The mark of the age, its science, its progress, has been restless movement, and this inevitably reacts upon every nation's emotions. The Germans look upon their strength and union simply as agents for further conquests by *Kultur*. In every nation the collective passion

which comes to the surface is at its strongest as it moves from stage to stage of successive crises, now hovering over this form of moral distemper, now over that. The greatest of these crises is a foreign war, especially if it is in the real sense a people's war. National passion then becomes individual passion, each individual feels himself nearly concerned, whereas in a dynastic contest what is involved is something abstract and only vaguely grasped.

No other people can be compared with the Prussian in its success in reducing national hate to system. Prussia has always striven, and with visible results, to make this principle a faith giving cohesion to a whole people. The structure of the State and society is such that, despite the severe class distinctions, there is no other country in the world where the average man and woman derive so large a psychic content from the social environment. But Prussia's success here has been materially aided by that natural envy which is the basic ingredient in the make-up of the Teuton. Alfred Fouillée says that just as the German is full of ideals and enthusiasms, so his inability to realise them fills him with bitterness and sullen rage. Baroness Bunsen, who knew both England and Germany well, comments on a letter from her husband dated 2nd August 1859: "The fact of power and preponderance alone, *without* the existence of injuries to resent, is shown to be quite sufficient ground for the unsparing national hatred entertained by the great proportion of Germans (whether Protestant or Romanist) against England." This spirit results partly from lack of natural gaiety and humour. The German satirises the weakness of others, rarely laughs at them with geniality, and when he sees others rated more highly than himself, his estimate of his own worth converts what might otherwise be gaiety into hate. This characteristic is sometimes concealed beneath an exterior show of goodwill. In a subordinate position the German is extremely docile; given the least authority, he is not satisfied with ordinary respect, he must make a display of power, *imponieren*, and he likes to have a tinge of fear mingled with whatever other feeling is entertained towards him.

In the hate of every nation there is at bottom something, perhaps racial, distinguishing each type, and this seizes upon new objects from time to time. I have heard people express surprise that the "stolid German" should be capable of such refined hate. But of late we have had to remodel many of our ideas of men and things. The German is a coarse, "stolid" creature at the worst, at the best he is a music-loving

"idealist." That has been the current popular notion. But there are intermediates, and between these extremes there is a complex of emotions, and each individual wears some of the moral features of the collective whole. Has one nation ever a natural antipathy for another, and can such an emotion be shared by a whole people? The official world, of course, hardly ever represents all the living forces in a nation. And some nations pass very easily from one "natural" enemy to another. Camille Selden said in November 1868 that he had met Berliners who regarded everyone not born on the banks of the Spree as their "natural enemy." That Russia, France (or the Latin race generally), and Great Britain, each in turn has had the honour of being the "hereditary enemy" of Germany, is an illuminating symptom of soul. Time after time in Germany within the past eight years I heard England spoken of as the *Erbfeind*. But just after 1871 Emanuel Geibel said, "The hereditary foe shall menace us no more"; and Professor Rambaud, who knew Germany profoundly, declared in 1873 that for years the *Erbfeind* had been anathematised daily. Press and parliament, school and university, had erected hate at once into a dogma and an ideal. The copious extracts published here from recent German songs may convey some idea of symptoms. Yet no one to whom the Deutschtum of the past decade, its real spirit, has been revealed, sees in them much more than surface signs. There is an atmosphere, an environment, and there is also an inner fire. The new Germany is not all new. The exploits of the past were all leading to Woerth and Gravelotte; these in turn became stages on a path which Germany still has to tread, a path which must be carefully prepared. That there has always been a noble *Vaterlandsliebe* in some Germans none who knows the history of the people can deny, but for Prussia as a nation "patriotism" has consisted largely in the hatred of other countries. Even against little Denmark this hate was organised so long as the fulfilment of the "mission" demanded it. A large proportion of Germany's historical output for fifty years has been coloured with national hate. This is especially true of Treitschke's work. He himself said: "People think us phlegmatic; we are the greatest haters in the world." The more fair-minded Sybel was not free from the taint where contemporary events were in question. Those people in England who were struck with amazement at Lissauer's *Hymn of Hate* had evidently never read German literature since Liliencron. Hertleben, Dehmel, Wedekind, Schnitzler,

and Bartsch were only names to them, and yet the output of these writers—of high literary excellence—throws a white light on the drama now unfolding its course in Europe. Instead of refusing to take them seriously we should have compared them with Körner and Rückert in 1813, with Becker in 1840, with Bismarck's declaration that the German *Lied* was among the imponderabilia which prepared the way for all German successes. Those who know the Prussianised Germany of to-day, whatever other feeling they may experience, can hardly be surprised at the circular issued by the Synod of the Prussian State Church in December 1916. This document called upon all Lutheran pastors to utilise the special Christmas services to preach the divine mission of Germany, and hatred of enemy nations as enemies likewise of true religion.

Collective hate, though different in kind from a sum-total of personal dislikes, resembles the latter in its transformations. Ferdinard Gustav Kühne, writing in 1850, said that Hungarian hate of everything in Austria that could be called *Deutschtum* was genuine, and open. He also speaks of the long history of mutual hate between Prussia and Austria, and expresses the hope that an understanding based upon goodwill may soon take its place. Indications of such hate as Kühne described have long been faint in these three countries as applied to the same objects.

Italian hate of Austria and "the Germans" has been a vehement passion. "The desire and the will to get rid of the Germans manifest themselves in all sorts of ways in Italy," wrote Cavour in January 1859. Three years previously he had spoken of the "universal detestation of Austria" which would inevitably "bear fruit some day." "The dogma of Italian nationalism" has been proclaimed by Vincenzo Gioberti and others; but nothing like the systematic drilling of *Deutschtum* in Germany has ever taken place in Italy. Macaulay writing on Machiavelli in 1827 delineates the Italian's character as traceable in the history of the fifteenth century, and he spares neither his vindictiveness nor his duplicity. But this Italian had seen the liberties of his little civic State outraged by the invader, his dearest possessions had been violated, he felt himself a partaker in the national humiliation. Internal strife, political and religious, has superadded a historic character to the Italian's ethnic character, and the struggle for unity against Austria has intensified this. Italian hate became a dream. Germany too had her vision. But a vision of universal dominion, of *Kultur*, extended over peoples who

reject and despise it, is a different thing from the dream of men whose eyes are turned towards "unredeemed" brothers in reality, and whose hopes are fixed forward to the time when they will re-enter the fold. Of this vision is borne the hate of a sensitive soul beholding her aspiration thwarted in every direction, her hearth and art rent in twain by brute force. Such a hating soul, still feeling the spearhead, confidently resigns itself to await "the day," and a great unifying force rallies the nation. Italian feeling towards France, *il misogallismo*, has likewise been bitter from time to time. Mazzini wrote in 1866 that the way France arrogated to herself "intellectual and moral supremacy in Europe" was hateful to him; and fifteen years later Domenico Berti said: "I do not hate the French people nor any people, but the character and temperament of the French wound me." The Italian has a sense of proportion. This feeling to France never became the collective passion of anti-Austrian sentiment. It is not a mere question of intensity, the nature of the feeling was different. Fouillée attributes to the Italian a wonderful "æsthetic sensitiveness" which affects the whole nation alike in its hate and its love. Writing to Ruggero Bonghi, one of the founders of the "Franco-Italian Committee for Friendly Understanding," in 1893, Leroy-Beaulieu spoke of the poignant impression made upon his mind when as a boy in Venice he saw the Austrian eagle hoisted at the top of three masts in front of St Mark's. Doubtless many an Italian has felt the same seeing the German flag in Metz and Strassburg.

There is the hate felt by an oppressed and subject race, that feeling which alternates between frenzy and sullen brooding over wrong. This feeling was strong in the Poles whom I met in various parts of Germany. Men and women before whose eyes the signs of conquest and dismemberment are ever present, whose language, religion, and customs differ from those of their oppressors, whose children are flogged in the schools for insisting upon saying their prayers in their mother-tongue, or who see laws placed on the statute-book for the purpose of dispossessing them of their lands, are capable of great collective emotion. Apart from material effects, hate itself breeds hate. Aristotle says that some men are born with "the impulse to love." Are there any born with the impulse to hate? The Germans, according to their own admission, are universally disliked, and this is especially true of the attitude of small nationalities towards them. Louis Leger, who knew the Czechs, their language, literature, and history, perhaps better than any other Westerner, says that throughout the Hussite

period the dominant passion in Bohemia was hatred of the German. One notes the same feeling half a millennium later, where it is by no means referable to a sense of Slav solidarity. Whence came it? Ernest Lavisse, a profound student of Germany and a remarkably fair-minded critic, said in 1871, in the hour of his country's humiliation, that the waste, desolation, and physical pain inflicted upon France and Europe were the least evil results of the strife. The world's real burden was the triumph of the Prussian spirit, which might be summed up thus: "La haine aujourd'hui, demain la guerre."

The finest products of a national mind may be steeped in religious idealism and yet have underneath a thick layer of realism, and both elements determine a nation's moral stature. Heine, writing on "Germany" in 1835, tells the French that they have no idea of German hate, because the German has so much more rancour in his soul than the Latin. "That is due to their being idealists, even in hate. We could not become angered over futile matters such as a wound inflicted on our vanity by an epigram, or forgetfulness in regard to a visiting card. No, what we hate in our enemies is the most intimate and essential of things—their thought. In hate as in love you French are prompt and superficial. But we Germans—our hate is radical, it endures." He refers to a remark he heard from a young German—that the Fatherland must avenge in French blood the execution of Konradin of Hohenstaufen. "You have forgotten that long ago; but we, we forget nothing." Similarly, Bogumil Goltz, who was partly of Polish descent, and a keen analyst of national character, insists on the wide difference between German and French hate. With the German, love and hate alike come from the whole heart, which concentrates and energises all personal feeling. But with the Frenchman all concentrated energy comes from the *Geist*, the intellectual faculties, not from the *Gemüt*, the feelings, and consequently neither his sympathy nor his antipathy has the energy of the German's.¹ With Heine's and Bogumil Goltz's estimate of German hate we should compare what Lord Morley wrote several decades later. The test of a people's health must be "found in the utterances of those who are its spokesmen, and in the action of those whom it accepts or chooses to be its chiefs." He was as "keenly alive as anyone to the levity of France and the *ὕβρις* of Germany"; but despite this *ὕβρις* he found that the German had his dream of a Great Fatherland to be, that his imagination was stirred by this aspiration in a way that is

¹ *Der Mensch und die Leute* (1859), p. 573.

lacking in an Englishman.¹ There has, however, been through all German ambition a vein of German materialism, something vulgar, *tudesque* as the French say, and this is reflected in their national hate. If Quinet could write in May 1836: "No longer seek the German swan in the sky; to-day she wallows in her cesspool," where would he have sought her in 1917? The Germans as a whole never were a people given over to visionary dreaming or to easy-going sociability. But nothing in their history has been quite so *tudesque* as the recent outcry for colonies, the "press to the east" propaganda, the clamour for *Weltherrschaft*, "universal dominion."

The traditional view of Russian character in the West of Europe has been long distorted because the Western mind has been concentrated almost without relief on certain types and episodes not nationally characteristic. An unorganised peasant empire, that has not yet had time and opportunity to lose its religious faith, still in the twilight of its intellectual life, living under conditions called "primitive"—it is difficult for any emotional force to have the unifying effects seen in a highly organised community. Strangers have never felt any jar or offence in listening to the Russian extolling his endurance or his country's piety, and have merely marked down as naïve the national pride which seeks to regenerate Europe by bringing it back to orthodox religion. Never before the present war has there been so complete a union of all parties and all people, and this because such hate as the Russians have been capable of collectively has always been levelled against the Germans. "When war was declared Russia suddenly grew lighter, as if an evil spirit had jumped off her back."² It is an indictment of Germanism to-day that the writer of those words should declare that the driving power behind this unity was the desire to get rid of "the German spirit in life," to shake off the yoke of sheer materialism. Nevertheless the Russians regarded the Germans "merely as the enemy." This agrees with what Leroy-Beaulieu wrote of the Russians nearly forty years ago. The peasant soldier went forth to do the Czar's and God's work whatever it was, but the conquering instinct was not in his nature. The vigorously denounced Pan-Slavism was not a policy of organised aggression, but a revolt against the one-time excessive admiration of everything foreign and occidental. He found in both Russian and Prussian one characteristic in common—respect for force. But he insisted strongly that there is in the Prussian

¹ *On Compromise* (1886), pp. 9 seq.

² Stephen Graham, *Russia and the World* (1915), p. 35.

nature a "supercilious arrogance" foreign to the Russian. Throughout the war with Japan there were, in the field, many instances of humanity on both sides, and no "frightfulness" on Russia's part in her darkest hour in that conflict.

The symptoms of national hate vary with the national character and with the causes of the moral distemper, the *malaise*. Whoever has spent a considerable time in both Germany and England under war conditions has had an opportunity of making interesting psychological comparisons. The curious nature of that emotion or state of mind which springs from natural envy, thwarted ambition, and hate by order from above, was indicated in some sections of the German people in rapid changes of feeling. The prevailing note struck as far as the attitude to England was concerned was one of implacable Prussianism, eternal enmity for never-to-be-forgiven treachery. But occasionally one could not help noting that men and newspapers talked in this strain one day, and the next appeared to think that we should all forget and shake hands a week after the termination of hostilities. During the twelve months that I have spent in England I have made a careful effort to compare the national feeling towards Germany with the German feeling towards England as I experienced it in Berlin. It must always be borne in mind that the psychological groundwork on which war conditions worked has been entirely different. All questions of race apart, the pictures of the two countries held up before the people and accepted by them as faithful portraits had few features in common. The Englishman before the war had never seen in the German a decadent nation hopelessly on the downward grade. And the contemned money-loving Power that Germany had been taught to see was suddenly tuned to a high pitch of national spirit, the main factor in destroying Germany's hopes of *Weltherrschaft*, universal dominion. The Englishman loathes the way Germany has conducted the war, but the feeling was in no way prepared by the diplomacy leading to the war. We are frequently reminded that German hatred has been largely official, that is to say, inspired by professors of State universities and stimulated through an organised campaign by a Press which is the mouthpiece of the Government. This does not explain everything. I saw much of the ecstasy due to the *Emden's* exploits, of popular clamour for "frightfulness" by submarine and zeppelin against England, heard recitals of raids and achievements culminating in the "heroic deed" (*Heldentat*) which sank the *Lusitania*, and noted the effect of such productions as Lissauer's immortal

Hymn of Hate. It was impossible for me to believe that such collective paranoia could take firm hold of either the English or the French. It is not easy to say why national hate in one case seems to be of different nature from national hate in another case. The Englishman has in him more of the sportsman than the German, and the true sportsman is less easily roused to hate, except hate of the unclean fighter. In regard to the French character, though the capacity for strong hate is noted in the earliest records, a chivalry, a certain greatness of soul, seems to have always characterised the race. With French sociability is closely associated La Bruyère's politeness of the heart. *La vraie politesse vient du cœur.* Heine is right. The brightness of the French mind—a different thing from shallowness—makes its hate likewise different from the long rancour of the German. In France one sees more of that *bonhomie* in its original sense of natural goodness and unaffected manners. We fought the French almost continuously for over a century, but on neither side was a permanent attitude of hate the fruit of the struggle, and this is especially true of the finest types in the two countries. War was still raging when Gibbon published in London his *Essai sur l'Étude de la Littérature* in the enemy's language, and nothing delighted him more than the flattering reviews of his book in the French periodicals. Nor can one read in the biography of Hume and of Adam Smith the references to the struggle which terminated in 1763 without realising that France and Britain were not in fact hating each other, even if they ought to have been doing so on principle. That the French are capable of hate, and revenge too, there can be no two opinions. There are men still living whose grandfathers heard the cries *Vivent les Américains* in France in 1812, but the feeling did not develop into a fixed attitude of mind. Soult's brilliant strategy was praised as warmly in England as in France, and when he visited this country he was received on every side with the utmost kindness. So were Botha and De Wet after the Boer War. They had played the game, and that was all we asked for. What seems to sober the Frenchman's hate and revenge is his sense of form and proportion. There is nothing mystical about these emotions in him, and though his hate has manifested itself in bitter execration at one time of Austria, at another of England, at another of Germany, yet he has never become quite bereft of his habitual politeness. This absence of rancour in the two nations in the eighteenth century may partly be ascribed to the fact that wars were taken for granted, they were in the course of nature. This is

a very different attitude from that which sees in aggressive war an essential factor in man's upward march, and deliberately forces an appeal to the sword. Nor did either France or England at this time lay claim to a superior "culture" which had nothing to gain by co-operation with other cultures. This is to be distinguished from the disdain which every "right-thinking" Englishman once felt for continental peoples, and which was strongest in the most ignorant section of the community. This disdain diverges widely from the direct effect of influences which work to assign hate a definite function in the national life—to supply the energy essential to aggrandisement.

Hazlitt, whose insight into national character was most penetrative, writing on the "Character of John Bull" in 1816, said: "He will have it that he is a great patriot, for he hates all other nations." But the student of Hazlitt will see that here and elsewhere he is thinking to a considerable extent of the Englishman's insularity and that disdain to which I have just referred. Now and then one comes across a good English hater, but the general impression seems to be that the people as a whole are not here in their element. They are not collectively capable of that *verknöchernder Hass*—hate that means to become bone. An air of freedom attenuates the consciousness of inferiority, and represses the tendency to envy. Where free people take themselves in hand, and when character is inward and reaches far down, they demand convincing reasons for their hate, and even if these reasons are forthcoming they will never elevate their hate to the dignity of a place on Parnassus. The feeling towards Spain in the sixteenth century was our nearest approach to a collective, national hate. It was a time of strong religious feeling and national awakening, and this appealed to such idealism as is ever likely to seize upon the average Englishman. Not that he is unimaginative, as is often said. But he loves sport and freedom and fair play. What he lacks is the philosophy requisite for profound hate, and that idealism which alone can give birth to the more exquisite shades of this sensation. Bogumil Goltz says that the English race is sworn to realism, and any idealistic elements in it—spleen and arrogance, for instance—are only the steam which supplies the driving power, and having done its work disappears in the upper air for ever. There may be a vein of natural poetry in this realism, but it never gets the upper hand and dictates a line of conduct. The Englishman's independence, he declares, is so pronounced as to be indistinguishable from *Hochmut*,

arrogance, but this excess of egoism denotes no capacity for strong hate. The Englishman seems to me to have known little of those imperial possessions of his own which excited so much envy in some quarters, and he had no culture which stood over against the culture of the rest of the world, and over which he brooded to the point of suffering acute mental pain. But the Briton went to the war and acquired experiences.

Whether the capacity for violent hate is a sign of moral health or disease in a nation I do not pretend to decide. The same supports are not strong enough to bear all national consciences. No nation accomplishes its mission unless it is captivated with its ideals, and a great destiny is worth a great emotion. Culture, like all other development, has her growing pains. We create our gods in our own image. This applies to nations as to individuals, and the pale creations of some of us inspire little respect elsewhere. No nation incapable of some degree of resentment will long resist moral decay.

A. D. McLAREN.

LONDON.

DRUDGERY AND EDUCATION.

A DEFENCE OF MONTESSORI IDEALS.

EDMOND HOLMES.

A NEW and revolutionary system, such as that which Madame Montessori has worked out in the sphere of education,—a system which goes deep into life and covers a large surface of life—is bound to become the target of much unfair, irrelevant, and unintelligent criticism. For the world into which it comes has long been dominated by certain ideals and standards; and the new system must expect to be judged by reference to these, and to be accepted or rejected according as it conforms or fails to conform to them. But as its own *raison d'être* is to protest against the validity of those ideals and standards, the criticism to which it will be exposed will be an elaborate begging of the question, and the arguments advanced by its detractors will be as illogical as, though possibly less effective than, the mediæval arguments—familiar to the students of religious controversy—of the rack and the stake.

The world into which the Montessori System has come has been dominated for more than a thousand years by one fundamental principle—distrust of human nature. As the mainspring of the Montessori System is trust in human nature, it is obvious that the old order of things will not easily come to an understanding with the new. Official Christianity teaches, as one of its fundamental doctrines,

“original sin,
The corruption of man's heart.”

It also teaches, in the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Holy Spirit, the potential divinity of man. But whereas the doctrine of original sin has been taken very seriously, the antidotal doctrines—with the immense demands which they make on human nature and the immense responsibilities which

they lay on it—have as a rule either been ignored or turned over to the theologians to deal with. It is possible that the explanation of this mystery is to be found in the spiritual indolence, the instinctive resistance to the expansive forces of Nature, which is man's besetting weakness, and which may conceivably have its equivalents in other grades of life. But that is a question which I must not allow myself to discuss.

The religious or quasi-religious distrust of human nature which has resulted from the acceptance by the average man of the doctrine of original sin and his tacit rejection of its sublime antidotes found, and still finds, its secular counterpart in feudal contempt for the mass of Humanity. Feudalism, as a political system, has long since passed away, but as a scheme of life it still dominates in greater or less degree the world in which we live. The delegation in feudal times of political power and administrative responsibility by a supreme over-landlord to his tenants and sub-tenants, led to the permanent association of power and position with property,—first with landed property, and then with property in general. The consequent political disfranchisement and social degradation of the landless and unpropertied masses generated in the upper classes a sense of mental and moral, as well as of social and economic, superiority to the lower, an attitude—alternately arrogant and condescending—which still persists, and which, as the lower orders form by far the larger part of every community, readily translates itself into a radical underestimate of human character and capacity, exceptions of course being made in the secular, as in the religious, world in favour of the elect. Allying itself with the traditional belief in man's congenital depravity, and descending from stratum to stratum of the social pyramid, this quasi-feudal feeling has gone far towards determining and, though no longer at the zenith of its influence, still helps to determine, our whole attitude towards life.

As is our attitude towards life, so will be our attitude towards education. In a feudalised society we must expect the school to be the first and last stronghold of feudalism. The child being comparatively helpless and ignorant, those who are responsible for his education naturally adopt a despotic, dogmatic attitude towards him, which readily harmonises with the prevailing distrust of human nature and underestimate of human character and capacity. Hence the tendency, which has long characterised education, both in the home and in the school, to regard the child as a potential rebel and criminal, and also as perversely stupid, and to deal with him accordingly. It is true that the rigour of this attitude is being gradually

relaxed ; but even where it has been abandoned in theory, its practical influence is still very strong. There is still a widespread belief—a belief which is by no means groundless, though the explanation of it is not that which is usually given—that education is, and ought to be, repugnant to the child, and that he must therefore be drilled and coerced into accepting it. The cane, the birch, the tawse, the imposition, and other instruments of punishment, the use of which is by no means extinct, bear witness to the teacher's conviction that he has to work against the grain of the child's nature. So do prizes, merit marks, class lists, and other instruments of bribery and corruption, by which the teacher tries to rouse the child to intellectual exertion. That the child does not take kindly to education, that he dislikes lessons, that mental work is drudgery to him, that the end of the term, or even of the daily session, is a happy release, is the fundamental postulate on which the orthodox system of education in this, if not in other countries, has long been based.

To those who are so well accustomed to this state of things that they have come to regard it as of divine dispensation, the sight of a class of children who are heartily enjoying their lessons, and seem to be thoroughly happy in their school life—in school as well as out of school—must be disconcerting in no small degree. The feeling that children ought not to be happy in their school life, that they ought, for their own sakes, to be working against the grain of their natures, is strong amongst the men and women—especially the women—of my own generation. When I describe the Montessori System to my friends and tell them how happy the children are who are working under it, I am often met with the rejoinder—made in perfect good faith and without any suspicion of its savouring of paradox—“Oh, but isn't that a bad preparation for the drudgery of life?” I have lately come into possession of a pamphlet issued under the auspices of the “Duty and Discipline Movement.” The name of the pamphlet is “Anarchy”; it belongs to what is called the “Patriot Series”; and the writer is a Mrs Colvill. I have not yet succeeded in discovering what the leaders of the “Duty and Discipline Movement” mean by the words *Duty* and *Discipline*: but I have reason to think that some of their supporters regard the “movement” as a buttress to the tottering fabric of Feudalism; that the “Duty” which they have in mind is the duty of the lower classes, as they call them, to order themselves lowly and reverently to all their betters; and that the “Discipline” which

they have in mind is the coercion of the lower classes by the upper, and in general of the weak by the strong. To such persons any serious departure from feudal ideals and the feudal scheme of life is anarchy. Mrs Colvill seems to be one of these. At the beginning of her pamphlet she tells us that one day she caught herself saying to a friend of hers, "England is going downhill; going to destruction like the Gadarene swine. You and I see the beginning of the end; our children will be in at the death." An unfortunate prophecy this, to which the events of the past two years have given the lie direct. The spirit in which this country is waging the greatest of all wars is not that of a dying people; and our army in France and elsewhere—an army of millions drawn from all classes of the community, including that class which Mrs Colvill, in characteristically feudal fashion, speaks of as "the dregs of the population"—can scarcely be described as a herd of Gadarene swine. But I have no doubt that many of the supporters of the "Duty and Discipline Movement" think, as Mrs Colvill seems to do, that from impatience of swaddling clothes to desire to dance the *carmagnole* there is but a single step.

That a writer who takes this reactionary view of life should see in the introduction of the Montessori System into this country one of the signs of our decadence and approaching downfall, is what we have every right to expect. Mrs Colvill tells us that Madame Montessori has announced her intention of reforming education from the children's point of view; and as the words "from the children's point of view" are printed in italics, one knows, without going further, what is the writer's own attitude towards education. Her comments on the Montessori System are for the most part meant to be jocular, and are scarcely worth quoting. But towards the end of her discourse she becomes serious, and delivers herself of the following criticism: "Seriously, in all this new system I question whether unwilling children ever really gain the power of doing something they don't want to do, of learning something they don't want to learn. This power can be gained; for instance, I mastered the Scales—with pain and grief, I admit—but their early conquest, quite apart from its benefit to my future playing, became an object-lesson to me for all my life. If the children don't learn to do the things they don't want to—and incidentally to submit themselves to their betters—what will their subsequent lives be? The good, the intelligent ones will no doubt grow up reasonable and disciplined, though I should expect even these to be 'soft.' But what about the children who are naturally insubordinate,

mischievous, dull, perverse, perhaps vicious? I think they will end as they have begun—Anarchists.”

Here we have the familiar drudgery argument, emphasised, elaborated, and extended. The Montessori System, which gives children freedom for development, and encourages self-help and self-reliance, is a bad preparation for the drudgery of life; and the Montessori School, in which the children are admittedly busy, happy, and well behaved, is a training-ground for Anarchists.

What is the value of the arguments which lead to this paradoxical conclusion? And to begin with, What is drudgery? To drudge is to do monotonous, laborious, and distasteful work. This will, I think, be generally admitted. But what do we mean by *distasteful*? Is drudgery distasteful because it is monotonous and laborious? Or must some other element be added to it if it is to rise—or sink—to the level of true drudgery? That monotonous and laborious work is distasteful to the old Adam—“the natural man,” as we miscall it—may perhaps be admitted. But what is distasteful to the old Adam is not necessarily distasteful to the new. The work of rescuing imprisoned miners in a coal-pit is monotonous and laborious in a high degree; but not one of the rescuers would call it drudgery. The end, the saving of their comrades from death, sanctifies and transfigures the means; and the rescuers, one and all, throw themselves into the work of rescue with all their heart and with all their will. If monotonous and laborious work is to be worthy of the name of drudgery, another element must be added to it. The work must be done under compulsion from without. The galley slave in bygone days was a drudge, in the true sense of the word. His work was monotonous, laborious, and distasteful; but an overseer, armed with a whip, stood near him and compelled him to ply the oar, the slightest relaxation of effort being visited with the lash. Yet rowing hard, even for hours at a stretch, is not necessarily drudgery. When the galley which carried the message of reprieve to the condemned men of Mitylene was racing against time, it is probable that even the slaves who manned it, inspired by the occasion, did more than was required of them, and did not count their toil as drudgery. And it would be an insult to the athletes who train for the University Boat-race, through weeks of toilsome practice, to speak of them as drudges.

But we have not yet fathomed the lowest depth of drudgery. The work done may be monotonous, laborious, distasteful to the average man, and compulsory, but so long as

it serves a useful end, so long as the drudge can see a meaning in it, his cup of bitterness has not been filled to the brim. But let the work be meaningless, or even seem to be meaningless, and the last drop—bitter with the bitterness of poison—will have been added to the cup, and the martyrdom of the drudge will be complete. The Russian novelist Dostoieffsky, in his book on convict life in Siberia, has truly said that the most terrible punishment which could be inflicted on a human being—a punishment from the prospect of which even the most hardened criminal would shrink with horror—would be that of compelling him, day after day, to do useless and meaningless work, such work, for example, as that of digging a pit to-day and filling it up to-morrow.

If, then, monotonous, laborious, and distasteful work is to be accounted drudgery, in the fullest and strictest sense of the word, it must be done under compulsion, and must either be intrinsically useless and meaningless, or must seem so to the worker. These two features are closely allied, as closely as are will and reason; and together they constitute the differential element in drudgery. When they are absent, drudgery rises to the level of ordinary work. Now it is highly desirable that drudgery should, as far as possible, be transformed into ordinary work. The life of drudgery is not the ideal life. To do monotonous, laborious, and distasteful work under compulsion, and without seeing a meaning in what one does, is not the best possible way of passing one's time. On the contrary, it is a bad way, bad for the worker, and bad for the work that has to be done. On this point all the critics of the Montessori System, including—I venture to hope—Mrs Colvill, will agree with me. But if I am right, if the life of drudgery, in the strict sense of the word,—the life of a galley slave, for example, or of the convict who takes exercise on the treadmill—is at best an unsatisfactory life, then two things are clear. *The best possible preparation for the workaday life of the adult*—I will not say for the drudgery of life, for that phrase begs the question—is *that which gives the worker the power of transforming drudgery into ordinary work.* And the worst possible preparation is *that which leads the worker to regard all work as drudgery.*

That being so, let us ask ourselves what preparation for the drudgery of life, if we are to continue to use the phrase, was made by education in its pre-Montessori days.¹ I do not

¹ By pre-Montessori days, I mean the days before Montessori ideals began to impregnate the atmosphere of education. There were Montessori teachers—teachers whose aims and methods were dominated by Montessori ideals—long before we first heard of Madame Montessori.

think I am exaggerating when I say that it was the fixed aim of the educator to make his pupils regard all work as drudgery. Take what subject you will, and call to mind how it was taught. Was it Writing? The child filled whole copybooks with strokes and pot-hooks and hangers before he was allowed to form a single letter. Was it Reading? The child began by learning the alphabet, and was then launched on a course of a-b, *ab*. Was it Arithmetic? He began with rules and tables and abstract numbers. Was it Geography? He began with definitions, and went on to lists of capes and bays, of countries and towns. Was it a Language? He began with declensions, conjugations, and vocabularies. Was it Music? Her life—for the pupil was probably a girl—was made a burden to her with what an admirer of the old régime calls “beastly scales.” Was it Drawing? In our Infant Schools, at any rate, the child began by drawing straight lines, followed by arbitrary arrangements of straight lines, and went on to simple curves, followed by arbitrary arrangements of curves. Was it Wood-work? The boys in our handicraft centres spent weeks in planing and weeks in chiselling before they were allowed to do any constructive work. And so on. And so on.

It was through this dreary portico that the child was supposed to be ushered into the hall of learning. Can we blame him if, after a long sojourn in the portico, he lost himself in its gloomy corridors, and thenceforth could see nothing but meaningless monotony wherever he looked? No appeal was made to his reason. No appeal was made to his will, except indeed the brutal appeal of “Do what I tell you or take the consequences.” No attempt was made to consult his tastes and inclinations. No attempt was made to discover his latent capacities. No attempt was made to interest him in what he did. The work which he was set to do was drudgery in the fullest sense of the word. It was monotonous. It was laborious while it lasted. It was compulsory. And, as far as he could see, it was meaningless. No wonder that if he was vivacious and high-spirited he rebelled against its deadening pressure, and sought refuge from it in pranks and escapades of his own contriving. And no wonder, let me say in passing, that his pastors and masters, obsessed as they were with the idea of the congenital depravity of human nature, attributed the child’s reluctance to learn to the old Adam of naughtiness in him, instead of to the old Adam of ignorance and stupidity in themselves.

But the child was at least compelled to drudge, and so formed the habit of drudgery, a habit which stood him in

good stead in after life. So it will be said. But did the habit stand him in good stead in after life? What of the vivacious and high-spirited rebels whose spirit of rebellion survived the pranks and escapades of childhood and lived on into adolescence and manhood? What of the many children, including some of the brightest and most vigorous, who, when they grew up, were swept away by the impetus of their instinctive protest against senseless drudgery into paths of lawless activity in which they lost themselves and came hopelessly to grief?

It is true that some of the rebels sought out paths of useful activity for themselves, and did good and even original work on lines of their own. It is also true that a few of them, men of the type of Robert Clive and Captain Cook, when they went out into the world, found appropriate spheres for great talents which their education had failed to discover and done its best to repress, and so were able to "ride with the great adventurers." The old régime may, if it pleases, take credit to itself for these successes; but in doing so it will pronounce its own doom, for the system of education is manifestly unsound which does its highest work and produces its best results by provoking a fierce reaction against itself.

And what of those—perhaps a more numerous class than the foregoing—who got into the way of regarding work as drudgery, and, in their not unnatural recoil from the latter, became work-shy for the rest of their lives?

And what of the majority? What of the milder, more submissive, less vigorous, less imaginative, less reactive victims of the old type of education who yielded to its pressure, and settled down to a life of dull routine? Were they the better for having learnt to regard all work as drudgery, and yet, under the numbing influence of a compulsorily formed habit, resigned themselves to drudge? Were they the better for having been forcibly disciplined into drudgery instead of having been encouraged to discipline themselves?

Here we come to the parting of the ways, to the point at which the new régime diverges from the old. It is right that children should learn to do work which is monotonous and laborious and even distasteful to the natural man. Let this be freely admitted. They will have to do such work when they grow up, and it is right that their education should prepare them for their adult life. But are they to be constrained to drudge—if I may continue to use that word "without prejudice"—or are they to constrain themselves? Need we be at a loss for an answer to this question? Is it not an

accepted principle—accepted in theory even by those who flout it in practice—that if a child is to do a thing well, he must learn to do it for himself? Let us apply this principle to the problem that faces us. If the child is to drudge well—and to drudge well means to transform drudgery into ordinary work—he must discover for himself the meaning and value of drudgery, and so, when the need for drudgery arises, must be willing and able to impose it on himself.

But how is this to be done? The first thing to do is to let the child see the meaning of what he is doing. In demanding blind faith and mechanical obedience from children we are overstraining human nature. And we are asking for what is of no value. Faith is less than faith if it is blind; and obedience is less than obedience if it is mechanical. It is only by forcible measures, by threats and punishments, that we can secure such faith and such obedience; and what is given in response to force is a tax, an exaction, not a gift. Nature has endowed the child with reason. The desire to understand, to see the meaning and purpose of things, is strong in his soul. Let the teacher appeal to his reason rather than to his fears. In doing so he will inaugurate an alliance between himself and the child which will probably be fruitful to both. But if the child's reason is to come into play, if he is to see a meaning in what he is doing, his work must be related to some desirable end. And the child must see for himself that the end is desirable. In other words, it must be an object, or capable of becoming an object, of his own desire. We cannot expect him to take a far-sighted view of things. We cannot expect him, for example, to realise that something which he is asked to do now and which he dislikes doing will be useful to him when he grows up. We may tell him this, but it will produce no impression on him, for we are asking him to look too far ahead. We must set before him ends which appeal to him now, and then trust him, under our guidance, to take the appropriate means, at whatever cost to himself.

One or two examples will help me to explain what I mean. In a magazine called *Science Progress* I recently came across the following paragraph, written by Mr Usherwood, teacher of handwork at Christ's Hospital: "Woodwork is commenced. Not that formal woodwork which has been condemned because it demands the expenditure of much time on mere 'exercises,' and through reliance on established schemes has degenerated into mere formal routine work; but of a freer, less restricted type which appeals to the boy's innate tendencies to construct and to manipulate, and leads naturally—through the actual

manufacture of models which do not require much refinement, much detail—to recognition of the reasons underlying this and that formal method, of the steps which led to the invention of certain tools, and their importance.” Here we have the teacher setting a desirable end before the pupil, and the pupil responding by recognising for himself the necessity for drudgery if skill is to be acquired and the end achieved. And we may be sure that the pupil, intent on acquiring skill, would drudge away contentedly without knowing that he was drudging; in other words, would see in the exercises which he had to go through, not drudgery, as the word is usually understood, but obviously useful, even though laborious, work. It is the same with the practice of “beastly scales.” The writer of an interesting paper on the teaching of music says that “the dull mechanical practice of scales, arpeggi, and five-finger exercises is the deadliest impediment to progress ever devised by the conscientious teacher.” But scales are not necessarily beastly. The pupils of Dr Yorke Trotter, the well-known teacher of music, who are encouraged to express themselves freely, and even to do original composition from a very early age, practise their scales (within reasonable limits) with due diligence, but, strange to say, do not find them “beastly”; for they instinctively realise that without such practice they will not be able to go far along the path of self-expression.

These examples are typical. They prove conclusively that drudgery ceases to be drudgery when it is seen to be the means to a desirable end. Shakespeare, who went to the root of most matters, went to the root of one of the most vital of educational problems when he wrote :

“ No profit grows where is no pleasure ta'en :
In brief, Sir, study what you most affect.”

We need not say to the child “ Study what you most affect, and that only.” But we ought to encourage every child to study what he most affects,—to study it, not to dally with it. For in studying a subject which attracts him the child will find himself pursuing congenial ends, and will be under the necessity, if he is to compass those ends, of devising the appropriate means. In this way he will get an insight into the heart of his subject, will be able to profit by and assimilate the experience of those who have studied before him and studied more deeply than he has, and will see a meaning in and realise the necessity for the laborious and even monotonous work by which skill is to be acquired and difficulties overcome. And having once learnt this lesson—having learnt for himself what study means

and what it involves—he will be able to apply it, if he is judiciously handled, when the time comes for him to give his mind to other subjects.

Now one of the great merits of the Montessori System is that it does for the very young child what Dr Yorke Trotter and the Christ's Hospital teacher of woodwork do for older children and adolescents,—it coaxes him into many paths of self-development, and leaves him free, within certain limits, to study what he most affects. And the result of this is that, in response to the teacher's trust in him, the Montessori infant drudges away at what he takes in hand, and finds happiness and even joy in doing so. Two years ago, when I was in the North of England, I visited a school in which one of the classes did Montessori work for one hour a day; and a little girl was pointed out to me who, having mastered the difficulty of tying a bow, had tied and untied bows without a break for nearly a week. She wanted to perfect the skill which she had acquired, and of her own accord did what another child would have accounted drudgery—and did it day after day for nearly an hour at a time. So too Madame Montessori tells us of a little girl of three who was so deeply absorbed in the work of placing wooden blocks and cylinders in a frame, that though she was moved,—arm-chair, frame, blocks, cylinders and all—from the floor on to a large table, and though the rest of the children in the room were invited to sing, she continued her work undisturbed, and did not pause until she had repeated the set of exercises forty-four times. This was laborious work for a child of three, and it was highly monotonous, but it was not drudgery, for it had a meaning for the child, and she did it of her own accord. Like the Christ's Hospital boys when they practise planing and chiselling, like Dr Yorke Trotter's pupils when they practise scales and other monotonous exercises, these little children drudged without knowing that they were drudging, and they thus transformed drudgery into interesting and enjoyable work.

Another merit of the Montessori System as a preparation for adult life, is that it encourages activity and perseverance, whereas the ordinary Infant School, through no fault of its teachers, discourages both. If you will go into a large Infant School, as I happened to do the other day, you will be struck by two things,—by the inactivity of the children during the greater part of the session, at any rate while the “3 R's” are being taught, and the shortness of the lessons. A writing lesson is being given to forty children. Much time is spent in giving out copybooks at the beginning of the lesson

and collecting them at the end. The teacher writes a letter or word on the blackboard and talks to the children about it. The children copy it. The teacher goes round and looks at the exercise books, and comments on what the children have done. This occupies some minutes, during which the children sit still. Then the teacher writes another letter or word, and the same performance is repeated. As the lesson must not last more than from fifteen to twenty-five minutes, for fear of over-tiring the more delicate members of the class and overboring the rest, the order to close copybooks is given long before the children have really got into their stride. It is the same, *mutatis mutandis*, when Reading or Arithmetic is being taught. What is the value of such a lesson? I have elsewhere told of the little boy who, after his first morning in a Kindergarten class, said to his parents when he got home that his time in school had been all interruptions. Forced inactivity during the greater part of the lesson, and then forcible interruption of the children's efforts at the end of some twenty minutes or so,—is that the best possible preparation for the work of life? Do not blame the teachers for these follies. Blame the system under which they have to work. If young children are to be taught in large classes, if all the children in a class are to do the same work at the same time, if the teacher is to be the chief centre of activity, if she is to spend her time in issuing commands, giving instruction, and doling out information, if no regard is to be paid to the child's inclinations, if nothing is to be left to his choice, then short lessons, during the greater part of which the child does nothing, must needs be the order of the day. Contrast with this the free activity of the Montessori child and his freedom to persevere in what he is doing, and then ask yourselves which system of education makes the better preparation for the work, or, if you will, for the drudgery of life. The noise of a Montessori class-room has been happily likened to the hum of a busy hive. Who will be the better worker in the future, the child who is reared in a busy hive, or the child who spends much of his school life in sitting silent and still?

There is another aspect of the Montessori System which is perhaps the most important of all from our present point of view. Being allowed to have free intercourse with one another, even in school hours, the children in a Montessori class spontaneously develop a social or communal spirit, which cannot be expected to flourish in the schools of the orthodox type, where all eyes are fixed on the teacher and intercourse with one's neighbour is a punishable offence. Where this

social spirit grows up, where the sense of belonging to a community and sharing its successes and failures is strong, the feeling that in doing one's own work well one is in some sort serving the community, comes into existence and, though not consciously realised by the children, becomes a real element, however subtle and volatile it may be, in the atmosphere of the school. The transforming influence of this feeling on the attitude of the child towards work cannot be overrated. When to pleasure in one's work is added the sense of service to the community, when the joy which is generated by unimpeded energy, or rather by the energy which triumphs over impediments, becomes a "joy in widest commonalty felt," the slowest and most backward member of the little community will be a willing worker, not a drudge. The Montessori infant is not too young to catch the infection of this happy spirit; but in schools for older children of the Montessori type, the sense of comradeship enhances, and even transfigures, the pleasure of doing congenial work, and the air is in consequence electrical with happiness and goodwill.

But that, it will be said, is precisely where the Montessori System breaks down. The child is actually happy in his school life. He is not working, as he ought to be, against the grain of his nature. Critics of Mrs Colvill's school come back to this point again and again. What are we to make of the philosophy of education, or rather of the philosophy of life, which underlies their criticism? Is it a deadly sin to enjoy work, to enjoy the use of one's faculties, to enjoy overcoming difficulties, to enjoy doing what is right? When I was an undergraduate at Oxford I studied a certain history of philosophy in which I came across two doggerel couplets which have remained in my memory ever since. They were made in Germany in the days when the doctrine of the Moral Imperative was in the ascendant, and they are characteristically German in their pathetic loyalty to the demands of logic and their sublime indifference to the demands of right reason and common-sense. A disciple who is in trouble about his soul says to his master:

"Willing serve I my friend, but do it, alas! with affection;
And so gnaws me my heart that I'm not virtuous yet."

To which the master replies:

"Help except this there is none: thou must strive with might to
contemn him,
And with horror perform then what the law may enjoin."

To obey the moral law with horror of heart, to hate your neighbour in order that your service to him may count as

righteousness,—that is the high-water mark of virtue. To obey your teacher with horror of heart, to hate your work and yet to do it under compulsion,—that is the proof of being a well-educated child. Is it really so? Is it of the essence of goodness to hate to do what is right? Is it of the essence of a sound education to make children hate work and then compel them to do it? When Mrs Colvill hears that Montessori children put things in their places, enjoy washing, and are distressed (at their own awkwardness) if they upset chairs, she exclaims, “Good heavens!” She expects children to be naughty and troublesome. She even seems to wish them to be naughty and troublesome, so that she may be free to coerce them into reluctant submission. Then they will be well educated. Then they will be well prepared for the battle of life. To provoke rebellion and, having provoked it, to deal with the youthful rebels as Prussia deals with her subject peoples, that is the educational ideal by reference to which Montessori ideals are judged and condemned. If the product of this feudal type of education had so strong a will that he could compel himself to do right even while he hated doing it, there might be something to be said for his upbringing. But you do not strengthen the will by breaking it. On the contrary: what coercive education, when it achieves its end, does to the child is to substitute in his character the force of habit for the force of will. This is what Prussian discipline does to the perfectly disciplined soldier; and Mrs Colvill and her friends seem to have made Prussia their model in more ways than one. Mrs Colvill expects the best products of the Montessori System to grow up “soft.” The current confusion between “softness” and natural goodness, like the kindred confusion between high spirits and naughtiness, throws a lurid light on the type of education which has long passed as orthodox. Southey, in his poem, *The Inchcape Rock*, says of Sir Ralph the Rover:

“His heart was mirthful to excess,
But the Rover’s mirth was wickedness.”

Educators of the repressive school seem to think that when children are mirthful to excess, their mirth must needs be, naughtiness. That is a profound mistake. Mirth, or high spirits, may become naughtiness if all natural outlets are closed against it. But I have visited schools in which, thanks to their being rationally and sympathetically educated, all the children were full of high spirits, and in those schools naughtiness was practically unknown.

In conclusion. The supreme merit of the Montessori System is that it is based, as I pointed out at the beginning of my paper, on trust in human nature. Some day or other the medical profession will, I hope and believe, take a serious interest in education. When it does, it will tell us, if I am not greatly mistaken, that the right education is that which vitalises, that the wrong education is that which lowers vitality, and that joy,—which is another name for the sense of well-being,—is at once the proof and the source of health of body and soul. Now nothing is so vitalising, so inspiring, one might almost say, as to be trusted. And nothing is so depressing as to be distrusted. This is as true of adults as of children. The education which is based on distrust of human nature, if carried out in practice to its logical conclusion, does undoubtedly enfold the child's life in an atmosphere of gloom. But to suppose that in doing so it fits the child to face the gloom of adult life is to make a fatal miscalculation. Just as the orthodox education, by teaching the child to regard all work as drudgery, gives him the worst possible preparation for the workaday world in which he will have to play his part, so, by making his childhood gloomy, it predisposes him to take a gloomy view of life, and therefore to carry gloom with him wherever he goes. The child who has been allowed to develop freely and naturally, and to lead a life of rational and happy activity, and whose consequent sense of well-being has been subconsciously realised by him as joy, will no doubt, when he grows up, have his full share of trials, troubles, disappointments, and sorrows. But he will neither anticipate these nor fear to face them. Why should he disquiet himself about them? He will wear an armour which is proof, in the last resort, against their slings and arrows. For there will be a song in his heart as he goes through life which will never die down into silence.

EDMOND HOLMES.

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF VLADIMIR SOLOVYOV.

MRS J. N. DUDDINGTON (NATHALIE A.
ERTEL), M.A.

THERE are men to whom it is given to influence the whole trend of thought in their country, and whose power, often unrecognised in their lifetime, becomes more and more felt as time goes on. This is pre-eminently true of Vladimir Solovyov, one of the most remarkable thinkers that Russia ever produced. He was a man of a richly endowed and many-sided nature, a brilliant writer, a profound thinker, an acute critic, and a true poet, yet during his lifetime he was regarded by all but by a few friends and disciples as merely a very clever and rather eccentric individual. Now, sixteen years after his death, one can say without hesitation that his has been the central figure in the development of recent Russian thought, and that not in the sense of his having had many followers, but in a deeper and more important sense. The ideas for which he stood have fallen on fertile soil, and have given rise, in the field of philosophy, to new theoretical constructions; in the sphere of religion, to a revival in the Christian Church; and in the realm of art, they have become the inspiration of poetic genius. Much of Solovyov's influence is no doubt ascribable to his unique personality, which made itself felt in all that he wrote. So far, little is known about his inner life, and the external facts of his career are few and quickly told.

Vladimir Sergeiyevitch Solovyov, the son of a famous historian, was born in 1853, brought up in Moscow, and, after having graduated in philosophy at Moscow, was offered a chair at the University at the early age of twenty-one. He lectured there, and subsequently in the University of Petersburg, for a period of eight years, and in 1882 he retired into private life, devoting himself to philosophy, literature, to social and political subjects. During his retirement he lived in Petersburg, in

Moscow, in Finland, abroad, or in the country with his friends. He had no settled home, and he was completely indifferent to material comforts. For months at a time he lived in lodgings with no one to look after him, doing everything for himself. He was extremely poor, and always ready to give away his last farthing; he was so devoted to his work, that he often forgot to eat and to sleep. Overwork and utter lack of care of himself undermined his health, which had never been good, and he died in 1900 at the early age of forty-seven years. Solovyov left many writings, his chief philosophical works being, *The Critique of Abstract Principles*, *La Russie et l'Église Universelle* (written in French), and *The Justification of the Good*, an essay on moral philosophy. Throughout his life he had taken the keenest interest in the social and political life of Russia, and several of his writings deal with the concrete problems of the day. Absolute freedom of conscience, opposition to all forms of tyranny, of national pride and aggressiveness, protest against economic injustice—these were aims that Solovyov was never weary of enforcing, often at the risk of prosecution. His attitude to the practical questions of his time was not merely the result of temperament and upbringing; it was entirely determined by one central principle to the service of which he devoted his whole life. This principle was the principle of the Christian Religion. In his early youth Solovyov became convinced that perfect and exhaustive truth had been revealed in the Christian Faith, and he made it the supreme task of his life to show, by disclosing greater depths in Christianity, that it contained a complete and sufficient answer to the demands of reason; or, as he put it, to prove that this ancient faith coincided with eternal and universal truth. In a sense, then, it is true to say that for Solovyov philosophy was pre-eminently the handmaid of theology. But nothing could be further from Solovyov's mind than to maintain that philosophy should be guided in its development by the demands of theology. Philosophy was for him the expression of an essential characteristic of the human spirit in virtue of which it refuses to submit to any external limitations, or to be enslaved by any creeds, traditions, or institutions. All values accrue from the inner life and become a part of our conscious being. The spirit of man is always seeking a greater fullness of life; and in rejecting ancient idols, it formulates a demand for a more perfect embodiment of truth. This double process, at once negative and creative, is the essence of philosophical speculation; the business of philosophy has ever been to cast down false gods, and, in freeing the human reason

from all external bonds, to give it positive inner content. It is precisely this aspiration towards the Infinite, this striving towards inward freedom, that distinguishes man from the rest of creation ; and in developing to the full the latent possibilities of reason man attains true realisation of himself. Philosophy, as Solovyov once said, makes man truly human.

Solovyov's system of philosophy might be described as a form of Neo-Platonism. Perhaps the best way to approach it is to premise that, according to Solovyov, there is no opposition between the universal and the individual. Reality is, in his view, one living system, each part of which, while remaining unique and individual, enters at the same time into the composition of a wider whole. And the whole, which includes the limitless multiplicity of forms, may itself be regarded as an individual entity ; and just as the particular forms that enter into it require for their explanation to be related to the Absolute Being or God, so too the perfect whole—*tout dans l'unité*—can only be conceived as dependent upon God, as the eternal object of the divine thought and love. It is the "Other" of God, the complement of God, or, in Solovyov's words, "the objective essence," "the universal substance," possessed by the three Persons of the Trinity.¹ As dependent upon God, and as receiving from God absolute fullness of being, the whole, which contains all the inexhaustible diversity of particular determination, is, in relation to God, a passive or feminine nature. The "Other" of God has, for God, from all eternity the image of a perfect feminine being. The whole so conceived is the fullness or absolute totality of being, logically prior to all particular existence. It involves plurality, but the plurality is held together in unity. It involves negation, non-being, emptiness, but only as a possibility, only as an antithesis to its own actual existence in God. The whole as an object of God's thought is not a mere lifeless image in God's mind, but a conscious and living entity,—the Wisdom of God, Sophia.

In the words of the Old Testament, Sophia "plays"² before God, evoking before God images of possible extra-divine existence, shapes of chaotic multiplicity, and reabsorbing them again into herself. To each manifestation of a possible chaos—of existence, that is, as it would be if the connection between

¹ The metaphysical argument is developed in full in *La Russie et l'Église Universelle*, Part iii.

² Proverbs viii. 30, 31. In the English text the word is rendered "rejoices," but Solovyov bases his argument upon the Hebrew, and the Latin versions of the Hebrew.

part and whole were severed—God opposes an act of power which suppresses it, an interconnected system of ideas which shows the chaos to be false and unreal, and an act of grace which absorbs it within the fullness of the divine life.

For God, then, the universe exists from all eternity as contained in his own absolute substance. In his first two aspects, as All-mighty and as true and just, God could limit himself to this "immanent manifestation," to this eternal "play" of his Wisdom. But being also Love, God cannot stop at a possible realisation only. In power and truth God is all. Yet as Love, God yearns for all to become God. He yearns for another existence outside himself which should gradually become for itself what for his thought it is from the beginning, and enter into a free and reciprocal relation with him. He loves the chaos which is not and longs for it to exist, for he knows how to bring back to unity rebellious existence, how to fill the empty infinite with the fullness of his life. And hence God allows freedom to the principle of chaos, which is contained from the first as a possibility in the "Other." He refrains from suppressing it by omnipotent power, and thus the world comes to be. The creation of the world does not mean, therefore, that a new reality is produced out of nothing; it means rather a snapping of the bond which held the universe together in perfect harmony, a letting loose of the centrifugal force in virtue of which each part strives to assert itself as a whole, and, in its exclusive self-assertion, to break asunder the living body of the universe.

When once chaos ceases to be a mere potentiality, the images of extra-divine existence, which Sophia evokes before God, become actual facts, and the divine reactions against possible chaos also become distinct existences. The act of power, which God in his original aspect opposed to chaos, is suppressed by the divine Will; but the reactions of God in his other two aspects, namely, the harmonious system of eternal truths which condemns chaos as discordant and irrational, and the source of grace which includes it in the Absolute life,—these reactions now become hypostasised as distinct entities. In opposition to the inferior chaotic world there emerges a celestial realm of objective essences and of pure spirits. These two poles of being are described in the Old Testament as "heaven and earth" created by God "in the Beginning," that is, in the Sophia.¹ There is, then, no

¹ The Hebrew word *reshith*, translated as ἀρχή, *principium*, beginning, is a substantive of feminine gender, the corresponding masculine noun being *rosh*—a term which is pre-eminently applied in Jewish theology to God. In the

impassable gulf between the celestial sphere and the world of generation, for both have their root in one and the same principle. In other words, Sophia is not only the perfect unity of all that is *sub specie æternitatis*, but also the unifying power in the divided and chaotic world, the living bond between the creator and the creature. Sophia is for ever seeking to bring back to herself the existence that has split off from the original whole, and by becoming incarnate in the lower world, to attain complete and perfect realisation of the ideal union between God and the universe.

It is impossible that there should be a real and positive existence outside of God, and therefore the extra-divine world can only be the divine reversed or transposed,—a distorted image of the absolute reality. And this is, Solovyov maintains, what we find to be the case. The chief characteristic of Deity is perfect autonomy, absence of external determination. In his objective essence, God is an indivisible unity; in his subjective reality God is One in Three, each Person of the Trinity completing and conditioning the other; in his relation to what is not himself, God is not determined by anything external to the free act of his own Will. And in direct opposition to these expressions of divine autonomy, we find in the created world three forms of heteronomy—space, time, and mechanical causality. The nature of extension evinces itself as pure externality; each part is outside the other, separate from and exclusive of the other. The nature of time evinces itself as an indefinite succession of moments which dispute reality with one another; one moment can only be actual by replacing the other. The nature of mechanical causality evinces itself as determination from without by an endless chain of material conditions external to the agent. All these three forms or laws of the terrestrial world are expressions of an effort to break up the living oneness of the universe. But effort presupposes will, and will presupposes a conscious subject, or soul. In order to account for the presence of this disruptive force in the universe we are compelled, then, to conceive a subject that can take a false point of view and invert, as in a crooked mirror, the truth of the divine existence. This subject is the World-Soul, the first created thing,—“the Earth” of the Book of Genesis, the *materia prima*, the opposite or the antitype of the Divine Wisdom. Being purely negative and indeterminate, the World-

Book of Proverbs (v. 22) the word *reshith* is used of Wisdom, which is thus expressly identified with the feminine principle of all that is (cf. *La Russie et l'Église Universelle*, ch. v.).

Soul has a double and variable character: it can strive to assert itself outside of God and, in its blind desire for chaotic and anarchical existence, attempt to produce a world discordant, aimless, and irrational. But it can also surrender itself to God, and by bringing all creation to perfect harmony identify itself with Sophia. Drawn in all directions by blind forces making for exclusive possession, broken into fragments and pulverised into an innumerable multitude of atoms, the World-Soul becomes conscious of a vague longing for harmonious being, and thus attracts the action of the Logos, that gives to the chaotic universe the form of an indefinite space, the form of *one* time—past, present, and future—and binds together the *dissecta membra* of the terrestrial world by the law of universal gravitation. Yet the World-Soul aspires to a more perfect unity; it disengages itself from the earthly mass, and transforms its power into a new and subtle form of matter, called ether. This matter is used by the Logos to create another cosmical unity, still more perfect—the dynamical unity, expressed by light, heat, electricity, etc. It envelops the material mass in all its parts, but does not enter into it, does not regenerate it. The soul of the world, “the Earth,” recognises in the luminiferous ether the ideal image of its heavenly prototype, but attains no real union therewith. And yet it is always seeking that union, it is never content with contemplating the skies and the brilliant stars, with bathing in ethereal fluids. It absorbs the light, transforms it into vital fire, and brings forth the creatures that have life—plants, animals, men. The new organic unity is objectively manifested by plants in the very form of their existence; it is subjectively felt by animals; it is conceptually understood by man. The earth at last concentrates itself, enters into itself, and puts on a form in which it can meet God face to face, and directly receive from him the breath of spiritual life. The sensitive and imaginative soul of the physical world becomes the rational soul of man. The essential unity of all that is becomes now for the first time recognised by the World-Soul through the reason and conscience of man. The Divine Wisdom finds at last the conscious subject that can enter into conscious and reciprocal union with her and raise up to her the whole of the material world. She finds this conscious subject, and rejoices. “My joy,” she says, “is in the sons of man.”

Man's nature is, however, twofold. His reason contains potentially the principle of unity, and is able to comprehend the universal meaning of things; but the life that the Earth

gives him is infected with the principle of chaos, which, though reduced on the surface to harmony by the action of the Logos, is for ever latent in the terrestrial world, like a fire smouldering under ashes. When the historical process begins, we find the principle of chaos in full sway in the human world. The original unity of the individual human being—male and female—is broken up into two sexes, into a series of successive generations replacing and expelling one another, into innumerable separate entities, each of which is aiming at exclusive self-assertion. The law of death reigns supreme. How is man, then, to overcome his chaotic state and to attain realisation of the ideal unity which he conceptually grasps through reason?

We discern in the empirical nature of man three fundamental features which render the beginning of such realisation possible.¹ These are the feelings of shame, pity, and reverence. Shame, pity, and reverence are the natural endowments of man, and, as psychical states, they are present in every normal consciousness. Moreover, they contain a rule of action; and, taken together, they determine man's moral relation to the whole of his objective environment,—to that, namely, which is below him, to that which is on a level with him, and to that which is above him.

Shame determines man's attitude in regard to the lower, material nature as manifested in his own bodily life. Primarily, shame is associated with the sexual appetite, and is a peculiarly human characteristic which distinguishes man from the rest of the animal world. No animal is ever ashamed of the functions of its body. But man, even at the lowest stage of development, is ashamed of those functions, and, by that very fact, proves himself to be distinct from and higher than his own material nature. Shame is the assertion of the inner dignity of man, warning him against falling a prey to the desires of the body. "The spirit must dominate the flesh" is the meaning of shame as interpreted by reason, and this principle is the principle of ascetic morality. All the rules of asceticism are designed to strengthen the mastery of the spirit over the body and, so far as possible, to free us from subjection to the lower appetites and impulses. But the principle of asceticism is not sufficient to constitute the whole of morality, for it leaves altogether out of account our relation to our fellow beings. That relation is determined by the second root of morality,—the feeling of pity. The feeling of pity, developed already among the animals, unites man to all that lives

¹ The line of thought is developed in *The Justification of the Good*.

by an inner bond of compassion. It is a subjective, or psychological, expression of the fact that we are members one of another; and the rule of action which reason deduces from it is that we should hurt none and help all, so far as in us lies. Such is the principle of altruistic morality. There remains, however, one sphere of relations which is not covered by either the ascetic or the altruistic principle of morality,—the relation, namely, to that which is higher than ourselves, a relation subjectively expressed by the feeling of reverence or piety. Rudiments of the feeling of reverence may be discerned in the higher animals; and in the human world the first instances of it are to be found in the attitude of children towards their parents. The child looks to its parents—at first, to its mother—for food, help, and comfort; and, conscious of its dependence upon them, regards them as beings superior to itself. The parents appear to the child as its providence. As the child grows up, the sense of dependence upon its parents becomes, of course, weakened, but the essential characteristic of the relation remains, and is preserved in the feeling of filial piety or reverence. Early in the history of the race the feeling of reverence was extended from the living to the dead and became the foundation of ancestor-worship; and as, in the course of its development, human reason gradually rises to the conception of one heavenly Father, the feeling of piety is transferred pre-eminently to him. The object upon which the feeling of reverence or piety is directed varies according to the stage of the development of the individual or the race, yet the essential nature of the feeling—a grateful recognition of something higher than ourselves—is the same throughout. The crudest cannibal and the most perfect saint in so far as they are religious are at one in that they seek to do not their own will, but the will of the heavenly Father. Reverence for something—whether it be human beings, deified forces of nature, abstract moral laws, or a living God—is inherent in every normal consciousness, and it lies at the root of religious morality.

Distinct as these three grounds of morality are, they proceed from one common source. Whenever we are conscious of having committed some wrong we feel ashamed, although the particular wrong in question may not have had anything specifically shameful about it. The feeling of shame, originally connected with the sexual impulse, takes, in developed human consciousness, the form of conscience, and is a reaction experienced by man at the violation of any moral norm whatsoever. This fact, borne out by the evidence both of introspection and of language, indicates that shame lies at

the root of morality as a whole. Consider once more the feeling of shame in its original form, as regulating, namely, man's relation to his lower nature. The warning voice of shame adjures man to abstain from following the way of the flesh because it is an evil way. In yielding to the carnal instinct man enters the stream of the bad infinity characteristic of material nature, and becomes a link in an endless chain of generations, which dispute existence with one another and are all swept away by death. The genus persists, but the individual disappears, and nature goes on building life upon dead bones—for ever, but in vain. Man, however, cannot rest content with this generic immortality. It is unworthy of him to be merely an instrument of the natural process by which a blind life-force perpetuates itself at the expense of separate entities that are born and perish and replace one another in turn. As a moral being, man is *ashamed* of submitting to the pitiless and impious law of nature, according to which the fathers disappear for ever, driven out of existence by the children, and, according to which, the old generations are replaced by the new. The potential *wholeness* of the human being reacts in the feeling of shame against the external division into sexes and into an endless series of generations. Warning us against the way of our lower nature, the inner voice of shame assures us that there is a better way, that there is a nobler future than to be merely a means for preserving the life of the race. And in the inspiration of love, which seeks a true and eternal union with the beloved, our higher destiny is revealed to us. For the meaning of love is that we should find a completion of ourselves, that we should rediscover the lost wholeness of our being, and the end love holds before us is to make that wholeness actual. The demands of love transcend the limitations of finite mortal existence. Love cannot be reconciled to death; for love embraces the body as well as the soul, and the union it seeks is the complete and immortal union of matter and spirit. Death is only the final expression of the principle of disruption or of chaos which reigns everywhere on earth. It means the breaking up of the organic unity of the body, the disintegration of the complex and subtle form in and through which the spirit expresses itself in the terrestrial world. It means the victory of matter over spirit, of the blind force of chaos over the freedom and reason of man. And the principle of ascetic morality—the supremacy of the spirit over the flesh—demands, when consistently worked out, that we should be immortal.

In the collective life of man, the centrifugal force of nature

manifests itself as the egoism of each and the antagonism of all; and in opposing it the essential wholeness of the human being takes the form of the feeling of pity or of the consciousness of solidarity. The fact that man can experience the suffering of others as though it were his own shows that there is no gulf between him and his fellows, and that humanity is one and indivisible. And it is just because of this immediate experience of a living bond between separate human beings that the ideal which the exultation of love reveals cannot be for the individual alone, but must include the whole of humanity. If a man really pities others he must necessarily strive to obtain the highest good for all. Suppose, however, that he has reached the goal and that all living beings have become perfect, immortal and incorruptible,—would that be the realisation of the end? Could he forget those who died before him and, leaving them in the grip of death, enter joyfully the new regenerated world? No; to be perfect, both his pity and his piety must extend beyond the grave, and urge him to release from the chains of death those to whom he owes his very existence. He cannot be satisfied with the fact that the *souls* of the departed are immortal; he will strive to obtain for them too fullness of life,—concrete individual existence of the soul in a glorified body.

Our conscience proclaims that we ought to do it, and that therefore we can; and yet it is obvious that at his present stage of development man cannot by a mere act of will save himself or his neighbour even from the toothache, to say nothing of death. The ideal of reinstating the perfect wholeness of humanity as one collective being is beyond the power of man to realise; and if man had to rely upon his own strength alone, he would have to renounce that ideal as an empty dream. But man is not thus alone. With the unshakable certainty of immediate experience he is conscious of a Being absolutely perfect and eternally real; and religious feeling testifies that in union with that Being he can indeed become all that he ought to be. Our conscience then, assuming now the form of the fear of God, proclaims our impotence to be in truth the same kind of anomaly as shamelessness and pitilessness; it is due to our separation from the absolute principle of Goodness and of Power. If, however, we recognise our dependence upon God and unite ourselves to him by all that is best and purest in our nature, we gain from him the power to realise our aspirations. The being of God is not a deduction from religious experience; it is the content of religious experience, it is *that* which is experienced. Take away this experienced

reality of the higher principle, and religious experience would no longer exist. But religious experience does exist, and therefore that which is given in it must exist also. God is in us, therefore God is. The inner basis of religion is not merely a consciousness of dependence upon a power immeasurably greater than ourselves; in its pure form the religious consciousness is the joyous feeling of the presence of a Being infinitely more perfect than ourselves and the conviction that it is this perfect Being and not some blind and unconscious fate that is the source and the ground of the universe. The fact that I am not always undergoing religious experience and that some people never undergo that experience at all as little proves the non-existence of the object of such experience as the fact that I do not always see the sun, and that persons born blind have never seen it, proves the non-existence of the sun.

Religious experience always involves discrimination and comparison. A religious attitude towards the higher is only possible if it be recognised *as* the higher, and if, therefore, we are conscious of ourselves as inferior or imperfect. And these two ideas of higher and lower, perfect and imperfect, do not remain side by side in the religious consciousness. If we are conscious of the divine perfection and of our own imperfection we must inevitably strive to reconcile the opposition and to make our imperfect reality conformable to the image and likeness of God. In other words, we inevitably strive to *become* perfect. Human reason, which comprehends the absolute fullness of being as an idea, and human will, which posits that idea as an abiding norm and ideal, contain within themselves the possibility of perfection. And the very purpose of the world-process appears to be that the possible perfection of man should become actual; implying that, since in man the spiritual and the material principles are indivisibly connected, the regeneration of man must necessarily involve the regeneration of matter.

As we survey the world-process as a whole we become aware that it exhibits one essential characteristic. The higher forms of life as compared with the lower contain a certain addition, a certain positive content, which cannot be accounted for by what was present in the lower. The main successive stages in the process it is usual to describe by the significant name of kingdoms. Five kingdoms may be differentiated,—the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, the human, and the divinely human or the kingdom of God. A stone exists, a plant exists and lives, an animal lives and is conscious,

man is conscious and understands the meaning of life according to ideas, the sons of God realise this meaning or the perfect moral order in all things. The positive characteristic which distinguishes one stage from another, — life, consciousness, reason, perfection,—is in each case something new; to try to explain it as the product of the preceding stage is analogous to trying to get something out of nothing. The fact that in the phenomenal world the higher forms appear subsequently to the lower lends no plausibility to the view that they are created by the lower. The order of appearance is not identical with the order of reality, and the fuller and more positive forms of being may be metaphysically prior to the lower, although they are manifested after them in time. Evolution of the lower forms brings about, in truth, the material conditions for the realisation of the higher types. These types, which are eternally existent, enter at a certain moment in the process into the sphere of the phenomenal world. Thus when, through the process of evolution, a highly organised animal form is produced, a new reality becomes manifested in it, and a human being, as distinguished from an animal, makes its appearance. And just as the specifically human characteristic is, in a sense, a new creation, so the characteristic which distinguishes the spiritual man from the natural man cannot have been produced by the latter. The difference between natural and spiritual humanity is a difference of quality and not merely of degree. In the natural man the spiritual element has no power of perfect realisation, while the God-man is the realised ideal, the perfect individual. Historically the God-man appeared in the person of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God. Christ was not the last word of the human kingdom, but the first and all-embracing word of the kingdom of God. By his teaching and the work of his whole life, beginning with the victory over the temptations of moral evil and ending with his resurrection—that is, his victory over physical evil, or death,—Christ revealed to humanity the kingdom of God. Yet from the nature of the case revelation cannot here coincide with attainment. Christ finally conquered evil in the true centre of the universe—that is, in himself,—but the victory over evil in the world's circumference—that is, in the collective whole of humanity,—can only be attained through the personal experience and free choice of each individual, each member of the collective whole being a rational agent. Hence the necessity of the historical process after the appearance of Christ. The kingdom of God, or the perfect moral order, can no more be revealed to a horde of savages than a human being can be born from

a mollusc or a sponge. Just as the human spirit in nature requires the most perfect of physical organisms, so the spirit of God in humanity requires for its actual manifestation the most perfect of social organisations, and that is being evolved in the course of history. The true subject of moral activity is collective man or human society.

We have seen that the whole sphere of relations in which it is possible for a moral being to stand falls into three categories—relation to that which is higher than we are, relation to that which is on a level with us, and relation to that which is lower than we are. Higher than we are is God and all that is in perfect union with God; lower than we are is material nature. The relation of humanity to these three realms of being becomes collectively organised in the forms of the universal church, the state, and the economic society.

Piety demands that the higher principle should be supreme in our life and that all our actions should be determined by it. Hence the church which expresses the divine principle as manifested in the world ought to provide consecration for the whole of our life. By the universal church is not meant any particular church; rather may the universal church be described as the whole of humanity in its direct relation to God. It includes the existing ecclesiastical organisations, but is more than the sum of such organisations.

Pity demands that we should actively help and protect from evil our fellow beings. And, since the range of activity of small groups of individuals is necessarily extremely limited, men have come in the course of history to organise their social life in the form of the state which can give to millions of individuals protection from the evils of anarchy or of imperfect organisation. By suppressing the more flagrant manifestations of the individual evil will the state brings about the conditions which render realisation of the good life possible. If, however, the state is to be a true expression of pity, the manifestations of the collective evil will, which evinces itself in the form of hostility between the state and the different classes within the state, must also be suppressed. Then will each state be seen to be what in truth it is, namely, only a distinct organ in the organic whole of humanity.

Finally, our relation to material nature, determined in the sphere of the individual life by the feeling of shame, has as yet no objective embodiment for mankind as a whole. Nature is still for the vast majority of men merely a means for individual gain, an object for exploitation. And yet the germ of a different attitude is to be found in well-nigh every person-

ality, and there are signs that it will some day receive objective expression. It is not vouchsafed to all to possess the poet's feeling for Nature, but most of us cherish a love for the familiar places of our childhood, for the fields where we were once at play, for the friendly outline of the distant hills. And in this personal love the moral norm of man's relation to Nature is to be discerned. Man must learn to see in Nature not a lifeless instrument for securing his own wants, to be ruthlessly exploited by him, but a living entity, to be loved and served for its own sake. Then he will want to free Nature too from the law of death and corruption, and thus "to weave for God the garment we see him by."

At what period in the world's history the three spheres of man's moral activity will become perfect it is not given to us to know. Times and seasons are not in our hands, and the revelation of the kingdom of God as an event does not depend on our own efforts alone. But we *can* act so as to bring nearer its realisation; we *can* contemplate in prophetic vision the world as it is destined to be. The cosmical process is reaching forward to a threefold fruition: Nature deified, the perfect human individual, and the perfect community of God and men. The World-Soul finally converted and purified would become identical with Sophia, just as matter becomes identical with form in a concrete living being.

It is this aspect of the Christian Faith—the idea, namely, of a total and concrete revelation of the divine,—which from early times has attracted the religious consciousness of the Russian people. The most ancient temples of Russia were dedicated to Saint Sophia, the Wisdom of God, represented in the form of a distinct feminine Being. Saint Sophia was to the Russian Christian the celestial essence, concealed by the appearances of an inferior world, the luminous spirit of regenerated humanity, the guardian angel of the earth, the future and final revelation of God.¹ And together with the *individually* human forms of the divine—by the side of the Virgin Mother and the Son of God—the Russian people have known and loved, under the name of Saint Sophia, the collective incarnation of the deity in the Universal Church. To give a rational interpretation of this idea, revealed to the religious consciousness of ancient Russia, and to proclaim it to the world, seemed to Solovyov the highest mission of Russian thought.

NATHALIE A. DUDDINGTON.

LONDON.

¹ *La Russie et l'Église Universelle.*

FIVE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS IN BRITISH NEW GUINEA.

E. W. P. CHINNERY, F.R.A.I., AND
A. C. HADDON, Sc.D., F.R.S.

I.

E. W. P. CHINNERY.

I HAVE recently been engaged in observing the origin of two religious cults known as "Kava-Keva" and "Kekesi." They are animistic practices that, notwithstanding their prohibition, have already become powerful, and extend from the Gira River (8° S. lat.) to Buna Bay.¹

The belief in ghosts and spirits is a predominant characteristic of the northern native. In almost every tribe I have observed the propitiation of family ghosts with individual offerings of food by ordinary persons to secure the vitality of their food supply, and by sorcerers to stimulate their charms. Ghosts are invoked during ceremonies by divination to reveal crimes and criminals. Food offerings to ghosts are made during death feasts and during certain initiation rites. The house of initiation and the paraphernalia of the dance are believed to have spiritual powers, and when the paraphernalia are thrown into the river at the completion of the rites, they are invoked to smite the enemies of the dancers.

Yet, although the spirits and ghosts are legion, I had nowhere come across any conception of a supreme spirit until the outbreak of the Kava-Keva² movement, when the villages

¹ It may be well to note that the Gira River opens at about 8° S. lat. on the north coast of British New Guinea, and that the mouth of the Mamba River is four miles to the south, both being in the Mambare Division. Buna is on the south of Holnicote (Gona) Bay, about $8^{\circ} 37'$ S. lat., and is in the Kumusi Division. Keroro, Mount Victory, is an active volcano, nearly 5000 feet in height, a little to the west of Cape Nelson, which is about 9° S. lat.

² "Kava-Keva" is a Motuan word which is used extensively throughout the tribes of British New Guinea by adoption to express a condition of madness or irresponsibility either temporary or permanent.

concerned discarded individual practices in favour of co-operation; or, more strictly, changed from the worship of individual ghosts to the worship of the "Food-Spirit." The Kava-Keva is, I understand, positively a new idea, and not an attempt to revive old customs. Whilst observing the Kava-Keva rites on the second occasion I invited Mr Copland King, a clergyman of the Anglican Mission, to attend with me, and he has since written a paper on the subject. Mr King and I are the only Europeans who witnessed the beginning of the Kava-Keva rites, and I alone witnessed the beginning of the Kekesi rites. The following account of the two cults is based upon information supplied to me by Boninia and Bia at the inception.

1. THE "KAVA-KEVA" RITES.—Boninia is an elderly native of Taututu, one of the villages of the Dowai-ia division of the Binandere tribe, on the lower Mamba River. He was a man of no reputation as a magician or prophet. Early, however, in 1914 he visited the other villages of his group—Gauoro (on the coast), Duvira, and Tsiu (up the river)—and announced that he had been "struck down" in his garden by the "Spirit of Taro" (the staple diet). He had been told, he said, to warn the people that their dilatory methods of cultivation had given displeasure, and that unless they observed a ritual which had been taught to him, the "Food-Spirit" would destroy their gardens and force them to live on sago. Boninia's message was received without enthusiasm, and the ritual was declined. Nothing more came of the incident until the following November, when a young girl named Dasiga, of the village of Gauoro, developed a condition of mental abnormality. For a day or two she was quite oblivious of her surroundings, and chanted mechanically a new song, which was identified as part of the ritual disclosed by the man Boninia. In response to the request of the people Boninia examined the girl, and, in conformity with his advice, she was taken into the gardens, and there, amongst the taro leaves, as he had foretold, the "Spirit left her," and she recovered her normal state. Two or three days later she returned to her village. Then, almost immediately, she relapsed into her Kava-Keva condition, and simultaneously one other Gauoro girl and four young men "were visited by the Spirit." A second messenger to Boninia found that the "sickness" had appeared in each of the villages of the group, and that several natives were "possessed" and under treatment by Boninia. The headmen of the group were considerably alarmed, and called a meeting in Gauoro. Here those who had been "visited" disclosed the communica-

tions of the "Spirit." It was decided that the group villages, acting co-operatively, should propitiate the "visitor," and that the rites taught to Boninia and others should be performed forthwith. So much spontaneity attended the services that on November 25th, when I witnessed the ritual, there were but few who remained uninitiated.

The ceremony, as I saw it, appeared to be controlled by Boninia. He invoked the presence of the "Spirit," and, to the rhythmic drumming of the younger men, he shouted repeatedly *Irie! Irie!* (which are not Binandere words), and gradually worked himself up into a frenzy. The excitement of watching his efforts became too much for some of those present, and in a second or two several men and women became, like him, "possessed." After the manner of drunken men they staggered through the village, falling over obstacles, bumping into trees and houses, their faces twitching and eyes rolling. They exhibited a stilted, jerky movement of arms and limbs and laboured respiration. With the palms of their hands outward, some shrieked, others sobbed, and many were silent. Those who were unaffected continued drumming and chanting in a low key the taro song which the "Spirit" had taught to Boninia. I noticed one of the drummers, who had previously been unvisited, gradually giving way to the feeling. He appeared at first to resist; but, after a short struggle, he displayed the symptoms of the "possession." He staggered a few feet, and then fell to the ground in a fit. The other drummers encircled him, and, changing to quick time, moved round him singing an ordinary food song. At this stage Boninia revived automatically, and treated the boy with vigorous rubbing and slapping, calling repeatedly in his ear *Do! do! do!* At length the boy responded and was placed upright. He was kept moving in order to prevent a relapse threatened by his puffed face and stupefied manner. Then the elder men were treated by Boninia, and they in turn revived the others with similar treatment. All of them appeared strained and drowsy for hours afterwards. During the ceremony those who remained unaffected appeared to be ill at ease, and many of the women exhibited great concern at the behaviour of their children, particularly the mother of the boy "visited" for the first time. The boy told me that the "Spirit" had taught him, when in the fit, the names of certain charms to plant in his garden, and had given him other information which would be passed on as general knowledge to the cult. On a second occasion I saw another man "visited" for the first time, and the procedure was similar throughout.

Boninia informed me that the precautionary ritual is as follows:—"No weapons of war may be carried in gardens. Gardens are to receive the greatest attention, and to be well fenced and continually weeded. No food is to be wasted. That which cannot be eaten is to be given to the pigs, as also the garbage. Food is to be handled carefully, lest it should be bruised or broken. When cooked it is to be boiled in a vessel. The practice of burning food in the fire must be abandoned."

The song of the "Food-Spirit" is:—"Ba taba Ai-adara!" "*Ba porovi Ai-adara!*" *Ba* signifies taro, and *taba* and *porovi* varieties of the same. Each kind of taro is thus recited and followed by the song-words *Ai-adara* (in which words the worship lies). Following the song of the taro there comes the worship of the sugar-cane (*do*), "*Do beguma Ai-adara,*" and of the banana (*bido*), "*Bido oira Ai-adara,*" the varieties of both being mentioned. Other garden-foods follow in sequence.

In January 1915 Tongua of Duvira was passing a heap of taro lying in the sun outside the village of Buadi on the middle Gira River. The people of this village had not adopted the cult. Tongua fell into a fit, and on reviving, gathered the taro and placed it in shelter. At the same time he took the opportunity of disclosing the teachings of the "Food-Spirit," who he said was very angry with the person that had left the taro lying in the sun.

The practices I have been describing being undesirable were for a time abandoned. Each man who had been "visited" took a long swim in the Mamba River to shake off the "sickness." Boninia, however, informed me that it would not be possible for him to shake off the "sickness" so long as he remained on the Mamba, and that he had received permission to visit the Kumusi. My friend Mr Beaver and I visited the dancers in December, and requested them to perform the Kava-Keva, but they excused themselves on the ground that the "Spirit" had left them, and that the "sickness" was not a condition to be produced at will. As a general practice, the Kava-Keva no longer exists. But isolated cases have been noticed throughout the two divisions as far as Buna, and particularly in and around the headquarters of the Anglican Mission, which is near the mouth of the Mamba. The noted prophets of the various tribes and villages on the coast have adopted the "Spirit," and the Kava-Keva and Kekesi cults threaten to break out in strong force along the whole northern coast from the Gira to Buna at any time, the cults, however, maintaining their rivalry.

2. THE KEKESI RITES.—Closely following the commencement of the Food Worship on the lower Mamba, a curious movement was introduced to the people of the village Manau, on the coast near the mouth of the Gira River. These people were formerly of Gadara and Bebewa on the Mamba. The movement was introduced by one of their chief men, a notorious sorcerer and a most plausible rogue, named Bia, who represented himself as the earthly agent of a Spirit calling itself Kekesi.

The man Bia himself gave me an account of the origin of the movement, and I reproduce here his own words. "Early in November 1914 I and my friend Yavevi were returning to Manau from Buna. We slept at the point opposite Mitre Rock. During the night I was visited by the Spirit of a man named Boinumbai, who died a long time ago at Gauoro village. I was told by this Spirit that a very powerful Spirit named Kekesi watched over all the people from the Mitre Rock (Kekesi) and controlled their food supply. Kekesi was a friend of Jesu Kerisu (Jesus Christ), and was able to see all that happened. Kekesi was going to make some laws for the people, and if they obeyed them, he would look after their interests, but if they disobeyed them, he would injure their food supply. Boinumbai then departed. A few nights later Boinumbai's Spirit again visited me at Manau, and with it came the Spirit that Boinumbai introduced as Kekesi, the big chief of food and a strong Spirit, 'all the same as Jesu Kerisu and Government,' whom he told me to listen carefully to and to take notice of. Kekesi sat down and commenced making a gurgling sound in his throat, all the while bouncing violently and rapidly up and down, but keeping his sitting attitude. I was very frightened until Kekesi stopped doing this. But Boinumbai told me not to be frightened, as Kekesi was reciting the laws which he wished to be introduced by me to the people on his behalf. When Kekesi had finished, Boinumbai gave me this interpretation of Kekesi's speech:—'You, Bia, are to tell the people I am their chief, and they must obey me in all things. My wishes will be conveyed through you to the people from time to time. Disobedience will mean the loss of his food supply to the defaulter. The people are to hear and obey the Government. The people are to observe the moral code of the tribe. Food is to be properly cultivated, and no wastage is desired by me. Songs in my praise are to be offered frequently. All must take part in these songs, and enact them in the manner I prescribe. The songs and manner of offering them are:

Standing	Chorus . . .	<i>Ba iso nau</i> (repeated several times).
Sitting	Solo . . .	<i>Kekesi lolo na ba iso nau.</i>
Sitting	Chorus . . .	<i>Iri-e ! Iri-e ! Iri-e ! Ta ba Iri-e !</i>
Kneeling	Solo (slowly) . . .	<i>Koi ba Kekesi ba in ba na Iubanawai ohi to.</i>
Standing	Chorus . . .	<i>Ire-e ! Ire-e ! Ire-e !</i>
Kneeling (hands clapsed and eyes closed)	Chorus . . .	<i>Hallilusi ! Hallibate ! Hallikauni !</i>
Standing (with drums)	Chorus . . .	<i>Manamba da ko-e</i> <i>Kekesi da manamba da ko-e</i> <i>Kesi da manamba da ko-e</i> <i>Kekesi da manamba da ko-e.</i>
Kneeling (as above)	Chorus . . .	<i>Hallilusi ! Hallibate ! Hallikauni !</i>
Standing (with drums)	Chorus . . .	<i>Taba da manambi ko-e</i> <i>Ovivi da manambi ko-e</i> <i>Godara da manambi ko-e.</i>

(Thus recite all names of taro in turn.)

Kesi is the name of the steamer in which I travel from place to place. And the songs I am giving you must be sung regularly by all the people, otherwise trouble will come to you. The vitality of your food supply depends upon the manner in which you obey my desires. When going to and from the gardens the people are not to straggle along, but to fall in, similar to the police working for the Government. The following commands may be given to the people whilst working in the garden or coming to and from the same :—*A kush ! A sha ! A shun man ! A shun be ! A hon de shen ! A som !* These commands are to be issued by the man Yavevi.' This is all that was said to me on that occasion, and the two Spirits left me. Shortly afterwards Kekesi came by himself, and, in a different manner to his previous speaking, said the following :— 'Wak kaise Dasiga kerere. Wai kaise Dasiga kerere ! Kekesi Boinumbai kononini tai vavini konininio ato bos Kesi Jesu Kerisa ked kom turn bush etai taba kai sol manau giana vavini slem bush Jesu Kerisa Kekesi dugus igit goot dugus goot vork work gardini finati giana Dasiga nart Mamau soro sino Government Missionary all same Kekesi met Missionary taro sino.'¹ Kekesi's speech was not in the Binandere language. I understood it, and it means that one boy had stolen his brother's wife, and that Kekesi was very angry with him and desired me to tell him so. The man's name is Dasiga. Kekesi has not visited me since."

¹ This conversation appears to be an indiscriminate mixture of New Guinea words of various districts and of many words that are unknown, but are obviously inventions of Bia, as I proved when two days after taking them down phonetically I asked Bia to repeat to me the teachings and conversation of Kekesi. He pleaded "bad memory."

I witnessed the rites of Kekesi on November 26, 1914. They were performed with every appearance of sincerity and fanaticism. The man Yavevi conducted the ceremony, and seemed to be under the hypnotic influence of the man Bia, who remained throughout silent and carefully watching us. When the proceedings at all dragged, Bia would instil enthusiasm by throwing himself into a fit of convulsions from the waist upwards, jumping violently up and down while remaining in a sitting posture, and babbling intelligibly, the saliva dropping from his mouth. In this condition he would be joined by Yavevi and some of the other men, whilst those remaining unaffected would redouble their efforts. Yavevi and Bia revived automatically, and Yavevi conducted the others through their prayer-like devotions.

The rites were forbidden in November, but shortly afterwards—in December and January—Bia paid stealthy visits to the villages of the Gira River. And at the end of December the whole of the people of the Gira from the coast to Tabara and the Eia River in the west were performing the Kekesi rites as described above, with additional songs.

Gagara ba nato mi badari
Girl taro mine with to grow up

Taba oro gaingumena
(Taro) greeting I have come to see

Ba warinwari
Taro leaves shaking in the wind

Ba ro beroberobe
Taro grow quickly

Ba sipo-tau-iegi
Taro daylight

Notwithstanding the prohibition, the rites have been introduced by Yavevi to the coastal tribes as far south as Buna Bay. Yavevi informed me, on one occasion, that he was influenced by Bia, and that he could not possibly refrain from indulging in fits when Bia was near him. On that account he was sent to Buna, where it was thought he would be beyond the influence of Bia. Yet shortly after leaving the Mambare he returned to Bia, and, upon once more reaching Buna, commenced the Kekesi teachings in that place.

E. W. P. CHINNERY.

II.

A. C. HADDON.

The following article was written a year before receiving Mr Chinnery's communication. I think it advisable to let both papers appear together, as they throw light upon each other.

The natives of the Kumusi, and more especially of the Mambare Divisions, must be in an excited condition, for the new cults noted by Mr Chinnery do not seem to be related with the somewhat earlier cult to which I call attention, nor is there any evidence of the slightest connection between these and the abortive message of the Milne Bay "prophet." It is interesting to observe that M. Moszkowski¹ records a Messiah belief among the coast tribes of the Mamberamo, a river that opens by Cape D'Urville, in Netherlands New Guinea, at the eastern limit of Geelvink Bay. He says that there is everywhere met with amongst the coastal tribes a belief in Manseren Korëri, an ancient culture hero, and that the belief is certainly older than the first appearance of the missionaries. Very long ago there lived, according to this belief, a man endowed with supernatural and divine powers. He gave the Papuans laws and regulations, and founded the men's ceremonial houses. But, because the Papuans gradually neglected his commands, one day he vanished. Yet, so the legend runs, he will eventually return, and then everything will be renewed. Therefore is he called Manseren Korëri, the god at whose return everything will cast its skin.

An awakening of religious activity is a frequent characteristic of periods of social unrest. The weakening or disruption of the older social order may stimulate new and often bizarre ideals, and these may give rise to religious movements that strive to sanction social or political aspirations. Communities that feel themselves oppressed anticipate the emergence of a hero who will restore their prosperity and prestige. And when the people are imbued with religious fervour the expected hero will be regarded as a Messiah. Phenomena of this kind are well known in history, and are not unknown at the present day among peoples in all stages of civilisation.²

It is significant that even among the savages of New

¹ *Zeitsch. f. Ethnol.*, xliii., 1911, p. 327.

² The Ghost Dances of the Indians of the Plains of N. America, which partake of a Messianic character, may serve as an example.

Guinea fresh forms of religious activity come into being from time to time definitely as a reaction against the encroachment of the white man. But the mainspring of others is at present obscure, and appears to be more distinctly related to purely native ideas. These cults afford a valid ground of argument against the very prevalent notion of the permanence of all native institutions and of the supposed disinclination of primitive peoples to adopt new ideas or new cults. In the five instances we are here concerned with, the movement has been stopped by the Government, so there are no means of telling how permanent they might have become. They illustrate, at all events, the methods by which cults have probably spread in the past, and, as I have previously suggested,¹ we have evidence elsewhere of a definite propaganda. Indeed, we might go further, and admit that savages may occasionally have a missionary zeal which impels them to impart to the benighted heathen the ceremonial or cult that yields to themselves so much satisfaction. The new observations of Mr Chinnery indicate nervous conditions which, so far as I am aware, have not been previously recorded of the natives of New Guinea, although they conform to what is well known in other parts of the world.

1. THE BAIGONA CULT.—The Baigona cult is of interest because “it illustrates the growth of a movement which is developing into a new religion before our eyes. The sorcery of Baigona seems to be of the kind generally known as white magic, like the Babalau of the Motu, but there is a danger that it may develop into systematic extortion.”² A large snake, called Baigona, which lives on Keroro (Mount Victory), first became known by killing a man and making all the other people ill. Later it took a man named Maine to the top of Keroro, cut out his heart, dried it in the sun, and then placed it over the fire in its house, so that it would get well smoked. Remaining on the top of the mountain, Maine was initiated into the mysteries of Baigona, and given certain medicines that would cure all diseases. Thereupon he was allowed to return to his village, taking his heart with him, which he hung up under the verandah of his house. Amongst other instructions received by Maine from Baigona was one to the effect that he should proceed up the coast and in certain centres appoint other “Baigona men,” all of whom were to be junior to himself. This he did, and there are “Baigonas” all along the

¹ *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, 1908, vi. pp. 44–46.

² Lieut.-Governor Murray, *Ann. Rep., Papua*, 1911–12, p. 14.

coast as far as the old Anglo-German boundary and for a long way up the rivers of the Kumusi Division. Moreover, the cult is still spreading. Needless to say, the Baigonas have to pay for their instruction. One or two men in a village go through a period of tuition, and, on their return, initiate the rest of the villagers, not into the positions which they themselves hold, but into a belief in their new powers. This is effected by a ceremony in which the people are smeared over with some stuff from the bush, and the Baigona gives each one a smack and sends him to wash in the sea. The ceremony gets its name from the "washing." Dr Copland King has seen Baigonas use massage on a patient. They massage the arms, for instance, down to the fingers, and then, as they say, pull Baigona out from the finger tips. The young men of the village, standing round the patient, sing a song, which seems to be the usual string of meaningless words. Only two recognised drugs are used,—viz. *Euphorbia pilulifera*, the "asthma herb of Queensland," which is burnt with the coral when preparing lime for chewing with betel-nut, and *E. Drummondii*, also used medicinally by Australian settlers, and eaten with paw-paw when chewing the nut. Various other plants are employed as drugs, but only such as are beneficial. All this was obviously a very subtle move on the part of Maine. How can the Government interfere in such circumstances? At the same time, the Baigona have powers of life and death, because if they do not choose to give the patient these drugs, or, in other words, if the patient does not pay enough for them, he dies; for the Papuan, like most savages, is peculiarly susceptible to impression, and can fall sick, or even die, without any corresponding physical cause. The Baigona does not work in his garden. He will not drink plain water, but only coconut milk. He pays more attention to dressing his hair and decorating his face with red paint than other people; he has not much else to occupy his time, as either from fear or in payment his village companions do his garden work for him. Very often during the evening in the village the Baigona goes into a fit, passing into a trance. It begins with violent shivering, after which the man falls to the ground and becomes insensible, uttering spasmodic bursts of rapid talk. His people cover him with a mat, and sit around listening and applauding. Dr Copland King has not been able to make sense of what he says on such occasions, and does not know whether the people understand it either. The main feature of the cult is the prohibition to kill snakes, crocodiles, monitor lizards, and

sharks, as these are protected by the master-snake Baigona; the prohibition being enforced by heavy penalties.¹ On one occasion Mr Oelrichs ordered his police to fire at a crocodile out at sea. That night some of these men had a dream or vision; the Baigona came to them and said, "Why were you shooting at my friend? You can't be friends with me if you do that." Three of the police were laid up the next morning in consequence of this vision. Here is another instance. One morning a certain Mr Oates killed a snake. Mr Oelrichs noticed that the natives around him looked very grave, so he jokingly said, "Oates, you have killed a Baigona." That evening at 7.30, although there had been no rain all day, the whole parade ground was some feet under water, and at 9.30 there was a break away in the creek, and it swept Mr Oates' house, furniture, and the whole of his allotment into the sea, all he had left being what he stood up in. None of the houses and allotments on the other side were touched. "Could any native want anything more convincing than that?"² This new cult, which has taken deep root, appears to be purely a native growth; there is no evidence that it has borrowed anything from the white man.³

2. THE PROPHET OF MILNE BAY.—Towards the end of 1893 a prophet arose in Milne Bay, at the extreme south-east end of the island. This prophet was a young man named Tokerua (Mr Abel calls him Tokeriu), who lived in the village of Gabugabuna, on the north side of the bay. He made a great stir among the natives. At night-time he mused beneath a sacred tree, from the branches of which a Spirit spoke to him; in the morning his face was transfigured, and he looked like a man whose wits had left him. The message which he delivered was to the effect that during the following moon

¹ The Baigonas claim both to make rain and to prevent it from falling; they also deal in other matters appertaining to the natives, and are consulted by them.

² These details are taken from the *Annual Report, Papua*, 1911-12, pp. 129 ff. (A. E. Oelrichs), and 1912-13, pp. 154 ff. (Rev. Copland King, M.D.).

³ A partial explanation of this cult may perhaps be found in the consideration urged by Sir William MacGregor: "In many places no native will kill a snake. Evidently snake cult is an ancient form of veneration and worship connected with ancestors over a large area of British New Guinea. Advantage is taken of this by the sorcerer in some districts, who does not scruple to threaten death by snake bite, and to encourage snakes about his premises." *Ann. Rep.*, 1897-98, p. 47. It is interesting to observe how a cult of this kind is copied elsewhere. Cf. Mr G. H. Nicholls' account of an old policeman, named Tai-imi, who, profiting by what his travels afield had taught him, set up as a sorcerer on the Gira River, and had his snakes, invisible to ordinary eyes, but nevertheless very deadly and real to any who obtained the illwill of the sorcerer. See *Annual Report, Papua*, 1910-1911, p. 139.

there would be a violent thunderstorm. From the black clouds would dart vivid flashes of lightning, and there would fall a deluge of rain. Then a furious gale was to arise which would work untold havoc in certain places along the coast. The foundations of the earth would be shaken, and, as a result of the earthquake, an eruption would take place in the middle of the bay between Wagawaga and Gabugabuna, causing a new island to appear above the waves. In consequence a tidal wave would arise and spread further desolation and engender the submergence of all the coasts thereabout for two or three months. Thus destruction would be the lot of the unbeliever, but those would be spared who complied with the behests of the Spirit, as transmitted by the prophet. First and foremost, no man might possess anything introduced by the *dimdim* (white man). He must part with his treasured match-boxes, tomahawks, knives, and other appliances, which rendered life pleasant or reduced toil; for these objects were the symbols of foreign domination, and in the new era old ways would be re-established. There would be a reversion to the stone age, implying the revival of ancient wont and custom and of the religion of their forefathers. New things must pass away, and the golden age of the past must be resuscitated in the present. As an outward and visible sign of the state of grace the faithful were to wear in their armlets a *bisare*, or long narrow ribbon of leaf that almost reached the ground. Finally, they were to burn their houses and take to the highest peaks in the ranges,—for, like the cities of the plain, the old habitations were to be swept out of existence by the catastrophes of nature. As the houses of foreigners are generally built close to the shore, it would seem as though the wheat was to be removed with the tares, since the tidal wave could scarcely be expected to discriminate between the two types of houses. The faithful villagers of Gabugabuna actually left their old village on the shore and built new houses not more than half a mile inland, but on the same level. They were told to go inland. And they did. But it did not occur to these faithful souls, or to their prophet, that the mundane laws of hydrostatics would inevitably cause their new abode to be flooded if the coast were submerged. Such is unreasoning faith. When the catastrophe was past, the wind would change to the south-east, the quarter from which blow refreshing winds during the greater part of the year, and the land would be covered with gardens of yams, taro, and other native food, and the trees would be laden with delicious fruits. The south-east wind would waft a huge vessel into their

vicinity, crowded with the spirits of the dead. And the faithful, who alone would have escaped the previous horrors, would be reunited with their departed relatives and friends.¹ So firm was the belief of these trustful people in the truth of the promise that food was to be abundant in the immediate future, that all the food in their gardens was consumed and ordinary gardening operations ceased. Not only so. Three or four hundred of their beloved pigs were killed and eaten. And anyone who knows the value the natives put upon their pigs will realise what a test of faith it was. A sceptical and prosaic Government interned Tokerua in prison for two years. The prophecy was unfulfilled, and the disillusioned and impoverished people once more reverted to the task of earning their daily bread by the sweat of their brow.²

3. THE GERMAN WISLIN OF SAIBAI.—In November 1914 I had the opportunity of investigating a new cult which had sprung up in Saibai, Torres Straits, and is spreading to other islands. My information was obtained mainly from Niki, a policeman, and was confirmed by Asa, a deacon, both of Saibai. So far as I could learn, the movement began in 1913, but it did not become organised until the spring of 1914. Wageba, Anu, and Sagaukus regard themselves as the headmen of the new religion, and they are known as "German Wislin."³ They were spoken of as "generals" or "captains," evidently a reminiscence of the old native word *kuiku-garka*, headman, a term which was applied to a champion or leader in war. But they were distinctly stated not to be "King George's men." I think it was on Good Friday, 1914, that these leaders issued instructions for all the men on the island to go to the graveyard at about eight or nine o'clock at night. Both my informants went, although apparently at the time they disbelieved the new doctrine, and certainly disbelieve it now. They found it hard, however, to make a stand against a popular movement, especially seeing that, after all, there might be something in it. The fear of running counter to unknown forces is as strong in these people as it is amongst the credulous elsewhere. So real was their fear, that I could only get information by taking my informants apart from

¹ Tokerua was to form a new Government and have a steamer of his own after the style of the *Merrie England*, the Government yacht, only larger.

² I am indebted for the above information to the report of Mr R. J. Kennedy, Native Magistrate at Samarai, *Ann. Rep., Brit. New Guinea*, 1893-94, p. 71, and to *Savage Life in New Guinea*, by Rev. C. W. Abel, 1902, pp. 104-114.

³ I do not know what this term means. The second word was sometimes pronounced "Wislun," and once it sounded like "Wesleyan."

eavesdroppers. And even then they spoke in a low voice. One said, "altogether man growl very hard all the time" at them. They were suspects, and public opinion was being expressed in the usual manner by abuse and threatened violence, which they feared would become operative. They were informed that the leaders were sorry for them personally, and that their punishment would be executed by God or the *Markai* (spirits of the dead). One of them, who works on a "company" boat at swimming-diving for pearl shell, had been warned that if he persisted in his infidelity he would be killed by a shark. On arrival at the cemetery, wild ginger was chewed, spat on the hands, and rubbed on the face, arms, and body of each member of the congregation, the members of which stood in a circle around the graves of two men. The "German Wislin" asserted that the people would see the *Markai* that night, and many of them prayed aloud, while others "prayed in their hearts." The service consisted of prayer, exhortation, and singing. The people were told to cease from working, or to do as little as possible in their gardens and elsewhere, as all good things would be provided for them by the *Markai*, who possessed everything. Those who did not believe would not get any money, and those of them who had any would lose even that which they had. They were enjoined to possess their souls in patience and not to be sceptical or frivolous, as all would come right in the future. But the three leaders made the mistake of trying to strengthen the faith of their followers by fixing a date for the consummation of all things. Sometimes it was two weeks, or three weeks, or a month hence, or the following new moon. Yet the Spirits delayed their coming. On the great day, a steamer, named *Silübloan*, crowded with the *Markai*, the spirits of dead relatives and friends, would come alongside a large jetty that would mysteriously appear at the western point of the island of Saibai. Once I was informed that the steamer came from Canaan. At all events, the *Markai* embarked at an island in the far west known as "German Town."¹ On its way the steamer would call first at Thursday Island, which in these days of British dominance is the "port of entry" for Torres Straits, as well as the centre of Government. There the *Markai* would fight and kill the white men, and thence the steamer would proceed to Saibai. The *Markai* were to bring with them everything which the heart of man

¹ Evidently a modern version of the old belief that the ghosts of the dead went to Kibu, a mythical island in the west, where they looked and behaved exactly as they did when they were alive.

could desire,—money, flour, calico, tomahawks, knives, and so forth. White and coloured men were all alike and equal. In the beginning God gave all things to everyone on earth, but the good things of life had been filched by the white man, and as he would not restore to the natives the share that was due to them, the latter would be forced to help themselves. At the conclusion of the service the people saluted and prayed to God to give them good sense and more light. He was entreated to show them the right way to get money and other material benefits. The services take place twice a week, on Friday and Sunday nights. The people do not let the South Sea teacher see them, nor do they allow him to stop them. I gathered that some women also attend the meetings. One feature of the cult is a reversion to the ancient belief in the efficacy of certain inanimate objects to bring good fortune. A man on finding a rounded stone, or a stone of unusual shape, or with curious markings, or it may be some other arresting object, concludes that it has been given to him by the *Markai*. But, in order to satisfy himself, he takes it at night to one of the leaders and asks him to find out whether it is properly authenticated. The next morning he goes to a “German Wislin,” who informs him that he has received a message from “German Town,” stating the measure of virtue the object in question possesses. And he mentions the name of the person for whom the *Markai* designed the object, who, however, need not necessarily be the finder. On returning the stone the leader says, “God bless you. By-and-by something good will happen to you, and you will have more power.” When the leaders instruct the people, or tell them about the stone, or whatever it may be, they do not fall into a trance or anything of that sort, but are wide awake, and speak in the ordinary way. Fees are charged for information and advice, and by these means the “German Wislins” are making the most of the occasion.

The cult has some resemblance to that which arose in Milne Bay, but there is not the slightest reason for thinking that the one has any connection with the other. Not only is there a considerable interval of time between them, there is also a considerable interval of space, Saibai being some five hundred and sixty miles distant from Milne Bay. The languages spoken in the two places are absolutely different; and there is no ground for believing that a native of Milne Bay has ever visited Saibai, though it is possible that a Saibai man may have formed one of a crew of a pearl-shelling boat which may have sailed from Thursday Island to the extreme south-

east of New Guinea. I think we can confidently attribute the coincidences to the fact that the two fishing populations have been affected in an analogous manner by the social unrest, and have also been more or less imbued with the Christian religion, the latter being especially evident in the Saibai cult. The prayers and exhortations were described to me as being "all the same as missionary talk," and the Christian God is acknowledged as supreme, working His will mainly through the instrumentality of the Spirits of dead islanders. One expression that was used, "Jesus on top, Jesus here," was meant to convey the idea that, though Jesus is in heaven, he is at the same time on earth, in communion with the believers in the new doctrine. There is no doubt that the leaders have so interwoven ideas derived from the Christian religion with racial animosity and a recrudescence of the vague ancestor cult of heathen times as to deceive, if not themselves, at all events their fellow islanders.

A. C. HADDON.

CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

FORCE AND THE CONQUEST OF EVIL IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

G. F. BARBOUR, D.PHIL.

THE events of the last three years have inevitably given an entirely new importance and urgency to certain of the age-long questions of Ethics, and in particular of Christian Ethics. When and how far must force, in the sense of physical constraint, be used in the pursuit of the moral ideal? To what length, in the endangering or sacrifice of human life, may its application be carried? What is the relation of War, as we have seen it since 1914, to the Christian ideal and rule of life? These questions have been so often and so fully debated that it may seem, at this late period of the War, needless to traverse them again. But the discussion has frequently turned on a negative conception—that of non-resistance—and on a negative precept in the Sermon on the Mount—"Resist not evil" (or, "the evil man"); and the chief aim of this paper is to set the subject in a more positive light by asking, by what means, according to the teaching of the New Testament on which Christian Ethics is founded, evil and violence can be most surely and decisively overcome. Has Christianity any contribution to make, different from that of other religious or ethical systems, to the solution of this greatest of problems?

It is not part of my intention to add to the many discussions that have centred round the interpretation, literal or other, of the Sermon on the Mount. But it does seem needful to point out that its precepts, in so far as they enjoin the meeting of violence by other weapons than those of force, stand by no means alone, but that a similar strain of thought is frequently found in the New Testament. Thus we may recall the Story of the Temptation, which gives, as it were, the keynote of so large a part of the narrative that follows. It indicates clearly that Jesus regarded the use of the ordinary methods of statecraft as inconsistent with the object which

He had come to secure, and held that even supernatural and divine powers could not worthily be used for mere self-protection or for display. Again, there is the great saying in the Fourth Gospel, "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered unto the Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence."¹ There is also the whole trend of the practice of Jesus, of His immediate followers, and of the Early Church, who undoubtedly looked for the conquest of evil through other agencies than force of arms—still less the outward organisation and the wealth which are familiarly described as "the sinews of war." There is the Pauline conception of Christian duty as including the wearing down of hatred through beneficence, and the overcoming of evil through continuance in doing good.² There is of course another aspect of New Testament teaching, for, in the verses immediately following those referred to, St Paul accepts the use of force by magistrates as part of the divinely appointed order. But the passages cited require to be placed in the foreground, so that it may be understood that the question of non-resistance cannot be disposed of with a passing epigram, but that it needs real effort to discover what the Christian view of the conquest of evil by spiritual methods ultimately involves, if account is taken of the whole teaching of the New Testament.

I.

St Paul summarises a great part of that teaching in the words, That, "though we walk in the flesh, we do not war according to the flesh (for the weapons of our warfare are not of the flesh)."³ Yet, when we seek to define what are "weapons of the flesh" and where exactly they differ from weapons of the Spirit, the task proves more difficult than at first appears. Nor is it possible to draw an absolutely rigid line. Indeed the attempt to do so is based on the hard-and-fast distinction between material and spiritual which has often been exposed. For, so long as "we walk in the flesh," we continue to be dependent on material media for the transmission of thought and the expression of aspiration, and we must work out our spiritual task by our use of physical tools and instruments; nor, so long as we master them and are not mastered by them, need our dependence on them derogate from the spiritual character of our work.

¹ John xviii. 36.

² Romans xii. 18-21.

³ 2 Cor. x. 3, 4; (R.V.) *cf.* vi. 4 ff.

But with the abandonment of the absolute antithesis between material and spiritual activities, the distinction between force and love falls also; or rather, we see that there is an infinite series of gradations between the use of sheer, untempered force and the pure activity of love, in which its ends are gained by a word or a look, and the material medium of communication is reduced to insignificance. Thus, in any given case, there are at least two questions which may be asked. Was it impossible for the more directly spiritual energy to come into full and effective play? And, if it was impossible, did the spiritual impulse maintain the mastery of its material instrument, or was it, "like the dyer's hand, subdued to what it worked in"?

The latter is a very real danger; but to this point we shall return, considering first what are the cases in which the use of force is certainly justified. These cases depend either on *ignorance* or *irresponsibility*, although, indeed, the two are closely related. Sometimes the gain in the use of force is so clear that no question can arise, as when a deaf man is drawn forcibly away from in front of an advancing motor; for, in this case, the ordinary method of warning and the appeal to reason are impossible. There is also the case of the man who is wholly or partly irresponsible, in whom through some mental or moral breakdown the ordinary inhibitions have ceased to work, at least for the time, and who must for his own sake and for the general safety be placed under restraint. The case of the child, again, can be placed under either head, ignorance or imperfectly developed responsibility; and here once more physical restraint can at times alone prevent action that might be dangerous or harmful, because the conditions for an effective moral control do not yet exist. Since the self-restraint which is the one foundation of liberty is wanting, external restraint, or force, must be brought in. Not that it can permanently supply the place of the inner and spontaneous restraint: for that there is no substitute. But its application may be necessary in order to avoid the more immediate dangers involved in the exercise of liberty without control. It would also be generally held that we must add to ignorance and irresponsibility the third condition of *irresponsiveness* to the moral appeal, the lack of conscience which persists in evil or injustice in face of the claims of the good.¹

Thus it appears that, in the interest of public order and

¹ Unless we hold with the Greeks that virtue is knowledge, in which case vice becomes a form of ignorance. But on this view it seems clear that moral education must provide the remedy, and not force.

safety, there must be an appeal to force, either when the moral appeal to conscience is impossible from the outset or when it has proved ineffective. But it cannot be forgotten that when the machinery of force has been established, either in matters civil or international, its application is so comparatively easy, and so much in line with the ordinary ideas and methods of society, that the higher and harder way of the moral appeal is most frequently left untried.

So far the argument will be accepted by all save the rigid Tolstoyans. For most "pacifists" are quite prepared to uphold the application of physical restraint by the police for the prevention of injury to life or property at the hands of those who are morally immature or defective. But they cannot accept it as right that life should be sacrificed. Killing, they hold, is wrong at all times, and not less, but more, wrong when it is organised by nations on the vast scale and amid the unspeakable conditions which we call War. But can an absolutely rigid line be drawn even at this point? For the danger to the life of him who attempts an assault depends on himself as well as on the defender. It is caused not only by the nature of the force opposed to him, but by his own resolve to exert his full energies, whatever the risk to himself, and that risk in turn depends in some degree on his physical condition. So that, even if we admit that the force to be exerted against the aggressor by the guardian of public interest or private honour should be the least that is adequate to preserve this trust, it by no means follows that the aggressor may not be seriously injured, or in extreme cases killed.

Thus it may be argued with much force that, when there is a clear right on the one side, and an unbridled impulse of destruction on the other, as when an outpost of civilisation is attacked by a raiding party of a savage tribe from a distance, then however active the defence might be judged from the outward standpoint, ethically it would seem to fulfil the conditions of "passive resistance"—the mere interposition of a barrier between the assailants and the carrying out of their lawless and destructive will. It is indeed true that no conflict between civilised nations is ever quite as simple as this. The question of aggression is often complicated by many past grievances, incompatible ambitions, disputes as to the meaning of some treaty or the rendering of some international law. It is further complicated by the politico-military theory that "attack is the best defence." But in so far as an approximation exists to a pure aggression on the one side, and a pure defence of some well-authenticated right on the other, the

aggressors may justly be held responsible for the whole loss of life—that which they suffer as well as that which they inflict.

Yet, while this is true, and while action from spiritual motives and action involving the use of physical force are not of necessity mutually exclusive, it is not in accord with the spirit of Christianity to allow the legal conception of responsibility to form the last word in regard to a great ethical problem. Still less is it possible to think that the taking of human life and the infliction of unmerited suffering on a vast scale represents any close approximation to the Christian ideal, although, in the actual condition of human affairs, it may form an unavoidable stage on the journey towards it. Thus we are bound to ask what is the purpose of force in the Christian scheme, and how can its use *now* be justified? May not the answer be that it is fully justified only in so far as its use is temporary, pointing towards, and clearing the way for, something higher than itself? In other words, the primary function of force is to win time and opportunity for moral and spiritual energies to come into full play. When such opportunity has been secured, and they have failed to come into play or to effect their end, it may then be the lesser of two evils to fall back on force again. But this is only a second best, and the clearly justifiable use of force is to break the impetus of evil and secure a pause in which reconciliation may work.

Such a pause is often needed, for the disarming action of goodness can seldom be instantaneous, and reflection and repentance are spiritual processes requiring some measure of time and quiet for their perfect work. It is one of the ironies of the moral life that evil is so often far readier, swifter, and more confident than good.¹ Often too its range of action seems much wider. In modern war those who plan the aggression may be far off from the point where the blow falls, while those who carry out their mandates have not the leisure, even if they had the moral courage, to pause and consider the result of their work. An example which springs to the mind at once is the German rush through Belgium to the Somme and the Marne in the first weeks of the War. And the same rule holds good in great measure of the most ruthless depredations of modern commerce. These are often directed by men

¹ This is no new fact in moral experience—witness the words of the “old knight Phoinix” in *Il. ix*:—“Sin is strong and fleet of foot, wherefore she far outrunneth all prayers, and goeth before them over all the earth making men fall, and prayers follow behind to heal the harm” (tr. Lang, Leaf, and Myers).

thousands of miles distant, while those on the spot, attracted by the prospect of gain and driven on by their superiors in another land or continent, have no time, and eventually lose the will, to reflect on the havoc that they are causing. Thus in both cases the protection of the weak can only be secured if the hand of the attacker is arrested, and if he is given cause as well as time to reflect.

II.

But there is a further and greater question. Granted that force may be necessary to *arrest* evil, can force ever really and permanently *overcome* evil? It may give time for reformation: it may even by the shock of its encounter awaken some sense of the need for reformation: but can it ever be the agent of reformation? In considering this question one's thoughts naturally turn to the argument in the *Gorgias* of Plato, that it is better for the wrong-doer to be punished than to escape the due punishment of his crime; for punishment and the suffering that it implies are the surgery of the soul. Now, if this famous paradox is true, we must suppose that as a rule physical suffering will enter into the nature of the punishment, and that force will in some way be exerted on the wrong-doer. But it is not the force, nor is it even the suffering, that works the great change. That depends on the reaction of the soul, whether of a man or of a nation, to the suffering which its crime has brought upon it. Force may occasion the change, but can hardly cause it. Indeed the more prolonged its application, the less likely is it to work any moral effect.

Thus the arrest of a lad or young man who has for the first time brought on himself the condemnation of the law may by its painfulness, and still more by the consequent loss of liberty and of self-respect, cause a revulsion from crime and a resolve to amend. In this case force is but the trigger releasing the potential energy of good which was latent in the heart all the time. It is the shock which brings the higher self into clear consciousness and vigorous action, but it is not the true cause of amendment, for, if it were, its efficacy would increase with repetition. But the very opposite is the case. If, in the case named, the first experience of "the strong arm of the law" does not give pause and begin the work of reform, it is far less likely that the second or the third will. Force may be necessary as an arrestant, but its native tendency is rather to harden than to soften. The law, in so far as it is identified with and maintained by force, is at the best only a *paidagogos*

intended to lead us as speedily as may be to a principle higher than itself.¹

The difficulty and peril of generalising on such matters as the moral effect of physical constraint or of punishment, or more widely of suffering itself, lies in the fact already noted, that there is so great a variety in the reaction of different men to them. What turns one man back upon his steps may urge another more resolutely forward; and normally the rule of force, though it may be intended as a permanent instrument of moral elevation, proves to be the very reverse. Indeed the fuller application of Christian Ethics in the work of education which has been brought about in modern times has consisted very largely in the discarding of physical compulsion and physical punishment, and their replacement by other and higher forms of appeal.² But if this is possible in the education of children, even of those whose previous history seemed to afford least ground for trust in the power of moral suasion, may it not also mark the true line of advance in the great process whose end is the moral education of Humanity?

"Force," we say habitually, "is no remedy," for it cannot penetrate to the root of moral evil. It has the supreme drawback as an educator, which fear has as a deterrent, that neither can be withdrawn without the danger of a relapse into lawlessness. Whereas the dynamic of love, of trust, and of an appeal to the sense of honour, though its action may be slow and uncertain at the outset, acts permanently, if it acts at all, by passing over into the heart and the character of its object. This principle, which lies very near the centre of Christian Ethics, has seldom found a finer expression than in the words of Spinoza :

"He who chooses to avenge wrong with hatred is assuredly wretched. But he who strives to conquer hatred with love fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their powers." And again, "Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love."³

But, as love tends to call out an answering love, so, on the other hand, it is the tragedy of force, even when it is

¹ This discussion is incomplete in as far as it does not consider the effect of fear of further suffering or of forcible restraint as a factor in securing outward morality. But the obedience so secured is only outward, hence not genuinely moral, and to ensure its continuance an increasing display of force is required.

² Cf. especially the "Junior Republics" of the United States and the "Little Commonwealth" in England.

³ *Eth.*, iv. 46; *Schol.*, iii. 43 (tr. Elwes).

exerted rightly, from pure and unselfish motives, that it also tends to perpetuate itself in fresh opposition. Nor does it only evoke a contrary effort from the person against whom it is directed. It often perpetuates itself by becoming a second nature to him who uses it; and there are few things more melancholy than to see a man or a people who have taken up arms reluctantly in a righteous cause, come gradually to accept the methods of force as natural and normal. Happily this is not inevitable, as the life of many a chivalrous soldier shows. But it involves a real call for and test of Christian faith and conduct to continue to use force in the service of righteousness without being mastered by it, and falling almost unconsciously into a habitual belief in compulsion.

So much as to the limitations of force as an ethical agent. But we must now turn to the other aspect of the question, asking whether, assuming that force cannot of itself overcome evil, its contrary, non-resistance, can do so. When Paul exhorts to "overcome evil with good," he is thinking, as the previous verses show, of a peace-loving, unvengeful disposition, ever ready to meet illwill with forbearance and generosity. Non-resistance is certainly implied, but an active goodwill which, as it were, robs the "enemy" of the initiative by "heaping coals of fire upon his head" is enjoined also.¹ There must, then, be an element of activity present, a spiritual "offensive," if evil is to be overcome by good. The concept of non-resistance is too negative. Meekness will not of itself win the victory. Thus Tolstoy's picture in *Ivan the Fool*² of a nation which repels invasion by laying down its arms, meeting spoliation by patience, and finally shaming the attacking army into withdrawal, while it finely expresses one side of the truth, minimises the strength and persistence of human passion. For greed and cruelty seem often to grow on what they feed on. This conclusion, unwelcome as it is and hard to reconcile with some elements in the teaching of the New Testament, is borne out by such historic tragedies as the butchery of the army of the Jewish Hasidim who judged it wrong to fight on the Sabbath; the death of Hypatia at the hands of the so-called Christian mob of Alexandria; the scene on the silver beach of Iona, when the whole company of Columban monks on the island were slaughtered defenceless by the Danish invaders; or the fate of the unresisting Armenian Christians burned by thousands in the churches of Ourfa and Marash, with other scenes, even more impossible to describe, in these past months. Human lust, greed, cruelty,

¹ Rom. xii, 20.

² *The Death of Ivan Ilyitch and other Tales*.

bigotry have all, not once but many times, proved deaf to the mute appeal of purity, helplessness, gentleness; and one may well ask whether in such cases, even if the active beneficence enjoined by St Paul had been possible, it would have sufficed to avert the threatening ruin.

Thus if force, while it can protect the innocent and give time for moral impulses to awaken, cannot of itself produce these impulses or eradicate the more deeply rooted evil of human nature; and if gentleness is often made the sport of violence, while non-resistance fails to disarm attack—what hope is there of the discovery of any principle by which evil can be assuredly overcome? It may help to answer this question if we reflect that, besides the cases in which non-resistance has failed to gain its end, there have been many instances in which force, or the threat of force, has been overcome by a purely moral appeal. When Napoleon returned from Elba and threw himself, outwardly unprotected, upon the loyalty of his former soldiers, his aim was not indeed disinterested or free from selfish ambition, but the form of his appeal was in the highest degree moral, for it was addressed not to thoughts of fear or advantage, but solely to a generous trust. And not seldom such an appeal has been disinterested, both in end and method, and has achieved its result, as many lives from the days of St Paul to those of Livingstone and other Christian explorers and missionaries have shown. From them we learn that, in circumstances of extreme danger, the most effective weapon may be a purely moral appeal, and that the goodwill of even the wildest savage tribes may be won by friendliness and a rigorous justice more surely than by any display of force. Sometimes indeed it has needed a martyrdom to achieve this end, but it is by a spiritual ascendancy alone and not by superior force that its achievement can be made lasting.

In all such instances the clearest note is not that of passivity, but of an active, resolute courage, all the more outstanding because it had ceased to rely on material power. To this there is added the appeal to goodwill as being a higher, and when it is fully aroused a stronger, faculty than fear, with the trust in the nobility and responsiveness of human nature which that implies. Frequently there is present also that mysterious endowment which we call *personality*. But in the highest examples there is something more. There is an absorbing desire not to secure gain, but to bring help; while the trust in the natural response of the human heart to a generous appeal has passed into a deeper confidence—into *faith* in the Divine Power and Will to renew the hearts of men. Thus

Love is not the whole secret of the conquest of evil. It has a great power to disarm evil and win it over to the side of good; but a writer who says more than any other in praise of Love, says also, "This is the victory that hath overcome the world, even our *Faith*."¹

The conquest may thus be achieved through an activity of the soul, and an activity which does not depend on even the highest resources of human love and forbearance, but which reaches out in faith to grasp the hidden resources of the Spiritual Order. But the other side of the truth is that this faith works *through love*,² a love which contains within it austerity and discipline as well as forgiveness and kindness. Thus the human activity is the channel by which the divine regenerative activity commonly becomes known and operative among men. When this is powerful enough, the conditions of a radical and permanent conquest of evil exist; for those whose lives are still in its grip gain a real perception of love, and thence a sense of the deadliness of sin, in all the forms—selfishness, violence, cruelty—in which it opposes itself to love. This is the specifically Christian way in which evil is subjugated, this and not the way of force. *Duae civitates, duo amores*. Nor can the lower love be finally uprooted, though it may for the time be restrained, or even crushed, by the method of force which belongs to the Earthly City. It can only be displaced by the growth of the love which is the bond of the City of God.

III.

It is still indeed possible that selfishness and materialism may so atrophy and encrust the soul that its fineness of perception is destroyed, and that it loses the faculty of responding to other motives than those of fear or of gain. In that case, as we have already seen, force may have again to come in as the only available method of placing some restraint upon an unbridled selfishness.³ But this recourse to external constraint to break the power of evil, while it may be the only path open, yet marks a descent from the characteristically Christian way, which is the way of patience and forbearance, the way of the Cross. Here, ethics begins to pass into theology; but if we would understand the nature of the moral dynamic of Christianity we cannot pass over the theological question, Wherein lies the moral efficacy of the Cross? Is it solely in its appeal to the consciences of

¹ 1 John v. 4.

² Gal. v. 6.

³ Cf. Forsyth, *The Christian Ethic of War*, p. 20.

men, as Liberal Theology holds—in its power of awakening remorse and aspiration and love? Was it only the moral beauty of self-sacrifice that Jesus had in view when he said, “I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto myself”? If so, has the supreme Sacrifice failed, because men only and not all have been drawn upward by it? Did Paul proclaim the bankruptcy of Christ’s mission, or only the poverty of human vision, when he said that the Cross was a rock of offence to the Jews and a monument of folly to the Greeks? ¹

In attempting to answer these questions we become aware of two main tendencies in recent thought. There is the school of thought just referred to which finds the nerve of the Christian message in the moral appeal of love, and in the inexhaustible patience which enables love to wait and hope until evil has finally wrought out its destiny and destroyed itself. “Love suffereth long,” and the power which endures to the end must thereby win the victory; nor does it need any other vindication than its increasing sway over the hearts of men. Over against this we may place the contention that the Cross was indeed a failure when judged by any earthly standard, and that it constituted a great final appeal from the world, and even from the religion and morality in the world, to the underlying power of God. In itself it was an ending rather than a consummation; and the central fact and great dynamic of Christianity is to be sought for, not in the Cross alone, but in the Cross as linked and leading to the Resurrection and the Sending of the Spirit.²

Now on the side of the former view we may at once recognise the great truth that love endures because it possesses, or rather is in itself, the principle of continuance and of life; whereas sin is self-destructive. Sin, the principle of division, can never provide the foundation for a lasting society of men. Sooner or later it must display its nature and work out its destiny in self-annihilation. That is true; but a soul, a nation, a civilisation may have become so penetrated by sin as to perish in the self-destruction of sin. And our question is that of the *World's* redemption. What guarantee have we that the Cross will save the world if, as we have seen, love’s appeal may be disregarded, or if, before patience achieves its slow but perfect work, sin has broken the fabric of society into fragments?

¹ John xii. 32; 1 Cor. i. 23. Cf. Luke xxiv. 25, f.

² As representative of these two points of view I may refer to C. E. Rolt, *The World's Redemption*; and Neville Talbot, *The Mind of the Disciples*.

In the first place, the vital principle of Christian Ethics is not that of mere sacrifice, which may be undertaken in a morally unworthy cause. It is sacrifice conditioned by an ethical end, the establishment of Love in righteousness. Again, as may be seen in its great examples, it is no mere passive endurance, but a definite and courageous activity of the spirit. And this is true of Christian Ethics, as Dr Forsyth contends in his recent book,¹ because it is true of the death of Christ, which was not a mere sacrifice, nor a passive sacrifice, but one weighted with great moral issues and active with a spiritual mastery.

Yet even when it is so understood, all has not been said. For the ministry of Jesus does not stand alone; otherwise human blindness and selfishness might annul the message of love which it brings, as is shown by the figure of Judas in the circle of His immediate followers. His work is completed, not only by the devotion which it evokes from men, but by the vindicating, energising love of God in the Gift of the Spirit which opens the channels of a new life. This is undoubtedly the view of the New Testament as a whole, even as the Prophet of the Exile looked beyond the sufferings of God's Servant to a great Vindication. It is expressed in such a verse as that in 1st Peter, which speaks of Christ as "committing himself to Him that judgeth righteously."² His self-sacrifice showed the moral power of that which the world calls weakness; but only those can be certain of its complete and final triumph who hold with Paul that the seeming weakness was "the weakness of God," which is stronger than man's utmost strength.³

If it should be said that these considerations lie outside the ethical sphere with which we are directly concerned, the answer clearly is that the man who bases his belief in the possibility of overcoming evil simply on what he has known of the power of generosity and forbearance to disarm opposition and awaken love, cannot act with the same confidence as he who adds to the evidence of present moral experience the deeper conviction in a final divine vindication of good and conquest of evil. The latter is the attitude which Lowell expressed two generations ago in the lines,

"Truth for ever on the scaffold: Wrong for ever on the throne,—
Yet that scaffold sways the future, and behind the dim unknown
Standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above His own."

¹ *Op. cit.*, especially pp. 50, 139. Cf. John x. 18.

² ii. 23 (R.V. marg., "Committed his cause").

³ 1 Cor. i. 24 ff.

It is true that the *form* in which this belief can be held in the Twentieth Century differs widely from that in which it was held in the First, just as the political position of the Christian citizen in a modern democracy differs from that of the member of a sect insignificant in numbers and without political power or responsibility within the great orbit of the Imperial power of Rome. In the circumstances of the Early Church, the belief in the ultimate conquest of evil, pride, and oppression naturally expressed itself in apocalyptic terms. Those who held it looked for a divine intervention direct, not long delayed, and so fundamental that not only would individual wrongs be righted, but a new world-system would be inaugurated. It is sometimes said that the War has given religion once more an apocalyptic character; and in a strictly limited sense this is true, for it has shaken our trust in a slow, steady, ordered advance in morality and civilisation, while it has restored the sense of the cataclysmic in history and the belief in the reality of judgment on wrong-doing. But this does not mean that we have adopted the full apocalyptic outlook; for our sense of responsibility for the course of history is too strong, and our conviction is too deeply rooted that a large part in suppressing violence and establishing right is assigned to human agency. But it is still the distinctive mark of the Christian outlook that its last word is one of faith, for it looks for the final Vindication and Judgment to the power of God.¹

IV.

It remains to gather up certain of the conclusions towards which the argument has led, and to indicate, without developing, one or two practical conclusions in the international sphere. One of the capital aims of Christianity is to substitute harmony, consent, and free obedience—in one word, Love—for Force as the ruling factor in human affairs. For the spiritual bond has a permanence and comprehensiveness that can never be attained by that of physical constraint, or even by the appeal to the psychological motives of advantage or of fear. It alone is self-renewing, and therefore permanent; nor does it recognise any barriers of race or tradition as ultimate, therefore in potency it is world wide. But while this is the far-off aim, Christianity moves towards it through a world still greatly divided, still absorbed in material things, and still largely stamped by ignorance and irresponsibility. As long as

¹ Cf. Rom. xii. 19; 1 Cor. ii. 5.

this moral immaturity is so widely spread, force must be used to secure a field of action for goodness and to give love time to develop and to operate. But the use of force even as a forerunner of moral freedom is attended with grave dangers, which can only be avoided by a steady concentration of mind and will on the ideal, and a constant resolve to attempt the Christian venture of trust and self-sacrificing goodwill.

This great venture, the "open secret" of Christianity in its contest with evil, is essentially positive; hence the term "non-resistance" fails to do justice to its nature. It implies activity, enterprise, and a courage and self-command which are not lowered but increased because the weapons of force have been laid aside. As active, it is more than patient waiting; yet waiting is an essential moment in it, since it looks, not only to the "natural" effect of love and forbearance on the hearts of men, but to the supporting, vindicating, and liberating work of God. Thus it is religious not less than ethical—an act of faith. It waits for the great Enfranchisement in which constraint shall be left behind, swallowed up in "the liberty of the glory of the Children of God."¹

But has this ideal (this mystical ideal, some may say) any relation to the possibilities of the world as we know it? In particular, does it hold out any hope, or indicate any duty, for the nations? Now, if the great venture be difficult for individuals—and how seldom it is seriously attempted!—it is assuredly harder for nations. It is harder because of the complexity of their life and interests; it is harder because of the inchoate state of international law, and the indeterminateness of most of our conceptions of the moral obligations of States and peoples; most of all, it is harder because the morality of every great body of men must lag behind that of its most self-sacrificing and morally adventurous members. But it is among these that the readiness is commonly found to stake much upon the practical worth of the Christian ideal; and if they are few, is it surprising that the many are slow to follow?

In some ways, in spite of outward progress, the ideal of mutual understanding and generosity seems harder of attainment for the nations of to-day than for the smaller and simpler peoples of earlier ages. I have referred to the success of Livingstone and others like him in disarming the hostility and winning the trust and love of savage tribes. But, strange as it seems, the civilisation of modern man may arm him more effectively against the influence of goodwill and for-

¹ Rom. viii. 19-21.

bearance than even the primitive hatred of the savage. For he has become sophisticated ; and, not always without reason, he has learned to be suspicious. Nay, more, he stands at a great distance from the men of other nations, and there are often few channels through which reconciling influences, which are always personal influences, can pass and repass. Nor are the men of rival nations only separated by distance, but in certain cases by something more sinister—by the rigidity of the machine which regiments them and deprives them of moral initiative. When this is so, there is need for a twofold remedy. The machine must be shattered, by force if need be, and the souls of the people liberated, and channels must be opened by which a real interchange of thoughts and ideals may pass. The former is the task of War, the latter of Peace—both hard of accomplishment, but both necessary if the intercourse of the nations is to be raised to the moral plane.

But, lest the goal should seem so distant as to lie utterly beyond attainment, we may reflect from how large a part of our life, where it is sane and normal, force has actually been expelled. In the family, in education, in far the larger part of our civil life, it no longer rules. As between the nations the distance to travel is greater, nor have we yet gone far. But the goal is not unattainable if only there spread from man to man and from people to people the conviction that it is supremely worth attaining, and the faith that those who set their faces towards it are placing themselves in the main stream of that great Purpose, which is both cosmic and divine.

G. F. BARBOUR.

EDINBURGH.

THE LOVE WHICH IS NOT THE FULFILLING OF THE LAW.

CONSTANCE L. MAYNARD,

First Principal of Westfield College, University of London.

IN our present great war the position of pacifists and conscientious objectors, as well as that of the time-honoured Society of Friends, has been so prominent, that now that the first rush of feeling with regard to the question is past, it is well for thoughtful people to give an hour's attention to the principles involved. For the Church of Christ to say, "This condemnation of all war is of course the ideal, only, alas! we cannot just now carry out our principles," plumbs the very depths of ignorance and feebleness. The persistent thunder of the great guns is to be heard across the Channel, and there must be found a decisive solution as to whether we are on their side or not. Are we in the sight of Almighty God right or wrong in firing them? Let us try to be clear with Yes or No.

Before me lies a paper written by a pacifist for the New Year, of which the sole purport is "Forgive, forgive, Love, love." It is too diffuse to quote, but it is built up on our Lord's solemn prayer, "That they may be all one," and sentence after sentence has but the one aim, "Forgive everything, Love everybody equally." If these five words are a correct translation of the words of Christ, then indeed the war is wrong, the temper of our nation is wrong, the cause of the Allies is wrong, and we may let the Germans take possession of our island and the whole world. But let us study the matter.

First, let us take the instinctive feeling of the honest human soul and judge of its position. I do not say this is a conclusive argument, for majorities are by no means always in the right, and yet the voice of such (when not proclaiming selfishness) is invariably worth listening to; it says, "And

what is strength and energy given me for, if not to defend those weaker than myself? Invasion was threatened, but the German shall never set foot on our dear soil except over my dead body. The diplomacy that preceded the war I can't well make out, but there the war *is*, and a cloud of unscrupulous, brutal foes are hovering ready to sweep down on France and on us, and treat us as they have Belgium. Whatever the cause was to begin with, the Germans by sheer inhumanity have proved themselves unfit to rule anywhere, pretty well unfit to live. Did I not hear of the Colonel of a brave regiment hanging crucified on a tree? Did not a friend of mine with his own eyes see a march of more than a dozen Prussians, each with a baby on his bayonet? Have you not read of Russian prisoners slowly starved till their gaunt frames were beyond repair? of wholesale licentiousness too bad to speak of? of the shooting of sailors struggling in the water, or the slavery of civilians, or the mutilation of women and children? Whoso hears of these things without his blood boiling is no Englishman. We are strong and free, and, if we put forth our whole might, we can protect, and he who does not join in this righteous cause is a shirker and a coward, and not a man at all. We suffer and die by the thousand, and the dastard sits safe at home. Shame upon him. If there is a God in heaven, I am sure He thinks and feels just as I do. I would die a thousand deaths rather than let the innocent and helpless suffer, and let this wicked spirit rule. My path is clear. It is to fight to the death, and the more Germans I kill, the better."

This view may be called crude and unregenerate if you will, but its very simplicity and breadth gives it a kind of majesty. It is held by millions who unflinchingly act upon it, and conviction supported by gallant action and by the supreme sacrifice always deserves consideration. Why, if a tribe of poor black savages labouring under some complete delusion threw away their lives by the score and by the hundred in imagined defence of me and of my country, I would at least say Thank you, and treat them with honour; but you will observe the pacifists never do this, but rather reap the benefit, and look on and blame.

Enough of the popular view. Let us now endeavour to dig into the real foundations of the subject and see what lies at the base of the national decision, and prove whether or no it will stand the stringent test of Christianity.

First as to being killed. It is not an easy lesson to learn that there are things more precious than human life. Young

springing life, the joy of the present, and the hope of the immediate future, must it be offered up wholesale to suffering and death? It must. There is no escape. It is one of the first principles of the Kingdom of Heaven that though human life is of value, there are things of more value. These may be divided into two: religion, or personal loyalty to God; and belief in the great ethical principles of Justice, Liberty, and Beneficence, on which the State as well as the Church is founded. Let these be infringed, and a man of true heart will fling away his life as freely as a bucket of water is flung on a destructive fire to quench it. Human life cannot be noble if it counts itself as the supreme treasure, if it has nothing above it worthy of perfect fealty, but is bowed down into a mean selfishness, formed like a closed circle that can never aspire. To soar outside the interests of the body and its possessions and mount into the pure air of Eternal Principles, and thence look down on the natural vitality as on a thing much loved, to be cared for and cherished and only to be spent in the best and highest cause we know of, that is wisdom, that is true nobility; to defend the present weakness of others, and to secure for the children and for generations yet unborn conditions of independence and well-being at least as good as those we ourselves have enjoyed, this is the generous position of a man, and the only position worthy of him. His own well-being, his health, his very life, are considered negligible quantities when laid in the scale against the great and honourable cause of Justice, Liberty, and Beneficence.

So far for being killed; but now for the killing, which is a far more complex matter. Turn back to my pacifist's paper, and read, "Feel for the Germans exactly as much as you feel for yourselves. Let heartache answer to heartache, forgive, sympathise, love, fulfil the prayer of Christ, and be one, *all one*." Now we come to the core and centre of the mistake, where love is made to stand alone, and there is to be no discrimination, no testing of values, no principles to uphold, no actual right on one side and wrong on the other. Is all life of equal value? Turn for a moment to biology and read half a page about parasites, and judge if their life is a good thing.¹ "A vivid impression of the prevalence of parasitism is afforded by the capture of the huge and majestic sunfish, and by picking off with forceps into museum bottles his crowds of uninvited passengers; the tufts of barnacles upon his back, the biting isopods like enormous fleas upon his skin, the trematodes sucking like leeches upon his eyes; and when he is opened to

¹ *Evolution*, by P. Geddes and J. A. Thomson (Williams & Norgate).

find,"—but no, the account of his inside is too disgusting for this page, for he seems to be crammed with foreign living matter more than with his own organs, and to have a new parasite for every part. Counted together they may well amount to half a million. If all lives are of equal value, the fish decidedly ought to be eaten through and through by his half-million guests, and only patiently live as long as he can that he may unselfishly support them. And thus Germany, brave, learned, gentle Germany, is being devoured, mind, heart, and soul, by enemies that have arisen from within, and are we to be "one" with the military despotism she, with all her fervent loyalty, can hardly bear? one with the most cruel tyranny, the most unbridled lust? Are we to take the part of the malignant arm of Germany against the main body of her good and home-loving people? They may be so blinded as to be proud of that arm and believe it to be their strong and necessary defence, but shall we take the side of the worst part of that noble nation against the best? The pacifist paper goes on, "Not to resist, not to resent," "not to be glad at the destruction of a German man-of-war or an Austrian regiment," but to forgive right and left, to sympathise with every pain equally, whether bad or good, to love, love, love, through everything, "to be all one,"—this is the attitude taken. It is not only amazing and distorted, it is positively and utterly wrong.

Why is it wrong? Because it abrogates the Moral Law, because it ignores the distinction between good and evil, because the only bond recognised is that of sympathy with suffering. Human pain must be spared, human life is of supreme value, and it is quite a secondary matter whether that life is to be spent in the service of God or of Satan. Love, love, only love, is to bear the brunt of the resistance to the many forces of evil. Justice or injustice, Liberty or slavery, Truth or falsehood, are not for a moment to be considered; Love is the only power to be used, and he will do all the work. Poor Love! his back is soon broken by the weight laid upon it! This belief that Love stands outside all law is the error which accounts for the misery of so much of married life; it gives the lie to the old song,

"I could not love thee, dear, so much,
Loved I not honour more."

It will account for scores of divorces, hundreds of broken hearts, and thousands of disappointed lives; and is this mistake to be magnified from the individual to the nation, and so bring ruin, not on the single home, but on the whole world? Ex-

perience is wholly against making the one feeling of our hearts do the work of the other convictions. Whenever Love, the bright king, who in all our complex being does indeed seem to be born to the purple, dashes aside the holy reign of law and becomes a despot on the throne of the heart, there first confusion enters, and then misery, a misery so acute, so ever-present, and so wasting, that nothing on earth is comparable to it. This it was, and in most cases nothing worse than this, which during the year 1915 threw exactly 365 young girls into the Thames, and 70 more into the well-guarded Serpentine; and if the Mersey, the Humber, the Dee, and the Tyne could be questioned, the number would be multiplied. These poor girls made the one and only mistake of believing that Love was the supreme authority of life, and that all the other enactments and laws of God were as nothing in its presence. Such an opinion leads straight to destruction, though, as Faust's Gretchen says, "Everything that led me to this sin, ah, God, how sweet and how good it seemed!"

But, it may be argued, we are not now dealing with blind, foolish passion, but with that sort of love that can embrace a nation; not with the contraction of the heart and its concentration upon one object, but with the expansion of the heart to take in the interests of a country, nay, of the whole world—"That they may be *all* one," said our God; no one is to be left out.

See the fallacies here. They are summed up under three heads. The first thing that stands in our way is the fact that all experience teaches, that this wide and all-embracing love, this beneficence, or philanthropy as doubtless it should rather be termed, this "sympathy august and pure," is impossible to keep alive for an hour without the recognition of the Moral Laws. Blind passion may trample them down, but the well-ordered love of humanity obeys them in every detail, and does not wish to be exalted above them. It is Goodness that is on the throne, and Love, sweet Love, is the guide to obedience, the bright servant who turns duty into desire. The second point we have already touched on, and it is, that if our sympathy and affection is to embrace the whole world, and every individual in it is equally to be held in honour, then we must love the murderer as well as the murdered, the seducer as well as the victim, Legree as well as Uncle Tom. This, as we have seen, is death to the Moral Law. Thirdly, when our Lord said "That they may be all one," consider the context and say who were those He spoke of? The treacherous government, the furious general, the brutal warder of the prisoners,

or even the smooth world who looks on smiling at untold cruelties and indecencies? It was none of these; it was His Church, His true Church, founded to last through the ages, against which the gates of hell shall never prevail, dark as the outlook may at times appear. That has indeed been "all one" in its inner spirit through nineteen centuries, and shall be to the end of time, and shall meet finally as one great multitude around the throne; but for the world outside, whether raging in the cruelty of war, or laughing in the wantonness of peace (a distinctly baser condition), the commands are different.

If I wanted to preach a sermon on "Forgive, forgive, Love, love," I could find more cogent arguments than any I have yet seen in print, arguments founded on the testimony of the universal heart of man, when submitted to the immediate working of the Spirit of God. Beautiful, strong, and tender is the character when first the World Invisible comes into view. The stubborn wintry wood has been cloven, and the first sweet wondering blossoms look out on the sun in the sky and all the world, and the strange thing is that through all the centuries and over all the countries these blossoms show the same ethical structure. Conscious of how much it has itself been forgiven, the heart tends to spread forgiveness over the whole of its past, and that possibly a much-injured past; feeling the sunshine of the love of Heaven embodied in Christ, it reflects that radiance on all around, even upon the hopelessly unworthy, and, having become in the ultimate sense the child of the Great Father, it shows in its conduct a decided likeness to Him who maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.

Now this is a testimony that cannot be refuted in favour of universal forgiveness and indiscriminating love, and it is strengthened by the voice of history, expanding the witness of the individual into that of the community. Look into the Acts of the Apostles, and see on the day of Pentecost the results of the birthday of the Church. It is not only the rapid addition of numbers to the original hundred and twenty, it is the marked characteristics of the new society that are striking. In those confused and difficult times we read of simplicity, happiness, unity, and complete generosity, and we can imagine what a flood of Forgiveness and Love was then born into the world, old unkindnesses pardoned, old grudges forgotten, and rivalries and strained relations set right. And it was not only feeling that showed itself in good wishes and talk, it was downright clear action, and it was in force for several years, unwavering and decided. A test case soon arose in the

martyrdom of Stephen. Now observe that not only did he himself pray, "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge," for that might perhaps be expected of him as a follower of the Lamb, but his friends took no revenge whatever. They "carried him to his burial and made great lamentation over him," but they took no precautions, they lifted no hand against the force that had inflicted so unjust a blow. Lamentation without action, sorrow and loud complaint with no force behind it, but ready to suffer the same loss again and again, surely this is a feeble position? There was full recognition that it was a murder, perpetrated though it was through a judicial court, and yet, strange to say, no steps were taken to prevent its recurrence. Is then the bitter Sanhedrin, stirred up by "Libertines, Cyrenians, and Alexandrians," to go its own way unmolested, killing off the very flower of the Church, our brave young soldiers of the Cross, the promise, and hope, and stay of the future? Yes, thus it is to be. No vengeance can be taken, no action is possible, for the region of the alleged fault and its punishment are not in the clear-cut world of Ethics, but wholly in the spiritual regions of faith in the Unseen, where physical force is out of place. It is always thus, and there is nothing for it but to "endure to the end." "Behold I see!" cried Stephen, and as no one could prove that he did not see, all they could do was to rush upon him with stones and shatter the eyes that saw and the lips that spake.

This position continued for centuries, and must continue. There were persecutions from devout Jews such as Saul, and then State persecutions such as those under Nero, Domitian, and onward to Marcus Aurelius, and no revenge was planned; and again after a long lapse of time persecution began again under Papal Rome in a more discriminating and intimate form. The world had greatly altered, but this principle of complete non-resistance stood firm, and in the few instances where it gave way, as in that of Ziska leading the Bohemians, the failure seemed to be openly marked with divine disapproval.

Now for the conclusions to be drawn from this experience and this history. Does not such a record set the seal on pacifism for ever and ever? Does it not prove that the servants of God should never take the sword into their hands, no, not even under that severest provocation, the defence of those they love? It is very solemn, it is a matter of life and death to us, but I believe that in the regions of religious faith it does prove it, proves it to the hilt, and we ought never to need that such a lesson should be repeated. The missionary must not carry a pistol. The conscience, the heart, and the

mind of man are the only faculties we are allowed to attack, and therefore the tongue, the pen, the actions of benevolence, and the patient endurance of suffering are the only weapons permitted to us. Let this be a fixed point in our creed.

But life is not composed entirely of "religion" in the ordinary sense of the word. Outside "religion" there is a wider ring where the Moral Law on its own merit is seen to be right and good. Millions upon millions of men agree to this, even while ignoring religion, and in fact all but a few of the more lawless of the human race profess a desire to live under its rule. We may call this all but universal agreement The State, or the Collective Conscience, or the longing for the Ideal Right; we may give it varied and even contradictory names, such as "The Categorical Imperative," "The Highest Utilitarianism," or "Le Contrat Social"; we may define it this way and that way; but there undoubtedly the power is, a something of the most extraordinary value to the human race as a whole, a something the animals have not, but which drives the conduct of man into well-ordered sequences. That this power and this order emanate from God, and are the work of His Holy Spirit on the conscience and will of the Race, there cannot be the least doubt, even though they are unaccompanied by any recognition of a personal bond; and that "Love is the fulfilling of the Law," and that the individual Christian life naturally fulfils the main obligations imposed by the State, is the chief corroboration of Christianity. There are other evidences, many of them, but this is the chief. The State has not, of course, the absolutely final word, and, through tyranny at home and lust of conquest abroad, it may fail in its high commission and serve evil purposes. In that case it must be resisted, and this implies using force, for we are now in a region where physical compulsion finds its right place. We must speak in a language that is understood, and, from the slight punishment of the child up to life in the convict settlement, or even perhaps up to the capital sentence, remedial and deterrent force must be employed. Behind the order must lie the ultimate power to punish disobedience, or the order is fragile and fictitious. That which would be wrong in the region of personal religion becomes right and necessary in the region of communal ethics. It is, for instance, easily seen that a free pardon, so rightly bestowed with regard to personal insult, becomes wrong in the judicial court, where the responsibility of maintaining the honour of the law is laid on our shoulders; to forgive is, in such a case, not only an error but a crime, a transgression of the highest right.

Turn back to our present war. In the light of all these thoughts, what shall we say now about the "Forgive, forgive, Love, love" of the pacifists? This war is, thank Heaven, not one of religion, but one of ethics. Had the Turks been our sole enemies, the position might well have seemed more complicated, but, as it is, both Moslems and Hindus fight in our ranks, and (alas!) some sincere followers of Christ fight in the ranks of the Germans, and this fact at any rate proves that the matters on which we disagree are not within the regions of faith, but are strictly confined to the regions of the Moral Law, where, when argument has failed, physical violence is not only permissible, but good.

There are some things we, as Christians, need to be quite sure of before we can agree to all this, and that is that the State as such has a real definite existence in the sight of God, and is a thing on which He can look with approval; that nations as well as individuals have a real life and a course of conduct, good or evil, and that He deals with them as nations, and that when we enter into close personal relations to Him we do not lose the wider, looser, collective responsibility; that "Render unto Cæsar" is as much a command as "Render unto God," and obedience is pleasing in His sight; that the Christian does not cease to be an Englishman; and that the great public laws of Justice, Liberty, and Beneficence are not blotted out by the private laws of "Forgive and love," but are the foundation-stones of all good, and unalterable; in fine, that by giving us Redemption our Father does not undo the work of Creation, but only makes the obligations the more emphatic.

With regard to the present war, it would be far too lengthy a matter to go back on the causes, but by this date the Germans have convinced us by a thousand barbarous demonstrations that they are about the very last of civilised nations to be entrusted with the guardianship of small States, or the mastery of the high seas, and that their rule would mean a condition of helpless servitude to the mass of mankind. To say that is enough, and the conviction arises unchallenged of the right of organised physical resistance to oppose itself to such high-handed violence—more than the right, at the present time the imperative duty; and the nobler and stronger the nation, the more it is willing to suffer and to do in behalf of the weaker nation. At the present time, I say, because it is easily seen that war as we have it now is but a rough test, a clumsy expedient, where the punishment falls upon the wrong people, and that arbitration backed by some central force in which all nations were agreed would be a far better plan. Personal fighting is the argument

of children, arbitration is for grown men. Before the reason is matured violence is necessarily appealed to, for we have to speak a language that is understood. We may take the very young child by the shoulders and stand it in the corner, but two or three years later such treatment would not only be a disgrace but wholly ineffective, and we have to select other methods, until finally we can appeal to the reason and the conscience without the least exertion of physical force. In considering the conduct of nations, it is a sorrowful admission, but the methods of reason and of peace lie still in the happy future, and in this our sudden and immediate distress we have once more, and it is ardently to be hoped for the last time, to take up the old weapons and to answer our would-be invaders by the arbitrament of the sword.

The childhood of the individual and of the race run parallel the one to the other, and the use of physical violence is an evidence of immaturity in the subject to be convinced. It is, as it were, first a "blow" alone, then "a word and a blow," and then a "word" alone, with the blow held in reserve far in the background. Glance at the story of Phœnicia. This people had not a religion of mere ceremonial independent of ethics, as is to be seen in other primitive nations, but they organised the worst lusts of human nature into a system of which evidence remains in their carvings, as well as in the short but dreadful glimpses given us throughout the Old Testament, and with their wonderful ability in commerce they carried the corruption round the shores of the Mediterranean far and wide. Man under such tutelage would sink lower than the beasts, and his future would be hopeless. The rotten part of the fruit must be cut out. Who would do it? As long as God has servants on the earth He will ask them to share His mind in the matter and to help Him, but at first there was no one, and the Cities of the Plain had to be destroyed without human agency, and the awful glare of burning Sodom lights the pages of the Bible from the first book to the last. A few centuries later the hardy, desert-trained bands of Israel were led by Joshua against the fastnesses of Canaan, and hills and groves soaked in memories of blood and lust were dedicated to the only God who cared for conduct; this was but imperfectly done, for the vanquished were often mentally the victors, but the fact alone unfurled the flag of war to the death. The next instrument was a heathen representative of mere brute force, for Nebuchadnezzar utterly destroyed Tyre and Sidon, as may be read in detail in ancient inscriptions and in the book of the prophet Ezekiel. Though these cities were

"scraped to the dust and made like the top of a rock" (Ezek. xxvi. 4), the wickedness was not yet taken from the earth on account of the large and luxurious colony of Carthage, and so the austere and valiant Romans were brought in; we all know the story of "Carthago delenda est," and the result of the Punic wars, and that was the end. There were four separate assaults covering a space of one thousand five hundred years before the earth was rid of this centre of defilement, but it was done at last.

But let us before closing turn to the record of Christ, the Word of the Father, the revealer of divine thoughts, and ask, Has he left us no pronouncement on this momentous subject? It is often taken for granted that our Lord condemned all violence, and that both His life and death spoke nothing but "Forgive, forgive, Love, love." This is not so. His conduct and character are unhesitatingly founded upon perfect justice, wise, discriminating justice, and such an idea includes a background of force, even though patient explanation and gentle entreaty stand full in the foreground. It is true that His Passion and Death fall within the innermost circle of Religion, where the natural heart of man can form no true judgment, and can therefore only serve as examples to the individual who claims them; but His teaching very often deals with the region of Ethics, a region open and clear to every honest conscience, and when on these topics He speaks of violence without the slightest hesitation. His parables are by no means always about Good Samaritans and Prodigal Sons, but at times they deal with very stern matters indeed. Note the following:

Matt. xxi. 41. "He will miserably destroy those wicked husbandmen."

Matt. xxvii. 7. "He sent forth his armies and destroyed those murderers, and burned up their city."

Luke xix. 27. "Those mine enemies which would not that I should reign over them, bring hither and slay them before me."

These are the closing words of three separate and important parables, and to our ears they may sound somewhat savage. Frankly admit without hesitation that our Lord always spoke within the circle of thought marked out by His age; that Oriental justice differs altogether from the exact measurements of Western justice, and loves to praise the good and punish the evil in an extravagant fashion that betrays the morals of the world's infancy; that wild and cruel revenges were occasionally taken by governors of distant provinces, and that the audience was not the least shocked by allusion to them, but accepted them as in the course of nature, where we should

utterly condemn and renounce; admit and concede all these points, and even yet you have force, irresistible, destructive force hovering over the parable, a force without which it would be meaningless.

Other examples rise to our memory: "Cut it down, why cumbereth it the ground?" "Bind him hand and foot, and cast him into outer darkness." "The lord of that servant will cut him in sunder." "Better that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depths of the sea." These instances are of individuals, not nations, but the principle is the same. The bad shall not for ever misuse the good, the innocent shall not for ever be crushed in the hands of the brutal, the selfish and unfruitful shall not for ever spread and prosper, but when entreaty fails a stroke shall fall that it is impossible to ignore, a testimony that our Almighty Ruler cares first and most about the Moral Law. We begin now to see that the "Forgive, forgive, Love, love," so stringently enjoined on personal conduct, is means to an end rather than the end in itself, which end is the unsullied purity and living energy of perfect Goodness. Man, when all is said, is made in the image of God, and nothing lower than this can give his heart and his judgment satisfying rest. The sun is very large and is a furnace of cosmic energy of which the earth receives but about one twelve-millionth of all it has to give; the earth is very small and hangs on a fragile poise of adjustments, and yet the whole sun is needed to satisfy the demands of the earth, and nothing less will serve.

Again look on to the future. The glimpses given us seem as purposely obscure as the words that deal with present conduct are luminous, but whatever there is or is not, there is certainly the idea of compelling force. Our Lord endorses certain awful cataclysms in the past, by saying He intends to repeat them. "As it was in the days of Noah . . . as it was in the days of Lot, . . . so shall it be," and twice over come the solemn words, "It destroyed them all." Now turn to that strange book which stands last in the Bible, endeavouring by an appeal to the eye (as it were) to catch the attention that wandered from the call of the preacher to the ear, and read Rev. vi. 14 to 17. People tell us that an earthquake is a far worse and more nerve-shattering thing to endure than either flood or fire, yet the men spoken of in these verses—and observe they are of every degree from kings to slaves—definitely prefer such a convulsion of Nature to that most awful of all things "the wrath of the Lamb." "The great day of his wrath is come, and who shall be able to stand?"

What is the real meaning of that long-delayed wrath? Let me quote words abler than my own:¹ "Earthquake, darkness, and the shaken heavens, are as nothing compared with the wrath of outraged love. They turn to the whole weight of the material universe to crush and hide them, rather than meet the judgment they know they have merited; to hide them from 'the wrath of the Lamb.' We cannot soften or explain away the words. If we could we should shake the foundations of the moral universe, we should rob the world and everyone in it of the great hope of the victory of justice, of the overcoming evil with good. All love on earth would be baseless if love in heaven were not rooted in equity. The heart of mankind could not rest on a love which could not burn with fires of indignation against wrong. No anger like the anger of pity for the wronged! no wrath like 'the wrath of the Lamb.' Thank Heaven for that strong paradoxical phrase. It kills for ever the weak delusion that pity means indulgence to sin, that patience means tolerance of wrongs to others, that indignation against injustice is an unsaintly agitation, that justice is an apathetic admission that both sides may be equally wrong, and mercy an indolent hope that both may be equally right." Words such as these strike into the very depths of the matter; and as long as God has servants on the earth, it is through them that He will work.

To fight for Ethics but not for Religion. Let me revert in closing to this distinction that I have already worked out, because I believe it is here that the best Pacifists are led astray. "Man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart." It is not blameworthy in man that he can judge only by the words and deeds of another man; that is his province, to decide by conduct, while the Lord reserves to Himself alone to judge of the inner motive from which the conduct springs. So important is this distinction that Christ did not leave it unnoticed. Not for the future but for the present, not in parable or metaphor but in direct and open terms, our Lord shows that the exertion of physical force is right in defence of the State, and wrong in defence of the Church. It is John xviii. 36: "If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight." Is Britain a kingdom of this world? Most decidedly she is. She is a kingdom that above all others stands for the three great foundation-stones of the State—Justice, Liberty, and Beneficence. In defence of such a kingdom the opposition of arms to the very death is to be expected; is necessary, is right, is to be

¹ *The Book of the Unweiling*, Mrs Charles (S.P.C.K.).

approved and honoured. These words of our Lord are His "Render unto Cæsar" over again, with the sudden and startling transfer from civilian to military life, and surely set the question at rest. Not for a moment would I deny that the "fighting" is better carried on by the pen than by the sword, but some sort of fighting (ultimately backed by compulsion) will be necessary to the end of the world, or the savage, grasping, retrogressive spirit will triumph, whether shown in commercial selfishness or in direct military assault. In the present instance it is not England, France, and Belgium only that would suffer by our present enemy proving the conqueror, it is the ethics of the whole world that would suffer; all supreme Justice, as the guardian of Liberty and Beneficence, would suffer; civilisation, the care and tutelage of inferior races, every good object on which the State finds its noble employments, all would be thrown back for a couple of centuries, and perhaps be deflected for ever from the right course of progress. We fight for the grandest, noblest, most world-embracing cause that the world has ever known, or that can be imagined; we have the Divine approval distinctly enunciated, and we will fight till our cause is won and reigns supreme over the whole earth.

The difficulty that confronts us lies in a wholly different region, and that is in the answer to the question, Are we as a nation worthy to be the champions of this spotless cause? The godless vanity of many of the rich, the besotting drink of many of the poor, seem to shout aloud, No, no, not worthy. Listen to the words of an officer at the Eastern front that appeared in the *Times* last March: "I feel confident, with many others, that the real war is against social evils, and the real battleground in the hearts of men. Not until there is some marked improvement in the atmosphere at home dare we hope or even wish for victory. I was through the fighting in Gallipoli, and, awful as it was, it was not sadder than——" There is plenty more, but I need not continue. If peace were innocent, our views of war would be changed, but sin is a worse thing than pain, and while peace is used for the degrading evils of self-indulgence, the energy and sacrifice of war only shine the brighter. But this is another subject.

CONSTANCE L. MAYNARD.

NATIONAL TRAINING.

A REPLY TO MR BEGBIE.

REGINALD F. RYND, B.D.,

Reader of the Temple.

THE excursion of Mr Harold Begbie into the regions of educational reform suggests many and varied reflections. Few subjects of the many upon which the War has served to centre attention call for so large a measure of technical knowledge and experience. Even the experts hesitate to speak with anything like finality or decision on the endless issues involved in the question of reform. Beyond an agreement that our methods are haphazard and unscientific, no constructive alternative policy seems as yet to have been more than outlined, and the whole question after months of discussion is still *sub judice*.

Before considering in any detail Mr Begbie's plea for national training, it is necessary briefly to question, if not to controvert, his fundamental idea of the function of education. He seems to have tripped over the ancient fallacy that the whole content of education is to be found in the etymology of the word by which the thing itself is expressed. Mr Begbie declares that education can only "guide" or "control," it cannot "create"; it can only draw upon and put out at interest a fund already in existence; it can add nothing *de novo* to the elemental stock of character or personality.

This idea that education is only formative, instructive, and not creative can surely be pushed too far. The childish mind is a *tabula rasa* upon which a whole series of impressions, good or bad, may be engraved by educational processes. Through education the child learns what are to him absolutely new truths; doors are opened hitherto closed, vistas revealed hitherto undreamt of; and an educationist with any experience knows that training will not only develop tendencies already

in existence in germ, but will awaken entirely new trains of thought, suggest entirely new fields of intellectual energy.

The function of education is to establish a relationship between the unformed mind of the child and a whole body of moral and intellectual principles of which he starts by knowing nothing. Upon the kind of education he receives will depend the choice of one or more alternative roads in the realm of conduct or understanding, and it is surely no abuse of language to call this work "creative."

Education may not be able to "radically change character," but it can so materially alter it as to give both moral and intellectual impulses an entirely new direction; it may not make a "saint of the sinner," or a "philosopher of the fool," but it can transform vicious tendencies into those of virtue, and dulness into intelligence.

But it is less with what education means than with what we demand of it that we are concerned for the moment. Unfortunately, in this aspect of the question, we do not appear to be as free to erect a new system as Mr Begbie would have us believe. It is possible that "national" training, as he conceives it, would go a good way towards creating a stronger social and racial consciousness than has hitherto belonged to the national ethos, but the modern child is something more than a mere social unit, or the member of a particular nationality: he is part of an intensely complicated social and industrial machine, in which he is destined to play his allotted part or perish. He is a human liability, and would not cease to be so by virtue of a civic training which is to make him a better citizen. The society to which he belongs must not only clothe and feed and train him in the years of growth, it must also provide him with the means of independent existence. At a certain stage in his development he must convert his physical or intellectual energies into pounds, shillings, and pence, or face starvation.

Now, if the State, at the same time that it provides the child with "health," "morality," and "intelligence," as postulated by Mr Begbie, can give him the equipment needed for the stern and ceaseless battle that lies before him, well and good; but if not, one or other of these desiderata will have to go by the board. You could not superimpose the system outlined by Mr Begbie upon the present competitive basis of professional and industrial life. It would demand nothing less than an entire reconstruction of the very foundations on which our society now rests.

Life is primarily a practical affair, it is only in a secondary

sense national, and any work of reconstruction would have to effect a balance between the rival claims upon the modern child's time and energy. The schoolmaster's function is necessarily confined to matters that are strictly relevant. He may, if time permits, make excursions into wider fields than those to which necessity binds him, but if he does so, it is at the risk of his own reputation and the future of the child. Modern life is at best for the industrial classes a stormy and complicated affair, and social and industrial pressure seems to increase rather than diminish as time goes on.

But can we be certain that our general system of training is so demonstrably bad, or that we should benefit by any larger measure of "State" control? As far as our primary education is concerned, things point the other way. People speak of the "State" as if it were some divinely-endowed entity that could always be relied upon to act with greater wisdom than any mere group or individual. But the State is after all only the nation in miniature; it is the microcosm of the national administrative faculty and intelligence: the stream cannot rise above its source.

As far as education is concerned, the State in action is resolved into a "local authority," which has not hitherto shown such evidence of enlightenment and sagacity in its administration that we can regard any extension of its power with enthusiasm. It has always suffered from that peculiar official lightheadedness which seems to overtake local bodies acting under Government control, and it has a pathetic attachment to red-tape possibly not equalled by any other branch of public service. It is well known, for instance, that the headmaster of a "Council" school has to spend so much of his time filling in the endless forms required by the local authority, that his opportunities of teaching and personal contact with his pupils are reduced to a minimum.

But we have the product of "State" control among us to-day in the person of the lower-class child. And the lower-class child is not voted a success. He has no manners, is prone to petty vices, and is just now causing a flutter in administrative dovecotes by criminal tendencies that are defying all the efforts alike of religion and philanthropy. We are not disposed to deny the need of broadening the basis of our education; the neglect of science and modern languages is an evil that should be remedied; but let us beware that in getting rid of one educational fetish (even if it consist of an exaggerated individualism), we do not exchange it for another.

In spite of all his protestations, Mr Begbie's plea is based on

a system and on principles associated with Germanism. It is a benevolent despotism no doubt, but it primarily looks to the good of the State and steadily subordinates individual interests to the larger national claim, and is founded on a theory of the State that inevitably tends to stereotype and depress the national character. The "State" cannot always be trusted. Party government is bad, but "group" government is infinitely worse, as the example of Germany has taught us.

The vision of the "State" is limited by official and bureaucratic tendencies that no amount of prescience can hope to eliminate. We were, not unnaturally, shocked at the picture of rampant individualism in this country which the War served to show up in such strong relief, and we are almost unconsciously influenced by models that have resulted in the national unity Germany is so proud of; but we should do well to remember that the whole strength and temper of the English race is intimately bound up with a conception of freedom which makes our normal civil and political institutions unique.

Our secondary education may be unscientific, and it may be absurd that our private schools should be proprietary concerns and our public schools self-supporting bodies owing nothing to State subsidy or control; but it surely will not be denied that they have done their part in the creation and consolidation of character, and have produced the men needed for England's social and political development. Before any drastic change is made there must be a presumption that a new system will produce results at least as good, if no better. But beyond certain questions of detail which probably in the long run matter far less than seems to be thought at the moment, no case for any radical change in the system of secondary education has as yet been made out.

With the education of the industrial classes things are very different. Here it is not a mere question of detail, but of the whole system, root and branch. Nationally speaking, the education of the lower classes, who are vastly in the majority, is a matter of much greater concern than that of the upper and middle classes. The reasons are obvious. There are traditions of order and refinement behind the upper classes which, while they may not prevent their being vicious or ineffective, must prevent their becoming, in any large sense, a menace to the moral stability of the nation. Private and public schools are based upon a conception of discipline and *esprit de corps* that helps to remove tendencies to individualism that may be harmful, unsocial, or destructive.

But with the lower-class child things are far otherwise.

He does not possess any strict social sense or sense of collective responsibility; he knows nothing of *esprit de corps*, but is mainly concerned to get through life with as little personal friction as possible. He belongs to a social order where the very pressure of existence makes a strict code of honour and veracity exceedingly difficult. At an early age he learns to look out for himself, and is on the defensive against parental or parochial encroachments upon his cherished liberty. By his parents he is often regarded less as a moral responsibility than as an economic asset, and he starts to earn wages long before his powers of mind and body are properly developed. Voluntary organisations of all kinds are brought in to supplement the moral training that school or home have been able to afford. They all do something to stop leakages and fill up gaps, but they do not touch the fringe of the necessity that actually exists. They all suffer from being voluntary institutions, with which a certain element of bribery is insensibly associated, and they are largely in the wrong hands.

The Scout movement, for example, one of the most universal and popular instruments of social progress, has not fully justified the hopes that were roused at its inauguration. It is a delicate instrument, and is liable to work more harm than good in unsuitable hands. It is based on "individualism," and the very freedom of its principles demands personal and administrative powers of the highest order.

From these and kindred organisations the men of the class with traditions of order and refinement behind them stand severely aloof. We are not disposed to inquire into the causes of this indifference; we can only state, as a matter of long personal experience, that it exists, and record our conviction that social work among the young people of the working classes needs the best in the way of brain and breeding that the country can offer if it is to be really effective.

The same principle applies in our primary education. It is in the wrong hands. Its teachers are taken from a class who cannot set the standard of moral, personal, and social refinement that is needed to counteract the unsocial and destructive tendencies associated with the less educated orders of society. The salaries paid are so wretched, that a class of teacher is attracted who must of necessity lack the strong personal qualities required for such work.

It is, of course, impossible entirely to model our national schools upon the example of the public and private schools of the country, but it should not be impossible to borrow something from them in the way of temper and administration,

and place the whole system on a broader, more human, and more dynamic basis than is possible with things as they are. The public school boy, who relatively needs far less discipline than his less privileged brother, is obliged to belong to a cadet corps, and besides the indigenous discipline of school-life is subjected to the severer military discipline of the O.T.C. For the lower-class boy there is no such provision. Between the critical ages of fourteen and eighteen he may either succumb to the blandishments of one of the many organisations that will try to secure him, or go his own way and possibly drift, as so many lads do, into one of those groups or gangs of young human wastage that may be seen any day in the week in the streets of East or South London.

In face of the urgent necessity of making fundamental changes in the system that is intended to educate and civilise the working-class child, we may safely leave secondary education to take care of itself. Its temper and methods are admirably suited to the English character in spite of certain faults in detail. But for the child of the industrial classes something more is needed than the mere extension of "State" control as conceived by Mr Begbie. Bureaucratic methods inseparable from "State" interference have been the curse of our primary education, which needs the play of freer and more enlightened principles than the present system, or its extension, can hope to give us. Failing any radical change such as we have indicated, some compulsory organisation, on a military basis, can alone give the moral stability and personal discipline which the children of the working-classes need: voluntary organisations have had their day.

The correlative question of "State" morality would need an article to itself; but we are surprised to find any advocate for an idea that both reason and experience must show to be an illusion: morality apart from the sanctions of religion has again and again been found to be "the baseless fabric of a dream."

REGINALD F. RYND.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"SACRAMENTAL RELIGION."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1917, p. 230.)

I.

It is a matter of great importance that the writer of a strongly controversial article should make himself acquainted with the actual opinions of those whom he is criticising, and that he should be able to explain with some coherence the position which he occupies himself. The Bishop of Carlisle, writing on "Sacramental Religion," has been singularly unfortunate in each of these respects. He is quite within his rights when he expresses his disagreement with "Sacramentalists," but he should not attribute to them notions which they would energetically repudiate, nor should he deny their adherence to truths which they hold as commonplaces of religion. He begins by defining Sacraments in the widest sense to be "all cognisable signs of the presence and attributes of the invisible God," and he has many excellent remarks to make on this subject. But he pitches his observations in such a key that there is connoted all through his disquisition the impression that this wide view is repugnant to "Catholics," and is a priceless treasure of Protestant theology. As a matter of fact, this wide view is a platitude of general Christian belief. It is tersely expressed in the Church Catechism, which says that a Sacrament has two parts, the outward visible sign and the inward spiritual grace; it finds explicit acceptance in the earliest Church writers, and it is implicitly held by everyone who believes in Christianity, and by many people who do not. The suggestion that it is the peculiar property of the Bishop and those who symbolise with him is perfectly gratuitous; the topic in question is an elementary truism of universal acceptance.

But the Bishop adds: "We narrow too much, and with fatal consequences, the sacramental character of human life when we limit it to specific ordinances and observances." One is sorry to hear that the Bishop is engaged in making such a limitation, but as he says "we," who in the world can be making it with him? Certainly not the Church of Rome. Out of the innumerable "outward signs" it has indeed selected seven which it considers to be so distinctly emphasised by the Almighty as channels of His grace, that it is justified in giving an assurance to all and sundry that the grace of God is to be found in the use of them. Not a whit more the Church of England, which has selected two only of such "outward signs" as being ordained by Christ personally, about which it feels able to give

the same assurance. But where is the limitation? There is here a positive certification of a small number of ordinances, but there is no denial of the value which presumably belongs to other ordinances which are not thus attested.

It is evident that a definition of what is called "validity" is needed. The Bishop recognises this necessity, and accordingly proceeds to meet it: "There are two kinds of validity: the validity of God's grace and a validity of man's invention. The former is known by its fruits and its freedom: the latter by its leaves and fetters."

And again: "When, therefore, men are considering the validity of Sacraments it behoves them to define the kind of validity they are considering, and to say whether they mean institutional validity or validity according to the fullness of the Incarnation. For it is a very serious matter indeed to restrict that fullness to the measures of an institution, and confound these institutional measures with the measure of the Mind of God."

As we must conclude from these definitions that institutional validity is "a validity of man's invention," and is known "by its leaves and fetters," we naturally shrink from confessing that that is precisely the validity which we mean. We are comforted, however, in doing so by reading that, "A Church regarded simply as an ecclesiastical institution or organisation clearly has a right to make its own conditions of membership" (in fact, to go in for "leaves and fetters"), "but it has no right to unchurch other Churches, or pronounce their ministrations either irregular or invalid because they differ from its own methods and teachings." Then what on earth is it to say about them? It "has a right to make its own conditions of membership"; which means that it has a right to say what elements constitute the true Church, what are essential principles in organised religion. What is it to say, then, about organisations which do not possess, and which do not want to possess, those features? Is it to say in one breath that it has learned from the Gospel that certain things are essential, but that it really is of no consequence whether you possess them or not? That "It does not matter what you believe as long as you believe that it does not matter"?

The long and the short of it is, that there is only one thing, and not two, to which the word "validity" is properly given. It is the assurance given by the Church that certain conditions exist which God has promised to crown with His Presence, and that these conditions fully exist on certain given occasions. In precisely the same way the Mint puts a "Hall-mark" on the precious metals to certify that they are genuine. It does not assert that there is no gold in the mines or elsewhere; it is even conceivable that it might be sometimes deceived about the metals upon which it stamps the Hall-mark. This is the work undertaken and the position assumed by the Church. "The outward and visible sign" is a "pledge to assure us" of the presence of "the inward and spiritual grace." But in all its sacramental definitions there is no suggestion that the grace of God may not be found elsewhere. In determining the Canon of Scripture the Church does not even imply that there is no inspiration outside it; in asserting the validity of its "orders" it does not deny the obvious fact that the grace of God is working through the ministry of many men who are not episcopally ordained; in certifying that the presence of Christ is to be found in His Sacraments there is no thought of restricting "that fullness to the measures of an institution." It is a perilous thing to assert a universal negative, but

I will venture to say that not one of those whom the Bishop of Carlisle is tilting at all through his article, from the Pope of Rome to the most obscure Anglican Ritualistic Curate, would be found to suggest such a preposterous restriction. The Bishop has set up a man of straw, such a man as never was on land or sea, and scolds us all for the existence of his puppet. For throughout his article runs the implication that "Catholics" do not hold truths which are of the essence of the Gospel, and the assertion that they do hold mechanical and limited notions which everyone of them would repudiate with all his might.

There are many other points in the article which call for notice, but I will indicate only two. It is said (p. 237), "If it [the sacramental presence] depended merely on historic successions or ecclesiastical institutions it would be dangerously uncertain." If it depended "merely" on this, it would be not only uncertain, but impossible. Yet there may be an essential element in a situation without its being the only one. The Church of England decides that this "historic succession" is essential when it asserts that the unworthiness of the minister does not affect the validity of the Sacrament; but the Bishop himself seems to assert the same thing when he adds a sentence in strange contradiction to that which has just been quoted: "A duly ordered agency is meet and right—nay, even necessary—for the decent and effective ministry of God's Word and Sacraments; for without such an ordination vagueness and chaos would inevitably ensue." Nothing more decisive about irregular ministries could possibly be said; for my own part, I would hardly go the length of ascribing "vagueness and chaos" to any effort made in Christ's name under whatever auspices it began.

Once more (p. 232), concerning "the Apostolical succession," the Bishop says, "I understand that some of the most learned ecclesiastical scholars are growing increasingly doubtful about the unbroken continuity of this succession." Such a method of suggesting doubts about a historical fact would be disingenuous if it were not made, as it evidently is, in complete forgetfulness of the wide area which such an argument covers. For example, on page 236 we read, "The most trustworthy means we possess for the authentic determination of the mind and will of Christ are the New Testament writings." But to this, if he is consistent, the Bishop must add that "some of the most learned ecclesiastical scholars are growing increasingly doubtful about" it, and a good many of them feel quite sure that the New Testament writings hardly represent the mind and will of Christ at all, but reflect merely the Judaistic presuppositions of the Synoptists and the Hellenistic eclecticism of John and Paul. But the Bishop is not consistent with himself; he does not understand in the least degree the theology which he is criticising, and, as far as one can make out, he writes from a position of his own which shifts its ground from page to page, from the vagueness of gnostic mysticism to the clear-cut certainties of Calvin.

FRANCIS LEITH BOYD.

ST PAUL'S, KNIGHTSBRIDGE.

II.

WE may indeed say with the Bishop of Carlisle that it is not for us to attempt to put limitations on the Divine grace, and that wherever the grace of God flows, there it makes its own channels. This, however, does

not settle the question whether there are not prescribed channels within the fellowship of a Visible Church in which grace has been promised to us and through which it is specially ordained to flow. Who of us, for instance, would assert that the Bible is the only written book which has proved to be a means of grace? Yet all Christians agree to regard it as the normal fountain of the grace of God and the ordained channel provided for its flow.

May we not say that God has made known to us two ideals, both of which it is necessary to keep in mind, yet apparently often conflicting, and which Christendom has not yet seen the way to combine, the ideal of fellowship in a Visible Church, and that of the all-embracing love of God? And may we not be glad that each ideal finds its exponents, seeing that the more earnestly we hold on to the one, the more likely we are to lose sight of the other? For ideals are amongst the most sacred things that we have given to us, and they must be maintained, come what may, even in this impossible world—impossible, I mean, because the facts rarely correspond with the ideals. Experience indeed has shown how little compatible the inward fellowship of spirit is with the lapse from outward unity. And yet, on the other hand, the position of the Nonconformist Churches, at home and abroad, with the undoubted spiritual forces behind their ministries and the fruits of the Spirit manifest in their works, constitutes, as the Bishop rightly impresses on us, a fact which we cannot afford to ignore.

Let us ask then, how does God Himself deal with facts which are out of harmony with His ideals? All through the history of mankind it may be seen how He is perpetually adapting His action to human infirmity. Even so, where disunion has abounded, grace has often abounded more exceedingly.

And so He has set us an example which the Church has been slow to follow. For us to abandon the ideal of unity in the fellowship within one Visible Church is unthinkable, but there must be ways of going outside and beyond it. Have we found these ways? Have we even earnestly sought for them?

And in this connection I would ask to be allowed to make one practical suggestion. For us, the clergy, to attempt to find ways of our own by passing the limits ordained by authority would be surely inexcusable. And yet, supposing that someone amongst us, of sufficient weight and eminence, should feel justified in overpassing the recognised boundaries in pursuit of some practical effort—I am not thinking, of course, of doctrinal variations—in order to establish relations of amity with those outside our Communion, would it not be better, instead of carping at it, to wait and see what fruits come of his action? Has it not sometimes happened that the Church has made some real advance by action in the first place of doubtful legality? Should the too adventurous explorer be found to be on the wrong track, no one is committed but himself, whereas, if he is right, we may all be following him in days to come; in which case, perhaps, the parable is likely to be exemplified which narrates that “no one remembered that same poor man.”

FREDERIC BONE.

"NATIONAL TRAINING."

(Hibbert Journal, January 1917, p. 177.)

MR BEGBIE cuts the Gordian knot of the religious difficulty in National education. He will have no religious beliefs taught, no theism of any kind. In order to reconcile us to this, he asks us to accept certain statements as axiomatic. Upon these I should like to make a few remarks.

Mr Begbie calls upon us to acknowledge that "education cannot radically change character." Then he tells us that "its only function is to develop the most useful talents and the best characteristics of a personality," and then, a little lower, "at its very best . . . education is only guidance." As if guidance were the same thing as development, and as if development, which acts on certain selected elements of character by way of encouragement, and on certain others by way of repression, does not radically alter character!

Personally, I believe that just as the State enforcement of Puritanism under the Commonwealth changed the character of our people so that we are no longer the musicians which our Elizabethan ancestors were, so education arranged to advance the military schemes of Prussia has radically altered for the worse the moral character of the German people.

Then as regards State education he says, "Its business is the training of its children in such qualities as the State demands in its citizens." Obviously, therefore, we must reach some measure of national agreement as to the qualities which the State demands. Mr Begbie's demands of a citizen of the British Empire, as such, are not coextensive with mine, and I do not think either of us could put up with the ideal the German Empire sets before itself. Some way must be found to formulate an ideal of citizenship acceptable to the nation as a whole before a scheme of education can be initiated to realise it.

Mr Begbie's citizen, as such, is to have "the spirit of Christianity, but not its creed." But the spirit of Christianity is that of loyalty to Christ. Nevertheless the citizen, as such, is to have no belief in the Heavenly Father, Whom it was the supreme object of Christ to reveal to the world.

The citizen, as such, is to be both moral and intelligent, but apparently these qualities are to be kept in watertight compartments, so that his intelligence must not be turned upon his morality, for that would inevitably lead him into the forbidden sphere of doctrine, orthodox or the reverse.

"The ministers of religion," says Mr Begbie, "have all their work cut out for them in preparing the public life of the nation for the reception of these children after the State has finished with them." They have indeed! These children, unintelligently moral, and intelligently unmoral, are to have a "public conscience" worked up in them after their school education is completed—a truly Sisyphean task!

Apparently our children are naturally moral, and not naturally intelligent. Is Mr Begbie not afraid that when he has quickened the germ of intelligence, which he perceives in them, it may burst the watertight compartments and ask awkward questions about morality, questions for which the State system makes no provision, and for the answers to which the child must look to amateur efforts at instruction provided for his jaded brain in times of relaxation?

Mr Begbie makes play with the differences of religious belief within the nation, and concludes that as the State no longer demands of its citizens

belief in any one system of religious teaching, no such system should be taught in its schools. But the State ought to require of its citizens religious belief, for history shows conclusively that an irreligious nation, a nation in which religious belief has ceased to have life and power, is a decadent nation. Only the State cannot, as things are, require any specified religious belief. And here, for want of space to prove it, I must ask him to accept as axiomatic the statement that the least satisfactory form of the Christian Creed, if it be living, and in touch with all departments of life, has a wholesome effect in the development of character for which no substitute has been, or can be, found. Undenominationalism is not such a form. It was manufactured, it did not grow, it is designedly incomplete, it is not a living thing. But there are ways of bringing to morality the indispensable stimulus of religious belief without either attempting the impossible task of discovering the irreducible minimum, or else perpetrating the injustice of teaching children beliefs which their parents do not wish them to hold. Hitherto the abominable practice of making education a pawn in the game of party politics has barred out all attempts at experimenting in this direction. Will the breaking up of old party ties after the war give those their chance at last who hold that in all State schools children should be taught the religion of their parents by teachers who believe in it?

CHARLES E. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF.

BUXTON.

"THE MODERNIST REVIVAL OF ANGLICANISM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1916, p. 90.)

WHETHER all-convincing to most or many folk, Mr Moxon's article is refreshingly clear. There is, however, one expression in a sentence of his which, unless I have misread it, is surely a slip of the pen. Mr Moxon says, "The religious bond between disciples and God in Christ is the bond of love and not an agreement with the belief *either of the Master* or of a majority of His followers." Mr Moxon must, surely, mean the words "either of the Master" to be taken in a limited sense. If used without qualification, they would strike at Him who is the Truth. Mr Moxon must, surely, have in his mind beliefs which Jesus shared with His age; *e.g.* as to the authorship of the Old Testament books or the nearness of the *Parousia*. He cannot possibly mean his sweeping sentence to include the fundamentals of the Christian faith. Indeed Mr Moxon himself speaks in the preceding sentence of "a common faith in the Divine character as revealed by the life and work of Christ," thus implying that we accept as authoritative our Lord's teaching about the Father.

There is one interesting point arising out of Mr Moxon's reference to the inhibition by the Bishop of Oxford of the Rev. J. M. Thompson because he expressed his denial of the clauses about Christ's birth in their literal meaning. Dr Charles Gore, when Bishop of Birmingham, himself enunciated similar views in his fourth lecture on "The Historical Trustworthiness of the Gospels," delivered in St Philip's Church, Birmingham, at noon on December 10th, 1902, when his *ipsissima verba* were, "The evidence of our Lord's birth of a virgin was no part of the original Apostolic testimony, and still to-day this question is not a ground on which belief is asked."

THEODORE P. BROCKLEHURST.

GIGGLESWICK-IN-CRAVEN.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

IN the last Survey I referred to the interesting series of papers published in commemoration of Professor Josiah Royce's sixtieth birthday. Professor Royce did not long survive that event. He died at his home in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on September 14 last. A distinguished philosophical thinker and teacher has thus been removed from our midst, and a man who can ill be spared in the present crisis of human history. Royce combined in singular measure depth of metaphysical insight with a moral enthusiasm that was inspiring and contagious. The idealism which he worked out in a succession of stimulating volumes bore from the beginning the stamp of original thinking and was in no sense a mere reproduction of the Hegelian mode of speculation. It owed, perhaps, more to Fichte and to Schopenhauer than to Hegel, and in later years Royce used to say that he considered himself less Hegelian than he ever was. Each of his books shows him gradually making headway along the line of reflection he had mapped out for himself. In his early work, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (1891), he breaks away from the conventional track by seeking to ground his idealism upon the contention that the conditions which determine the logical possibility of error must themselves be absolute truth, and by challenging an opponent to show how he could make an error save through the presence of an actual inclusive thought for which the error always was error. In *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (1897), by means of the distinction between the world of description and the world of appreciation, he reaches the conclusion that since that only can be described which has first been appreciated, there must be universal types of appreciation, and in consequence ideals must be logically prior to mechanism—and nature, in order to be relatively describable, must embody purposes and so be possessed of truth. In the two volumes, *The World and the Individual* (1900 and 1901), on the basis of the distinction between the external and internal meaning of ideas, the conception of individuality is elaborated and the attempt is made to show that the individuality of the unique divine purpose is in such wise present in each finite purpose that no finite purpose, viewed merely as an internal meaning, could have its place taken by another without a genuine alteration of the whole. Finally, in his last work, *The Problem of Christianity* (1913),

the main stress of the argument is laid upon the nature of what is called "interpretation" as contrasted with perception and conception. There are, it is contended, objects which can be called neither things nor universals—namely, meanings or signs; and the knowledge of a sign *qua* sign, *i.e.* *qua* meaning, is a knowledge *sui generis*. A mind is essentially a being that manifests itself through signs, and the very being of signs consists in their demanding interpretation. The relations of minds are essentially social, and experience shows that the idea of the individual self and that of the community are peculiarly adapted to interpret the other, both to itself and to the other, when such interpretation is carried on in the spirit which the Apostle Paul laid at the basis of his philosophy of human history and of his Christology.

The sudden death on December 16, at the age of fifty-three, of Professor Hugo Münsterberg, Director of the Psychological Laboratory at Harvard, removes from our midst another thinker of great independence and originality. His earliest publication was a dissertation on the development, application, and significance of the theory of natural selection, which appeared in 1885; but he first became known by his brilliant monograph, entitled *Die Willenshandlung*, that appeared in 1888. Premising that psychology is exclusively concerned with contents of consciousness (*Bewusstseinsinhalte*), and that sensations are the ultimate irreducible constituents into which a content of consciousness may be analysed, Münsterberg maintained that the will, as a psychological phenomenon, could be reduced to a complex of sensations, each one of which is of the same order as blue, hard, sweet, or warm. The little volume, written with much vigour and force, gave rise to a somewhat heated controversy both in Germany and in England. It was followed by a series of *Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie*, in which the author, on the basis of a considerable amount of experimental investigation, tried to show that what Wundt had named apperception was not essentially different in kind from the process of association. In his later books, however—in *Psychology and Life* (1899), and particularly in the *Grundzüge der Psychologie* (1900), unquestionably his greatest work,—Münsterberg argued that although psychology as a science is restricted to *Bewusstseinsinhalte*, yet these are no more the ultimate reality of our inner experience than the unperceivable atoms of the physicist are the ultimate reality of the outer world. The real subject is a willing subject, but the will, in this sense, is not a perceivable object, and cannot, therefore, be dealt with from the psychological point of view. Finally, in the volume entitled *The Eternal Values* (1909), dedicated to Josiah Royce, Münsterberg worked out an idealistic philosophy, according to which the world is a deed—*i.e.* the realisation of that which is willed, the unfolding of an eternal will.

We are glad to see in *Mind* (Oct. 1916) a translation from the Russian of Professor L. M. Lopatin's paper on "The Philosophy of Vladimir Soloviev." Soloviev tried to reconcile in his philosophy many conflicting tendencies of thought. He was a theist in his ideas of the primary basis of things; and at the same time a pantheist in his conception of the world-process as a becoming absolute. He was an optimist in his general appreciation of the meaning of human and natural existence; and to some extent a pessimist in appraising the actual conditions of universal and human development. He believed that freedom was a fact, inasmuch as he conceived all concrete existences to emerge from the absolute self-

determination of God, whom nothing impels to act in any prescribed manner; and he was a determinist inasmuch as he regarded all cosmic and historical process as predetermined by the interrelations of the fundamental factors of reality which called it forth and direct it. He was an idealist in his view of the inner essence of things; and at the same time he was a realist in so far as he considered space, time, and causality in nature to be not mere illusions of our consciousness but to possess a certain independent reality, though relative to ourselves. Professor Lopatin tries to show how these apparently irreconcilable points of view were united in his system into one coherent whole. There is an interesting article in the same number of *Mind* by Mr Archibald A. Bowman on "Kant's Phenomenalism in its relation to subsequent Metaphysics." It was, Mr Bowman contends, Schopenhauer's fundamental error (as indeed, though in a less crude way, it was Hegel's) to see in Kant's phenomenalism a subjectivism akin to Berkeley's. Phenomenalism, as Kant understood it, is, in truth, the very opposite of subjectivism. A phenomenon, according to Kant, is not a mere appearance (*Erscheinung*), but an appearance imbued with a universality that is original and native to it. The theory was designed to establish the objective validity of scientific principles by purging appearance of inconsistency; and although this could only be done by introducing the antithesis of appearance and reality, the antithesis, in so far as it concerns the content of knowledge, is entirely negligible. Mr Carll Whitman Doxsee presents a careful piece of work in his article on "Hume's Relation to Malebranche" (*Phil. R.*, Sept. 1916). He shows that these two thinkers have in common (a) a very similar analysis of causation; (b) a negative account of the knowability of the self; and (c) a doctrine of "natural judgment." No feature of Malebranche's philosophy, considering its position as a stage in the development of Cartesianism, is more noteworthy than the contention that we have no idea but only a vague feeling of the self. "My inner self reveals only that I am, that I think, that I desire, that I feel, that I suffer, etc.; but it does not reveal to me what I am, the nature of my feelings, of my passions, of my pain, nor the relations of all these to one another, because, having no idea of my soul, not beholding its archetype in God, I am not able to discover either what it is or the modes of which it is capable" (*Entretien*, iii.).

The *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* have become indispensable to those who wish to follow the current tendencies of philosophical reflection. The new volume (vol. xvi., 1916: London, Williams & Norgate) contains a number of important papers. Dr H. Wildon Carr's inaugural address, as President, on "The Moment of Experience," deals with a problem that has recently occupied much attention. Premising that the moment of experience is the moment in which reality is sensed, the moment in which the mind is in direct and immediate relation to its object, he argues that movement or change is directly sensed, that what is mathematically past and what is mathematically future are both actually present to the mind in such a moment. The abstract contradictions, past and future, synthesised in a present moment, become in the concept of activity an organic unity, and, therefore, reality in a higher degree. And as the moment of activity, the moment of experience may be said to be the moment of "attention to life." Lord Haldane contributes a paper on "Progress in Philosophical Research," in which he gives an account of the rise of the New Realism and the gain to philosophical inquiry resulting from the discussions it has

initiated. Lord Haldane maintains that the mind, when it is adequately conceived, evinces itself as that which envelops the world, and not as a thing alongside of other things in that world. If universals are to be thought of as existing in an extra-mental world and apart from mind, then physical reality becomes so transformed from the old-fashioned way of regarding it as to exhibit a logical vitality impossible to dissociate from continuity with a psychical system. One of the ablest papers in the volume is that by Mr J. W. Scott on "The Common-sense Distinction of Appearance and Reality." Common-sense, he argues, selects one from the many appearances of an entity, and signalises it as the reality, of which the rest are the seeming, and from a knowledge of which the rest in certain circumstances can be expected. The thesis which the author endeavours to defend is that the "real" appearance possesses the characteristic of being the container, of which the other appearances are the content. Ultimately, it is contended, we emerge with the conclusion that the real is not a few selected appearances only, but that everything that appears at all is real. Professor A. E. Taylor's contribution on "Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates" is full of suggestive material, bearing not only on Greek philosophy but on modern thinking, such as the distinction between a vicious and a harmless infinite regress, and the acute discussion of Plato's "refutation of idealism" in the *Parmenides*. The presentation of the theory of relativity in Professor A. N. Whitehead's paper on "Space, Time, and Relativity" is likewise a valuable piece of work, and will be especially helpful to those who are concerned with the philosophical significance of the theory. Two symposia are included in the volume. One of these, to which Miss Beatrice Edgell, Mr F. C. Bartlett, Dr G. E. Moore, and Dr H. W. Carr contribute, is on "The Implications of Recognition." Miss Edgell criticises Mr Russell's theory of knowledge in that it allows no place for retentiveness, as distinguished from definite memories, and considers this failure to arise from the attempt to analyse the simplest cognitive experience into a two-term relation, viz. mental act and physical reality. Dr Moore urges that Miss Edgell's arguments are an attack not upon Mr Russell's theory of knowledge, but only upon his theory of the physical world. The other symposium is on "The Nature of the State in view of its External Relations." The writers—Mr C. Delisle Burns, Mr Bertrand Russell, and Mr G. D. H. Cole—are largely in agreement in rejecting the view that the State is an end in itself.

A somewhat similar position in regard to the State is taken by Mr Edmund H. Hollands in his article entitled "Nature, Reason, and the Limits of State Authority" (*Phil. R.*, Sept. 1916). Mr Hollands contends (a) that Hegel's idea of the State as the final possible human organisation is inconsistent with his own philosophy, for the logic of that philosophy would demand the transcendence of every moral interest, as an ideal principle, over its immediate objectification; and (b) that the theory is contrary to the facts of the moral life, for men have interests in common goods—economic, æsthetic, scientific and philosophical, moral and religious—which exceed by their nature the limits of the State, and are, potentially at least, universally human. Mr George H. Sabine, writing on "Liberty and the Social System" (*ibid.*), also maintains that in the works of idealistic philosophers there is a definite tendency to over-emphasise the ultimateness of the social order. The emphasis of the idealists has been upon the ethical necessity of *finding* a station in the objective order,

as if the system were final while the individual is only casual. The argument starts from a sound principle—the principle, namely, that ultimately the individual's claim to a right has to be judged in the light of the common good, but does not really exclude the other principle, namely, that any organisation of the common good has also to give scope to individual accomplishment.

We welcome the publication of the fifteen essays and addresses, some of which appeared originally in this Journal, of Professor Cassius J. Keyser, under the title of *The Human Worth of Rigorous Thinking* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916). Professor Keyser's enthusiasm for his science is unbounded. What Gomperz says of Socrates is true of him: "he thirsts for pure concepts as ardently as any mystic ever panted for union with the Godhead"; and naturally he has little sympathy with the "evaluation of the science-making method of concepts," which he finds in the writings of Bergson and William James. Only, by the way, it is hardly fair to the latter to represent him as saying that in the absence of concepts the universe would reveal itself as "a big blooming buzzing confusion." James did not assert this as a universal proposition, he asserted it only of *some* such apprehension—namely, that of the primitive consciousness. Mathematics, Professor Keyser maintains, is, even in its purest and most abstract form, not detached from life. It is the ideal handling of the problems of life, and the central ideas of the science are precisely the chief ideas with which life must always deal, and which give to life its interests, its order, and its rationality. For example, the concept of "functionality" finds its correlate in life in the all-pervasive sense of interdependence and mutual determination among the elements of the world.

The January number of *Mind* contains an elaborate criticism of Mr Russell's Lowell Lectures by Professor L. P. Saunders. Professor Saunders argues (a) that scientific propositions cannot be logically translated into propositions whose constituent concepts are abstract constructions; and (b) that if the elimination of uncertain "matter" could be effected by logical manipulation and translation, this in itself would neither (i.) constitute a proof of the truth of the resulting body of translated propositions, nor (ii.) add to the degree of their probable truth. It is pointed out that in saying that sense-data are certain, Mr Russell ought to mean only that they are known. But as such, sense-data are meaningless, *i.e.* are not facts, in the sense of being complex entities. They are not *in themselves* judged. And *if* only facts are known, it would appear that sense-data, as such, are not known. The same number of *Mind* opens with an interesting article by Professor C. Lloyd Morgan entitled "Enjoyment and Awareness." Using "enjoyment" in Professor Alexander's sense of the term, the author maintains that there is an ascending hierarchy in the *qualia* of enjoyment. At the lowest or inorganic level the *qualia* of enjoyment, as referred to that from which awareness proceeds, may differ but little from the physical properties of component objects. At the highest or spiritual level they transform the world on which they are projected and determine our conduct therein. But only through the systematic linkage of the whole ascending series of enjoyments, from bottom to top, can all the modes of our supreme and highly integrated enjoyment be interpreted. Our enjoyment, with all its *qualia*, is the net result of the constitutive totality of enjoyments, including those at all levels within the conscious organism. Yet the conscious organism is not only aware of external occurrences with which it

is actually compresent : it has also a foretaste of occurrences with which—as interpreted by conceptual thought—it will be compresent.

With the January number *The Philosophical Review* enters upon its twenty-sixth volume, and the articles which appear in this number have been written as contributions to a survey of the progress of philosophy during the last quarter of a century. Dr Bernard Bosanquet leads off with an essay on "Realism and Metaphysic." With the intention of naïve realism—the realism which accepts external nature in the fullness of its qualities as a factor of our world *prima facie* on equal terms with every other—speculative philosophy of the Post-Kantian type is, he thinks, in the main at one. It is essential to such a realism to treat all thought, including perception, as *ipso facto* an apprehension of reality ; to take primary and secondary qualities as in the same relation to mind, and to keep clear of materialism ; to recognise universals as real, and to keep clear of nominalism. Professor G. H. Sabine writes on "Philosophical and Scientific Specialisation," and discusses the influence on scientific specialisation of the Post-Kantian idealism. He points out that the notion of dialectic has never had among English philosophers the vitality and seriousness which it had in the estimation of Hegel himself. The English idealists have laid stress rather on the ideal of dialectic than on its detailed elaboration ; it represented for them a position which ought to hold rather than one which they can claim to exhibit in detail. Professor James H. Tufts, in surveying the progress of "Ethics in the Last Twenty-five Years," finds that within the period in question the genetic study of morality has taken advantage both of the wealth of new material offered by anthropology and of the methods of interpretation suggested by social psychology, whilst there has been a return of interest to the economic, political, and social problems which marked the ethics of Aristotle, Adam Smith, German idealism, and the Utilitarians. There are two articles on progress in psychology—one by Margaret Floy Washburn and the other by Professor W. B. Pillsbury.

Two new volumes have been added to the valuable "Open Court" Classics of Science and Philosophy—viz. Isaac Barrow's *Geometrical Lectures*, translated by Mr J. M. Child, and Diderot's *Early Philosophical Works*, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (London: Open Court Company, 1916). I have been asked to state that a Society for the publication of the works of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) has been formed at the Hague, and that a commencement will be made by publishing the Letters written by and to Grotius. A Committee has been appointed of which Professor C. van Vollenhoven is president, Mr G. J. Fabius treasurer, and Dr P. C. Molhuysen secretary.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

REVIEWS

Progress and History: Essays arranged and edited by F. S. Marvin.
Oxford University Press, 1916.—Pp. 314.

THE Preface informs us that "this volume is a sequel to the *Unity of Western Civilisation*, published last year, and arose in the same way, from a course of lectures given at the Woodbrooke Settlement, Birmingham," and Mr Marvin may certainly be congratulated on getting together so strong an Association team (mainly Oxonian) to play with one of the most important and elusive of popular notions. As is always the case in such enterprises, the members of the team do not all play up equally and not infrequently contradict each other, partly no doubt because they do not seem to have known what the others had said or were going to say. Still the general effect is impressive, and on the whole superior to that of the preceding volume.

The Editor kicks off with an essay on *The Idea of Progress*, in which three notions of progress are ventilated. He tells us that his own idea was that it meant the increase of power, but that a friend, a professor of philosophy, thought it was increase of knowledge, and another, a lady, demanded an increase of humanity. As definitions they all three appear to have the logical defects that "increase" is a tautology for "progress," and that they do not seem to be general enough to cover all the sorts of "progress." However, little harm is done, because more adequate definitions appear in later essays. Mr Marvin's essay also makes the noticeable point that the idea of progress was originally a Roman reaction upon Greek thought, and finds its first literary expression in Lucretius.

As the examples of Progress may be traced either in a historical or in a logical order, it is not surprising that the four next essays should prefer the former. The first of these is by Dr R. R. Marett, and sketches *Progress in Pre-Historic Times*. It is excellent reading, and must have been delightful as a lecture. Dr Marett is learned on the early types of man and flint, and is cheerfully optimistic, as well as entertaining. His (very sound) definition of progress is "change, in some sense, for the better" (p. 29). He also believes that it has occurred, and that he is certainly "nobler" than palæolithic man, though possibly too much of a "tame dog" to be as certainly happier than his more robust and "wolfish" ancestors. He looks forward to a eugenical future, in which "people will marry intelligently, and the best marriages will be the richest in offspring" (p. 46).

To Miss Melian Stawell an impossible task was set in *Progress and*

Hellenism; for had not the Editor himself put the origin of the idea in post-Hellenic thought? And she is herself aware that the Greeks did not believe in progress, but struggles gracefully and ingeniously against this handicap, making the most of the idea of different degrees of reality in an unchanging universe as the analogue or substitute for progress in Plato and Aristotle, and pointing out, quite truly, that in history progress is not an uninterrupted process.

Dr A. J. Carlyle's *Progress in the Middle Ages* discriminates the lights and shadows within that systole of European civilisation, and shows how in it were laid the foundations of our political and social order.

Baron von Hügel is handicapped by a doubt whether *Progress in Religion* is really traceable at all, but nevertheless struggles gallantly to compress the historical development of Judaism and Christianity within the compass of his essay. It is no wonder that he has no space in which to consider the great *crux* which religious progress presents to "orthodoxy," viz. that the progressiveness of a revelation seems bound to detract from the absolute truth of its original form.

In the next essay, on *Moral Progress*, Dr L. P. Jacks abandons the historical mode of treatment. He gives a keen analysis of the notion of progress and of the flattering assumption that we are progressing morally. His essay is pure gold throughout, and no analysis can do it justice. But anyone who believes the things he sees daily in his newspapers should read it about once a week for his sanity's sake. The temptation to quote some of Dr Jacks's clear-cut and incisive home-truths no human reviewer can resist. Dr Jacks sees clearly that the question of progress is a question of valuation, and so defines progress as "that process by which a thing advances from a less to a more complete state of itself. Now whether this process is a desirable one or not obviously depends on the nature of the thing which is progressing" (p. 139). If the thing, e.g., "the world, is evil, what reason can I possibly have for rejoicing in its evolution? . . . The less such a world progresses the easier will it be for moral beings to live in it." He points out that moral progress conditions all the other sorts, and determines their value—"Science, Industry, Government, might all claim progress on their own ground and in their own nature, but this would not prove progress as we understand the word, unless it could be shown further that these things contribute to human betterment in the highest sense of the word. *Their* progress might conceivably involve *our* regress" (p. 134). He castigates the "philosophic pharisaism," which "seems to say 'I thank thee, O God, that I am not as former ages: ignorant, barbaric, cruel, unsocial; I read books, ride in aeroplanes, eat my dinner with a knife and fork, and cheerfully pay my taxes to the State; I study human science, and talk freely about humanity, and spend much of my time in making speeches on social questions'" (p. 135). He tells us that "there would be more optimists in the world, more cheerfulness, more belief in moral progress, if we candidly faced the fact that morally considered we are still in a neolithic age, not brutes indeed any longer, and yet not so far outgrown the brutish stage as to justify these trumpeting" (*ibid.*). He raises the very pertinent question "whether man is a being who can safely be entrusted with that control over the forces of nature which science gives him. What if he uses this power, as he plainly can do, for his own undoing?" (p. 141). Thus scientific progress might become "a step towards the self-destruction of the human race" (*ibid.*). He inquires similarly whether mere increase in

numbers or riches or control by the State and the "common will" are good (p. 146), and whether States as such are good and wise, remarking (p. 148) that "either the States do not represent collective wisdom, or else this collective wisdom is one of the lowest forms of wisdom now extant on this planet." All of which seems highly salutary doctrine at the present juncture.

Mr Zimmern's clever essay on *Progress in Government* does not cut so deep. It exalts the State, as an official should, and liberty, as a liberal official should. We are assured that "since the close of the Middle Ages the art of government has advanced by giant strides" (p. 177), and credited with two of the greatest of these, the Principle of Representation and Responsible Government. The Cabinet also is described as "a distillation of Parliament," but a hint is dropped that "its methods are not the methods of Parliament" but of the old *régime*, and can easily reduce Parliament to a sham and a farce, and that it is "open to the charge of being autocracy in a new guise" (p. 185). But he prudently concludes that to endorse this recent reversion to the old idea that government is the art of ruling others whether they like it or not "would be a gross overstatement."

The essay on *Progress in Industry*, also by Mr Zimmern, deals with economic questions about labour and capital. It is mildly socialistic in tone, and rests on the highly teleological assumptions that there are no "dunces" (p. 206), and that the world is so beneficently constructed that everyone can find in it a predestined place to fit him. Strangely enough, industrial progress is *not* traced to the growth of applied science.

Mr Clutton Brock in *Progress in Art* is candid enough to confess that no case can be made out for this, historically. He can only urge that we have now learnt to value the many forms of good art and to "rebel against the process of decadence in art" (p. 237). And we have now the *will* to progress. So there is more hope of success than ever before.

Mr Marvin in *Progress in Science* returns to the historical treatment. His sketch is interesting, but deals almost wholly with *pure* science, making no attempt to estimate either the effects of practical problems in forcing scientific development, or the effects of *applied* science in transforming the conditions of life. As in his account of industry Mr Zimmern had similarly shirked the problem of technology, there results a *hiatus valde deflendus*. It would be curious at any time that the progressive applications of science to life should be omitted from an account of Progress, but in the midst of the Great War it is amazing that the Prince of Denmark should be thus extruded from the stage on which he is so peculiarly the protagonist. Why too is there no lecture on *the most continuously progressive* (if not the most creditable) of all recorded human activities, the Art of War?

Two philosophic essays by Professor J. A. Smith conclude the volume. The first, on *Progress in Philosophy*, was of course confronted with the historic facts that no philosophic problem has ever been finally solved, and that there has never been anything like a consensus, even of philosophic experts, about the truths of philosophy. Professor Smith evades this difficulty, of which the explanation lies in a psychological region which is to him anathema, by ignoring it, and devotes himself to eulogising a certain type of philosophising which has been with us from the beginning, but which seems unfortunately as little capable of progress as the problem of philosophic agreement. His essay is eloquent, and concludes with an assurance that "the door of the treasure-house of Wisdom stands ever open." Worldly Wisdom will, I fear, retort that if *this* is the way Philosophy keeps

house, it is a moral certainty that there will be *no* treasure found in the treasure-house of Wisdom!

In his final essay, on *Progress as an Ideal of Action*, Professor Smith lets off a number of metaphysical squibs at the ideal of Progress, without much regard to the damage they may do to his colleagues, or even to his own earlier assertions. Such paradoxes as that Progress cannot possibly be both a fact and an ideal, because to be a fact it must be independent of our making, while to be an ideal of action "it must be wholly and solely of our making" (p. 301), and because an ideal cannot be a fact anyhow (p. 306), that Progress is inconceivable as an ideal, because it must either pass into a higher end not itself, or continue without end, and then become futile and unmeaning, because it has no standard of better and worse whereby to measure its progress (p. 302), that history determines our ideals (p. 309) and yet cannot determine them (p. 308), that we must "learn to see Progress as universal and omnipresent and omnipotent" (p. 310) and yet conceive it as so tolerant of retrogression that "even regress is seen to be a necessary incident in progress" (p. 312), that evil is good, because "the spirit in progressing deposits what, being abandoned by it, corrupts into venomous evil, but except in meeting and combating that, it cannot progress" (p. 313), are of course familiar enough to technical students of philosophy. They are not difficult to dispose of when examined closely, but they probably puzzled the worthy folk of Woodbrooke, and prevented them from carrying away any clear conception of progress from the course as a whole.

It would have been more instructive if the concluding lectures had attempted to correlate and evaluate the different conceptions of progress presented by the various lecturers, and in particular to decide the theoretically important and practically urgent question what in the end man has to say to Progress. Are we to mean by the term a securely established law or institution of the universe, which, though it may work *through* man, yet constrains him to obey it, and is essentially independent of his will and assent; or are we to conceive it as essentially relative to human estimations of good and evil, and essentially dependent on human wills that must aim at it?

The choice between these alternative conceptions of Progress will be found difficult only by a few metaphysicians. For do not the history and the condition of the world at all times, and particularly now, strongly suggest that there is no *natural law* of Progress, no fatal and predestined necessity to progress in any way, but that retrogression and decay are possible and common, and are not really rendered palatable by calling them a sort of progress—in the opposite direction? Surely we shall never find our way to God unless we realise how entirely free we are to go to the Devil, and how imminent and constant is our danger of going there! It is not only vain, but positively perilous, to search for verbal spells that promise to bridge over the stupendous abysses of the natural world and to insure man against the unavoidable risk of returning, as a prodigal son, to his parents, Chaos and Black Night.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

The World as Imagination. (Series I.) By Edward Douglas Fawcett.
London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1916.—Pp. xliii + 623.

THIS treatise offers the general impression of being the doctrine of Hegel or of Mr Bradley translated into a philosophical romance. Not that the author has no reason for the transformation. He moulds it so as to escape just those cruces which are most difficult in the doctrine of absolutism, and, some of us would say, which indicate its greatest values. I will give some account of the conception, and then point out what seem to me its failures.

The substance of the universe is psychical experience, but instead of being defined as thought or merely by the term experience, it is specifically of the nature of imagination. This is simply consciousness of content—there is nothing beside it or behind it. It lives and creates itself spontaneously and without conditions external to it, of which, as with other forms of absolutism, there are none. But the Cosmic Imagination *in se*, if I follow right, is the total universe conceived as containing or even constituted by sentient indeed, but these as satisfied and at rest. To see what directly concerns us we have to consider the Imaginal,¹ or world-system, which means a stirring in the tranquil universe, such as may begin and end, and be often repeated, by the quickening life of its members, and brings with it its own temporal succession, its own externality (due to the expansion, so to speak, of the sentient, as their life quickens and a pressure on each other arises), its own finite god or gods, and its own evil. For in such a stage, "the corruption of eternity," imaginings run amok (the idea takes us back to Böhme), and all but escape cosmic control; and evil is generated, which, however, is not permanent in the universe, but tends to be extinguished, as it arose, within each world-system, by the harmonisation of the sentient and elimination of discordant features through selection.

For this translation of absolutism the enemy is conceptual or abstract reason along with rational necessity and total inherence in the universe. The gain is "looseness," and so freedom, concreteness, justice done to "appearances," the temporal extinction of evil, a free hand in supposing sentient of all kinds throughout nature and above it, together with "prospects for the individual," real succession and externality (though on a background of duration which *per se* would be eternity), and the all-importance of the future. "C'est l'avenir seul qui a été le grand objet de Dieu [for which read "the Cosmic Imagination"] dans la création, et c'est pour cet avenir seul que le présent existe."² The idea of the Cosmic Imagination at rest, or rather, like an engine working with no load, is due to Dr Schiller's insistence on the *ἐνέργεια ἀκίνητος*. William James and Dr Schiller are responsible for much in the author's thought.

A strong impression is conveyed to the reader that the author, having sympathised with part of the ideas of great writers—such as concreteness and the self-movement of experience—and constructed a theory which insists on these, has nevertheless brought with him commonplace notions of obsolete philosophy which he has actually imputed to those writers so

¹ Mr Fawcett defends his habit of coining new terms, with some success.

² Cited with approval from d'Hauteville.

as (I do not mean intentionally) to construct a foil to set off his own conceptions based too hastily on a superficial understanding of them.

I give two instances. He has an objection to something he calls concept-worship and "the command-concept"—the concept invented for our use—which he supposes that the great moderns inherited from the Greeks. He thus approaches Plato *de haut en bas* with the words, "This way lies folly" (p. 166), in reference to the great passage where the latter quite clearly points out the nature of the astronomer's task, as the moderns were one day to understand it. Does Mr Fawcett think that the "visible" (apparent) motions of the stars, as he sees them on a clear night, are one with the "true" motions as astronomy has to reveal them? If so, astronomy would have been easier than it has proved to be. And these are respectively the "visible" and the "true" motions of which Plato is speaking.¹

Here is the same contrast as its elucidates the idea of imagination which he thinks characteristic, and on it builds his main antithesis to thought and reason. "If (p. 142) I could aware (*sic*) the 'State' in the fulness of immediate presence, with all its complicated human activities experienced concretely together, I should not need a concept (usually a very abstract statement) 'about it'; and if I could further aware other States in the same way, I should know what is common to States, not by way of concept, but by immediate perception of the common aspect in the facts. Concepts are surrogates for reality, which is better presented, from the contemplative point of view, in immediate feeling." That is to say, he thinks that a blurred mass of sensuous detail is a concrete experience of a reality, and that the only alternative to this is a concept after the style of the tree of Porphyry. The proposition is utterly false. A true concrete such as can be real and have value is a system; the lines of organisation, selection, and explanation run through and in it, not without it. But the piling up of unselected immediate feelings could not present to you the reality of the State, not even if you could see all the kingdoms of the world at once. Reason is an order and connection in a whole, not an abstraction, and is the only character capable of carrying with it a charge of high emotion. The author has obviously not studied the lesson of art in this regard.

This distinction, on which his whole argument is based, between thought and imagination, I cannot find that he anywhere discusses systematically. He is in places ready to resolve imagination into thought; but the real distinction, that thought maintains its continuous connection while imagination slides from one feature to another, he does not, I think, observe. To suppose that imagination is in principle concrete and thought abstract is of course the reverse of the truth. Thought is always relatively complete, and, like reason and the universal, is a matter of concrete system; imagination is always, except when one with thought, abstract and limited, being thought at work under reservations.

The fact is that Mr Fawcett, being determined to have novelty, and having no conception of a synthetic necessity or implication which is at once determinate and freely creative, chooses imagination just for its quality of detachment, which purchases novelty at the price of arbitrary caprice, and destroys the idea of dialectic, which depends on the life of self-transcendent experiences.

¹ See, e.g., Burnet, *Greek Philosophy, Thales to Plato*, p. 226. The place is Rep. 530 a-c.

In speaking of "looseness" it seems to me that Mr Fawcett discusses two distinct subjects. One is, whether there can be degrees of connectedness between parts of a world-whole; and that I see no reason to deny, so long as it is not maintained that any part is independent of the whole itself. The other is, whether we must believe "laws" to be "rigid," and, *e.g.*, the law of contradiction to be true. This, I must think, is a different question from the former. No one would maintain, surely, that if you find apparent conjunctions AB, AC, AD, then A, without any further condition, can be the same in all these; hardly anyone would maintain it even if A were a sentient or intelligent being. If you do maintain it, of course you are saying that A can be B and C in the same relation and under the same conditions, and you are proving that for you at least the Law of Identity was no negligible formality, but a very necessary precaution. On such a hypothesis there is no reason for attempting to explain any given facts. A thing is what it does, and unless you are prepared to say that a thing is not what it is, you must not say that under given conditions it does what under those conditions it does not. If you find the law, it is certainly rigid or uniform; that is, it tells you how the thing acts under certain conditions, and those only. If you had not to believe that there is such a proposition, which is true whether you can find it or not, you would have to accept all conjunctions without an attempt at explanation, AB, AC, AD, and so on for ever, all as true, just as they stand. But you cannot do this.

The author's idea of Nature depends on the assumption of sentient beings throughout which respond to stimuli with appropriate degrees of creative adaptiveness—all under the head of imagining. This is suggestively drawn out. The difficulty to me is the disparity between the tasks set them and what we can suppose of their sentience. We can understand how the higher intelligence uses their outsides, but hardly how their mind is a guiding feature in their own evolution or in that of the substructure of the higher intelligence itself, which does so little to guide the processes of its own body. Why suppose they can do better? And if not, why suppose them?

The treatment of evil is characteristic of the general standpoint. "The matter of chief importance to ourselves is to justify the plan in a way satisfactory to the finite beings whom it concerns." But surely a finite being satisfied is a contradiction in terms, or an example of the deepest sin. I gather, moreover, that there is a prospect for the individual beyond his present life, though whether within or beyond his world-system, which is finite, is a problem reserved for a later volume.

There is much in the book that is interesting and suggestive, but I confess that it appears to me to have but little logical structure. The long criticism of Hegel is, like the reference to Plato, not that of an expert. The whole problem of the movement by which finite experience passes beyond itself, the universal, the system (except here and there as a suggestion, of which the author himself hardly sees the bearing, as in the case of the colour-system), implication, and so dialectic, are fundamentally unfamiliar to him. The relation of the Imaginal (a world-system) to the Cosmic Imagination (the Universe), on whose surface it is a ripple, reproduces insoluble difficulties of old theology. Why should it begin if it had not begun before? But the unity of a world, which is only experience, but yet is in real time, presents metaphysical problems which the author deals with

rather by metaphor than by thought. If the past is gone altogether, where is the unity of the experience? If it is stored up in the Cosmic Imagination, where is the reality of time? As I understand him, the true "past" has passed into "made reality," but with that has become for us a thing in itself, beyond mortal ken. But if so, the universe is cut in two.

In truth, the experience which Mr Fawcett describes ought, as he almost acknowledges (p. 342), to be that which is above relational thinking, but, as he portrays it, it is of a lower order.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY.

Raymond, or Life and Death, with Examples of the Evidence for Survival of Memory and Affection after Death. By Sir Oliver Lodge.—London: Methuen & Co., 1916.

THIS book, well described by its title, has had a remarkable success with the public, and no fewer than seven editions have been issued since its first appearance in November 1916. This success is natural, for Sir Oliver Lodge has a gift of simple, popular exposition; and at a time when so many are mourning near friends and relatives cut off in their prime, and so many are desiring evidence that the separation is not complete or permanent, a book by him offering such evidence in the case of his own son is sure to be widely read. It is indeed the hope of affording comfort and help to such mourners that has led Sir Oliver to publish the book.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first is a short account of his son Raymond, who was killed on the Western front on September 14, 1915, with extracts from letters from him and about him. The second, and longest, part consists mainly of notes of sittings, with professional mediums, or in the family circle, held with a view to getting into communication with Raymond after his death. To these are added such comments and information as are required to enable the reader to estimate the value of any evidence that certain verifiable communications exhibit knowledge beyond that normally possessed by the medium—and especially evidence that Raymond is the source of this knowledge. The reader would do well to begin his study of the book by reading the introduction to Part II. (p. 83), as this shows clearly Sir Oliver Lodge's own attitude to the subject, and the spirit in which he has written. The third part, called "Life and Death," is of a more theoretical nature. In it Sir Oliver discusses, in a series of short essays, various points concerning matter, life, and mind, and some of the theoretical difficulties likely to be felt by persons endeavouring to fit the subject of communication with the dead into the scientific framework they already possess. He also discusses some methods used in obtaining communications, and some theories and hypotheses concerning the process involved. Part III. concludes with an article reprinted from the *Hibbert Journal* of July 1911, on "The Christian Idea of God."

There are good evidential points in Part II. such as no student of the subject can afford to overlook; but too much should not be expected. If we had no evidence but what this book contains, the cautious student would hesitate to conclude more than that there was a good *prima facie* case for investigation. As Sir Oliver Lodge says (p. 85), "To base so

momentous a conclusion as a scientific demonstration of human survival on any single instance, if it were not sustained on all sides by a great consensus of similar evidence, would doubtless be unwise; for some other explanation of a merely isolated case would have to be sought." He himself, before his son died, had become convinced by other evidence that survival and communication were verifiable facts. "Speaking for myself," he wrote in 1911, "and with full and cautious responsibility, I have to state that as an outcome of my investigation into psychical matters I have at length and quite gradually become convinced, after more than thirty years of study, not only that persistent individual existence is a fact, but that occasional communication across the chasm—with difficulty and under definite conditions—is possible."¹ In 1909, in his book, *The Survival of Man*, which gives an account of the evidence then before him, he says rather more tentatively (p. 321), "The hypothesis of surviving intelligence and personality,—not only surviving but anxious and able with difficulty to communicate,—is the simplest and most straightforward, and the only one that fits all the facts." He is quite justified therefore when he says (*Raymond*, p. 85), in defending the bringing forward of his new evidence, "I myself considered the case of survival practically proven before, and clinched by the efforts of Myers and others of the S.P.R. group on the other side; but evidence is cumulative. . . . Each stick of the faggot must be tested, and, unless absolutely broken, it adds to the strength of the bundle."

And there is no doubt that the stick this book adds to the bundle is a solid and valuable contribution. To anyone who may feel disappointed that the mass of evidence here presented is not greater, or more overwhelming, I may point out that good evidence of survival and communication is more difficult to devise—quite apart from the difficulties there clearly are in producing it—than persons new to the subject are apt to think. One great difficulty is that the possibility of thought-reading from the sitter has to be excluded. To put this difficulty in Sir Oliver Lodge's own words: "The gradually recognised possibility of what may be called normal telepathy, or unconscious mind-reading from survivors, raises hesitation—felt most by studious and thoughtful people—about accepting such messages as irrefragable evidence of persistent personal existence; and to overcome this . . . difficulty, it is demanded that facts shall be given which are unknown to anyone present, and can only be subsequently verified" (p. 346).

Space forbids my attempting to give even in outline any account of special incidents, but I may mention that among those fully described the one which best meets the above condition is the group-photograph case of which the details will be found in Chapter IV. of Part II. The E.A. incident (pp. 243-46), of which, however, full particulars are not given, seems also to have been a remarkable one. I should like also to call attention to the "Honolulu" incident (pp. 212, 215-16, 271-75). This incident includes correct references to songs sung by Raymond, and an interesting correspondence between a sitting with a medium in London and a contemporaneous family sitting at Birmingham. Incidentally I think it throws light on conditions of communication. But we must admit with Sir Oliver Lodge that it does not completely exclude explanation by telepathy between living minds. A considerable number of the communications purporting to come from Raymond Lodge show knowledge which,

¹ *Raymond*, p. 389, reprinted from *Hibbert Journal* of July 1911.

while it can hardly have reached the medium in any normal manner, may without improbability be accounted for by telepathy from the sitter or other living person. As already said, such cases cannot be used as distinctive evidence of communication from the dead. Nevertheless they strengthen that evidence indirectly by showing that supernormal power is at work.

My own provisional belief, based on a comparison of thought-transference experiments with evidence of communication from the dead, is that the latter is not different in kind from telepathic communication between the living. In both cases we have—as I believe—communication between mind and mind otherwise than through the senses. In both cases it appears generally to reach the normal consciousness of the recipient in an uncertain, scrappy, and imperfect way, mixed with ideas and associations apparently imported by the recipient; and in both cases, especially perhaps if the recipient of the communication is in trance, and therefore his normal consciousness in abeyance, what is said is liable to have the incoherence of dreams.

I do not think Sir Oliver Lodge quite agrees about this, for (on p. 330) he expresses a belief that the communicating intelligence with difficulty and imperfectly operates the brain of the medium in the place of the medium's own mind; and he can hardly suppose that this happens when the communicator is a person in the body. At the same time he does not exclude my hypothesis—at least as regards automatic writing—for he says (pp. 355-6), "The intermediate mentality employed in this process seems to be a usually submerged or dream-like stratum of the automatist. . . . In some cases the content or subject-matter of the writing may emanate entirely from [this stratum] and be of no more value than a dream. . . . But when the message turns out to be of evidential value it is presumably because this subliminal portion of the person is in touch, either telepathically or in some other way, with intelligences not ordinarily accessible,—with living people at a distance perhaps, or more often with the apparently more accessible people who have passed on."

As regards the mixed, and therefore untrustworthy, nature of the communications he is in entire agreement with me, and frequently warns the reader that they cannot be taken at their face value without examination. For instance, on p. 180, "It is unlikely that lucidity is constant all the time, and Feda" [the so-called control of the medium through whom the communication is supposed to come] "may have to do some padding." Or again, p. 192, "I should think myself that they" [*i.e.* statements about life on the other side] "are of very varying degrees of value, and peculiarly liable to unintentional sophistication by the medium." Or again, on the same page, "Some books, moreover, have been published of late, purporting to give information about ill-understood things in a positive and assured manner, and it is possible that the medium has read these and been influenced by them." Or again, on p. 269, "A good deal of this struck me as nonsense; as if Feda had picked it up from some sitter. But I went on recording what was said."

It is certain, then, that no supposed communications, whether through private persons or professional mediums, should be accepted uncritically at their face value. But the difficulty is greatly increased in the case of professional mediums for three reasons. Firstly, many of them—perhaps most—are more or less fraudulent. Even where there is some real power

it acts fitfully, and the temptation to supplement genuine with manufactured evidence must often be great when the medium's living depends on satisfying sitters. My second and third reasons do not necessarily involve conscious deception. The second is, that the need of producing something must tend to increase the amount of what may be called padding. The third is, that the effort to get into relation with the affairs of a constant succession of new sitters and to give them tests is apt to develop a habit of fishing, of rapid inference from small indications, and of bold guessing. For these reasons I think resort to professional mediums is to be deprecated.

Sir Oliver Lodge in his wholesome advice to bereaved persons (pp. 342-3) also deprecates it for many people. "It may be asked," he says, "do I recommend all bereaved persons to devote the time and attention which I have done to getting communications and recording them? Most certainly I do not. I am a student of the subject, and a student often undertakes detailed labour of a special kind. I recommend people in general to learn and realise that their loved ones are still active and useful and interested and happy—more alive than ever in one sense—and to make up their minds to live a useful life till they rejoin them.

"What steps should be taken to gain this peaceful assurance must depend on the individual. Some may get it from the consolations of religion, some from the testimony of trusted people, while some may find it necessary to have first-hand experience of their own for a time. And if this experience can be attained privately, with no outside assistance, by quiet and meditation or by favour of occasional waking dreams, so much the better."

I am afraid that notwithstanding this excellent advice *Raymond* is likely to lead many people, who had much better not do so, to go to professional mediums, and is likely to encourage a very undesirable trade. I can only hope that the evil of this will be compensated by the comfort which the book will bring to many mourners.

ELEANOR MILDRED SIDGWICK.

CAMBRIDGE.

The Forms of Hebrew Poetry. By George Buchanan Gray, D.Litt., D.D.
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915.—Pp. x+303.

THE author of this book explains that he was led to make a special study of the formal elements of Hebrew poetry by the problems which were presented to him in preparing his well-known Critical Commentary on the book of Isaiah. Since the time of Bishop Lowth, in the eighteenth century, all scholars have recognised the division of the literature of the Old Testament into two classes, according to the presence or absence of what the learned Bishop called parallelism; no reader of the Psalms, Job, Canticles, Lamentations, and the greater part of the prophetic books can fail to note the parallelistic structure of the sentences, which is absent from the remainder of the Old Testament,¹ and these two divisions of Hebrew literature were distinguished as poetry and prose respectively. The validity of this test has been actually or virtually challenged, on two grounds: (1) that parallelism actually occurs in prose; and (2) that parts

¹ Except in songs, like those of Moses, Miriam, Deborah, Hannah, etc.

of the Old Testament from which parallelism is absent are metrical and, therefore, poetical in form.

To discover a means of deciding what is really prose and what is poetry in the Old Testament is the aim of our author. Parallelism is not confined to Hebrew literature; it is a characteristic of the Babylonian Epics of Creation, which may be, and probably are, poetry, and in Arabic literature in compositions which are undoubtedly prose, though rhymed—the Arabic *saj'* or "rhymed prose." The great problem to be attacked was, therefore, What is it in parallelism that constitutes poetry? and this leads to the consideration of metrical forms.

Now, while Arabic *poetry*, and much of its prose, rhymes, Hebrew poetry rarely, though occasionally, Hebrew prose never, does so; where is a criterion to be found? Only in the metre; does Hebrew poetry possess a definite scheme of metrical composition? Lowth reduced parallel lines to three sorts: synonymous, antithetic, and synthetic, which latter the author suggests would be better called *incomplete* parallels with or without compensation. Examples of the latter are Isaiah i. 26: "I-will-restore thy-judges as-at-the-first, And-thy-counsellors as-at-the-beginning"; and Gen. iv. 23: "A man have I slain for wounding me, And a youth for bruising me," where the parallelism makes it clear that only one individual is referred to. Of the former are Judges v. 4 and Numbers xxiii. 23, in which the second text is reduced to ordinary prose if the parallelism is not observed; it should read: "Now shall-it-be-said of-Jacob, And-of-Israel, What hath God wrought!"

Of poetry like the Shakesperean or Miltonic blank verse, with its unstopped lines, there are no examples in Hebrew; but a most illuminating suggestion is made by Dr Gray, that a real comparison may be made between Hebrew poetry and the alliterative poetry of the Anglo-Saxons, *i.e.* in the metrical scheme, for there is no alliteration in Hebrew. Anglo-Saxon poetry, and early English, such as *Piers Plowman*, consists of lines with a certain number of stressed syllables (marked by alliteration) and an uncertain number of unstressed syllables, and here we have the criterion we have been seeking. "As between Anglo-Saxon poetry or *Piers Plowman* and Hebrew parallelistic poetry," says our author, "these resemblances are certain: (1) the isolated verse in Anglo-Saxon corresponds to the parallel distich in Hebrew; (2) the strong internal pause in Anglo-Saxon to the end of the first parallel period of the Hebrew distich; (3) there is a correspondingly great irregularity in the number of the syllables in successive lines of Anglo-Saxon, and in successive distichs of Hebrew." The difficulty lies in determining the exact number of stressed syllables in Hebrew rhythm, but this is lessened when we recognise that Hebrew distichs may be divided into two broad types of rhythm: in one the two parallel lines balance one another, whereas in the other the second comes short of and echoes the first. For example, take the two chapters, Lam. iv. and v. In Lam. iv. a clearly defined rhythm, to which the name of *kinah*, or elegiac, is commonly given, prevails; in Lam. v. a no less clearly defined though different rhythm is found, which should have a distinguishing name if a suitable one could be discovered: for these two types the author proposes the names of *balancing rhythm* and *echoing rhythm*; in Lam. iv. the latter, in Lam. v. the former, prevails. Of balancing rhythm Lam. v. 13 is an example: "Young men bare the mill, And youths stumbled under the wood"; of echoing rhythm, Lam. iv. 8:

"Her nobles were purer than snow, Whiter than milk." The scheme of the one may be represented by 3 : 3; of the other by 3 : 2, and the rhythm is apparent even in a translation. Many questions of criticism and emendation are solved by a right appreciation of rhythm, notwithstanding all uncertainties; but for the discussion of these we must refer the reader to the book itself. The question of Hebrew rhythm may perhaps remain "the shaking bog" or "treacherous quagmire" which the author calls it, after all efforts to unravel its mysteries, but he has provided stepping-stones on which the wary traveller may advance with more safety than was heretofore possible.

An interesting discussion is afforded by the endeavour of Sievers to find metrical composition in what have hitherto been considered the prose narratives of Genesis, and the efforts made by that author to distinguish sources by that means—as to which Dr Gray is extremely doubtful; and Duhm's emendations of Isaiah xiii. and xxxiv., xxxv. and of Jeremiah are passed under a keen critical inspection which leaves them by no means unscathed. The last two chapters of the book furnish instructive studies of the alphabetic poem in Nahum i.-ii. 3, and of Psalms ix. and x.

This is a book that throws much welcome light on a confessedly thorny and difficult subject, and the author's conclusions, which he does not claim to be final, but only to point the way to further advance, are as follows:—The main forms of Hebrew poetry are two—parallelism and rhythm, to which, as a third and occasional form, we may add strophe. Rhyme is in Hebrew, as in Assyrian, merely occasional. Though it occurs in one of the earliest Hebrew poems, the Song of Lamech, it never developed into a form of Hebrew poetry till the Old Testament had long been extinct and there came, under the influence of Moslem culture and Arabic poetry, a renaissance of Hebrew poetry in the Middle Ages. Of the two main forms of Hebrew poetry, parallelism and rhythm, parallelism is most intimately associated with the sense, and can and should be represented in translation. Merely judged from the standpoint of parallelism, rhythms fall into the two broad classes of balancing and echoing rhythms, and lines and distichs must be defined by the number of stressed syllables in them; the exact number of unstressed syllables accompanying a stressed syllable may be uncertain, but is certainly not unlimited. A single rhythm need not be maintained throughout a poem, though a change in the dominant rhythm raises the question whether a new poem has begun. And finally there is the question whether, though parallelism in Hebrew seems commonly to have occurred with certain rhythmical forms, it may not in some cases, as in the Arabic *saj'*, have been used in a freer style more closely allied to ordinary prose. "The best service to the future of Old Testament studies," says Dr Gray in closing his remarks, "will be rendered, I believe, by those who combine with that further study of Hebrew metre which is certainly needed an unswerving loyalty to the demands of that other and more obvious form of Hebrew poetry which is known as parallelism."

The book naturally appeals more especially to Hebrew scholars—the examples are given throughout in Hebrew and English,—but at the same time we very heartily commend it to the attention of all students of the literature of the Old Testament.

H. J. DUKINFELD ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM, NORFOLK.

The Brook Kerith : A Syrian Story. By George Moore.
London : T. Werner Laurie, 1916.

THE English public, it seems, take a deep and even enthusiastic interest in theology when it is put in the form of fiction. Probably since *Robert Elsmere* no publication has so vividly illustrated this fact as Mr Moore's study of the career of Jesus of Nazareth, who preached the Kingdom of Heaven, suffered under Pontius Pilate, rose again to life under the ministrations of Joseph of Arimathea, and retired to an Essene monastery on the brook Kerith, there to follow his old calling of a shepherd on the Judæan hills, and in that peaceful yet active life to clear away from his true self the dust and wreckage of his vast illusion. There is a great deal to be said for the instinct of the public in this matter. After all, the true test of a theology, the true revelation of its real contents, is life; but the judgments of life, though infallible, are very slowly and haltingly delivered: the artist alone can summarise in a book the process of the ages.

In one respect Mr Moore's book occupies a very peculiar place in its own class of fiction. The exposure of lofty illusions, the defeat of noble though misplaced ambitions, is the common stuff of tragedy, but this is not essentially the stuff chosen by Mr Moore. In the tragic stories of history, such as that of Timon of Athens, of Brutus, of Rienzi—above all, in its close resemblance to Mr Moore's conception, the story of Savonarola—when a man has pursued phantoms for realities and at last discovered his delusion in public defeat and shame, art and life often seem agreed that there is nothing for him but to die. Thus only can he end nobly, death turning to tragic dignity what would otherwise have been merely pitiful or ridiculous. But in fact this noble ending, though the storyteller never omits it, is not always provided by life. Here, then, is a chance for a poet to break fresh ground. What happens when the man does not die? How does he piece together his broken life? Or does he leave it in fragments, and become a savage misanthrope? or sink into apathy and insignificance? That is the central theme of Mr Moore's book. Born and bred in a Catholic household, he knew little or nothing of the Bible until a friend lent him a copy some years ago. It stirred and interested him profoundly, though not perhaps in the way which the Bible Society would approve,—and when an artist is stirred by anything, he tries to put it into a work of art. On the assumption familiar to rationalist theology, that Jesus did not die on the cross, but recovered and lived in retirement to the end of his days, Mr Moore saw a subject made to the hand of the psychological novelist, and the result is *The Brook Kerith*.

To have taken such a theme out of the New Testament and not to have failed grotesquely, to have invented for the Jesus of the Gospels a whole career of some thirty years and told it in a manner which does not seem violently incongruous with the three years whose history is on record, is in itself a great triumph. This triumph Mr Moore has achieved. Jesus, the shepherd of the Essene brotherhood in their cenoby among the stony hills between Jericho and Jerusalem, is certainly one of the most beautiful and memorable figures in story. To take one episode alone, the narrative of how he went out to buy a ram for the flock which had sadly fallen off in his absence while he was shepherding

a different flock, his failure to get what he wanted, his discovery of an abandoned lamb, and the journey home of the shepherd and his little charge, is an idyll of the tenderest grace, and is told, as indeed are all the events of the book, in language full of quiet melody and so subtly woven that, as we read, the scenes rise, dissolve, and change with as little apparent effort as when the landscape glides by before the eyes of a traveller floating down some placid steam. This part of the book—the secondary or post-resurrection life of Jesus—is a masterpiece of writing and of invention until we come to the visit of Paul, who travels as a missionary to the Essenes on the brook Kerith. Here Mr Moore, it must be said, lets us down. He evidently has an immense admiration for Paul, but that master-orator is ill represented by the interminable address, full of his own autobiography, which he makes to the brethren, and which certainly could never have got him a convert anywhere. Nor again can we feel much assent to Mr Moore's portrayal of Jesus during the known and historical period of his mission. The personality will not sustain the action. Jesus is represented as at first preaching simply the gospel of pure religion, unadulterated by priestcraft and independent of the cumbrous Pharisaic ritual; then the magnetism with which he drew the multitude reacts upon himself, he persuades himself that he is the Messiah foretold by the prophets; he denounces woes on those who do not accept him, or who place any human interest or affection before "the Kingdom"; he looks for a divine intervention which shall at the last moment of his trial place him at the head of a repentant and glorified people. One can imagine Jesus convincing himself of all this, without our being obliged to accept the old dilemma, *Aut Deus, aut non bonus*, but one cannot easily imagine the Jesus here portrayed as convincing anybody else. The truth, I suppose, is that in this part of his story Mr Moore could not hope to give the impression which the Gospels give without simply incorporating the Gospels in his narrative, and this resource he rightly avoids.

We see Jesus in this part of the book mostly through the eyes of Joseph of Arimathea, the earnest, thoughtful, and affectionate nature with whom we make acquaintance in the opening chapters. He records his first impressions thus:

"The shepherd, he now heard, was an Essene, but he lived among the hills, and Joseph remembered the striped shirt, the sheepskin, and the long stride. His memory continued to unfold, and he recalled with singular distinctness and pleasure the fine broad brow curving upwards—a noble arch, he said to himself—the eyes distant as stars, and the underlying sadness in his voice, oftentimes soft and low, but with a cry in it; and he remembered how their eyes met, and it seemed to Joseph that he read in the shepherd's eyes a look of recognition and amity."

To his mates Jesus is "the finest shepherd that ever ranged the hills"; they tell of his marvellous cure for scab. To the disciples he appears to be a mystery; they interpret his words with a stupid literalism of which the Gospels indeed go far to convict them, but which cannot have been so bad as either they or Mr Moore make out. They appear in Mr Moore's pages to fear and wonder at their master rather than love him. But the Jesus of the second period, where the writer's invention has free play, is a figure which enriches our literature, and which it may be hoped even the most orthodox of readers will not forbid themselves to study and admire.

And there is, in truth, much else to admire from the first page to the

last. The book is singularly rich in incident and character. Its pages are thick with life. The career of Jesus is merely one prominent thread in the many-coloured texture of the Judæo-Roman world. Amid this world move the familiar figures of the New Testament, not now "the disciples" or "the Pharisees" or people in trouble about their souls, but men among living men. The reader of this book, whatever he may think of Mr Moore's theology or history or archæology, will certainly have the sensation of seeing in the flesh and under the light of day persons and things usually seen only as stained-glass paintings in a church. If he think that a loss rather than a gain, then *The Brook Kerith* was not written for him.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

LONDON.

A Spiritual Pilgrimage. By R. J. Campbell, M.A., Priest of St Philip's Cathedral Church, Birmingham.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1916.

By those who have known the author personally, heard him frequently, or followed him through any part of his journey, this book will be read with interest and sympathy. It is frank, human, kindly explanatory—autobiography from an armchair by a study fire. But the outside reader, being not in this category, may find himself critical unduly, and wonder at all the bother about "The New Theology." And he will follow here, not an arduous and continuous pilgrimage to a far-off Mecca, but rather a leisurely circular tour. Whoso essays to write of his pilgrimage must first have set his face to go to his Jerusalem and reached ultimately the Holy City. Our author does not appear to have done either. "I was beginning life anew in my forty-ninth year at the very point where I had left off in Oxford nearly a generation earlier" (p. 282). In the interim he had been ordained into the Congregational Ministry and held two prominent and lengthy pastorates successively, but only to secede from Nonconformity ultimately and be ordained afresh into the Anglican Church. Asked to explain this apparent challenge to the validity of Congregational Orders Mr Campbell replies, not to this question alone, but with the whole story of his religious life, and leaves it to speak for itself. He deliberately takes the line of not arguing the various debatable issues which inevitably emerge through fear of stirring party feeling, and confines himself to describing the steps by which he has come to his present position. Such a plea, of course, disarms criticism in advance; yet, none the less, this is an indirect defence, an *Apologia*, an autobiography with a purpose, in which the descriptive often appears in argumentative guise.

No autobiography can be uninteresting wholly, such is the attraction of personality; but the most quickening help which a religious man can give to his generation is a frank revelation of the inner changes and experiences by which his faith has been tested and his attitude changed. And it is often the spur and pressure of controversy which draw forth this confession into the light of day. The outward story can be told quickly. Son and grandson of Nonconformist ministers, brought up an Ulster Protestant, by nature a mystic, he is at length offered an assistant position in a school of Anglican tone, the head being a clergyman. "It was considered desirable that I should be confirmed and become a com-

municant in the ordinary way. I took the step whole-heartedly." Having thus broken definitely with Nonconformity, he went up to Oxford eventually in the days of *Lux Mundi*, worshipped with the Cowley Fathers frequently, was influenced by Dean Paget and Dr Gore deeply, became an Anglo-Catholic of approved type—but was faced ere long with the problem that "If the Anglo-Catholic theory of the Church were the true one, I should not feel safe outside Rome." Pulled up by this prospect, though still a Churchman at heart, he is ordained to the Nonconformist Congregation of Union Street, Brighton. This unexpected episode covered an eight years' period, and produced great good. Our author, we feel sure, belittles his fine influence here. Although he protests that he had few intimate friends amongst Nonconformists, and that Evangelical theology failed him entirely, we know that he raised the congregation, which had fallen on evil time, to a high religious position in the town. But the Catholic Faith, the mystic life, and the corporate Church were more and more filling up his thoughts. Why then did he next launch on the sea of a troublous London ministry, accept responsibility for the City Temple of Nonconformity, and delay for thirteen further years his return to the Anglican Church! Yet again he rose to the occasion, and during these vivid years in London undoubtedly held a great position. He was a popular preacher in the best sense of the idea, understanding the necessary association of philosophy and religion, dealing with vital themes and drawing keen congregations, of whom men formed a large proportion. But, as the years went by, doctrinal controversy brought forth *The New Theology*, and social sympathy with modern industrialism led to plain speaking and some misunderstanding. What a purgatory it must have been! The cleavage with Nonconformity widened apace, and the parting of the ways came at last—ecclesiastically on the question of authority, doctrinally on that of Christology. *The New Theology* was withdrawn from circulation, and its author left London, to be re-ordained at Birmingham into the Church of England. We must give his reasons in his own words. "I have always loved the Church of England—her historic continuity, dignity, comprehensiveness, worship and discipline. She stands unrivalled in Christendom for her combination of intellectual freedom with Catholic tradition. No new Church was created at the Reformation. . . . The whole system of the Church hangs together—doctrine, practice, institutions. I cannot rest in religious individualism, and everything short of full communion with the Church of all the Christian centuries is religious individualism. The question of the reunion of Christendom is one of urgency, not mere expediency. My action in submitting to re-ordination was no slight on Nonconformity; if I were to continue to be a preacher, let alone serve the altar, I must receive episcopal ordination. There is but one Church, and to be a Christian at all is to belong to that one Church" (pp. 282-308). Two further quotations must be given as material to the position. "Either Jesus was what the Catholic Church said He was, or He did not exist; either He was the man from heaven, a complete break with the natural order of things, the representative of a transcendental order, supernatural, super-rational, super-everything, or He was nothing" (p. 250). "Such a stupendous event as the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ must have been acclaimed in glory when it was begun, and watched all through its course with close and reverent interest by the host of heaven. Angels did

indeed sing around the cradle of the holy child; angels did minister to Him as he lay depleted after His lonely grapple with the tempter in the wilderness; yea, and in dark Gethsemane itself they wiped the blood drops from His brow. Such things are not merely pious tradition, but literal fact" (p. 257).

It is not our business to take sides, either for or against, in this latest instance of an age-long contest. The issues raised are of vital interest, and readers will be wise to face them afresh with justice and patience. Our common Christianity, divided sorely though it be, is more precious to-day than at any period of its history. Mr Campbell is revealed at last as an ardent and consistent Anglo-Catholic; but we wonder whether he has ever heard or understood the Catholic note in Nonconformist worship. There is within it increasingly a wide spiritual sympathy which loves not Dissent as a final polity, thinks less of individual views than of the corporate Church, is not narrowly evangelistic or orthodox, but longs and prays for the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace, understands the mystic and the saint, builds symbol and beauty into its fabric, and loves much in the ancient Prayer Book. Blame is cast so conveniently on a separatist Nonconformity, or an evangelistic Christianity. But the responsibility lies surely with the Church which ejected the Baxterian Clergy, approved the Act of Uniformity, and itself created the Dissent which it now decries as uncatholic. There are reluctant Nonconformists whose hope for a truly Catholic Church is not met by an historic episcopate or the creeds and articles and formularies which prevent so many clear thinkers from taking orders. Our author's final plea is for a Reunion of the Churches, and he lays down the absolute requisite that the historic episcopate shall be accepted by all the non-episcopal bodies. Can either spiritual or ecclesiastical unity be manufactured in this dogmatic way! We confess that we see no hope in this "absolute requisite." Can authority in Christianity be claimed artificially through either an infallible Church or an infallible Scripture? The divine and the human are wonderfully intermingled, the spiritual and the natural are alike revealed. It is only when the spiritual becomes God-conscious and the divine is vividly realised as in Jesus that the imperatives of faith ring out clearly and Christianity speaks with authority. But it is a spiritual not an ecclesiastical authority. Neither can unity be produced artificially. Unity is never uniformity. It not only admits but needs diversity for its own continued vitality. It appears hence in the Hymn Books of all the Churches.

The Church of England has a unique opportunity to-day. Let it widen its doors, spiritualise its formularies, transfer its *Quicumque Vult* to the end of the Prayer Book to be perused by the curious as an ancient document full of interest. Let it believe that a truly Catholic Churchmanship may combine the undogmatic with the devout, the intellectual with the symbolic, the usual with the sacramental, the material with the spiritual, the practical with the mystical, the world-spirit with the saintly, the spirit of the Lord with liberty—and without the permission of the Archbishop of Canterbury.

FRANK K. FREESTON.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

RECONSTRUCTION.

I. PERSONALITY THE FINAL AIM OF SOCIAL EUGENICS.¹

PROFESSOR JAMES WARD, F.B.A.

"The crux of all our social problems centres in the child."—Sir JOHN KIRK,
Daily News, May 9, 1917.

SINCE the days of Lamarck, at the beginning of the last century, there has been among biologists a ceaseless collecting of facts and propounding of theories about heredity. Organic or physical heredity we must henceforth call it; for by the end of the century another form of heredity had become a not uncommon topic with sociologists—social or moral heredity, that is to say. By this we are to understand more than the tradition which, in a very strict sense, is the individual's social inheritance. That, however, is usually spoken of as his social environment—the legal, economic, and intellectual conditions, in a word, the civilisation, of the time and place in which the individual is born. Social heredity in the narrower sense is to be distinguished from social environment, much as physical heredity is distinguished from physical environment—such circumstances, for example, as climate, food, and shelter that affect the viable organism as soon as it is born. Environment in both cases implies something static, a permanent situation that is common to many. Heredity in both cases suggests rather a continuous process or development, that is always more or less unique for each; the process, in fact, whereby his individuality is gradually shaped and differentiated.

¹ Presidential Address to the Civic and Moral Education League, 23rd May 1917.

The physical process comes first, and may be said to end in the bodily constitution and congenital endowments, the *natural* or inborn qualities, with which the child begins its separate life. The prime factors in this process are the germs or "gametes" which the parents contribute to form the embryo of the new individual. To realise the importance to the future of our race of heredity in this sense, we need only "to parade before our mind's eye" the rickety, misshapen inmates of our orthopædic hospitals, or the juvenile imbeciles of our lunatic asylums, or the anæmic crowds "with narrow chests and weak chins" who, if they have the means, "expatriate themselves for the chance of life" to sunnier climes; and if they have not, fall a prey to tuberculosis before they are out of their teens.¹ Facts such as these it was that led the late Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin's, to found and endow the movement which has led to the present Eugenics Society.

Where physical heredity ends, there social heredity begins: the one, it is commonly said, is concerned with *nature*, the other with *nurture*. But the earlier process sets limits to the later. "You cannot," said Henry the Eighth, "make a silk purse out of a sow's ear"; and Prospero called Caliban "a born devil, on whose nature nurture can never stick." Such incorrigibles, the morally demented, are a sociological problem to be dealt with apart: we must here leave them out of account. But even those who start with a normal human nature may degenerate and acquire characters as bad and almost as hopeless, or they may develop into honest and honourable citizens. To prevent the one and to promote the other is the function of social eugenics. As we regard physical heredity as ending when the mature embryo becomes a viable organism, so we regard social heredity as ending when the legal infant becomes in the eyes of the law a fully responsible person, member of the commonwealth. During this period of nonage or legal immaturity the so-called "minor" is the ward of society. The prime factors in determining the sort of character or personality with which he or she will "come out" when they arrive at full age are the influences—the practices and the precepts—of those about them who educate or draw out their native possibilities. And we must remember that the possibilities for evil are more easily educable than those for good. Such social dysgenics has then to be prevented and forestalled. But omitting further reference to this as mainly negative or repressive, we come in sight of what we specially mean by Social Eugenics—the positive end

¹ Cf. Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty*, 1883, p. 23.

and aim of the Civic and Moral Education League. As the advocates of physical eugenics seek "to disseminate knowledge and encourage action in the direction of perpetuating a higher racial standard," so we seek to spread knowledge and promote action with the view of fostering a fuller, higher, and wider civic and moral life.

This language is, however, not sufficiently precise; for the problem of social eugenics is more complex than at first sight it seems to be. Social heredity, no doubt, points clearly enough to the individual. But when we say the aim of social eugenics is to promote civil and moral life—even when we add, by means of education—our aim is only partly defined. The individual may be the end, he may be only a means. In educating the young the question is: Do we intend to provide them with such nurture as will ensure that they make the very best of themselves, or such nurture as will adapt them the most to the service of the existing social whole? Even physical eugenics has before now been diverted to special ends; as, for example, that of adding to the stature of his favourite regiment by Frederick William I. of Prussia, the father of Frederick the Great. To this end he was credited with selecting the tallest women he could find as wives for his famous Potsdam Guards. When we remember the variety produced among our domesticated animals by less distinguished "fanciers," it makes one shudder to think of what a Frederick William might make of mankind in these days if he had the chance.

Doubtless this danger is imaginary, but with social eugenics there is a real danger, if a less sensational one. There are other fables besides Mandeville's to be drawn from a beehive. All the difference between a queen bee and a worker is said to be due to difference of nurture applied to the same nature. Here is material for a new fable. I turn again to Germany for illustration. She affords us at this moment both encouragement and warning: she shews us at once how much social eugenics may hope to accomplish and at the same time how disastrous it may be if misapplied. For Germany has not neglected to make the formation of character the chief aim in school life; and the result she has attained is a demonstration of what method and singleness of purpose can do. But, on the other hand, the character she has succeeded in forming has reduced her citizens severally to so many pliant instruments of an autocratic government, instead of fitting them to act collectively as the sovereign power of a democratic one. There is happily neither the will nor the way to such an abuse

of a natural trust anywhere in the British Commonwealth: that I know, of course. But notwithstanding the happier political environment that after centuries of liberty we have now consolidated for ourselves, we are still at the crossways, hesitating between education in the individual's interest and the German ideal, "education to the State, and for the State, as well as by the State."

It may be said that the true interests of the Man and the State cannot conflict. Of the ideal State we certainly must allow this: we might even frame it into a definition of what a State ought to be. Or it may be said that what chiefly hinders the realisation of this ideal is just the keen eye and the zest everybody has for his own interests, contrasted with his extreme insensibility and obtuseness to the general welfare. "*Every man for himself*—and God for us all" is the maxim by which men live. There is no need then, it is said, to foster egoistic interests. The young scarcely require to be trained to take care of number One: they *must* be trained to care for others. Perhaps nobody—at any rate nobody here—would make this reply; for it rests on a complete misunderstanding. The true interests of the individual involve the fullest possible realisation of his highest self, and are not to be gained by a self-suppression like the Bushido or "national spirit" of Japan. And now my point is that it is here most of all that the young need help—help which training with a view to what are assumed to be the interests of the State will not give them. But, before passing to this point, a remark that the supposed objection suggests is worth making. The pure altruism of the Comtist's *vivre pour autrui* is just as one-sided and, if it could be fully realised, would be perhaps just as detrimental to social progress, as pure egoism—which, after all, is equally unnatural and equally rare. For, save in the morally imbecile, some sympathy and fellow-feeling are always to be found. But indiscriminate charity or such amiable generosity as Oliver Goldsmith's—said to be the characteristic of all Irishmen—who always found something for a beggar but rarely had anything for his creditors, is neither morality nor civic virtue, and not a disposition to encourage.

Now for my point. We may agree that ideally the true interests of the Man and the State cannot conflict. When that stage of progress is reached, Herbert Spencer's famous exposition of this conflict will have only a historical interest. Meanwhile that day is a far-off event. At present there is anything but harmony between the truest interests of the individual and the interests of society, *as society now conceives*

them. If, then, you aim at inculcating—I use this hateful word because it belongs to the terminology of the theories I oppose—if you aim, I say, at inculcating the principles of conduct that now predominate, you will certainly improve upon the German model of a citizen—which, by the way, owes its shape largely to the use of heels—but you will fall sadly short of educating to the utmost the highest possibilities of the rising race. In plainer words, the type of human being that would suffice to meet the present effective demand of society is not the highest type, is very far from it. This you may say is a very grave indictment. It is, and the position of this league—like a voice crying in the wilderness—is a proof that it is no baseless charge. “The formation of character ought to be the chief aim in education” we say. Yet, though there has been much discussion in Parliament and in the Press about the new education after the war, this all-important topic, the foundation of the whole, has been almost completely ignored. It is agreed on all hands that the nation must make up for its shameful neglect of scientific education; not, however, from any newly awakened interest in science for its own sake, but simply because at length its technical value has been brought home to us by our enemy. To this end, then, it is proposed without hesitation or misgiving to sacrifice the *literæ humaniores* and the higher studies generally; though their bearing on character and a wider, more creative life cannot be questioned. Very different, I am sure, is your conception of the most pressing demand of the times. It is not education with a view to a more efficient economic rivalry when the present hostilities have ceased—according to the motto *fas est et ab hoste doceri*. It is not military training as “the best antidote to individualism” and as a remedy against “the growth of syndicalist ideas and strikes”—I quote some recent writers. The eager race for wealth we do not regard as a pursuit to encourage; for “a man’s life consisteth not of the abundance of the things that he possesseth.” National defence we do regard, I take it, as a duty that a citizen cannot devolve on others; but what we strive for is the time when we may “beat our swords into ploughshares and our spears into pruning hooks.” But I must pause to anticipate an interruption to this attempt to outline what I take to be our view.

It will be said perhaps, and with some impatience, these are not practical ideals. Of course not: no ideals are practical, and none ever become so but those men strive to realise. The first thing is conviction as to the worth of an ideal: faith in its attainment then becomes possible. It ought to be,

therefore it can be. Given these, all the rest—the methods, the ways and means—will then be added unto us. Put to the test of numbers such ventures of faith are always outvoted at first; but let the world remember in this connexion Ibsen's fine saying: "the minority may be right, the majority is always wrong." Let us then not be afraid of seeking or of boldly proclaiming our ideal. But now so far as my somewhat slight acquaintance with the literature of educational reformers extends, I find much that is most excellent as regards ways and means of progressing beyond the present situation, but I find little to indicate the ideal end they seek.

"I have urged you forward and still urge you—
Without the slightest idea of our destination."

So spake Walt Whitman, and so many of these seem to speak. No bad advice either, you may say, provided we have the sense to discriminate between "forward" and "backward," and so much moral sense we think we have: *ein guter Mensch in seinem dunklen Drange ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst*. I agree: at the same time I think less *Drang* and more reflection would ensure a clearer insight. The ant and the bee may both get home at last, but the bee's superior sense of direction saves it from the meanderings in which the ant often loses its way and itself into the bargain.

At no time could the demand for some clear "idea of our destination" well be more urgent than it is now. People on all hands are realising that the old civilisation is passing away; and the new social reconstruction that will replace it is being everywhere anxiously awaited. Now, as in all great epochs, ideas are in what chemists call "the nascent state"—set free from old, and ready for new, combinations. When Russia casts off her Czar and America lays aside its Monroe doctrine, visions may be hailed as inspired that but yesterday would have been hooted down as mad. For example, here in *The New Statesman* for May 5 I read: "The nation that first appreciates the ideal of Ibsen—that every child in the land should be brought up as a nobleman—will lead the world." If I were attempting that other Fable of the Bees of which I spoke, this passage and the following might point the moral: I quote now from a recent pamphlet entitled *What Labour wants from Education*. "Hitherto," says Mr M'Tavish, the writer, "the working class has never been seriously consulted as to what it wants from education. [It is expected] to fit in with preconceived notions as to its proper place in a generally accepted scheme of things; and educational reform

is only to concern itself with equipping *the workers to be more efficient bees in the industrial hive.*"

We must try to realise that there will be henceforth no "generally accepted scheme of things," and that therefore the task of reconstructing will devolve on individuals no longer helped or hindered by vested interests. The more we realise this, the clearer the problem of social eugenics will become. When a city has to be extended, the old plan is there to prejudice the new; but when the city has to be rebuilt, the old defects survive only as a warning. The law of progress, Sir Henry Maine taught us, has been a movement from Status to Free Contract: we may enlarge this and say that it has become a movement from Status towards Free Personality. Henceforth the one thing needful is that the men and women who are fit to rebuild—that these, whatever be the class they come from, and only these, shall be promoted to the work and socially ennobled.

"The greatest spiritual tragedy of working-class life," says another W.E.A. pamphleteer, "is disclosed in the phrase, 'I never had a chance.'" Henceforth everyone is to start with the nobleman's chance: one may have it thrust upon him, but all are to have the opportunity to achieve it; and only by achieving may any hope to retain. After all, in so far as the existence of society is due to the *nature* of individuals, in so far, it seems plain, that its progress must depend on the *nurture* of those individuals. The very continuity which we now recognise between rational human nature and its animal (or anoetic) antecedents suggests this priority of the individual to the whole by which he is nevertheless to be transfigured. Only, in times like the present, when a thorough reconstruction of society is imperative, have men ever realised the full significance of this simple truth that society has been, and always will be, what its members make it. Obviously, then, the many who are now beginning to feel the force of this elementary truth must also begin to see the folly of sacrificing the means to a better state of society for the sake of a worse. That is what education in the interests of society has long meant, and what it will still mean, unless we cease talking "of making the man a better mechanic," and strive mainly and primarily to make the mechanic a better man.

To strengthen my case for the initial value of personality in social structure I will venture yet further afield. I will ask you to imagine what the ideal society will be like—in plainer words, if you prefer them, to imagine what heaven will be like. It is doubtless a wild question. Never mind, you

have some ideas; and I think I can guess some of them. There will be no want, no struggle therefore for subsistence, no private property perhaps. At any rate there will be no real temptation. Everybody will be as pure as they look, overflowing with goodwill and radiant with love. But what will they *do*? Get up missions to the denizens of hell?—unless these once for all have chosen evil for their good and ceased to be. Or visit the spirits in prison perhaps, for whom all hope is not yet abandoned. This would doubtless, as Bret Harte said, be “a . . . better business than loafing around a throne.” But such possibilities seem incompatible with an ideal consummation of all things, which is what we mean. What when the *whole* world is perfect will everybody do? Find delight in creation and in friendship is the only surmise we can make as to a state that wholly transcends our imagination. It was, I take it, on these lines that the scholastic doctrine grew up that every angel was *sui generis*, and interesting therefore to every other. Our experience, at any rate, knows of no other escape from insipidity: true personality is the salt of the earth. And a survey of animate nature points in the same direction: as Goethe said, *die Natur scheint Alles auf Individualität angelegt zu haben* (“Nature seems to have planned everything with a view to individuality”). Our surmise then suggests anew the supreme value—we may call it this time the final value—of personality.

But further to bring out my point, I will ask you to look at the matter in yet another way. Glancing back over the history of our race, we find one of its most striking features to be the influence of great men. The plausible but shallow attempts of writers such as Buckle, Spencer, Taine, and many more, to show that great men, like all men, are but resultants to be explained along with other “phenomena” by their antecedents and their environment, on pain of denying the law of universal causation,—these attempts no longer impress us.¹ From the mechanical standpoint, the law of causation may hold out to the last—as there an indispensable postulate. But from the standpoint of history, the last fact we reach is some great Supreme, who wrought

“But this main miracle, that thou art thou,
With power on thine own act and on the world.”

I will refer therefore without misgiving to such pioneers in the moral realm as, say, Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, and,

¹ Cf. W. James's Essay on “Great Men and their Environment,” *Will to Believe*, pp. 216–254.

above and beyond all, Jesus Christ as being pre-eminent instances of the power of personality in human affairs. Beginning with these, the principle of continuity should help us to realise that influences the same in kind have been at work from the first and are working now, though exerted in narrower and narrower spheres till we come down at length to that of the mute inglorious Miltons and village Hampdens, of whom there has been and will be no historic record. Such reflection should then convince us that we shall never clearly understand history so long as we are content to talk vaguely of general tendencies, social movements, public opinion, *Zeitgeist* or the spirit of the age, and so forth. These are actual and efficient only in so far as they are incorporated in concrete individuals: the veritable creators and conservers of the whole are not diffused forces, they are distinct persons.¹

Creators and conservers, I have said: the duality of function here implied suggests some remarks that may again help us forward. Stability is essential if society is to exist at all; for this imitation and obedience may suffice: these make up the conservative factor, answering to custom and routine. But for progress, invention and initiative are required: these constitute the creative factor, which means change and reformation. But in what Bagehot has called the preliminary age, the two rôles were and had to be distinct: in what he calls the age of discussion they are and have to be combined.² Or as Tarde, in his masterly work, *Les Lois de l'Imitation*, puts it: at first imitation was *unilateral*, at length it became *reciprocal*; those who led in some capacities were prepared to follow in others, and *vice versa*. Now when we recall what ages of struggle against suppression it has taken to advance from the one extreme—essential to existence but inimical to progress—towards the other, in which progress is assured, we may be more willing to admit the common defect in educational systems against which I am trying to protest. For towards the young we are apt to conduct ourselves as if the world were still in the preliminary age. While we nowadays only bow, they are still expected to bow down—I suppose everybody knows of the originals, of which our modern bow and other formalities of courtesy are but the atrophied survival. Children are “to be seen not heard,” “to speak when they are spoken to,” “to come when they are called,” “to do as they are bid without asking why,”

¹ Cf. J. A. Leighton, “The Psychological Self and the Actual Personality,” *Philosophical Review*, 1905, p. 678.

² *Physics and Politics*, chapters i. and v.

and so forth. I expect few—save the youngest among us—have escaped this *régime*: indeed none of us can have escaped it altogether, or we should not be here. For obviously the parental relation is in every respect “unilateral” at the first: the child does and must begin by imitating and obeying those on whom its very existence depends. But in bringing up children parents, and teachers too, easily forget the potentialities of the child and the pace at which these become actualities. As the child’s stature increases rapidly, so too does its experience. A decade that often extends but little the parental horizon widens enormously that of their offspring. What the biologists call palingenesis has its analogue here. The newly hatched chicken, they tell us, acquires in three weeks the organisation that the primary evolution or *élan vital*, as I suppose Bergson would call it, took untold ages to “canalise” or map out. Equally rapid is the rate at which the child enters upon its social inheritance, that tradition which reaches back into prehistoric times.

Yet this neglect both of parents and teachers to recognise adequately the early and rapidly developing personality of the young is easily explained. In the first place, they are only treating the rising generation as they were treated themselves. So the evil gets perpetuated and confirmed; partly because, when their turn comes to exercise arbitrary authority, parents and teachers have usually forgotten what they suffered under it; partly because the present sufferers are as yet helpless—only aggravating the evil if their nature impels them to resent it. In the next place the customary routine is immediately effective; but sparing the rod means spoiling the child and risking the need of sterner remedies later on. Authority must be maintained, and the rod is its symbol. Thus it comes about that the type of government characteristic of the primitive age is upheld even now in the “management of the young.” Only by sacrificing individual initiative to custom has society got under way, and a like sacrifice is still assumed to be needful for the young even when we adults are living in the age of discussion. Moreover, it saves so much trouble to work with machinery and to one pattern: in fact, production on a large scale is only possible in this way. But even if education were an art comparable—as it is so often supposed to be—to the potter’s art in moulding clay, personal handling would still be vastly superior to “knocking into one shape” all and sundry to reach a prescribed “standard.” The potter at his wheel at least feels his material, and in giving it form can take its quality into consideration: neither is possible to the potter at a press.

The greater value of hand-made articles, then, might lead us to question mechanical methods of education, even if the young were merely so much plastic material that may safely be dealt with in the lump. But what is too much overlooked is that the young are not inertly plastic—only imitating and obeying—but spontaneously plastic—full of mischief as their elders say, but always original mischief, displaying their inborn inventiveness.

What, however, specially impresses me in the teaching of men like Bagehot and Tarde is the presumption they suggest—as I hinted just now—that when the position of the adult is altered that of the alumnus should be altered too. “Were slavery to be his lot,” said Herbert Spencer, “—if his after-life had to be passed under the rule of a Russian autocrat, or of an American cotton-planter, no better method of training could be devised than one which accustomed him to that attitude of complete subordination he would subsequently have to assume. But just to the degree in which such treatment would fit him for servitude, must it unfit him for being a free man among free men.”¹ “That’s enough in all conscience,” some will say; and anywhere but here I might be shouted down. “In a word,” they might add, “we gather you want to enfranchise children!” Yes, I do. It looks as if we were going to enfranchise women at last, and the children’s turn seems to come next. “When the child is free the world will be rebuilt,” was said the other day at a symposium about *The Ethical Principles of Social Reconstruction*. But the enfranchisement I mean is one appropriate to the special case: it is an educational enfranchisement, not the electoral franchise. I mean the removal of every hindrance and the provision of every facility, so that freedom of thought and action may be displayed within the steadily enlarging bounds of juvenile life. The United States, many of which have anticipated us in the matter of woman suffrage, are also, I understand, greatly in advance of us here.

A powerful argument, as it seems to me, for this early enfranchisement of those who have soon to take up the full responsibilities of citizenship is also suggested by the bare fact of social progress itself. To what was the progress due? Ultimately simply to this—that the children were wiser than their fathers. Ancestor-worship is a widely spread and ancient cult; its true inwardness, however, is still uncertain. If we regard it as a commemoration of benefactors, we may ask: To whom do we owe most—to the ancients or to the moderns?

¹ *Social Statics*, 1892, p. 85.

Well, the later Jews, we remember, were commanded to teach their children that "they might *not* be as their fathers were." And are we not constantly doing the same? It is then surely probable—nay, it is our devout belief—that our children will retrieve our faults and be wiser than we have been. If, then, we honour our fathers for what they were, should we not reverence our children for what they will be? And in fact they, as has been often said, are the true ancients after all; for they will constitute that older, and so wiser and better, world that will have outgrown the comparatively inexperienced days to which we belong. Mr Bertrand Russell in his recent *Principles of Social Reconstruction* speaks of reverence for the child as essential to the teacher; though lacking, alas! far too often from mere thoughtlessness and want of imagination. For, adapting Tennyson's words, we may say:

The world which credits what is done
Is cold to all that will have been.

But if we "take wings of foresight"—as Tennyson in the next canto goes on to say—and credit what hereafter will have been done as well as what has been done already, must we not feel that honour is due to our children as well as to our parents? Looking at the world *sub specie æternitatis*, that is *what we should do*. Personally I confess I have long felt that "unaccountable humility" in the presence of a child which Mr Russell describes, whenever my thoughts have led me to think of the child's future; and never have I felt it more than in these latter days when such vast tasks are soon to await the erstwhile child, tasks in reconstructing our social systems that time has tried and proved wanting.

People in general are, however, too absorbed with the present to be duly sensible of the dignity and worth that its future entails upon the rising generation. We talk mostly of the submerged tenth of the population, but Lord Haldane, as everybody knows, has lately shewn that as regards education it is a submerged nine-tenths that we ought to talk of. Our callousness to this awful waste and injustice will some day be condemned as universally and as severely as the indifference of our forefathers to the evils of slavery is condemned now. But there is another kind of waste and injustice that would remain, even if the nine-tenths—treated more or less as chattels—received all the education the favoured tenth obtain. The education itself is bad; for it regards social eugenics as a means for which society itself, not the individual, is the end. Thereby society shows itself an *injusta noverca* rather than an *alma*

mater, providing an education that tends to keep the world stationary rather than to promote its progress. And so far it is short-sighted as well as selfish.

The value of a single man or woman of open mind, independent judgment, and moral courage, who requires to be convinced and refuses to be cajoled, is only concerned to be right and not afraid to be singular, deferring to reason but not to rank, true to their own self, and therefore not false to any man—the value of such a man or woman, I say, is priceless: a nation of such would leaven and regenerate the world. That is the true national education at which England should aim. What we actually aim at is something immeasurably inferior. Great advances in national education were made, it must be allowed, in the course of the last century; and yet class interests, political jealousies, and sectarian differences blocked the way for seventy years or more. Then University Tests were abolished and Board Schools began; and since, great strides have been made, and greater still are pending. But the evil influences that formerly delayed the movement are still powerful to check its perfect work. Prejudices venerable only for their age, class interests that are morally unjustifiable, conflicting dogmas that cannot all be right and may quite well all be wrong, still bar the attainment of full liberty of thought and the complete development of each one's personality.

To this hour we have not made up our minds as to what we intend to aim at. This is the point with which I began, and I trust I have not wholly failed to make the issue clear. I fear, however, that many, perhaps most of you, will think that issue rather academic. For all I have said about ways and means is that if we are convinced about the end these will be found: I quite meant, when I began, to say more, but have left myself no time. But, supposing you were convinced, I could tell you one way—the most obvious and the most important. No matter how early or how long children are sent to school, education must begin and be continued at home. Parents need to be actively interested and wisely instructed in turning their unequalled opportunities—both to make and to mar—to the best account. This I fancy is a missing link in the League's organisation, and it is a point that may sometime be worth discussing.

JAMES WARD.

II. RECONSTRUCTION—OF WHAT?

HELEN BOSANQUET.

AFTER the war, Reconstruction. We are all clear about that. Our social structure has undergone profound modifications; conditions and relations which offered obstinate resistance to all the efforts of reformers have been melted away in the heat of the furnace; and the chance has come, we think, such as will never offer again, of building up our people into a community from which the old defects will have been struck out and in which new perfections will have room to grow.

We think the chance has come, but it is obvious that whether it has or not will depend entirely upon the way in which we attack the problem. There will be an almost irresistible tendency for things to slip back into the old grooves, and an increasing tendency also to feel satisfaction as they do so. It will be as if a jig-saw puzzle were assembling its scattered pieces and feeling more and more comfortable in proportion as each piece fitted neatly into its old place. Sooner or later the whole picture will be there again, black patches and white patches, red streets and dark-blue streets, just as it was before, only perhaps on a larger scale and with the colours intensified; and "see what wonderful powers of recuperation," we shall say, "how well we have come out of the war!"

And yet we do not, most of us, want the old arrangement back again; there was so much in it of pain and poverty for which we could see no necessity, and which nevertheless hung about us like a nightmare which would not be banished. And most of all, we do not want it back because it contained in it the seeds of the crash and devastation we have been through. We want life raised to a higher level, and while the keenness of our sufferings and the height of our exaltation are still with us the larger vision prevails. It is when the

routine of ordinary life returns that we shall find the old ways the easiest, and that we shall follow the familiar lines of least resistance unless we succeed before then in raising ourselves clear above their entanglements—or shift the points so that they will lead us to a wider world.

What does this mean? Surely we must continue to live in the world of realities, such as we find it to our hands, fashioned by Nature and bequeathed to us by our ancestors; and any attempt to escape from it is foredoomed to futility. All we can do is to make the best of it, to clear away the slums, to provide better housing, to see to it that the workers receive proper wages, to spend more money upon education, and to check infant mortality. All these things we have long been working for, and are now preparing to work for with energy a hundredfold intensified. What more is necessary?

Well, these things are necessary, and many more of a like kind. But if they are to be of any avail something quite different is also necessary, something without which they must fail to bear the fruit we hope from them. For is it not conceivable, nay, even likely, that the new society which they will aid us to construct will contain just the same seeds of strife and devastation, only with their power for evil intensified to a still higher pitch of destructiveness?

Consider the spirit in which some of these reforms are being urged. Why are all European nations pressing the cult of the baby with such vigour? The motives are mixed, no doubt; but the one which has most power, the one which works politically and extracts grants from Governments, is the desire to have more men for the next war. Constantly the number of infants which die is compared with the number of deaths on the battlefield; repeatedly we are told how many more divisions we should have been able to put in the field to-day if we had instituted schools for mothers twenty years ago; solemnly we are warned that the enemy will omit no measure which will enable him to outstrip us in the growth of population. The method works; babies are kept alive; but if they could be aware of the fate which awaits them, they might well enter their feeble protest.

Or take, again, the question of education. We cannot afford, we are told, not to cultivate our human material to a higher degree than we have done in the past. Agreed. But why has the nation only now awakened to a fact which has been obvious for many years? and what has enabled the Minister of Education to ask for an increase of expenditure which would have been thought preposterous in our days of

wealth before the war? Some true lovers of education are seizing the opportunity; but can it be denied that the opportunity is there because the predominant motive is to rival Germany on her own ground of efficiency, and enable us to start on a renewed war of industry and commerce with the aid of more intelligent and capable workers? Even the raising of agricultural wages comes only with the desire to increase our home supply of food, and so to sever with impunity one of the chief links which binds us to other sections of humanity.

If these considerations are even partially true, how can we avoid the conclusion that the new world which we are hoping to construct is more than likely to repeat all the follies and heart-burnings and rivalries and hatreds of the old; that it will be a world in which the nations will have learned chiefly how to injure each other more efficiently and scientifically?

But, it may be objected, war will not be allowed. It will be prevented by a League of Peace.

It will not be prevented. No League of Peace could possibly be framed strong enough to prevent war if the feelings and ideas which lead to war are allowed to flourish unrestrained. If, indeed, wars were always and merely for material gain, if men never fought except to snatch the possessions of their neighbours, then an international police might keep the peace. But the truth rather is that it is *ideas* which are at the bottom of human warfare. Amongst civilised peoples, at least, it is ideas of religion, of wounded honour, of lessened prestige, which lead to war, rather than the crude desire to drive cattle, or snatch wives, or to acquire territory. And even where the desire to acquire territory persists, it is based upon the wrong idea that no benefit can be derived from the land without exclusive possession.

We live in a world of things and actions; but we live also, all of us, in a world of ideas—ideas of what actions are right and what are wrong, of what things are good to have and what best, of our relations to other people and theirs to us. And it is this world which cries out for reconstruction. Whatever we may think the proximate causes of the war to be, we must find them ultimately in the fact that men have believed their good to lie in directions which lead to conflict rather than to harmony; and the problem which most urgently demands solution is the construction of a system of ideas which will *not* lead to conflict, but will naturally and inevitably involve co-operation. It is work which must be done primarily by our teachers in religion,

in ethics, in economics, and by them passed on to our teachers of the young to become part of our educational system. We must, in short, devise an education which will lead men to seek their treasure in things which gain by being shared, to find their joy in making and giving rather than in taking or destroying.

This is not business, we shall be told ; it is all very well for the Sunday School or for private life, but the business man is out to make a living, and must do it in the old way, only of course much more efficiently. He can't be hampered in his operations by "ideas."

Well, even suppose it were not "business" as now conceived, it might possibly be something much better. But take it on the old grounds, scrutinise the business world with this view of reconstruction in your mind, and see how it teems with suggestions that after all the best business may spring from ideas of quite another order than those which generally prevail. There is, for instance, a belief which has been gaining ground for years in the world of industry, very slowly at first, but with accelerating rapidity under pressure of the war—the belief that the health of the worker is of primary importance ; a purely humanitarian idea, and one which cannot possibly be refuted, but one which has been ignored for generations in countless places of toil and by innumerable employers. And now it is being realised, with some astonishment we may expect, that the ignoring of it has been not only wrong, but also bad business ; not merely a crime, but a blunder. The employer has actually gained less by his hard bargain than he would have done by a generous one.

Another crucial instance is working itself out before our eyes to-day in the discovery of what is called "scientific management." No one doubts that there lies in it the possibility of immensely increasing the productiveness of labour. Whether it can be successfully applied, however, depends entirely upon the fundamental ideas which guide its application. The workers are fighting against it because they believe that the employers intend to utilise it to wrest the last ounce of labour from them for the sake of profit alone. But suppose the employers themselves inspired by the thought that here is a way to shorten the hours of work and to return the worker to his home unexhausted, ready for true recreation, who can doubt that in this case "scientific management" would produce something very like a peaceful revolution in industry ? At any rate we know enough from actual experience to be certain that a reconstruction of our ideas

will not necessarily involve any falling off in efficiency or productiveness.

To recognise the need for a reconstruction of ideas is one thing, to work it out in general and in detail is another and far more difficult. That must be the task of the leaders and thinkers in every department of life and for all the generations to come. Of course no scheme can ever be worked out *a priori* which should provide an appropriate maxim for every occasion as it arose; but something is needed between that and the vagueness of the general injunction to "be good," some sort of "middle principles," to be interpreted and applied in the light of changing experience. Some of these might be reached by the consideration and discussion of the vital question, "How far is it true under present conditions, and how far necessary, that one man's gain is another man's loss?" It is a question of the first importance in all spheres of conduct, and neglect to answer it rightly leads to fundamental fallacies in economics, to blunders in business, to disaster in international relations, to injustice in social affairs, and to discord instead of harmony in private life. It is a problem of which some of the issues are so simple that its study could be begun in the elementary schools, and others so complicated and difficult as to task the highest faculties of the economist or statesman. And wherever achieved, its solution could not fail to throw new light on many of the dark places of the world.

Would it be too much to expect as a result of such a study that men might one day, perhaps in the far future, come to reject all gain which involved a loss to others? I do not think so, provided always that we began early enough with the children. If they were helped, at home and at school, to care most for what is best, to find their happiness in the things which gain by being shared, to know the difference between liberty and licence, and to respect each other's rights and their own duties, we might safely expect them in after life to accept a loftier conception of profit and loss than that which prevails to-day. And with such a reconstruction we might perhaps hope also that war would become a thing of the past.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY.

III. EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT, M.P.

THE welkin rings with reports of "reconstruction," and it may be that people are becoming rather weary of the continual reverberations. Still, the fact remains that after the war we shall be face to face with a new world, and that for that new world the old machinery will no longer suffice. The problem by which we shall be and are confronted has been widely discussed; but nowhere have I seen it stated at once more comprehensively and more compactly than in the *Report of the Departmental Committee on Juvenile Education in Relation to Employment after the War*,¹ and from that Report, therefore, I quote the following eloquent passage: "We have to perfect the civilisation for which our men have shed their blood and our women their tears; to establish new standards of value in our judgment of what makes life worth living, more wholesome and more restrained ideals of behaviour and recreation, finer traditions of co-operation and kindly fellowship between class and class and between man and man. We have to restore the natural relations between the folk and the soil from which the folk derives its sustenance, to revivify with fresh scientific methods and better economic conditions the outworn practice of our agriculture, to learn over again that there is no greater public benefactor than the man who makes two ears of corn to grow where but one grew before. We have to bring research to bear upon the processes of our manufactures, to overhaul routine and to eliminate waste, to carry our reputation for skilful workmanship and honest and intelligent trafficking into new markets and to maintain it in the old. These are tasks for a nation of trained character and robust physique, a nation alert to the things of the spirit, reverential of knowledge, reverential of its teachers, and generous in its estimate of

¹ Cd. 8512, 1917.

what the production and maintenance of good teachers inevitably cost."

In view of a problem so complex and many-sided, plain men may well ask, Where are we to begin to look for the solution? As they ponder over this question, people are, I believe, coming more and more to the conviction that at bottom the whole problem is one of education. And for this reason. Analyse the elements of any one of the specific problems ahead of us, and what do we find? Take, for instance, the industrial problem: probe it to its depths, and you find that the essence of the demand is not so much for new methods in business organisation—though these may be called for—nor for the introduction of new machinery—much as this may be needed—but rather for a new spirit among the human agents in industrial production, and a new personal relation between man and man. We hear, in fine, on every side, an insistent demand that business relations should be "humanised." The mere "cash nexus," deplored and denounced by Carlyle, has proved, as he predicted that it would, insufficient to bind men together even in industrial organisation, much more to provide the basis of a social system. If, however, relations are to be "humanised," the process must begin with the moral and intellectual equipment of the individual, and this can be provided only by education. Educational reconstruction must, therefore, have precedence. It may, indeed, be objected that the problem of education, although it be the most fundamental, is not the most pressing and immediate. Many of the problems awaiting solution will, it is urged, have to be solved by and for men and women who have already passed the stage of formal education. I would remark in passing that no one can be qualified to take part in the task of reconstruction who imagines that his education is "completed," but I am chiefly concerned to insist that, urgent as the problems are, no reasonable person can suppose that they are going to be solved in a month, in a decade, or even in a generation. Old men and young men are alike in a hurry, and I would respectfully commend to them the wise warning of a French historian:

"The French Revolution has not been . . . a great tragedy, followed in the course of a century by accessory little plays, the chief benefit of which would have been to supply mankind, in a dull and unpoetical age, with fresh elements of the picturesque. If we give that word Revolution the substantial meaning it did and does convey to a French mind, if we show that Revolutions have not been futile dramatic incidents in modern French history, but are part of one great Revolution,

which is still going on at this very hour, and the final consequences of which have not been reached yet, then, I think, we shall understand much better many events of the past and of the present time. France is not only a land of Revolutions, but *the land of the Revolution*, the same spirit, which led the nation a hundred years ago, being still and always at work.”¹

The criticism thus admirably expressed applies to “reconstruction” no less than to “revolution.” The work of “reconstruction,” if it is to be lasting and sound, will be a work of time. We shall be wise, therefore, to lay the foundations by an earnest attempt to solve the problem of education. And it may be as well to define at the outset what, in this paper, will be the meaning attached to the word itself. In doing so we may attempt incidentally to redeem a good word from unpopular associations by defining education simply as culture. “Culture,” said Professor Huxley, “means something different from learning or technical skill. It implies the possession of an ideal and the habit of critically estimating the value of things by a theoretic standard.” “The possession of an ideal and the habit of critically estimating the value of things by a theoretic standard.” Would it be possible to find a better definition of the meaning and end of education?

Value, as the economists have taught us, is a relative term; in order, therefore, to estimate critically the value of things we must see things in relation to other things; and for this purpose we must needs have both knowledge and judgment. Education itself must be brought under the same law of relativity. It must be thought of, not as a thing apart, not as something which can be contained in a water-tight compartment. Life is education, and education is life. To “reconstruct education” must therefore mean to get a new outlook upon life, the capacity to “see life steadily and to see it whole.” Does this conception of education throw any light upon the failures of the past, and in particular upon the disillusionment which seems so commonly to have fallen upon the men who were young forty years ago? The fact of that disillusionment it is hardly possible to ignore. The reforms which followed rapidly upon the political reconstruction of 1867 were going to make a new world. More particularly was this result anticipated from the passing of the Elementary Education Act of 1870. Many other reforms were effected by the Legislature, partly under the guidance of Mr Gladstone in the Parliament of 1868–1874, partly under that of Lord

¹ Professor Paul Mantouxap, *Lectures on the History of Nineteenth Century*, p. 149.

Beaconsfield, whose programme of reform between 1874 and 1880 was summarised in the cry, "Sanitas, sanitas, omnia sanitas." That much good was effected it would be stupid to deny. But the total result has been admittedly disappointing, not least in regard to the results attributable to the great reform effected by Mr W. E. Forster. May it be that the disappointment is to be ascribed to the fact that reform was attempted piecemeal; that there was an imperfect synthesis in social effort; that the great law of relativity was deliberately ignored? There must, of course, be a differentiation of functions even in reform. But analysis if it is to be fruitful must only be a stage in a synthetic process.

It may perhaps be useful to approach the problem of educational reconstruction with these questions and considerations in mind.

There have come into existence in the last few months a number of schemes or programmes of educational reconstruction propounded by various official bodies or voluntary associations. These programmes exhibit a very remarkable consensus of opinion. It is, for example, generally agreed that no child should be allowed to leave an elementary school until attaining the age of fourteen; that attendance at day continuation classes, for not less than eight hours a week for forty weeks in the year, should be obligatory on all young persons between fourteen and eighteen years of age, and that for such young persons there should be a corresponding compulsory restriction of the hours of labour; that there should be a much more generous provision of secondary schools, together with enlarged opportunities for attendance at such schools for every boy or girl who shows any real aptitude for the studies appropriate to the secondary stage; and that facilities for proceeding from the secondary schools to the universities should be provided for all students who exhibit capacity to profit from a university education. Apart, however, from such points, which are and have long been the commonplace of educational reformers, there have recently been three pronouncements to which special attention may be directed. The first is the *Report on Juvenile Education in Relation to Employment*, already mentioned; the second is the speech of Mr H. A. L. Fisher, President of the Board of Education, delivered in the House of Commons on April 19th; and the third is a speech by Lord Haldane in the House of Lords on May 9th.

The questions raised by the first are of extreme urgency. It is a fact, indubitable and lamentable, though not unin-

telligible, that there has been a marked increase in juvenile delinquency since the outbreak of war. The causes are not far to seek: the relaxation of domestic discipline, the absence of fathers of families on military service, a great demand for adolescent labour at preposterously high wages, the inevitable "withdrawal of influences making for the social improvement of boys and girls,"¹ the accentuation of "tendencies adversely affecting the development of character and efficiency," and so forth. The coming of peace is, in many ways, likely to aggravate conditions which have arisen during, and partly out of, the war. No social or educational reformer can, therefore, afford to neglect the recommendations of the Departmental Committee responsible for this Report. Insisting, like other people, strongly upon the necessity of bringing to an end at the earliest possible moment "the present detestable system of half-time exemptions below the age of fourteen," of establishing compulsory continuation classes to be held in the daytime, of limiting the hours of employment for adolescents, the Committee make their own further recommendations. They lay great stress, for example, upon physical training "as an indispensable element in the curriculum" for adolescents. Sir George Newman lends the weight of his great authority to the adoption of the Swedish system of formal gymnastic exercises. With great deference I submit that this is not enough. From the point of view of physical development such exercises are doubtless admirable and perhaps sufficient. But they lack an essential educational element. Mere exercises, however physically advantageous, do little for that training of character which boys (and in increasing measure girls) of the "public school" class derive from participation in games.

The nation as a whole has in the main responded to the test of war in gratifying fashion. But certain defects, both physical and moral, have been revealed, and the necessity for improved physical training cannot be gainsaid. That physical training can be and should be devised in such fashion as to contribute to secondary purposes. Our German foes have long been devoted to physical exercises most scientifically devised; but they have never really learnt to play games, still less to play the game. And the results are apparent to the world. There is another aspect of the question to which Lord Haldane drew attention in his statesmanlike speech in the House of Lords. Even if, after the war, we continue to rely primarily upon an Expeditionary Force, "the nation

¹ *Report*, p. 5.

must," he said, "be more willing to lend itself to arrangements for a Second Line Army capable not only of comparatively rapid mobilisation but of great expansion. . . . Whatever line you take about that, you could make use of the schools as a means of preparing your future potential soldiers. . . . Why should not one of the periods of education after the elementary school be a period in which this compulsory training should be required to fit men to be called upon in after life, if necessary, to become rapidly capable and trained soldiers?" It is a pertinent question, and from no one does the question come more appropriately than from Lord Haldane. Why should the physical training now insistently demanded by the best educationalists as a compulsory item in every curriculum not be associated in elementary schools with the admirable organisation devised by Sir Robert Baden Powell, in secondary and continuation schools with a Cadet Corps, in universities with an Officers' Training Corps?

Mr Fisher, in the remarkable declaration of educational policy to which reference has already been made, focussed attention mainly upon the problem of finance, and upon that problem more particularly in relation to the supply of teachers. He may be assured of general assent to his proposition that here lies the key to the immediate situation. "In education," as he rightly insisted, "almost everything depends upon the personal element. If the teacher is good and is thorough in his work, and if he is fond of children, and if he be alert, understanding, sympathetic, firm and yet good-humoured, success is secured. If the teacher is bad, the most costly buildings and equipment will not redeem pure educational system from failure." It is, however, common knowledge that the supply of teachers is running short. This is the case not only with the State-aided and State-provided schools with which Mr Fisher was dealing, but with the schools—both preparatory and secondary—which cater for the wealthier classes. This phenomenon, though accentuated by the war, had been clearly and increasingly discernible for some years before 1914. Nor is the reason far to seek. Economic law was operating. The supply of good teachers showed signs of diminution because the remuneration of teachers in all grades of education—not excluding the Universities—is admittedly inadequate. And not the cash remuneration only. If the teacher is content with his own consciousness of a high mission faithfully discharged, well and good. If he looks for social recognition he will have to look long. Only of late years has the teaching profession come to be regarded as respectable, and even now it can hardly

be described as a "recognised" profession on a par with law, medicine, or divinity. This is true more or less of all grades except the very highest, but it tells most hardly upon the elementary teachers. Inadequately remunerated and socially unregarded, their lot, especially in the isolation of country parishes, is often a depressing and sometimes a painful one. It is small wonder, therefore, that the statistics of educational recruiting should give ground for serious concern. Some men and women become teachers because the sense of vocation is irresistible—they can no other; to a few the calling offers, or appears to offer, the opportunity of social advancement; but two things are plain: on the one hand, that the profession must be made, in an economic sense, more attractive; and on the other, that in the ranks of existing teachers there are some whose presence is a danger to the Commonwealth. "I do not," said Mr Fisher in a notable passage, "expect the teaching profession to offer great material rewards—that is impossible; but I do regard it as essential to a good scheme of education that teachers should be relieved from perpetual financial anxieties, and that those teachers who marry should be able to look forward to rearing a family in respectable conditions. An anxious and depressed teacher is a bad teacher; an embittered teacher is a social danger." There will, therefore, be a consensus of opinion in favour of Mr Fisher's initial contention that the first condition of educational advance is that we should learn to pay our teachers better.

The education estimates for the coming year are skilfully designed to effect this object. Into the rather complicated details it would be impossible in this place to enter, but it may be said, in brief, that the participation of local education authorities in the increased subvention offered by the State will depend largely upon their liberality towards their teachers. The proportion of the expenditure covered by the Treasury grant is to be 40 per cent.; but there is to be an ingenious differentiation in the objects of the expenditure. Towards the salaries of teachers the State will contribute 60 per cent.; to all other expenditure, only 20 per cent. By this means the Central Government will give a direct encouragement to the improvement of salaries, and at the same time indicate the importance which it attaches to this particular aspect of educational reconstruction.

An increase of salaries will not, however, by itself suffice to improve the quality of teachers. It is a first and essential step, but something more is needed. At present elementary teachers are largely recruited from the ranks of elementary

scholars. Among these are to be found a very large number of able and devoted men and women, whose loyal service to the State cannot be too warmly acknowledged. The average of teaching capacity among them is conspicuously high, higher perhaps than among any other grade of teachers. But they would themselves be the first to acknowledge that it would be a real gain to them and to their scholars if the supply of teachers could be drawn from more varied sources. A vocation of high political significance is opening out to men, and even more perhaps to women, who have passed through a different curriculum; who have received their education in the great boarding or day schools and in the older Universities. To the women students of Oxford Mr Fisher has already appealed for co-operation; if he has not made a similar appeal to the men, it may be because he would have to go to France, to Egypt, and to Mesopotamia to make it. On the response of university women much in the immediate future of English education will undoubtedly depend.

There is, however, another point which it is important to emphasise. The Government has asked the House of Commons to make an additional grant of £3,420,000 for the assistance of elementary education, mainly for the purpose of improving the salaries of teachers. It is not too much to say that this expenditure will be sheer waste of public money if we do not simultaneously take in hand the problem of secondary education. Of the £40,000,000 or so annually devoted to elementary education much is undoubtedly wasted at present owing to the fact that the children are turned adrift during the critical years of adolescence—between their dismissal from “school” and their permanent absorption into the ranks of industry. All social reformers are therefore agreed that from the mere point of view of national economy we shall never get value for the vast sums spent on elementary education unless we are prepared to spend much more on secondary education. As a beginning Mr Fisher has proposed an additional grant of £433,500, and has foreshadowed considerable reforms to be effected in the near future.

The difficulties in the way are not inconsiderable. Any comprehensive reform of secondary education must cause considerable dislocation of the industrial system—particularly in the textile industries—and some readjustment in the conditions of the rural economy. Reformers, therefore, must needs tread warily, but at the same time boldly. Mr Fisher himself is clearly conscious of the difficulty of establishing

any system of compulsory continued education "at once sufficiently comprehensive and sufficiently elastic to give the young people of this country what we all desire that they should have, without undue dislocation of our industrial system."

Two sets of people will have to be convinced of the advantages of the reform alike to themselves and to the community; and in neither case can they be convinced unless they can first be induced to take long views. The earnings of adolescent boys and girls form at present an appreciable item of the family budgets in thousands of working-class homes. This is, of course, more particularly the case in the Lancashire towns and in the rural districts throughout the country. Can the parents be convinced of the vital importance of the sacrifice which in the interests of the State and of their own children they will be called upon to make? It is not without significance, in this connection, that we should have learnt, on authority, that the recent period of full employment and high wages should have been marked also by a sensible increase in the number of children who proceed from the elementary to the secondary schools. Some part of the increased earnings of the workpeople are, we may infer, already being invested in the education of their children. Further details on this point would be welcomed; if the tendency is at all general, it is a most encouraging symptom. It appears to indicate a connection between higher wages and a quickened appreciation of the duties of citizenship. If that connection can really be established, it will go far to dissipate the fears which are not infrequently expressed and are still more frequently entertained as to the "extravagant" earnings and much more "extravagant" spendings of the wage-earners. More than that. It may suggest the line of solution of the problem which is immediately under consideration. If the minimum wage of 25s. a week at present guaranteed to the agricultural labourer is to be maintained or increased, it will have to be earned. Unless it is earned no legislative or administrative authority can permanently maintain it. If, however, it can be maintained, after prices have returned, if they ever do, to a normal level, it will enable the rural labourers to assent more readily to some postponement of the wage-earning age of their children.

Similarly in the textile industries. The half-time system will, to use a Lancashire phrase, "take a deal of shifting." Still greater effort will be needed to persuade the cotton-workers to surrender a portion of the earnings of the adolescent

members of their families. But in the case of the adolescent it may not even be necessary to do so. The half-timer of elementary school age will, of course, cease to earn anything. The shortened-timer of continuation school age may very possibly earn as much in his curtailed hours of labour as he does at present in the longer hours. A diminution in the hours of labour has not invariably resulted in the case of adults in a diminished output. Why should it in the case of adolescents? Such a result might the more certainly be avoided if education authorities could co-operate with employers in devising something in the nature of a shift-system for adolescents. For the loss of "half-time" earnings the parents can be compensated only by the enhancement of their own industrial value and by that of their adolescent children. Both results may very probably ensue, the one very soon, the other in the not remote future. The difficulty of diminished adolescent earnings may not arise at all. It is the considered judgment of the Juvenile Employment Committee that it will not. "We do not honestly think," they write, "that the parents need have much fear on this score."

There remains the question as to the attitude of employers. They also will have to be convinced as to the economic and social advantages of the contemplated changes. On this point I can only express my general concurrence in the conclusions reached by the Departmental Committee.¹ Few things are more remarkable than the change of attitude on the part of employers towards the allied problems of child-labour and education in the last thirty or forty years. To that change two things have mainly contributed: an awakening of the social conscience, and the pressure of economic conviction. The gross scandals connected with child-labour in the early days of the factory system have long since been removed by legislation and inspection. But even in regard to the restricted and highly regulated employment of children and young adolescents there has been of late years, as the Report truly says, "a growing uneasiness." Apart altogether from the ethical aspects of the question, there has, however, been a distinct modification in economic opinion in regard to the industrial value of education. There are to-day not a few enlightened employers who not only give to their younger employees "time off" for the enjoyment of educational facilities, but actually provide such facilities at their own expense. Their motives may be purely philanthropic, but the results are likely to prove economically advantageous. The more these

¹ Cf. in particular p. 19.

results can be demonstrated, the more easy it will be to deal with the recalcitrant employers and the short-sighted parents. That both can and will be dealt with, and wisely and persuasively dealt with, under the new *régime* at the Education Office, I make no doubt.

The pace of the persuasion will, however, depend largely upon a quickening of local interest in the higher branches of education. Much has already been done in this connection by the multiplication of universities. Much still remains to be done, and it is more particularly on this account that the speech lately delivered by Lord Haldane in the House of Lords demands much closer attention than, in the pressure of events, it has hitherto received.¹ That speech usefully supplemented Mr Fisher's statement in "another place." For the latter contained little or nothing in regard to the organisation by which he proposed to carry his beneficent projects into effect. Lord Haldane is an ardent advocate of the policy of decentralisation or devolution. Mr Fisher proposes that the local education authorities should submit schemes for the approval of Whitehall. There are at present no less than 319 local authorities dealing with elementary education. It will be no easy task for the Board of Education effectively to supervise the schemes submitted by these 319 authorities, and Lord Haldane accordingly proposes the setting up of an intermediate authority. His recent experience as Chairman of the Royal Commission on the University of Wales has convinced him of the importance of grouping the existing local education authorities into larger areas, and of getting them to co-operate in devising schemes more particularly in matters of post-elementary education and in matters relating to the supply and training of teachers. The smallness of the existing administrative areas is unquestionably tending to accentuate difficulties, especially in finance. London, for example, and the great provincial cities are at present rated for the supply of educational facilities for the benefit of the surrounding districts. Already acute, the difficulty must needs be aggravated by the development of secondary education. Nothing will meet it except the enlargement of the educational areas. This would involve some surrender of control on the part of Whitehall, and it might temporarily retard, in the more backward districts, the realisation of hopes which all educational reformers in common entertain. But the retardation is problematical, and would at worst be temporary. Few people except those whose business it is to know can be aware of the quickening of

¹ Cf. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, vol. xxv. No. 34.

interest in higher education which has already resulted on the one hand from the establishment of new universities and university colleges, and on the other from the rapid extension of the extra-mural activities of the older universities, alike in the sphere of teaching and in that of examination. The multiplication of universities, so far from curtailing the sphere or diminishing the prestige of Oxford and Cambridge, has so far tended to enlarge the one and enhance the other. Is there any reason to apprehend that the enlargement of areas advocated by Lord Haldane would have a contrary effect? Only, it is submitted, if the older universities are neglectful of their opportunities, or blind to their duties as intellectual trustees for the nation as a whole.

The question of devolution is, however, one which cannot be further discussed in this paper.

Nor is it necessary or desirable to enter upon the question avoided altogether by Mr Fisher, and barely touched by Lord Haldane—that of the place of religion in education. On this point the Bishop of Oxford, speaking in the debate initiated by Lord Haldane, pronounced a considered judgment to which great weight must be attached. He strongly deprecated the intrusion of “the old religious controversy in such a way as would obstruct” the scheme of educational reconstruction. In his view that scheme is demanded so profoundly by the interests of the country that he declines “to raise a question which could stir religious questions in this connection, or at this moment,” though he obviously looks forward to a time, not distant, when the “question of religion and its position in education” must be reconsidered. At that we may for the moment leave this thorny question.

There is, however, one point on which, before bringing this paper to a close, I desire to insist.

The educational experts are busily engaged in working out the details of educational reconstruction; they are concerned primarily with questions which are necessarily questions of machinery. It is not suggested that they are on that account the less important. The leaving age; the differentiation and grading of schools; the organisation of curricula; the place of the classics, of science, of modern languages in these curricula; the relation of science to industry; the size of classes; the status and remuneration of teachers; the provision of scholarships; the delimitation of areas, and so forth;—all these are matters of high significance. But in the elaboration of machinery we must not lose sight of the essential purpose and meaning of education. What is it, asked Mr Fisher, that

we desire in a broad way for our people? It would hardly be possible to improve upon his answer: "That they should be good citizens, reverent and dutiful, sound in mind and body, skilled in the practice of their several avocations, and capable of turning their leisure to a rational use."

How is this end to be secured? It can be secured only by impressing upon our people a new ideal, not merely of education but of life. The one cannot really be attained without the other, for, as the greatest of political philosophers taught long ago, education must be relative to the polity; the young must be trained in the spirit of the polity. German statesmen have realised this truth, and in devising their educational system have acted upon it. Every German boy is taught that he has come into the world in order to take his part in the defence of the Fatherland; every German girl is taught that it is her primary function to be the mother of sons who will fight for the Fatherland. The spirit of the modern German polity, like that of ancient Sparta, is war. Germany is pre-eminently the *Krieg-Staat*. The ideal of such a State may be perverted, but it remains an ideal, and it is impressed by every possible means upon the minds of the young citizens.

For the modern German has grasped another of the fundamental truths inculcated by the greatest of the Greeks: that the individual can only realise his capacities, can only "fulfil" himself, if he is an active member of a political community. He is primarily a "citizen." Has the same conception really permeated the teaching of youth in this country? A great war is calculated to drive the truth home as nothing else can; but periods of high tension are apt to be followed by periods of relaxation and reaction. The whole future of education in this country, the whole future of the State, in relation to which all educational systems must, if they are to be effective, be devised, really depends upon the extent to which we are able to work out, in the days of peace, the lessons which have been more or less dimly apprehended in the days of war.

This is the real problem of educational reconstruction. The reconstructed system must of course subserve many subsidiary purposes; it must contribute to the stability of the material foundation upon which the spiritual superstructure must necessarily be erected; the steed of Science must be yoked to the car of Commerce; if manual labour is to yield higher remuneration to the individual labourer, that manual labour must be directed and organised in the most approved methods known to the science of industry; if wages are to be

high, the output must be large; no means must be neglected by which the productivity alike of labour and of capital can be increased; out-of-date machinery must be scrapped (under the pressure of the last two years much of it has been scrapped), and obsolete methods of industrial organisation must be abandoned, and for the attainment of these and like results we must look to a reconstructed educational system.

But we must look to that system for something more. The most elaborate machinery is liable to dislocation, the most cunningly devised systems will miscarry, unless you can rely with absolute confidence upon the intelligence and the loyalty of the human factor. We must have skilled workers and scientific directors; but neither will, in the long run, avail unless the general body of the citizens are imbued with "the spirit of the polity." That "spirit" must, however, be a sound one. What is the lesson which the average boy is apt to carry away from his school-time? Is it not that his primary duty in life is to "get on in the world"? The proposition is not without practical value; but its terms need to be carefully defined. The view that free competition is the breath of life seems to the present writer eminently sound. But the object of the competitive struggle should be discriminated. Is the prize to go to him who gets most, or to him who gives most? Is the ideal to be acquisition or contribution? The war has proved that the citizen will cheerfully die for his country; if the end of war is to bring peace, internal as well as external, the citizen must learn an even harder lesson: how to dedicate not death but life to the service of the State. To inculcate and to enforce that lesson must be the primary function of a "reconstructed" educational system.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

OXFORD.

IV. THE NEW RELIGION.

THE COUNTESS OF WARWICK.

THE question of the effect of war upon the religion of the thoughtful and educated classes is one that, as far as this country is concerned, the Church has settled for itself. In every phase and aspect of its work the Established Church has found shelter somewhere below the heights of each vital occasion; it has not taken a lead where it could follow one, or voiced the needs of the people where silence and a non-committal attitude would suffice. Above all, it has made no attempt to reconcile its conception of the Almighty and Loving Father with the Power that has permitted millions to go to their death in the fulness and vigour of life for quarrels of which they know little and care less, and tens of thousands to come from the battlefield mere parodies and travesties of men, with nothing before them but the maximum of pain and discomfort, the minimum of pension and of ease. Granted that the task before the Church was a very formidable one, that it was even impossible, something of the equivalent in moral courage to the physical courage shown upon the battlefield should have been forthcoming from its spokesmen. Unfortunately there is much to suggest that the Established Church is conserving its courage for the *post bellum* task of preaching the old platitudes and asking those who have seen war, or merely suffered by it, to take them seriously. And truly courage of a kind is needed for this.

With these attempts of a pitifully forlorn body, bankrupt in valour and policy, resource and prestige, most of us who take seriously what is left to us of life will have no concern. For the sake of our forebears, for the sake of our earlier faith and friendships, we will turn our heads away and try to forget that the best cared-for and the most highly pampered appanage of the State failed in the hour of our need to "play the game." Some of us have long suspected that we have troubled too

much about the souls of our fellows and not enough about their bodies. Now many are beginning to think that if a soul be set in a body that is properly clad and housed, fed and cared for, the soul will find out its own salvation, and that if it fails, it will at least be no worse off than it must needs be to-day in the keeping of a dead Church. It has been said as a result of the Commonwealth in England our middle classes "entered the prison of Puritanism, and had the key turned upon their spirit for two hundred years." "This led," says Matthew Arnold, "to that character of their steady and respectable life which makes one shiver; its hideousness, its immense ennui." Though these things be true, we are faced by the more significant truth that the Nonconformists as a class, descendants of the Puritans, have found a certain measure of religious consolation during the years of crisis, and have not lacked a wide-eyed and courageous ministry. The Chapel has not hesitated to tell the truth, and if nonconformity can be won to social service of the most uncompromising kind, and will give to the general interests of the nation an equivalent of the energy and devotion it has given to its own, the changing face of England will testify in a very few years to the quality of the work done.

The failure of the Established Church during the years of war is the inevitable result of its failure during the long years that preceded it. It has been the collapse of an Institution that deliberately dwelt in a world of its own imagining, and never had the strength of will or purpose to tell home-truths to the comfortable and the possessing classes, upon whose support it had learned to rely. Now at last the public conscience is stung.

In an article published towards the end of 1916 an officer who had commanded men recruited from the unspeakable slums round dockland called attention to the "homes" that so many gallant Englishmen were defending from Belgium to East Africa. He told of the slum tenements where only rats can live in comparative ease, where sanitation is at a discount, where light and air are reduced to a minimum, where squalor, poverty, disease are a man's constant companions, and child life is wasted, degraded, and even sacrificed. Doubtless the same story could be told of Glasgow, Dundee, Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle, and a dozen other important cities, where life for the dwellers in the underworld carries a burden that only death can lighten. A religion that has left these conditions to be explained by platitudes and relieved by charity is surely a faith outworn, not to be redeemed by the efforts of a handful

of devoted men who labour beyond their strength in vain endeavour to give their Church its lost repute.

Man needs Religion, and will find it with or without the aid of the Church ; his conscience is the force that impels him to look for a way of life with or without reward when the tale is told. Out of the waste and horror and incoherent welter of war one truth emerges more clearly than any other, the truth that if the nations are to lose the suicidal mania that threatens the carefully built-up civilisation of ages, the sense of responsibility of active citizenship must be possessed by every man and woman, and that this sense is a form of religion. To learn to respect life, to understand that no question is worth the sacrifice of millions of men and women to whom it means little or nothing, we must start by respecting and safeguarding the life that surrounds us in peace time. We must elevate this care for humanity to the highest place in our hearts ; it must be our new Religion. We must realise that if a man is a wastrel or a woman a harlot the fault is largely ours, because we have tolerated the conditions that enforced their ruin. We must learn that it will not profit any one of us to save his own soul if in so doing, or while so doing, he has consigned other souls to destruction, or has taken no active steps to combat the destruction going on around him. Passive resistance to war may have some foundation in morals, passive resistance to evil can claim no sanction.

Peace has its massacres no less complete than war, and to the most of these massacres, whether by drink, disease, poverty, or vice, the Established Church has been a spectator, if the term can be applied to that which has eyes but sees not, ears but hears not, and a mouth in which most utterance is platitudinous. The Heads of the Established Church, with one or two brilliant exceptions, do not know anything of the actualities of the world they live in ; they do not dare to know ; their training has stereotyped their minds ; the present state of the world has found them not only unprepared, but quite helpless to cope with it. I do not expect to live to see the Established Church recognise the truth that the real salvation of this country depends upon the removal of all existing social conditions that create paupers, criminals, and lunatics. I do not expect to hear ministers advocating ceaselessly in the pulpit the taking of the necessary measures for restoring the social balance, quite regardless of the chance that there may be among the congregation some of those whose life-work is responsible for one or more of the evils denounced. Before the war, such home-truths were tolerated only from the preachers who were

extremely fashionable and preached to an audience almost exclusively feminine, an audience that took no heed of what they said, and was concerned only with the manner of saying it. One does not dare to dwell upon the fashionable preacher whose congregation is largely feminine!

To speak with a freedom that will seem blasphemous only to the conventionally minded, the Established Church has failed because it has left too much to Christ. It has commended to Him all the fruits of its own failures, and has continued to fail with a tranquil mind. The religion of humanity will be concerned essentially with these failures, and it will not seek to transfer any part of the burden. Not by saying that what is must be will the new religion succeed, but by declaring that much that is must promptly cease to be.

I believe that many of the thousands whose faith has failed them, who regard the stark actualities of suffering as something inexplicable, will find in a new religion of social service the proper anodyne for their loss. Our life-history teaches all of us in turn that in the service of others we are best able to forget our own troubles. The sufferings of those around us keep us from dwelling upon anxieties nearer home. Now we shall have, not only in Great Britain but all over Europe, when this war is over, millions of men and women whose losses are of the kind that life for all its infinity of resource cannot make good. Had the Church been a light in the darkness of this struggle, the sorrow-stricken would have turned to it; now it seems likely that only a small proportion will do so. For the great mass there will be no hope within its walls, but there will be a great hope outside them. To heal the wounds of others, to comfort the widow and the fatherless, to struggle for the right of men and women to the proper measure of life, to oppose stern resistance to every measure by which man sacrifices man to his ambition or woman to his lusts, to equalise the burdens and the pleasures of sane and normal life, these will be the burdens of the new religion which might take for its motto the famous sentence written by George Sand: "*La vie idéale, n'est autre que la vie normale, telle que nous sommes appelés à la connaître.*"

It may be objected that a religion founded upon material service and, while based upon ethics, ignoring theology altogether, is dangerous or retrogressive in tendency. Such a contention is of course absurd, but it must be met. In the first place, the material and the spiritual part of us are interwoven; none can distinguish clearly the one from the other, or say where the first ends and the second begins. We can

change the character of a man or woman merely by a choice of the food they eat. As far as theology is concerned, let any one ask the young and mentally vigorous Church of England clergymen of his intimate acquaintance where they stand to-day in regard to certain popularly accepted doctrines. Then when they have answered the question, or still more likely hung it up surrounded by all manner of indefinite statements, let him ask them whether the sound mind in the healthy body, the man or woman who has light and air and all the other necessities of life, is not likely to be more responsive to the moral law than the city-slum products of our present social system. There can be no doubt about the answer that will be given by the honest man. I am disposed to go as far as to say that any Church capable of reconciling men and women to the social conditions prevailing in England to-day is not doing Christ's work but the Devil's, and is helping to ruin not only the people but the country.

We have trusted Emperors and Kaisers and the rest, and they have failed us; the power that the poor, blinded multitudes have conferred upon them has been shamelessly misused. We have trusted the Church, and it has comforted us with stones when we asked for bread. Naturally we have never trusted politicians; it suffices to endure them; the blindest would not ask one to guide him. Nothing then remains but to develop self-reliance, to take our courage in both hands and to labour to set the world in order, not by delegating the task to any section of the community, but by taking it up each one for himself in pursuit of a common plan.

The world will be the Temple in which the believers in the new religion will labour and worship, for we are told that to labour is to pray, and, indeed, is the universal experience so that the labour be a worthy one. We shall be striving to mitigate the blasphemy of those who declare, with some knowledge of commercial centres and their purlieus, that man is made in the image of God! We shall have no priests, no ritual, no Establishment, no superiors or inferiors, no bond of unity save that of labour in the same field. The labour of those who love in the service of those who suffer will be of a new kind, because instead of seeking to mitigate evil and preach resignation, we shall endeavour to destroy evil and preach its overthrow. We shall not preach the world to come; we shall preach the world of which we are a part, the breathing, sentient earth which mankind has endeavoured to make a heaven for the few and a hell for the multitude, failing in the first endeavour perhaps, but meeting with an

extraordinary measure of success in the last. And we shall incense a multitude of good, stupid people who are charitably inclined, but think they were sent into the world to be superior to poverty and merely to assist rather than to remove it. The Scribes and the Pharisees and the Publicans, known in the jargon of our latter day as Profiteers, will rage furiously at our doctrine and charge us with all offences under heaven, partly because we are opposing their selfishness, and largely because they cannot understand our motives. But we shall continue in an endeavour to save bodies that they may become the fit habitation for souls, and I believe that we shall derive from our work more satisfaction than is obtainable from the doctrine that the comfortable classes shall inherit the Kingdom of Heaven. Shall we not be hastening the advent of George Sand's prophetic truth, that "the ideal life is the normal life of man as we shall some day see it"? There never was in the history of civilisation, as recorded within our reach, a time when the call was louder for a new religion that seeks to mend the old earth, and reverently leaves the things lying beyond to a Supreme and all-divining Power, whose ways are as obscure to us as they were to Job himself. The increase of prosperity, of commercialism and mammonism, of overcrowding, want, destitution, and all the kindred results of man's inhumanity to man, should terrify the conscience of the world even more than the horrors of war, for with the latter every imaginable evil is inevitable, but we have had the evils without the necessity. War is one of the fruits of this increase, war that is blind, blundering, and foul, that confounds the innocent with the guilty, and preys upon the young as the Minotaur of old time, though its labyrinth is larger than Crete and includes all the Chancelleries of Europe. If there is a word to be said for war, it is that its sacrifices are bloody and direct, it marches over burning cities and the violated bodies of mothers. Its music is the thunder of guns and the cry of little children for the bread that none can give. Sight and hearing cannot fail the dullest amongst us, and we ask ourselves why this monstrous evil should have fallen like the Black Death that swept Mediæval England from end to end before people had mastered the sanitary laws that set bounds to infection beyond which it may not pass. Asking diligently and searching our minds, we see that the blind, restless pursuit of power, territory, money, the evil that besets our daily lives many times magnified, is the source of this great trouble, that only the people have the power to stop its recurrence, and that they are like children. The old religion has failed

them, and men set the world ablaze because "the letter killeth."

We have no glad tidings for the people, we evangelists of the New Religion. We are indeed bearers of evil news, but until the truth is known there can be no hope of setting the crooked straight and making the weak strong. The people know neither their danger nor their strength, they need help that they may help themselves. Ignored by Government, fooled by politicians, exploited by commercial "magnates," degraded by landlords, drugged by philanthropists, and thrown with all classes of the community into the furnace seven times heated of war, their plight is evil indeed, but not hopeless. In the history of Europe a generation is no more than a day, and if those of us who are devoting the latter end of our life to the sowing cannot hope to see the harvest, we may yet hope to see the young green corn and hear the new-risen larks singing above it in the sunshine and the blue. This is the limit of our hope, but there is enough in it for all encouragement. Like the rest of the world, we shall make our mistakes and meet our disappointments and know seasons when difficulties baffle us, for we shall be called upon to meet the vast array of those who profit by things as they are and are often honestly unconscious that they are delaying world progress for selfish, narrow, and personal ends. Though we attack no religion we shall be attacked by all, for we propose no appeal to the unknown future to mitigate the horrors of the existing present, but we shall at least know that opposition, misrepresentation, and denial are the only soil in which all movements that have a real vitality can hope to thrive. If the movement towards the emancipation of those who walk in darkness met with encouragement on every hand the whole structure would fall by reason of its own weight. There is no danger of that. To be attacked for lack of religion by those who could hardly define their own, to be charged with working for wrong ends by those who have grown gross on the profits of them, is not really to be injured or even annoyed, and to excite the wrath of rulers is merely to hasten the glad day when rulers and ruled will meet face to face to decide yet again wherein authority lies.

We have no fixed rules or methods, we do not know one another. Our work is to teach the workers that they must become thinkers, that they must seek the mainspring of their own power and use it not merely in their own interests but in the interests of that great majority of humanity which toils that others may idle, and suffers that others may enjoy them-

selves in an atmosphere of riot and waste. We start under good auspices in as far as the position of wealth is concerned. All must make some sacrifices; public opinion may even enforce in them an approach to equality. The times may even aid a religion of humanity, seeing that even over the houses of the most callous among us the Angel of Death has brooded, solemn, implacable, mysterious, reminding one and all that in his eyes is no respect of persons, and that even though kings went to battle, instead of delegating that unpleasant duty, king and dustman might lie on the same patch of ground shattered beyond recognition of mortal eyes.

The forces that will fight on behalf of the religion that seems to me the chiefest need of our unhappy world to-day are not limited to the serious thinking and idealistic part of the community that is left in these islands; they will receive an enormous impetus from soldiers, from all classes who have realised something of the proportions in which honour and misery, glory and squalor, brutality and waste, mingle to make up war. Those who have not faced the actualities might soon find their enthusiasms drugged by peace, but the soldiers have been making a new world, and I think, if I can judge from what all ranks of combatants have told me, they propose to see that it is better suited to the times, though it may be less to the liking of those who ply the hereditary ruler's unnecessary trade.

How splendid it would be if, after the war is over, the rank and file of all belligerent countries could find unity in the common cause of humanity and atone for what they have done to order in the past by what they do in the future of their own free will! That I fear is too much to hope for in the near future, but time and a truly effective peace may do more than our present hope dare compass. Whatever our speculations, we do know that all Europe is suffering from the exploitation of the many by the few; only the measure and manner of the exploitation differ. There is a common bond between the hard workers of Europe, though, as I write, their desire may be no more than to kill and maim and capture one another. Each and all will return to varying degrees of poverty and toil, will go down to the grave bearing the memory of sorrows that the last few years have wrought, and will know it was less the hand that struck the blow than the brain that engineered it to which they owe all that has befallen. And when they recognise that the evil lies in a system that makes wars of civilisation possible, surely their enemies will become if not their friends yet their associates in an endeavour to make such crimes impossible.

The forces that seek to keep the world's workers asunder are not the forces that seek to strengthen labour.

It is not easy to write coherently of the surging mass of hopes and aspirations born of these drab and sombre days, but there is so little left for us but the belief in the ability of the future to atone for the past and present, that it is almost impossible to refrain from setting the prospects down in spite of the obscurity that belongs to the very essence of the future. The past is beyond the control of all, the present is the working out of the forces our folly has called into being, but the future in large measure is our own to make or mar. I seem to see the progress of a creedless religion that has no ministers and no houses of worship, that gathers men and women of all classes to its service and yet keeps them apart, that supplies but one doctrine and leaves the method of carrying it out to the individual, that prepares for seed time and harvest much ground now growing nothing save weeds. I see many impelled to embrace the new religion without being conscious of all their action means, working for the ends in view without any knowledge of the extent to which they have become reformers, merely acting as honest people always will act for the cause that seems the worthiest. The change from the old bad time of mere philanthropy is bound to come, if only because all classes have suffered from this war and have an equal resolve that it shall be the last of its kind as far as any effort within their capacity can enforce the change. The narrowest type of conservative mind can grasp the truth that if we are to have no more wars power must be given to the people to prevent them, that the personal risks run by the supreme war makers can hardly be said to affect seriously either their lives or their fortunes. Consequently the class that was most anxious to avoid the grant of too much liberty to the people because it feared they would curtail profits in the interest of wages is already eager, or soon will be, to give power to the working man that he may by his united action in all countries maintain and support the fabric of civilisation from which all profit is drawn.

The choice before the privileged classes is a simple one. They can either see labour suppressed and restricted without coming to its aid, or they can help the workers and sufferers of all kinds to take up a strong position and fight the forces that are rendering them ineffective as citizens. In the first case they risk another cataclysm of the kind from which they are suffering, and as war is the one democratic institution of universal recognition in the world, they must recognise that

those they love most may be sacrificed with the rest. In the second case they avoid the danger of further cataclysms, for if the united democracy declares for peace, there is no more to be said by those who would make war. But the profits of commerce must needs be less, for that same force which bids kings and counsellors to leave the peace of the world intact will demand of capital that labour be paid its full, fair price. In short, will the people who possess be content to enjoy much less in security, or retain what they possess, as long as they may, exposed to all the dangers that the latter years have revealed?

It seems to me that this great war must unite all classes of the community against war makers, though, doubtless, if the proletariat did all the fighting the case would be different. Our Island Empire, our strictly limited and constitutional monarchy, leave us hardly conscious of the plight of men and women who live under a despotism thinly covered with constitutional forms. Our will to change the existing order of things will be much less than theirs. We do not realise how in every belligerent country the tendency of this war will be to increase the demand for power among the people themselves, and how it will be seen by all who hope to direct the movement that every man and woman of the people must have the fullest free citizenship, and every child the most abundant opportunity. The universal demand for peace will bring people together who, before the war, had little or nothing in common; they will learn something of one another, and knowledge will be the forerunner of respect, just as it has been in the trenches, where social equality, which may almost be said to have been born in the din of battle, rules. Even if, after uniting to crush the common foe, militarism, they develop certain antagonisms, they will at least understand one another, and will know of some ground whereon they may meet disposed to hear what the other has to say.

There will be very few sane men and women in Europe after the war, whatever their class or creed, who will not be ready to assent to the proposition that if there is any class that desires war or will intrigue for or even support it in an aggressive form for whatever ultimate ends, that class must go, and must not stand upon the order of its going. "All that a man hath," remarked Satan, who might be supposed to know, "will he give for his life." He will not give less for the lives of his wife and his children, and if he be one of the class that has lived upon the labour of others, he will know that he must look to those he had hitherto regarded as hired

servants to rise up in their strength that they may save not only themselves but him. Such service implies a sense of brotherhood, and a common sacrifice has brought that in its train. The interest of man in man is no longer what it was before the war, a distant, impersonal thing founded upon the possibilities of employment or exploitation; it is something vivid and vital, founded upon the sharing, often at the most impressionable age, of risk and suffering. We who remain at home may find it a little hard to measure the strength of the bonds of friendship forged by life and death adventure. From women, adventure of this kind stands remote; from men who have passed serviceable age it is a memory of the past, very dim and vague, and in some form that does not respond to the happenings of those woe-stricken years.

There is no more reliance for us upon miracles or upon mere sentiment as cures for the conditions that make wars easy if they do not make them inevitable. For each and all a definitely appointed labour, to give social service the status of a religion, to preach not Christ but Man crucified, and to bear Man down from that cross to which he has been nailed so long that all the evil in the world can be wrought without reference to his sovereign will.

How will the soldiers and the sailors regard the new religion? Will they be quick to grasp the fundamental truth that nothing but the service of man can make man strong enough to bid such horrors cease? We think so, for we are overpowered by the pale reflection of the tragedy of the times; they have lived through it all, and seen with the eye the living pictures they dare not ask their mouths to reconstruct. Though no one doubts that they have the physical and moral courage to face the ordeal again in defence of what they have already fought for, would they be willing to force equal sufferings upon their own children, born or unborn, or even upon the children of their enemies? Those with whom I have spoken have given me one answer. It may be set down fairly as follows: "To the end now, whatever that end may be; but when the goal is reached we will have no more if aught we can devise will stop it."

FRANCES EVELYN WARWICK.

V. PRACTICAL RELIGION.

JOHN BEATTIE CROZIER.

WITH Mr Wells' new book on Religion—*God, the Invisible King*—flaming like a comet in the sky, the reader, perhaps, while studying its larger theological implications, may be willing to consider with me for a moment some suggestions that have only recently taken definite shape in my mind on Practical Religion itself—and especially in answer to the simple question: "What is any given human individual to do, in this matter of religion, from youth to age, between birth and death?"

In my poor judgment, then, he is not to follow a straight line, as it were, starting with either a Catholic syllabus, a Westminster "Confession of Faith," or a Calvinistic "Longer or Shorter Catechism," beginning and ending with it in an undeviating straight line; but is to follow a rising and falling curve rather like the sun in the heavens, from its rising up to its meridian, and then downwards to its setting.

As an infant he will start as a mere blank point or zero emerging from Eternity; as a boy, an animal mainly thinking of his food, his mischief, and his play, which, like the playing of a kitten in stalking its imaginary prey, is educating itself and its organs for their real uses in after life. In early youth he is to be a "Barbarian"—as Matthew Arnold, not without sympathy, would have called him—in his games, his sports, his mischiefs even; the only properly religious restraint or punishment being simply that exercised over him by his masters and companions, in seeing that in all situations, as in cricket, he "plays the game." Later still, let us say as a public school boy (who has always been my ideal for this time of life), let him still "play the game," but under stricter control, and with Religion still a dribble; but all combined with a beginning of real education and culture (scientific if I were to have my choice), and specially morality; not the *whole* Decalogue (for that would be too great a strain, poor boys!), but an inflexible personal "honour" and integrity,

and especially as great a horror of speaking or acting an untruth as if it were a lasting stain.

As a young man he is now to put on all his "feathers" and seek to gain the favourable glances of the fair sex, which he cannot do, with all his mere knowledge and rough physical prowess, unless he adds to them gentleness and grace of manners and of form, and even of personal adornment, as a stepping-stone to the "ideal," which in its cruder or more refined forms lies before him as a mature and full-grown man. In this transition stage the society of good and virtuous women must be his tutor, and their frowns his censors on the "ideal" side, and on the outward and conventional side public opinion and public law itself rather than any merely religious court of appeal. His Religion, in a word, must now be to do what one may call the "decent," the "right thing." It must be that of the "gentleman" and "man of honour" in Captain Hawtrey's sense of the term, when in Robertson's play of *Caste*, some question of "rank" coming up for disposal, he replied with a manly dignity, "No man can be more than a gentleman." But if, at this stage, he could add to this the attitude of mind of a really Christian "converted man"—not of the mere pious, mechanical, conventional adherent of either Church or Dissent, pledged to them merely by his birth or bringing up,—that, indeed, in my judgment, would be well-nigh perfection itself!

And now we have come to the mature adult man, with a wife and family of his own, and his way to make in life—with its struggles and ambitions, its hopes and fears and disappointments, amid all of which, like an animal, he must catch his opportunities and successes on the wing, as it were, or lose them altogether, in a world where each man has from choice or necessity to become, sooner or later, some kind of a 'specialist'—from a shoemaker up to a millionaire magnate, a poet, a philosopher, or a king. In this stage his Religion is simply to do his work, whatever it may be, truly conscientiously and well to the best of his ability; for he will now soon touch the meridian point of his curve of life, and with each succeeding year must decline slowly or quickly to his setting. Let him, therefore, stretch his own ideal of accomplishment to its utmost limits while it is yet time; even if he imagines himself a new Phaeton who cannot be arrested in his flight until his wings have been singed by the sun itself! Let him push on, therefore; for if the collective judgment of his fellow-men cannot stop him in his flight and round him in, the inevitable years will do it for him. What now is to be his attitude to Life,

or, in other words, his Religion, in this the beginning of his declining years and powers? He should habituate himself to renounce all those personal or family ambitions of his prime, and turn right-about-face, as it were; furling his once spreading sails and drawing his curtains gradually closer and closer for the ever-nearing night. Instead of revolving on his own axis, as if he were indeed a planetary orb, he should now look around and about him on the struggling world *outside* of himself, to see where and when he can lend a helping hand. "Self-renunciation," in a word, must in his decline of life become his real Religion, as Goethe and all the sages have perceived. Not precipitously, like Tolstoi, who stripped all his old clothes off at once, but gradually, decently, and in order, as a man puts off his successive garments one after another, before retiring for the night. He should, in a word, now become a listener, and passive, sympathetic *spectator*, rather than an active, aggressive, and pushing participator in the world's affairs. His object of devotion should now be the "general good," not his own; and in making himself (as all the animals do that go in herds) the *servant* of the commonweal, not its lord. This is to be his Religion; but even this is not enough. Along with it he should see clearly and lay to heart that there is a Designing Providence on high (or somewhere at the core of things), who made him, but whom *he* did not make or design; a Supreme Intelligence who bound him, as on a wheel, in the great revolving laws of an inexorable fate. This he must see; else, whatever he does, he becomes like an animal who was merely born and has at last to die.

This, then, of self-renunciation for the common good is to be his real Religion; this self-renunciation and again self-renunciation, and with this, as with an old Stoic's mantle, around him, he may, in spite of churches and theologies, or "spooks" and "mediums," pass peacefully and with all assurance to his rest.

But is it not somewhat Utopian to expect all this from us human beings, even in our declining years? asks the reader. I think so; and I will now venture to submit the explanation. It consists in a single main difficulty which blocks the efforts of all reformers in the cause of religion, whether they be royal, aristocratic, plutocratic, democratic, or frankly socialist and plebeian. It lies, in a word, in the differences in the constitution of the family in the *herd* called Man, and of all other animals' herds whatever. In all animals, whether those that like hawks lead isolated lives, or those that go in flocks and herds like cattle and sheep, the family tie between

parent and offspring is snapped, and *ends* when the offspring are full-grown and start on their own account; whereas in man, with his added power of looking before and after, the tie of the family still lasts, and does not end even with life itself, but is seen by the parent in imagination, stretching on and on in unbroken continuity after his own life. It is as the difference between a girl's hair falling softly on her shoulders like a waterfall, and there ending; and a plaited strand, running and tapering, as I have seen it, down almost to the ankles and feet. And it is this concern for the length and future of the family in man which, like the life after death in *Hamlet*, puzzles the human will, and makes cowards of those who (like the celibate Catholic priests in their devotion to the Church) would otherwise have made that great renunciation in the decline of life which I have ventured to define as the human side and function of all Religion. It is this, too, of the family that makes all conservatism of so long life, and perplexes while it sours the realisation of the socialist's dream. In pure democracies such as America and the Colonies, the family as such counts for little more, after men are grown up, than among the animals—each adult son going his own way without further parental responsibility. And accordingly, one would suggest that the future success of what I have called the “religious renunciation” in the decline of life would be found to be more easily realised in these young countries than among the ancient dynasties of kings, or the scions of the “entailed” families of aristocracies. Is it credible, for example, that the Kaiser would find it an easy “renunciation” to give up to the “general good” of the Prussian people the crown and sceptre of the Hohenzollerns who are to succeed him? Or “entailed” aristocracies their personal and family interests? Or even the “superior” socialist working-man, for whom I have the deepest sympathy, when one knows he is working hard, and often with declining power, to give his family those superior advantages of education and social advancement which were denied to himself? No! It will not be done; and the pretence or denial by any or all of them will only spell hypocrisy.

But let not the reader be startled; for it is not only the family which is the great obstruction in human life. For if we consider it well, this human herd has already outgrown in its *mind*, not only ideally but morally, and especially aesthetically, the baser uses and necessities of his lower animal functions; and yet in practice, as in the case of the family, is obliged to submit to them all. It seems almost as if Divine Providence had not quite kept time and step with Himself;

had not, as it were, brought up all His forces into line at the same time, and without leaving some of them lagging behind. But as this would be a pure blasphemy for any mere mortal like myself to suggest, I have only dared to mention it here to bring out my point, and to throw light on the reason why human beings as such cannot jump the element of time, and realise *now and here* the millennium of their dreams, and their ideal of the religious life. And yet the lower animals, as I have said, have in their unconscious instinctive ways done it.

Now, how to get over this, I must confess I do not see; but perhaps Mr Wells, who has been called the "popular prophet of the people," may be able to help the reader. He too has found the dominance of the family instinct a standing obstacle in the way of socialism. But, unlike myself in this matter of Religion, he thinks he sees his way to a scheme which will circumvent Providence Himself (if not entirely rout Him!) in the case of socialism. But as he cannot cut off the family, as the animals do, at maturity, he proposes to be more radical and to cut them off almost at birth! His proposal, if I remember rightly, is to take away all children from their own mothers after infancy, transport them all alike into huge caravanseries in each district, and let them be brought up there by *other* children's mothers—or, better still, by superior persons who have not yet been mothers! In this way he thinks the influence of the family tie will, as in the case of the Turkish Janissaries, be altogether neutralised, and the kingdom of socialism will have come. Mr Wells, it is evident, will stand no nonsense in this matter of family ties; and doubtless it is a difficult nut to crack both for socialism and for Religion. But he has touched an even higher flight. For, after having straightened out the inequalities of the children—their caprices, indulgences, and petulances—by his scheme of what amounts to a "stepmother" regime for them, he then proposes to straighten out the difficulties confronting the union of separate nations, owing to their differences in race, colour, and creed. And by what? thinks the reader. By simply allowing, and even encouraging, them all to marry freely with each other; so that their offspring, when time has been given them to be ground down into a common promiscuity, shall, like the mongrel dogs that live in common in the streets of Constantinople, be all blood relations!

Why, then, he asks, should they ever have wars or quarrels with each other? And yet, I must confess, that to me this generalised, mongrelised monstrosity of Mixed Races, as the solution either for the problem of socialism in a world-unity

of all nations or for any kind of Religion, human or divine, is the "limit"; and beyond it human absurdity cannot go.

But there is still a further point on which I should like to touch in passing. It is in reference to an intermediate position, as it were, between the crude barbarism of youth and the religion of renunciation of declining life. It is seen, indeed, in nearly all great and energetic natures at all times of life. It is what may be called the religion of the ideal, and is a good half-way house at least to the religion of renunciation itself. Farther than it, I may frankly say, I have not reached myself. It is seen where one would least expect it: as, for example, in the great money magnates who are engaged on great designs; the men whose minds reach to vast expansions of unpeopled continents, with their systems of railways and clearances, of town openings, forest clearings, and the like—all of which, I admit, in their first inception, have been concerned and devised for private gain. But once these designs begin to realise themselves, they become, as I have known them in these men, as much a point of religion as is the devotion of a soldier to his flag; as John Stuart Mill said of the Civil War in America, that what started as a war of interests ended, when they had taken their coats off, in a war of principles. And so, too, these men in their way do sacrifice like soldiers both their lives and their money-bags for their great designs. But this fatal heritage of the family around their necks usually ends in poisoning their ideals by slowly worm-eating them, and so their lives rarely flower out into a real *religious* renunciation.

And, as upshot of it all, we may well consider that if *personal* religion is blocked by the family spirit among the members of the *same* nation, and a cosmopolitan religion, which shall embrace all nations, is damned entirely by the secret or open antagonisms of race, colour, and creed, where, then, are we to turn for a real religion of renunciation, such as is realised by Nature in the lower animal world? As I have said, I cannot tell, but must pass the problem on to the race of "kite-flying" prophets of whom Mr Wells has made himself the spokesman. He tells us plainly that the proper and distinctive "method" for all these studies, indeed their very backbone, is "the creation of Utopias and their exhaustive criticism." That is to say, he would have any or all of us send up kites or balloons of our own creation, without reference to the past teachings of either history or civilisation, and let the gaping multitude below select the one which for the time best takes its fancy!

JOHN BEATTIE CROZIER.

VI. TOWNS TO LIVE IN. A HINT TO RECONSTRUCTORS.

W. R. LETHABY.

WHEN classes of things and groups of activities have once received distinctive names we are apt to think of them as special subjects which can be understood only by few people. Science, Philosophy, Art, Music, Architecture have all in this way been isolated from everyday existence. Art, in the common view of it, has been narrowed into a matter of pictures, especially "oil paintings" which are brought together in annual exhibitions, and explained, or at least written about and about, by people called "art critics." The once flowing stream of Music in a similar way has been turned into the dry bed of concert-halls, where it is tasted by other sets of critics. The arts are thus thought of as specimens you occasionally see in galleries for a shilling; they have ceased to be a daily inspiration for life. Most people have come to suppose that they are mysteries altogether outside the common round, "not for the likes of them"; and indeed the arts have been imprisoned by dealers. We all have to exist, however, and we have to make up our own minds on hundreds of problems without expert knowledge. As we are concerned with politics, with manners, and with religion, so we necessarily deal with art in all work, recreation, clothing, cooking, gardening, housing, and indeed, in a word, in living. This Art about which such elevated yet confusing things may be said when it is considered at its remoter end as genius, emotion, and poetry, at its nearer end is just good workmanship, quality, skill, fitness, rightness in all things done and made. A town, then, is a work of art according to its quality as a dwelling-place for men. Its art is its service and stimulus to life. Some little confusion may arise because we judge beauty quickly by the outward show, and many an old town which we

call beautiful may have been neglected into dirt and disease. The dirt and disease, however, do not make the beauty, and during the ages it has been the estimate of life value which has formed and conditioned our thoughts about beauty. Beauty is the evidence of Vitality—the smile of Health.

Without attempting to describe our towns as they now are, it will be admitted that they are not the perfect homes of a stout and proud people at the centre of a great commonwealth. We need not worry ourselves about beauty for a long while yet; there are many prior questions of decency, cleanliness, order, fitness. Our towns have not been thought of enough as organisms and wholes: wonderful work has been done in them in departments, especially in remedial ways, but not so much in constructive ways. The town itself is hardly ever thought of as a cradle of life, a school of manners, and the foundation of civilisation. We have accepted our institutions as matters of course, and the problem of intense training for quality in community life has hardly ever been considered. Our better-educated people, indeed, had come too much to look on our towns as places for labour—labour for them,—while they could go abroad for recreation. We have to reorganise all our towns as places in which to live and to train strong and willing children. A man is the child of his city, and if he cannot reverence her he is much of an orphan. Even an apostle felt a satisfaction in belonging to no mean city. National spirit and “patriotism” cannot begin high in the air with flag-waving; they must be reared on affection for home, pride in our town, and the sense of community.

Town improvement is likely to be put aside as some great thing, and doubtless great things are needed; but it is also a common and immediate necessity. Greater things, indeed, can only be satisfactorily dealt with as the result of constant desire and effort. Without experience in the little things grandiose doings are likely to be unrelated and artificial, or even destructive. Many of the smaller things do not raise the question of cost; they are rather matters of custom and training, and much of the humblest kind needs everywhere to be done for the preservation of a minimum standard of order.

In every town there is at least one building for which the Government is responsible, the Post Office; and this fortunately has no unworthy associations. The central authorities should be expected to make the Post Office a reasonable standard of dignity in building and of pleasant orderliness in administration. Here too it would be possible by some finely designed coat-of-arms—which would be next to costless, as it might be

repeated by thousands—to bring in a little colour and special character in a significant way. Most of our people have probably never seen the national coat-of-arms except as hideously engraved and attached to some advertisement. One coloured example in a town would even be educational, and school children might be stirred to ask about the lions of Richard of England and Alexander of Scotland, and the pretty harp. Is not one of the secrets of education to create curiosity?

A more difficult service to deal with, as being neither public nor private, and as being of the utmost importance to the town while not of it, is the local railway system. The municipalities will have at some time to reconsider their rights against the great external exploiting corporations, and require that some proprieties are observed in the stations, approaches, and bridges. The stations especially have been allowed to run down by degrees to a level which is intolerable, and most of them seem to be looked on as mere hoardings for advertisements. We must first of all try to see them as they are, and not go on supposing that stations are “like that.” This is no question of taste: it is a tremendous matter of national efficiency and discipline. The riot of advertising along the approaches to our towns will have to be controlled into some order, and the citizen must to some extent be protected. Violent advertisement is a form of assault which seeks to gain attention by slapping you in the face.

The town buildings—Guildhall, Market, Schools, Infirmary, Museum—even if they are not yet fine in themselves, should have the distinction of being well kept, tidy, clean, and even smart; they should be good-example buildings. Lamp-posts, tramway-standards, ventilators, shelters, and such things can only be properly designed from the point of view of being perfectly fit for their purpose and unobtrusive; we often make the mistake of forcing them into a bad prominence by loading them with repulsive ornaments. The movable services, like fire-engines and tramcars, which are usually considered only from the point of view of efficiency, plus a workmanlike smartness, are usually well designed and decently kept, while the fixed ones are often perfect models of fussy incompetence and mistaken compromise. Iron bridges and railway sheds should be designed as a ship is, and then be kept ship-shape. Structural ironwork for supports and railings should generally be painted one of the many tints of neutral grey. The prevalent frowsy red is nearly the worst of all colours, as being irritating. Our great mistake is to make minor things furiously

ornamental to begin with, and then to let them decline into slatternly misery. There is no need that our most practical daily utilities should be made repulsive as a sacrifice to what is supposed to be Art: poor Art! what crimes are committed in thy name!

As soon as greater interest in town life can be aroused, improvements must be undertaken in every direction. The smoke nuisance must be reduced, rivers and streams must be cleansed, refuse must be better dealt with, house fronts must be repaired and repainted, backyards must be whitewashed and front gardens planted. The space in front of the town railway station must be made orderly. In foreign cities even the strip between tram-lines is at times laid with trimly kept turf. We need more opportunities to get wholesome food outdoors; indeed, cooking generally might well be made a matter of municipal concern. All the minor items connected with town administration are worthy of attention. The town arms—not the public-house sign—might be redrawn by one of our competent heraldic draughtsmen, and a town monogram could be devised; the street names might be done in better, clearer lettering; and municipal printing can be improved for all purposes.

We have become so subject to words, that arguments to the eyes are little appreciated. The first need is to see with our eyes, for if people only saw things there is no reason why a great change might not soon be brought about. Some reasonable teaching about quality in work—that is, art—has to be brought into all our education, from the Infant School to Oxford; and in every university the civic arts should form an important group of subjects.

We have to set up ambitions for great things in civilisation, and induce a flowing tide of high types of production. Interest should be created in every town's story—every town is a Zion and has had its prophets. This town spirit is best stirred by the sight of some older buildings, and such buildings should be preserved as assets for life. Buildings like Cheetham College, Manchester, the Dean's House at Wolverhampton, and even the comparatively modern but fine Town Hall at Birmingham, have a worth which is incommensurable by site value. Civic missions, study circles, bands of hope, and exhibitions are required. Probably nothing better could be thought of, as likely to bring new interest to our towns, than some form of annual festival like the Welsh Eisteddfod. This is not a vain survival of playing at being Druids, but music, the arts, and athletics are all stimulated at those

gatherings. Such festivals have been general in all times and countries, and the people are starved for the lack of them. A better organising of town games should lead to the provision of a proper stadium where athletics would merge naturally into discipline. Local ability should be brought out by the employment of local artists and craftsmen, and towns should compete in civilisation as Florence, Siena, and Venice competed.

In every considerable town there is already a building called the School of Art, but it is too much of a water-tight compartment, and usually it is allowed little influence. Such schools might be made vital centres for civilisation, and even for commerce, for commerce too will fail without ideas and initiative. These schools must become producing workshops; they might as a beginning be encouraged to experiment with derelict industries like Spitalfields silk-weaving. The old special town crafts like Bristol glass, Sheffield plate, Worcester china are of very great importance every way. Some of our museums and picture-galleries also seem to be arranged and conducted as sacrifices to custom without anyone clearly knowing what they are all about. Local history and interests should be a special concern, and the School of Art might help by getting together a collection of drawings and photographs of the antiquities of the town and district. The contents should be arranged in the most exquisite order, and so far as possible interest should be renewed by some changes brought about by borrowing and the temporary formation of special groups. In some foreign galleries bowls of flowers are set about. The buildings should be direct, perfectly finished, and even over-lighted. Far too many of them were spoilt before the foundations were put in by worry about style and the decision to load them with fortieth-rate ornament, so called. This same is true of most of our buildings; we have indeed been betrayed by the mysterious word *Architecture* away from reality into a realm of pretence about styles and orders and proportions and periods and conception and composition. If we had had no other word than *building* we might have been living in sound, water-tight, well-lighted dwellings. As it is, it takes an expert student a lifetime to find out that there is nothing in it all beyond the human spirit working on data as presented by custom and commonsense. All this æsthetic talk, however, has isolated art from common sympathy and understanding, and no art can flourish in a vacuum. If the people cared we might have noble schools of building, painting, and music in a generation. Everything indeed depends on caring enough, and anything could be condensed from that

infinite nebulosity the possible. Glorious new worlds are even now waiting to be born and projected on their orbits, if only we would care and will and work. Great art of all kinds is produced only by common effort over a long time.

Public memorials might more often take the form of works of communal value. Our towns, it must be said, are ill supplied with suitable buildings, from worthy bridges to meeting-halls, baths, drill-halls, and markets. If statues are desired, it must be seen to that they have some "life-enhancing" quality which is the soul of art. A dull presentment of even a hero only adds to routine and social slumber. Variations of existing types might often give some depth of content; Alfred Stevens's Valour and Courage, hidden away in St Paul's, might lend their vitality to scores of other works. A town impersonation like the Paris "Strasbourg" may be moving if it is done with dignity: all depends on that. Even a big bold lion would be impressive. Where funds are small it is wise to spend them on one thing. A great unhewn stone from the nearest source, with just a name and a date in good lettering, would be far more appealing than a monument of the same cost where most of the money has been spent in bringing marble from Italy and granite from Aberdeen, and the rest has been expended in chipping and polishing these into the necropolis mode. The only way, however, in which a successful monument of any sort is likely to be obtained is to ask someone who can best be trusted to get it done; many of our public works have died of too much committee before they were properly begun.

About a century and a half since there was a general movement towards some ideal of communal culture in our towns, and even small ones had "Assembly Rooms" erected which for a time became centres of local life. Then came the time of Institutes and Lecture Societies, many of which still do excellent work. A century ago Edinburgh and Dublin were true capitals; towns like York had society; Bath was about the most beautiful modern city in Europe; Brighton, Leamington, Tunbridge Wells, Buxton, and Cheltenham had style; and many of the seaside places, like Hastings and Weymouth, were truly beautiful. Oxford was as lovely as anything in the world; and old prints show that most of our towns were beautiful as a matter of course—ugliness, and especially vulgarity, had not been invented. In all the larger places forms of fine craftsmanship were in daily practice—good cabinet-work, clock-making, and so on; the shopkeepers were little merchants. Norwich was an excellent school of paint-

ing; Newcastle was the best school of wood-engraving in the world.

Without bringing a railing accusation against the works of the nineteenth century, we may all agree that town development was a little one-sided, and that plenty has been left for us to do. The quick growth outran strength and sense of fitness and order. The railways attacked towns rather than served them. However, the first works of the great expansion were in many places carefully constructed. Brunel did not foresee all that the engineers of the next two generations would hire themselves out to do.

Around our towns we must preserve or redeem a space of pleasant suburb not too remote, a wood, or common, or "walk," or "view." The planning and planting of our town parks and gardens are frequently done according to a dry and harsh ideal. There is too much gravel and iron railings; they must be made less like cemeteries and more like gardens simple and sweet. We too often spend our effort to produce added weariness. We lay out sham splendours of cracked cement and cast iron around a fountain which holds no water, rather than get a carpenter to set up a strong home-made seat by a space of clean turf or a blossoming tree.

Poetry and Art come from insight into the essentials of things and life. Our refounding of these and a national school of Music must begin with the simple and the obvious; we must try to construct a ladder of salvation. Our towns have to be made delightful homes to live in, rather than delightful to get away from.

W. R. LETHABY.

LONDON.

SURVIVAL AND IMMORTALITY.

THE DEAN OF ST PAUL'S.

THE recrudescence of superstition in England was plain to all observers many years before the war; it was perhaps most noticeable among the half-educated rich. Several causes contributed to this phenomenon. The craving for the supernatural, a very ancient and deeply rooted thought-habit, had been suppressed and driven underground by the arrogant dominance of a materialistic philosophy, and by the absorption of society in the pursuit of gain and pleasure. Modern miracles were laughed out of court. But materialism has supernaturalism for its nemesis. An abstract science, erecting itself into a false philosophy, leaves half our nature unsatisfied, and becomes morally bankrupt before its intellectual errors are exposed. Supernaturalism is the refuge of the materialist who wishes to make room for ideal values without abandoning the presuppositions of materialism. By dovetailing acts of God into the order of nature, he materialises the spiritual, but brings the Divine will into the world of experience, from which it had been expelled, and produces a rough scheme of providential government, by which he can live.

The revolt against scientific materialism was made much easier by the disintegration of the mechanical theory itself. Biology found itself cramped by the categories of inorganic science, and claimed its autonomy. The result was a fatal breach in the defences of materialism, for biology is being driven to accept final causes, and would be glad to adopt some theory of vitalism, if it could do so without falling back into the old error of a mysterious "vital force." Biological truth, it is plain, cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative categories of mathematics and physics. Then psychology aspired to be a philosophy of real existence, and attacked both absolutism and materialism. The pretensions of psychology rehabilitated subjectivism and founded pragmatism, till

reactionary theology took heart of grace and defended crude supernaturalism, with the whole apparatus of sacerdotal magic, as the "Gospel for human needs." All protection against the grossest superstitions was thus swept away. With no fixed standard of reference to distinguish fact from fiction, it was possible to argue that "whatever suits souls is true."

In this atmosphere many old thought-habits reasserted themselves. While we enjoyed peace and prosperity, the credulity of the public found its chief outlet in various systems of faith-healing, in experiments in telepathy and thought-transference, and in the time-honoured pretensions of priest-craft. But the devastation which the war has brought into countless loving families has turned the current of superstition strongly towards necromancy. The "will to believe," no longer inhibited and suspected as a reason for doubt, has been allowed to create its own evidence and its own logic. A few highly educated men, who have long been playing with occultism and gratifying their intellectual curiosity by exploring the dark places of perverted mysticism, have been swept off their feet by it, and their authority, as "men of science," has dispelled the hesitation of many more to accept what they dearly wished to believe. The longing of the bereaved has created for itself a spurious and dreary satisfaction.

One cause of this strange movement cannot be emphasised too strongly. It proves that the Christian hope of immortality burns very dimly among us. Those who study the utterances of our religious guides must admit that it is so. References to the future life had, before the war, become rare even in the pulpit. The topic was mainly reserved for letters of condolence, and was then handled gingerly, as if it would not bear much pressure. Working-class audiences and congregations listened eagerly to the wildest promises of an earthly utopia the day after to-morrow, but cooled down at once when they were reminded that "if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." Accordingly, the clerical demagogue showed more interest in the unemployed than in the unconverted. Christianity, which began as a revolutionary idealism, had sunk into heralding an apocalyptic revolution. Such teachers have no message of hope and comfort for those who have lost their dearest. And they have, in fact, been deserted. Their secularised Christianity was received with half-contemptuous approval by trade unions, but far deeper hopes, fears, and longings have now been stirred, which concern all men and women alike, and on the answers to which the whole value of existence is now seen to depend. Christianity

can answer them, but not the Churches through the mouths of their accredited representatives. And so, instead of "the blessed hope of everlasting life," the bereaved have been driven to this pathetic and miserable substitute, the barbaric belief in ghosts and dæmons, which was old before Christianity was young. And what a starveling hope it is that necromancy offers us! An existence as poor and unsubstantial as that of Homer's Hades, which the shade of Achilles would have been glad to exchange for serfdom to the poorest farmer, and with no guarantee of permanence, even if the power of comforting or terrifying surviving relations is supposed to persist for a few years. Such a prospect would add a new terror to death; and none would desire it for himself. It is plainly the dream of an aching heart, which cannot bear to be left alone.

But, it will be said, there is scientific evidence for survival. This claim is now made. Cases are reported, with much parade of scientific language and method, and those who reject the stories with contemptuous incredulity are accused of mere prejudice. Nevertheless, I cannot help being convinced that if communications between the dead and the living were part of the nature of things, they would have been established long ago beyond cavil. For there are few things which men have wished more eagerly to believe. It is no doubt just possible that among the vibrations of the fundamental ingredients of our world—those attenuated forms of matter which are said to be not even "material," there may be some which act as vehicles for psychical interchange. If such psychic waves exist, the discovery is wholly in favour of materialism. It would tend to rehabilitate those notions of spirit as the most rarefied form of matter—an ultra-gaseous condition of it—which Stoicism and the Christian Stoic Tertullian postulated. The meaning of "God is Spirit" could not be understood till this insidious residue of materialism had been got rid of. It is a retrograde theory which we are asked to re-examine and perhaps accept. The moment we are asked to accept "scientific evidence" for spiritual truth, the alleged spiritual truth becomes for us neither spiritual nor true. It is degraded into an event in the phenomenal world, and when so degraded it cannot be substantiated. Psychical research is trying to prove that eternal values are temporal facts, which they can never be.

The case for necromancy is no better if we leave "scientific proof" alone, and appeal to the relativist metaphysics of the psychological school. Intercourse with the dead is, we are told, a real psychical experience, and we need not worry ourselves with the question whether it has any "objective truth."

But we cannot allow psychology to have the last word in determining the truth or falsehood of religious or spiritual experience. The extravagant claims of psychology to take the place of philosophy must be abated.

Psychology is the science which describes mental states, as physical science describes the behaviour of matter in motion. Both are abstract sciences. Physical science treats nature as the totality of things conceived of as independent of any subject; psychology treats inner experience as independent of any object. Both are outside any idea of value, though it is needless to say that the votaries of both sciences trespass habitually, and often unconsciously. Both are dualisms with one side ignored or suppressed. When psychology meddles with ontological problems—when, for instance, it denies the existence of an Absolute, or says that reality cannot be known—it is taking too much upon itself, and has fallen into the same error as the materialism of the last century. On such questions as the immortality of the soul it must remain silent.

Faith in human immortality stands or falls with the belief in *absolute values*. The interest of consciousness, as Professor Pringle-Pattison has said in his admirable Gifford Lectures, lies in the ideal values of which it is the bearer, not in its mere existence as a more refined kind of fact. Idealism is most satisfactorily defined as the interpretation of the world according to a scale of value, or, in Plato's phrase, by the Idea of the Good. The highest values in this scale are absolute, eternal, and super-individual, and lower values are assigned their place in virtue of their correspondence to or participation in these absolute values. I agree with Münsterberg that the conditional and subjective values of the pragmatist have no meaning unless we have acknowledged beforehand the independent value of truth. If the proof of the merely individual significance of truth has itself only individual importance, it cannot claim any general meaning. If, on the other hand, it demands to be taken as generally valid, the possibility of a general truth is acknowledged from the start. If this one exception is granted, the whole illusory universe of relativism is overthrown. To deny any thought which is more than relative is to deprive even scepticism itself of the presuppositions on which it rests. The logical sceptic has no *ego* to doubt with. "Every doubt of absolute values destroys itself. As thought it contradicts itself; as doubt it denies itself; as belief it despairs of itself." It is not necessary or desirable to follow Münsterberg in identifying valuation with will. He talks of the will judging; but the will cannot judge. In con-

templating existence we use our will to fix our attention, and then try conscientiously to prevent it from influencing the verdict. But this illegitimate use of the word "will" does not impair the force of the argument for absolute values.

Now, valuation arranges experience in a different manner from natural science. The attributes of reality, in our world of values, are Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. And we assert that we have as good reason to claim objective reality for these Ideas as for anything in the world revealed to our senses. "All claims on man's behalf," says Professor Pringle-Pattison, "must be based on the objectivity of the values revealed in his experience, and brokenly realised there. Man does not make values any more than he makes reality." Our contention is that the world of values, which forms the content of idealistic thought and aspiration, is the real world; and in this world we find our own immortality.

But there could be no greater error than to leave the two worlds, or the two "judgments," that of existence and that of value, contrasted with each other, or treated as unrelated in our experience. A value-judgment which is not also a judgment of existence is in the air; it is the baseless fabric of a vision. Existence is itself a value, and an ingredient in every valuation; that which has no existence has no value. And, on the other side, it is a delusion to suppose that any science can dispense with valuation. Even mathematics admits that there is a right and a wrong way of solving a problem, though by confining itself to quantitative measurements it can assert no more than a hypothetical reality for its world. It is quite certain that we can think of no existing world without valuation.

"The ultimate identity of existence and value is the venture of faith to which mysticism and speculative idealism are committed."¹ It is indeed the presupposition of all philosophy and all religion: without this faith there can, properly speaking, be no belief in God. But the difference between naturalism and idealism may, I think, be better stated otherwise than by emphasising the contrast between existence and value, which it is impossible for either side to maintain. Naturalism seeks to interpret the world by investigation of origins; idealism by investigation of ends. The one finds the explanation of evolution in that from which it started, the other in that to which it tends. The one explains the higher by the lower; the other the lower by the higher. This is a

¹ Quoted by Professor Pringle-Pattison from an article by me in the *Times Literary Supplement*.

plain issue ; either the world shows a teleology or it does not. If it does, the philosophy based on the inorganic sciences is wrong. And the attempt to explain the higher by the lower becomes mischievous or impossible when we pass from one *order* to another. In speaking of different "orders," we do not commit ourselves to any sudden breaks or leaps in evolution. The organic may be linked to the inorganic, soul to the lower forms of life, spirit to soul. But whether the "scale of perfection" is a ladder or an inclined plane, new categories are necessary as we ascend it. And unless we admit an inner teleology as a determining factor in growth, many facts even in physiology are hard to explain.

If the basis of our faith in the world-order is the conviction that the Ideas of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful are fully real and fully operative, we must try to form some clear notion of what these Ideas mean, and how they are related to each other. The goal of Truth, as an absolute value, is unity, which in the outer world means harmony, in the intercourse of spirit with spirit, love ; and in the inner world, peace or happiness. The goal of Goodness as an absolute value is the realisation of the ought-to-be in victorious moral effort. Beauty is the self-recognition of creative Spirit in its own works ; it is the expression of Nature's own deepest character. Beauty gives neither information nor advice ; but it satisfies a part of our nature which is not less Divine than that which pays homage to Truth and Goodness.

Now, these absolute values are supra-temporal. If the soul were in time, no value could arise ; for time is always hurling its own products into nothingness, and the present is an unexpended point, dividing an unreal past from an unreal future. The soul is not in time ; time is rather in the soul. Values are eternal and indestructible. When Plotinus says that "nothing that really *is* can ever perish" (*ἀπολείται οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων*), and when Höffding says that "no value perishes out of the world," they are saying the same thing. In so far as we can identify ourselves in thought and mind with the absolute values, we are sure of our immortality.

But it will be said that in the first place this promise of immortality carries with it no guarantee of survival in time, and in the second place that it offers us, at last, only an impersonal immortality. Let us take these two objections in turn, though they are in reality closely connected.

We must not regard time as an external, inhuman, unconscious process. Time is the frame of soul-life ; outside this it has no existence. The entire cosmic process is the life-

frame of the universal Soul, the Divine Logos. With this life we are vitally connected, however brief and unimportant the span and the task of an individual career may seem to us. If my particular life-meaning passes out of activity, it will be because the larger life, to which I belong, no longer needs that form of expression. My death, like my birth, will have a teleological justification, to which my supra-temporal self will consent. When a good man's work in this world is done, when he is able to say, without forgetting his many failures, "I have finished the work that Thou gavest me to do," surely his last word will be, "Lord, now lettest Thou thy servant depart in peace"; not, "Grant that I may flit for a while over my former home, and hear what is happening to my country and my family." We may leave it to our misguided necromancers to describe the adventures of the disembodied ghost—

*"Quo cursu deserta petiverit, et quibus ante
Infelix sua tecta supervolitaverit alis."*

The most respectable motive which leads men to desire a continuance of active participation in the affairs of time is that which Tennyson expresses in the often-quoted line, "Give her the wages of going on, and not to die." We may feel that we have it in us to do more for God and our fellow-men than we shall be able to accomplish in this life, even if it be prolonged to old age. Is not this a desire which we may prefer as a claim? And in any case, it is admitted that time is the form of the will. Are we to have no more will after death? Further, is our probation over when we die? What is to be the fate of that large majority who, so far as we can see, are equally undeserving of heaven and of hell? To these questions no answer is possible, because we are confronted with a blank wall of ignorance. We do not know whether there will be any future probation. We do not know whether Robert Browning's expectation of "other tasks in other lives, God willing" will be fulfilled.

*"And I shall thereupon
Take rest, ere I be gone
Once more on my adventure brave and new."*

The question here raised is whether there is such a thing as reincarnation. This belief, so widely held at all times by eminent thinkers, and sanctioned by some of the higher religions, cannot be dismissed as obsolete or impossible. But if it is put in the form, "Will the same self live again on earth under different conditions?" it may be that no answer

can be given, not only because we do not know, but because the question itself is meaningless. The psycho-physical organism which was born at a certain date and which will die on another date is compacted of idiosyncrasies, inherited and acquired, which seem to be inseparable from its history as born of certain parents and living under certain conditions. It is not easy to say what part of such an organism could be said to maintain its identity, if it were housed in another body and set down in another time and place, when all recollection of a previous state has been (as we must admit) cut off. The only continuity, it seems to me, would be that of the racial self, if there is such a thing, or of the directing intelligence and will of the higher Power which sends human beings into the world to perform their allotted tasks.

The second objection, which, as I have said, is closely connected with the first, is that idealism offers us a merely impersonal immortality. But what is personality? The notion of a world of spiritual atoms, "*solida pollentia simplicitate*," as Lucretius says, seems to be attractive to some minds. There are thinkers of repute who even picture the Deity as the constitutional President of a *collegium* of souls. This kind of pluralism is of course fundamentally incompatible with the presuppositions of my paper. The idea of the "self" seems to me to be an arbitrary fixation of our average state of mind, a half-way house which belongs to no order of real existence. The conception of an abstract ego seems to involve three assumptions, none of which are true. The first is that there is a sharp line separating subject from object and from other subjects. The second is that the subject, thus sundered from the object, remains identical through time. The third is that this indiscerptible entity is in some mysterious way both myself and my property. In opposition to the first, I maintain that the foci of consciousness flow freely into each other even on the psychical plane, while in the eternal world there are probably no barriers at all. In opposition to the second, it is certain that the empirical self is by no means identical throughout, and that the spiritual life, in which we may be said to attain real personality for the first time, is only "ours" potentially. In opposition to the third, I repeat that the question whether it is "my" soul that will live in the eternal world seems to have no meaning at all. In philosophy as in religion, we had better follow the advice of the *Theologia Germanica* and banish, as far as possible, the words "me and mine" from our vocabulary. For personality is not something given to start with. It does not belong to the world of claims

and counter-claims in which we chiefly live. We must be willing to lose our soul on this level of experience, before we can find it unto life eternal. Personality is a teleological fact: it is here in the making, elsewhere in fact and power. So in the case of our friends. The man whom we love is not the changing psycho-physical organism; it is the Christ in him that we love, the perfect man who is struggling into existence in his life and growth. If we ask what a man is, the answer may be either, "He is what he loves," or "He is what he is worth." The two are not very different. Thus I cannot agree with Keyserling, who in criticising this type of thought (with which, none the less, he has great sympathy) says that "mysticism, whether it likes it or not, ends in an impersonal immortality." For impersonality is a purely negative conception, like timelessness. What is negated in "timelessness" is not the reality of the present, but the unreality of the past and future. So the "impersonality" which is here (not without warrant from the mystics themselves) said to belong to eternal life is really the liberation of the idea of personality. Personality is allowed to expand as far as it can, and only so can it come into its own. When Keyserling adds, "The instinct of immortality really affirms that the individual is not ultimate," I entirely agree with him.

The question, however, is not whether in heaven the circumference of the soul's life is indefinitely enlarged, but whether the centre remains. These centres are centres of consciousness; and consciousness apparently belongs to the world of will. It comes into existence when the will has some work to do. It is not conterminous with life; there is a life which is below consciousness, and there may be a life above consciousness, or what we mean by consciousness. We must remind ourselves that we are using a spatial metaphor when we speak of a centre of consciousness, and a temporal one when we ask about a continuing state of consciousness; and space and time do not belong to the eternal world. The question therefore needs to be transformed before any answer can be given to it. Spiritual life, we are justified in saying, must have a richness of content; it is, potentially at least, all-embracing. But this enhancement of life is exhibited not only in extension but in intensity. Eternal life is no diffusion or dilution of personality, but its consummation. It seems certain that in such a state of existence individuality must be maintained. If every life in this world represents an unique purpose in the Divine mind, and if the end and meaning of soul-life, though striven for in time, has both its source and its achievement in eternity,

this, the value and reality of the individual life, must remain as a distinct fact in the spiritual world.

We are sometimes inclined to think, with a natural regret, that the conditions of life in the eternal world are so utterly unlike those of the world which we know, that we must either leave our mental picture of that life in the barest outline, or fill it in with the colours which we know on earth, but which, as we are well aware, cannot portray truly the life of blessed spirits. To some extent this is true; and whereas a bare and colourless sketch of the richest of all facts is as far from the truth as possible, we may allow ourselves to fill in the picture as best we can, if we remember the risks which we run in doing so. There are, it seems to me, two chief risks in allowing our imagination to create images of the bliss of heaven. One is that the eternal world, thus drawn and painted with the forms and colours of earth, takes substance in our minds as a second physical world, either supposed to exist somewhere in space, or expected to come into existence somewhen in time. This is the heaven of popular religion; and being a geographical or historical expression, it is open to attacks which cannot be met. Hence in the minds of many persons the whole fact of human immortality seems to belong to dreamland. The other danger is that, since a geographical and historical heaven is found to have no actuality, the hope of eternal life, with all that the spiritual world contains, should be relegated to the sphere of the "ideal." This seems to be the position of Höffding, and is quite clearly the view of thinkers like Santayana. They accept the dualism of value and existence, and place the highest hopes of humanity in a world which has value only and no existence. This seems to me to be offering mankind a stone for bread. Martineau's protest against this philosophy is surely justified: "Amid all the sickly talk about 'ideals,' it is well to remember that as long as they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, they have no more solidity than floating air-bubbles, gay in the sunshine and broken by the passing wind. You do not so much as touch the threshold of religion, so long as you are detained by the phantoms of your thought; the very gate of entrance to religion, the moment of its new birth, is the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting real."¹ But though our knowledge of the eternal world is much less than we could desire, it is much greater than many thinkers allow. We are by no means shut off from realisation and possession of the eternal values while we live here. We are not confined to local and temporal

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. i. p. 12.

experience. We know what Truth and Beauty mean, not only for ourselves but for all souls throughout the universe, and for God Himself. Above all, we know what Love means. Now Love, which is the realisation in experience of spiritual existence, has an unique value as a hierophant of the highest mysteries. And Love guarantees personality, for it needs what has been called *otherness*. In all love there must be a subject and an object, and a bond between them which transcends without annulling their separateness. What this means for personal immortality has been seen by many great minds. As an example I will quote from Plotinus' picture of life in the spiritual world. This writer is certainly not inclined to overestimate the claims of separate individuality, and he is under no obligation to make his doctrine conform to the dogmas of any creed. "Spirits yonder see themselves in others. For there all things are transparent, and there is nothing dark or resisting, but everyone is manifest to everyone internally, and all things are manifest; for light is manifest to light. For everyone has all things in himself and sees all things in another, so that all things are everywhere and all is all and each is all, and infinite the glory."¹

This eternal world is about us and within us while we live here. "Heaven is nearer to our souls than the earth is to our bodies." The world which we ordinarily think of as real is an arbitrary selection from experience, corresponding roughly to the average reaction of life upon the average man. Some values, such as existence, persistence, and rationality, are assumed to be "real"; others are relegated to the "ideal." Under the influence of natural science, special emphasis is laid on those values with which that science is engaged. But our world changes with us. It rises as we rise, and falls as we fall. It puts on immortality as we do. "Such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them to be."² Spinoza rightly says that all true knowledge takes place *sub specie æternitatis*. For the πνευματικὸς the whole of life is spiritual, and, as Eucken says, he recognises the whole of the spiritual life as his own life-being. He learns, as Plotinus declares in a profound sentence, that "all things that are Yonder are also Here below."

Is it then the conclusion of the whole matter that eternal life is merely the true reading of temporal life? Is earth, when seen with purged vision, not merely the shadow of heaven, but heaven itself? If we could fuse past, present, and future into a *totum simul*, an "Eternal Now," would that

¹ *Ennead*, v. 8. 4.

² From John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist.

be eternity? This I do not believe. A full understanding of the values of our life in time would indeed give us a good *picture* of the eternal world; but that world itself, the abode of God and of blessed spirits, is a state higher and purer than can be fully expressed in the order of nature. The *perpetuity* of natural laws as they operate through endless ages is only a Platonic "image" of eternity. That all values are perpetual is true; but they are something more than perpetual: they are eternal. These laws are the creative forces which shape our lives from within; but all the creatures, as St Augustine says in a well-known passage, declare their inferiority to their Creator. "We are lower than He, for He made us." Scholastic theologians interposed an intermediary which they called *ævum* between time and eternity. *Ævum* is perpetuity, which they rightly distinguished from true eternity. Christianity is philosophically right in insisting that our true home, our *patria*, is "not here." Nor is it in any place: it is with God, "whose centre is everywhere and His circumference nowhere." There remaineth a rest for the people of God, when their warfare on earth is accomplished.

A Christian must feel that the absence of any clear revelation about a *future* state is an indication that we are not meant to make it a principal subject of our thoughts. On the other hand, the more we think about the eternal values the happier we shall be. As Spinoza says, "Love directed towards the eternal and infinite fills the mind with pure joy, and is free from all sadness. Wherefore it is greatly to be desired, and sought after with our whole might." But he also says, and I think wisely, that there are few subjects on which the "free" man will ponder less often, than on death. The end of life is as right and natural as its beginning; we must not rebel against the common lot, either for ourselves or for our friends. We are to live in the present, though not for the present. The two lines of Goethe which Lewis Nettleship was so fond of quoting convey a valuable lesson:

"Nur wo du bist, sei alles, immer kindlich:
So bist du alles, bist unüberwindlich."

"Death does not count," as Nettleship used to say; and he met his own fate on the Alps with a cheerfulness which showed that he believed it. The craving for mere survival, no matter under what conditions, is natural to some persons, and those who have it not must not claim any superiority over those who shudder at the idea of resigning this "pleasing, anxious being." Some brave and loyal men, like Samuel

Johnson, have feared death all their lives long; while others, even when fortune smiles upon them, "have a desire to depart and to be with Christ, which is far better." But the longing for survival, and the anxious search for evidence which may satisfy it, have undoubtedly the effect of binding us to earth and earthly conditions; they come between us and faith in true immortality. They cannot restore to us what death takes away. They cannot lay the spectre which made Claudio a craven.

"Ay, but to die and go we know not where
To lie in cold obstruction and to rot;
This sensible warm motion to become
A kneaded clod; and the delighted spirit
To bathe in fiery floods, or to reside
In thrilling regions of thick-ribbed ice;
To be imprisoned in the viewless winds,
And blown with restless violence round about
The pendent world; or to be worse than worst
Of those that lawless and uncertain thoughts
Imagine howling! 'tis too horrible!
The weariest and most loathed earthly life
That age, ache, penury, and imprisonment
Can lay on nature, is a paradise
To what we fear of death."

We know now, if we did not know it three years ago, that the average man can face death, and does face it in the majority of cases, with a serenity which would be incomprehensible if he did not know in his heart of hearts that it does not matter much. He may have no articulated faith in immortality, but, like Spinoza, he has "felt and experienced that he is eternal." Perhaps he only says to himself, "Who dies if England lives?" But the England that lives is his own larger self, the life that is more his own life than the beating of his heart, which a bullet may still for ever. And if the exaltation of noble patriotism can "abolish death, and bring life and immortality to light" for almost any unthinking lad from our factories and hedgerows, should not religion be able to do as much for us all? And may it not be that some touch of heroic self-abnegation is necessary before we can have a soul which death cannot touch? When Christ said that those who are willing to lose their souls shall save them, is not this what He meant? We must accustom ourselves to breathe the air of the eternal values, if we desire to live for ever. And a strong faith is not curious about details. "Beloved, now are we sons of God; and it doth not yet appear what we shall be. But we know that when he is made manifest we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is."

SIR OLIVER LODGE AND THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD.

CHARLES MERCIER, M.D., F.R.C.P.

SIR OLIVER LODGE is conducting what may fairly be called a raging, tearing propagandism in favour of spiritualism, telepathy, clairvoyance, crystal-gazing, and all forms and manifestations of occultism. He has published several books on these subjects, besides magazine articles and letters in the newspapers; and by this time the subject has obtained a thoroughly firm hold of the public. His last book on the subject has sold in tens of thousands of copies, and continues, I am told, to sell at a great rate. The advertisements of mediums in the papers devoted to spiritualism became very numerous until the prosecution of some of the more notorious, when the advertisements suddenly ceased to appear. The public is so thoroughly permeated and excited with the propaganda, that at the trial of one notorious medium it was stated that, if the matter was pushed, half London would be implicated. Cardinal Bourne and Father Vaughan have found it necessary to warn their flocks against the prevailing heresy. People in trains, tramcars, shops, restaurants, and clubs are all talking spiritualism. The thing has caught hold in a way and to a degree that has not happened for more than a generation; indeed, it is doubtful if a parallel could be found more recent than the witch-mania in the seventeenth century.

It may be that this is to the good, or it may not. It is certainly not all to the good. Cases have come before me, in my capacity as physician for mental diseases, that show indisputably that it is not all to the good. However, I need not rest upon my own experience alone, but will cite that of an independent authority. Dr G. M. Robertson is the Medical Superintendent of the Royal Hospital at Morningside in Edinburgh, the premier institution for the insane in Scotland.

He is by no means antagonistic to spiritualism, for in his annual report published in February of this year he says: 'I recognise that it is a difficult subject, worthy of patient and unbiassed inquiry by competent investigators.' But yet he feels it his duty 'to utter a note of warning to those who are seeking consolation in their sorrows by practical experiments in the domain of spiritualism.' The warning is that the manifestations of mediums, supposing them to be honest, are, if not morbid, yet closely related to manifestations of mental disease that have no element of the occult about them; that indulgence in practices of a spiritualistic nature is apt to awaken a dormant proclivity to hallucination in those who inherit a tendency to nervous disorders; that the belief in spiritualism merges into unmistakable delusion, so that in some cases it is impossible to say where the one ends and the other begins; that inquiries into spiritualism in some cases lead to insanity, and in other cases retard recovery from insanity, and may render permanent what might otherwise have been a temporary affection. It will be seen that Dr Robertson weighs his words, and indulges in no furious diatribe against spiritualism. He is not biassed against it: he considers it worth investigating. But he has no doubt at all of its pernicious effect in certain cases. Nor have I. All that Dr Robertson says I can corroborate from my own experience, and I could add enough to justify stronger opinions, expressed in more positive terms, as to the extent of the evil. However, I am content merely to endorse his opinion; and I submit that when experienced physicians like Dr Robertson and myself issue such warnings as these, temperate, moderate, and reasoned, such warnings are not to be lightly regarded. To some people—I will go farther, and say to many people—spiritualistic practices carry a decided, it may be a grave, danger to sanity.

What I have said is true whether Sir Oliver Lodge's beliefs are justified, and whether the practices founded upon them are fruitful, or not. In either case it is much to be deprecated that the beliefs should be inculcated wholesale, and the practices widely adopted by all and sundry, whether they are predisposed to mental disease or whether they are not. Much more is this the case if the beliefs are not justified. In that case, the whole propagandism and the whole of the practices are irredeemably and unmitigatedly pernicious. Sir Oliver Lodge has convinced himself: he and his colleagues in the Society for Psychical Research have accumulated a vast body of evidence: he, or the evidence, has convinced an enormous number of persons who, it is quite fair to say, are incompetent to appraise the

evidence; an enormous number of unthinking persons who are willing and eager to accept anything that is told to them on authority, especially on authority that purports to be 'scientific'; a smaller number of persons, such as lawyers, who are accustomed to weigh evidence of a kind, but not of this kind; a still smaller number of persons who by long study of physical or biological science are accustomed to presuppose the operation of natural laws, and to refuse credence to the miraculous until the operation of natural laws has been shown to be excluded; and of the persons most fitted by training and experience to appraise evidence of the kind—that is to say, professional conjurers—he has convinced not one. I think this is noteworthy.

I do not propose to examine here the evidence on which Sir Oliver Lodge bases his beliefs. This task I have performed in a book already published; at least, I have examined the crucial experiments on which the whole vast structure is avowed by Sir Oliver Lodge to be founded. Those who would learn the result of examining many other cases should consult, if they can procure it, a book by Dr Ivor Tuckett, entitled *The Evidence for the Supernatural*. I do not propose to go over any of this ground again. My purpose here is to examine Sir Oliver Lodge's statement of the attitude of the scientific world towards him and his propaganda, and to show that he entirely misconceives and misapprehends this attitude, and therefore misrepresents it.

He begins by telling us that certain phenomena which are being asserted and discussed 'are received with more or less legitimate scepticism by the scientific world. It has been so with many discoveries and novelties. It seems to represent an inevitable stage of assimilation by the human race.' It seems to Sir Oliver Lodge 'desirable to show that these phenomena are not so entirely detached from present knowledge as may at first appear . . . any more than other facts which at first seemed extraordinary but were subsequently found to be perfectly natural. The lever of custom, use, and wont is often the strongest influence that can be brought to bear in favour of a given proposition.' This passage conveys the notion that the incredulity with which Sir Oliver Lodge's doctrines are received by the very great majority of scientific men is due to prejudice, obscurantism, and repugnance to what is new; that 'the scientific world' is settled down in the ruts of custom, use, and wont, and repels Sir Oliver Lodge's novel discoveries because they do not fit in with preconceived notions and ingrained prejudice. This is a complete misapprehension.

It is unlikely, says Sir Oliver Lodge, 'that in the present stage of natural knowledge we are acquainted with all the workings of the human spirit, and have reduced them to such simplicity that everything capable of happening in the mental and psychical region is of a nature readily and familiarly to be understood by all. Yet there are many who seem practically to believe in this improbability: for although they are constrained from time to time to accept novel and surprising discoveries in biology, in chemistry, and in physical science generally, they seem tacitly to assume that these are the only parts of the universe in which fundamental discovery is possible, all the rest being too well known. It is a simple faith and does credit to the capacity for belief of those who hold it—belief unfounded upon knowledge, and tenable only in the teeth of a great mass of evidence to the contrary.' . . . 'The whole moral is contained in the advice, to all those who care to be students of the subject, patiently and critically to examine facts, and not to be led into premature negation by prejudice born of mistaken and over-limited theory, or by any infallible certainty about our power of judging beforehand what is possible and what is impossible in this vast and complex universe.'

All this is extremely ingenious. It is as clever as anything can be; but it seems to me more ingenious than ingenuous. It is calculated, and it is evidently intended, to forestall any accusation of credulity and gullibility that may be made against Sir Oliver Lodge, and to turn the tables by casting an accusation on his antagonists and placing them, instead of himself, on the defensive. He secures the initiative; and recent events in another field have shown the immense value of the initiative. He adopts the tactics of the man who arrives late at an appointment, and instantly abuses the other party for not being in time, or for going to the wrong place. The audacity and effrontery of the attack are often successful, not only in convincing bystanders, but even in browbeating the wrongfully accused party and depriving him of his just grievance. Sir Oliver Lodge does not wait to be attacked, but, like a dashing commander, carries the war into the enemy's country. It is a bold device, and it has secured a great success. He has overrun Belgium and invaded France, and now he turns upon his enemy and accuses him of unprovoked aggression. He is the injured party. He is denied his place in the sun. He is the meek and innocent victim of unscrupulous boycotting. He is the enlightened Galileo, suffering under the persecution of an ignorant and obscurantist

Inquisition. He is the Bruno who is to be burnt in the marketplace for teaching truths that cannot be disputed, but that, since they are new and in conflict with orthodox doctrines, are to be suppressed. He is a martyr to prejudice, obscurantism, custom, use and wont, intellectual inertia, impenetrable ignorance, and overweening cocksureness. This is the position he takes up. How does it accord with the facts?

I do not pretend to speak for 'the scientific world,' but I have this right to criticise Sir Oliver Lodge's doctrines, that he expressly invites criticism. 'If criticisms were well-informed and fair, we should, I hope and believe, welcome them. Certainly, it is our earnest desire to welcome all criticisms possessing these attributes.' Well, my criticisms are certainly well-informed, for I gain my information from Sir Oliver Lodge himself, or from sources that he will admit are equally unimpeachable. Whether the criticism is fair or not, I must leave the reader to judge. My difficulty is that criticisms that seem to me well-informed and perfectly fair, such as those of Dr Ivor Tuckett, do not so appear to Sir Oliver Lodge, who takes up very much the same attitude as Sir Anthony Absolute. He is cool, quite cool: he is compliance itself — when he is not thwarted: no one more easily led — when he has his own way; but we must not put him in a frenzy.

The first criticism I have to offer is that Sir Oliver Lodge is quite mistaken in supposing that I, at any rate, take it for granted that 'we are acquainted with all the workings of the human spirit and have reduced them to such simplicity that everything capable of happening in the mental and psychical region is of a nature readily and familiarly to be understood by all.' He is quite mistaken in supposing that I, at any rate, 'tacitly assume that these (biology, chemistry, and physical science generally) are the only parts of the universe in which fundamental discovery is possible, all the rest being too well known.' I have been studying psychology for more than forty years, have lived much among psychologists, and am familiar with the writings of all modern psychologists, and I can assure Sir Oliver Lodge that there is not one of them, not one, who makes any such assumption, either tacitly or expressly. I assure him that the actual state of affairs is quite the reverse of that which he supposes. Our assumption is not that we are acquainted with all the workings of the human mind, but that we know very little about them, and we are most eager to know more. We do not think that everything capable of happening in the mental world (we do not say mental and

psychical, for we regard mental and psychical as the same)¹ is of a nature readily and familiarly to be understood by all. We regard very many of these things as puzzling in the extreme, and of a nature that no one at present understands. We do not assume that biology, chemistry, and physical science generally are the only parts of the universe in which fundamental discovery is possible, all the rest being too well known. On the contrary, we consider that the region of psychology is less known than any of the physical sciences, and we are constantly striving to make discoveries, both fundamental and other, in psychology. Indeed, some of us, *quorum pars minima sum*, believe that we have made discoveries and are still making discoveries in this region. In all this Sir Oliver Lodge is totally and entirely mistaken. His belief is in grotesque discordance with the facts. He is as wrong as it is possible to be. And yet he speaks with the utmost confidence, as if he were merely asserting a well-known and accepted truism. If he is thus grossly mistaken in a matter in which we can test his knowledge, in a matter in which he could have put himself right in a moment by inquiry among his colleagues in his university, what confidence can we possibly repose in his assertions about matters very much more difficult to ascertain, and in which we have no means of testing his knowledge?

The second criticism that I have to make is that the 'phenomena' which he would have us believe are new discoveries are not new discoveries, but are as old as human nature itself. Again Sir Oliver Lodge seems to me more ingenious than ingenuous. He does not anywhere explicitly assert that his 'discoveries' are novel; but in the first place the very use of the word 'discovery' implies and conveys novelty. We do not speak of discovering a thing that has long been known. Sir Oliver Lodge does not say that his discoveries are novel, but he implies it throughout. In his first paragraph in *THE HIBBERT JOURNAL* he says that 'certain phenomena,' which we must take to mean the phenomena of spiritualism, 'are received with scepticism by the scientific world,' and then continues, but in a separate sentence, 'it has been so with many discoveries and novelties.' He does not explicitly assert that his discoveries are novelties, but he very strongly

¹ It has been represented to me that people who know nothing of psychology, and not much of the meaning of words, have been taught by Sir Oliver Lodge and other spiritualists to suppose that the word "psychical" means "spookical," "ghostly," of or pertaining to disembodied spirits, spooks, or ghosts. I need hardly assure readers of *THE HIBBERT JOURNAL* that I do not use it in this sense, though it appears as if, in the passage quoted, Sir Oliver Lodge does use it in this sense.

suggests that they are; and the suggestion runs throughout his argument. He consistently implies that his doctrines are rejected because they are novel. Otherwise there is no applicability and no meaning in his complaint against 'the lever of custom, use, and wont.' Here, again, he does not explicitly say that custom, use, and wont are the obstacles in the way of the acceptance of his doctrines: but no one can rise from a perusal of his introduction without a very strong impression that he has said so. If he had deliberately designed his statement so as to produce the strongest possible conviction that he had made certain assertions, and at the same time so as to enable him to deny that he has made them, he could not have framed it more adroitly. Whether intentionally or not, he certainly leaves upon the mind of his reader the impression that he has made certain novel discoveries, and that these discoveries are rejected because of their novelty and strangeness by 'the scientific world,' which is hidebound in prejudice, and cannot emancipate itself from its customary formulæ.

Whether Sir Oliver Lodge designed and intended to produce this conviction in the minds of his readers I am not concerned to assert or examine. All I am concerned with is that he does most unquestionably convey this meaning, and that he conveys it in expressions that permit him to repudiate it if it should seem desirable for him to do so. I am not concerned with his intention: I am concerned with the impression that he conveys. I consider that the impression is false, and I am concerned to remove it.

Telepathy (under other names), somnambulism, hypnotism, crystal-gazing, clairvoyance, trance, prevision or prophesying, disembodied spirits, 'telekinesis' (under other names), materialisation, hauntings, conversation with the dead, and all Sir Oliver Lodge's manifestations, are not new; they are as old as the hills. They are older than many hills. They are, most of them, as old as humanity itself. There is scarcely a savage tribe that has not its witch-doctors, who go into trances; who foretell the future; who receive communications by telepathy, from spirits, both embodied and disembodied; who produce 'manifestations' of 'materialisation'; who cause their enemies to be haunted; who converse with the dead; and who produce 'manifestations' of all the kinds for which Sir Oliver Lodge vouches, and more besides; and these manifestations have been produced continuously, or at frequent intervals, from the earliest times down to the present day.

Of course, I recognise that in this I am presenting Sir Oliver Lodge with an argument of some cogency. It is quite

open to him to argue that if these manifestations have, as I admit and assert, occurred very frequently in the history of mankind from the earliest beginnings of humanity down to the present day, that is cogent evidence that they have in them a basis of truth. So many instances, occurring in so many ages, among so many diverse peoples having no connection with each other, scattered widely over all the face of the earth, place collusion and the transmission of a tradition of imposture out of the question. These practices have originated *de novo* again and again in the history of humanity. Is not this some evidence that they are genuine? And when we find that instances bearing the closest similarity to one another occur in this isolated manner in different ages, among different peoples who could not possibly have learnt them from one another, is not this cogent evidence that they are genuine? Sir Oliver Lodge does not put his case to the best advantage. He might have made it much stronger by adducing this argument, of which I make him a present.

Table-rapping, for instance, or communication by raps and taps and tilts, has been employed again and again by different mediums in different centuries and in different parts of the world. In 1661, Mr Mompesson, a justice of the peace living at Tedworth in Hampshire, caused a wandering beggar, who forestalled the methods of the Salvation Army and solicited alms to the sound of a drum, to be arrested, and confiscated his drum. Shortly afterwards, he and his household were infested by extraordinary drumming noises, with a great knocking at the doors and on the outside of the walls, and the roof. The ghostly drummer beat 'Roundheads and Cuckolds' and other points of war with complete dexterity and accuracy. Not to speak of earlier instances, rapping was employed by the Cock Lane ghost in 1760. It was employed again by an illiterate family in the State of New York nearly one hundred years later. It has been employed since by many mediums. It was employed by Home about fifty years ago, and it is employed again now by the Lodge family. The Cock Lane ghost expressed 'Yes' by one knock, 'No' by two, and displeasure by 'a kind of scratching.' Sir Oliver Lodge's ghost signifies 'Yes' by three tilts, which seems to show that it has more time, or more energy, or less simplicity than the Cock Lane ghost.

The phenomenon of levitation also has manifested itself to people who could not possibly have had any communication with each other or any knowledge that similar phenomena had been produced before, and therefore must be pronounced, in Sir Oliver Lodge's phrase, 'veridical.' Tables have risen in

the air, in the presence of mediums, and as we are assured by the mediums (and they ought to know), without any material supports. It is true that when a sudden and, unexpected flash-light has been burned and a photograph taken thereby, the photograph showed what appeared to be the medium's foot supporting the table; but photographs are notoriously untrustworthy. Eusapia Paladino compels footstools to slide along the floor by means of 'astral force' or 'psychic force' or some other occult mode of energy, and levitates various objects in the most surprising manner. It is true that some of these phenomena have been proved to be produced by simple mechanical means, and to be fraudulent manifestations; but others have not yet been proved to be fraudulent, and therefore Sir Oliver Lodge, since he cannot explain how they occur, considers them supernatural, and 'that something more is involved than is recognised in the present state of orthodox science.' These phenomena merely reproduce others that occurred hundreds of years before Eusapia was born, and of which she cannot possibly have known; and the coincidence seems conclusive of the genuineness of both sets of manifestation. On the 5th of November 1661 the Rev. Joseph Glanvil, a clergyman of unimpeachable integrity, witnessed the following occurrence:—A servant, observing two boards moving, bade it (the devil) give it to one of them. Upon which the board came (nothing moving it that he saw) within a yard of him. 'Nay,' said the man, 'let me have it in my hand': upon which the spirit or devil pushed it towards him so close that he might touch it. 'This,' says the reverend Mr Glanvil, 'was in the daytime, and was seen by a whole roomful of people. It left a sulphurous smell behind it, which was very offensive.' This part of the phenomenon was not, I think, imitated by Eusapia. During prayer-time the spirit withdrew into the cock-loft, but returned as soon as prayers were done, and then in sight of the company the chairs walked about the room by themselves, the children's shoes were hurled over their heads, and every loose thing moved about the chamber. At the same time a bed-staff was thrown at the minister, which hit him on the leg. This is a thing about which the minister could not possibly have been mistaken, and he is a witness of unimpeachable integrity.

Sir Oliver Lodge quotes Dr Hodgson's account of Mrs Piper's relation of the description given to her by her ghostly communicators. In passing through so many media it may perhaps have become slightly modified, but as recorded by Sir Oliver Lodge it appears that we all have bodies of luminiferous ether. The relation of Mrs Piper's ethereal body to the ethereal

world in which the communicators claim to dwell is such that a special store of peculiar energy is accumulated in connection with her organism, and this appears to them as 'a light.' Mrs Piper's ethereal body is removed by them, and her ordinary body appears as a shell filled with this 'light.' This is closely paralleled by the account given by the celebrated Dr Dee of his experiences in Queen Elizabeth's time. He relates that one day in November 1582, while he was engaged in fervent prayer, the window of his museum looking towards the west suddenly glowed with a dazzling light, in the midst of which, in all his glory, stood the great angel Uriel. The angel Uriel was Dr Dee's Mrs Piper, and, like her, had a special store of peculiar energy accumulated in connection with his organism, and this appeared to Dr Dee as 'a light.' The angel Uriel was very gracious to Dr Dee, and presented him with a crystal of convex form, and told him whenever he wished to hold converse with beings of another sphere (meaning Summerland) he had only to gaze intently upon it, and they would appear in the crystal and unveil to him all the secrets of futurity. *This crystal is now in the British Museum*, and if there is any person, belonging or not to the scientific world, so obdurately sceptical as to question the truth of Dr Dee's story, let him go to the British Museum and have his foolish objections for ever silenced. Until he does so, he is merely exhibiting what Sir Oliver Lodge rightly calls 'that unbalanced and comparatively dangerous condition called "open-mindedness."'

There is another respect in which Mrs Piper's experiences were forestalled, so that the two lend reinforcement and corroboration to each other. 'Very few communicators,' says Sir Oliver Lodge, quoting Dr Hodgson, who is quoting Mrs Piper, who is quoting the communicators themselves, who must know,—'Very few [communicators] can produce vocal effects, even when in contact with the light of the head.' This was the experience of Lilly, the astrologer, also. In his *Memoirs of his Life and Times* he says: 'The prophecies were not given vocally by the angels, but by the inspection of the crystal in types and figures, or by apparition the circular way, etc. It is very rare, yea, even in our days, for any operator or master to hear the angels speak articulately: when they do speak, it is like the Irish, much in the throat.'

The authentic records of persons who before Sir Oliver Lodge have had communications with the dead are quite innumerable. To cite them all would require not merely a magazine article, but a book, many books, a whole library. I will cull only a few, and present them to Sir Oliver Lodge for

incorporation, if he sees fit, in subsequent editions of his works, as corroborative evidence.

Cornelius Agrippa, at the request of Lord Surrey, Erasmus, and other learned men, called up from the grave many of the great philosophers of antiquity; among others, Cicero, whom he induced to redeliver his celebrated oration for Roscius. Paracelsus had frequent interviews with Galen and Avicenna. The Count de St Germain in the time of Louis XV. described with minute particularity conversations he had with Henry VIII. and Charles V. Cagliostro was such a powerful and efficient medium that 'there was hardly a fine lady in Paris' says the *Biographie des Contemporains* 'who would not sup with the shade of Lucretius in the apartments of Cagliostro; a military officer who would not discuss the art of war with Cæsar, Hannibal, or Alexander; or an advocate or counsellor who would not argue legal points with the ghost of Cicero.' There was another point of similarity between Cagliostro and the mediums of the present day. These interviews with the departed were very expensive; for, as Cagliostro very justly said, the dead would not rise for nothing; and it is not to be supposed that the ghostly or ethereal whisky and cigars, of which Sir Oliver Lodge tells us, are to be obtained without ghostly or ethereal money. We know from innumerable accounts that ghosts wear ghostly clothes, and in these clothes the male ghosts, at any rate, must surely have ghostly pockets. Of what use is a ghostly pocket without ghostly money to put into it, and to take out of it in order to exchange for ghostly whisky, ghostly cigars, and other ghostly things? Again, I say, the close coincidence of similar occurrences happening to different people in different ages is strong corroborative evidence of the veridical nature of both.

One more coincidence, and I may close this part of my argument. An important part of the evidence that convinces Sir Oliver Lodge of survival after death is afforded by 'phantasms of the living.' In this matter Cornelius Agrippa was an expert. He showed Lord Surrey when in Germany a phantasm of the fair Geraldine, who was Lord Surrey's *fiancée*. She was to be seen sitting on a couch and weeping for the absence of her lover. Lord Surrey was a shrewd and careful observer. He forestalled the warning given by Sir Oliver Lodge in his hints to investigators: 'Too much care cannot be expended in getting the record exact. Exact in every particular, especially as regards the matter of *time*.' When Lord Surrey saw the phantasm of the weeping Geraldine, he did not allow his emotion to interfere with his scientific

accuracy. He made a note of the exact time. How he did this we are not told. We naturally suppose that he looked at his watch, and no doubt he would have done so, but that in the time of Henry VIII. watches were not yet invented. Presumably there was a sundial in view from the window, and he noted the time by that; but when we remember that a sundial is not a very accurate time indicator, we find, in spite of ourselves, an unworthy doubt creep into our minds when we are told that Lord Surrey afterwards ascertained that his lady was actually so employed at the very same minute. Had she also a sundial in view? Did she intermit her weeping for a moment to go to the window and look at it? Did the sun happen to be shining both in England and in Germany at the very same minute? Did they make allowance for the difference in longitude? 'Twere to consider too curiously, to consider so; and thus the native hue of resolution to believe is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought, and demonstrations of great pith and moment with this regard their currents turn awry.

All these corroborative, reinforcing, and endorsing instances I present to Sir Oliver Lodge for embodiment in future editions of his works, and I have in reserve volumes upon volumes more of them: I place them freely and unreservedly at his service—unlike a medium, without fee, remuneration, or reward; but if he avails himself of my offer, and even if he does not, he must abandon his claim to the novelty of his discoveries. They are not new. They are older than many of the hills. They are as old as humanity itself. When, therefore, Sir Oliver Lodge poses as the discoverer of things so new, so strange, so unfamiliar, that we, who are hidebound in preconceived prejudices, and are startled by the novelty and unfamiliarity of his discoveries, refuse on account of their novelty and unfamiliarity to allow them or discuss them, he misconceives the situation. We may be as stupid, as conservative, as hidebound, as prejudiced, as Sir Oliver Lodge makes us out to be; but whatever our objections to his discoveries, these objections do not rest on the ground of the novelty of his discoveries. As to this he totally misconceives our attitude, and I cannot help feeling convinced that his misconception would never have arisen if he had been familiar with the works of his great predecessors. I respectfully commend to him a study of the works of Al Geber, from whose name we derive our modern word 'gibberish'; of Duns Scotus, from whose name we derive our modern word 'dunce'; of Albertus Magnus, Artepheus, Michael Scot, Raymond Lully, Nicholas Flamel, Trithemius, Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus, Mother Shipton,

Dr Dee and his coadjutator Edward Kelly, Jacob Böhlen, the Count de St Germain, the Count of Cagliostro, Peter of Pontefract, Partridge (so cruelly maligned by Swift), Isaac Bickerstaff, Old Moore, Zadkiel, and the Red-faced Nixon, referred to with respect by so eminent an authority as Mr Tony Weller. In the writings of all these authorities Sir Oliver Lodge will find records of experiences, some of which are exactly parallel, point by point, with his own, and others of which are much more wonderful than his own.

The next capital complaint of Sir Oliver Lodge is that 'the scientific world' refuses to consider his facts. 'I do not ask you'—so he says in other words—'I do not ask you to believe without examination of the facts; but I do complain that you will not examine them. I have examined them, and the result of my examination has been to produce conviction in me. You sneer at my conviction, but you do so without warrant, for you have not examined my facts, and until you have done so you are not entitled to an opinion: you are certainly not entitled to sneer at mine.' These, I say, are not Sir Oliver Lodge's own words, but this is the gist of his complaint and of his argument, and very plausible it is. It has imposed on tens of thousands of people, and will, no doubt, impose on tens of thousands more.

Hear his own announcement in his own words: 'No phenomenon was to be unhesitatingly rejected because at first sight incredible. No phenomenon was to be accepted which could not make its position good by crucial and convincing facts. Every class of fact was to have the benefit of inquiry, none was to be given the benefit of any doubt. So long as doubt was reasonable, the phenomenon was to be kept at arm's length: to be criticised as possible, not to be embraced as true.' Captivating, is it not? Conceived in the true spirit of scientific inquiry: completely disarming of all suspicion of bias or prejudice: open, candid, fair, and just. So far we are all in agreement with Sir Oliver Lodge. Believers and sceptics, 'the scientific world' and the unscientific world of the spiritualists, would all be in agreement; but exactly one hundred and forty years ago a man who is not to be compared with Sir Oliver Lodge in scientific eminence made a scientific discovery that we may well lay to heart. No less a person than Sir Peter Teazle discovered that a man may give utterance to the most noble sentiments, and yet be so deficient in the capacity or the willingness to apply them in practice as to provoke from the bystander the impatient and improper expression, 'Oh, damn your sentiments!' I trust I have more

self-control than to be provoked into an expression so hasty and so improper; but when Sir Oliver Lodge expatiates on the virtue and advantage of the scientific method, I am stirred by a sentiment that, if I should give it utterance, would, in the words of Joseph Surface, 'give that worthy man grounds for great uneasiness.'

The quarrel that 'the scientific world' has with Sir Oliver Lodge is not with his sentiments. They are altogether admirable; and if he adhered to them in his practice, the scientific world would follow him in a body. The quarrel the scientific world has with him is that in their eyes his practice violates these principles in every point and on every occasion. They have no quarrel with his facts, but they are very impatient of what he calls his facts. Anything that Sir Oliver Lodge may record as having actually himself observed they are prepared to accept upon his assurance, provided they are assured that he has not mistaken for fact his interpretation of the fact. This is the main difference, it is almost the sole difference, between him and us. He records as facts, and expects us to receive on his assurance that they are facts, what in our opinion are plainly and manifestly not facts, but are glosses and interpretations put upon the facts. For instance, Mrs Sidgwick thus describes the hand of a medium, apparently Mrs Piper, which was engaged in automatic writing: 'The hand seems tremendously pleased and excited, and thumps and gesticulates. The impression given is that of a person dancing round the room in delight at having accomplished something.' For my part, I am quite prepared to believe that the hand moved and was used by its owner to thump and gesticulate. These movements, supposing they took place, which I do not doubt, are facts. But all the rest is not fact, but interpretation of fact, and, while I accept the fact, I do not accept the interpretation. Nothing would make me believe that the hand itself was pleased; and though it may have given to Mrs Sidgwick the impression of a person dancing round the room, this dancing is clearly not a fact, but the interpretation of a fact; and I am not bound to accept Mrs Sidgwick's interpretation of facts. When she says that the hand gave her the impression of a person dancing round the room *with delight*, I am still sceptical, and ask how she distinguishes dancing round the room with delight from dancing round the room in agony—in the agony of burnt fingers, for instance? Still more sceptical am I, even supposing the dancing was the dancing of delight, that the delight was the delight of having accomplished something. It may have

been the delight of receiving a present—a new pair of gloves, for instance, or, rather, a new glove, for but one hand was implicated in the dancing.

This difference between fact and the interpretation of fact is ignored throughout the whole of Sir Oliver Lodge's descriptions. What he describes is for the most part not fact but his interpretation of fact: and he mourns our obstinacy, blindness, prejudice, want of the true scientific spirit, and so forth, in gentle and pathetic remonstrances, without a trace of anger, but penetrated by a deep feeling of pity, supported by a patience and resignation that are truly admirable, but that might with advantage be a little less obtrusive.

When Sir Oliver Lodge tells us that the activity of the hand that writes is remarkable, I receive his observation of fact with submission; but when he tells us that the activity of the hand is dramatic activity, I say at once this is not fact, this is interpretation of fact; and yet he desires me to accept it as fact. When he says that the hand is full of intelligence, and can be described as more like an intelligent person than a hand; that it turns itself to the sitter *when it wants* to be spoken to by him; that it turns itself away from the sitter *as if* receiving communications from outside; that it directs itself to a part of the room where nobody is *for further information*;—then I say he is not relating facts, he is relating interpretations that he puts upon facts—interpretations so far-fetched, so improbable, so wanting in any reasonable basis, that we can find no parallel to them outside of Bedlam.

In short, as it seems to me, Sir Oliver Lodge completely misconceives the attitude of the scientific world towards him, and his own attitude towards the scientific world and towards the 'facts' or interpretations of fact that he asks the scientific world to accept. His attitude is in effect this:—Here, he says, are my conclusions: disprove them if you can. Here are my interpretations of the facts: disprove them if you can. These are the facts on which my conclusions are founded: disprove them if you can.

This attitude is thoroughly unscientific from top to bottom and from beginning to end. It is wrong root and branch, lock, stock, and barrel. It shows an utter misconception of the nature of evidence, of the presumptions of science, and of the incidence of the burden of proof. Throughout all his books runs the tacit assumption that if we cannot disprove his assertions we ought to accept them and all their consequences, and nothing but prejudice, custom, use and wont, etc., etc., prevents our falling into line behind him and hailing him

as the prophet of the age, the New Messiah. This attitude arises from his ignoring of a very simple, but very sound, necessary, and fundamental principle, which is this: *Whoso makes an assertion, upon him lies the burden of proof.* It is not for the scientific world, or for anyone else, to disprove Sir Oliver Lodge's assertions, his doctrines, his interpretations, or his facts. *The onus is on him to prove them.* He is to bring forward evidence of fact, not of interpretation of fact; and if he asks us to accept his interpretations, *they must be of such a nature that no other interpretation can be placed upon the facts.* As long as his facts are susceptible of interpretation by the operation of natural laws, he has no right to ask us to follow him in supposing that they are supernatural. As long as he offers us interpretations of fact in the place of fact, he is not entitled even to a hearing. As long as his facts are observed only by himself or by others who have already avowed their desire to interpret them in a certain way, he has no right to ask us to accept them as indisputable. Facts, or what are called facts, observed under hole-and-corner conditions, by those alone who are determined to see them in a certain light, and to interpret them in a certain way; facts that have never been seriously tested; facts from the observation of which independent observers are excluded; facts that never happen when sceptics are present; facts on which the observers have not been cross-examined;—do not deserve the name of facts. To the scientific mind they are not facts: they are untested, unacceptable assertions, on which it would be waste of time to found an inference. Inferences founded upon them are not worth examination. The scientific world has something better to do with its time. This, and not any prejudice, not obscurantism, not custom, or use, or wont, is the reason why Sir Oliver Lodge can gain no hearing from scientific men. Let him produce evidence that is worthy the name of evidence; let him produce facts that are facts; let him give scientific men the opportunity of testing his observations and his inferences, and he will have no occasion to bemoan their lack of interest. On the contrary, he may well have to deplore that they take too much. When they have had an opportunity, the result has been disastrous to the facts. He is willing to invite them, he has invited them, in general terms, and without specifying time, place, or circumstance; but real opportunity for a real test he has never given, and I shall be much surprised if he ever does give one. We shall see.

CHARLES MERCIER.

THE THEORY OF SURVIVAL IN THE LIGHT OF ITS CONTEXT.¹

L. P. JACKS.

AMONG the dangers and the difficulties of psychical research, not the least are those which arise from the use of the common words "spirit," "spiritual," and "spiritualism"; and the suggestion I have to make is, that as a temporary measure we should be well advised to drop these words from our working vocabulary and pursue our investigations for the time being as though they did not exist.

Everyone who has thought out the problem of proving the identity of those who are alleged to communicate from beyond the grave must have experienced both the danger and the difficulty that lurk in these words. To prove identity, to prove that the person who was here and the person who is there are really one and the same, you want as much resemblance and as much continuity as possible. Difference and discontinuity, on the other hand, are always obstacles to identification. But what greater difference, what wider breach, could be conceived than that between an embodied and a disembodied being—between a man and a ghost? No two beings that I can think of could be more unlike one another than myself in my body and myself out of my body. What it may be to see without an eye, to speak without a tongue, to think without a brain, or to move about without limbs I find myself wholly unable to conceive. I cannot deny that such things may be possible; but I am certain that they are very different from seeing with an eye, speaking with a tongue, thinking with a brain, and moving about with the aid of my bodily limbs. The difference is so great and the discontinuity so startling that I cannot recognise myself under those conditions as one with the person I now am, nor do I understand how anybody else could possibly identify me.

¹ Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research, June 28, 1917.

We are apt to thrust this difficulty aside by saying that the true self of a man consists of his moral characteristics, and, if these are found in existence after death, then, body or no body, you have the real essential man. That I do not question as an abstract proposition. It is a profound truth of moral philosophy; but it has no relevance to the business of psychical research. Moral characteristics are of the highest importance; but they are not easy to distinguish, they are elusive and difficult to define, and are of little use as identification marks. I imagine that a man would have some difficulty in picking out his wife from a crowd of ten thousand women if he had nothing but her moral characteristics to go by, however admirable these might be. The sound of her voice or the colour of her dress would be much more to the purpose. Nor would it be easy to get one's passport *visé* in a foreign city, or to persuade an American banker to cash our letter of credit, if our moral characteristics were all we could adduce to prove our identity. Now, the problem which the theory of survival has to solve is closely analogous to that of a man looking for his wife in an enormous crowd, or to that of the American banker who has to satisfy himself that his would-be client is really the person he professes to be. Moral characteristics will not suffice unless they are backed up by evidence in detail, of which the most trivial may be the most important. Speaking for myself, I am by no means sure what my moral characteristics really are; if called upon to enumerate them I should certainly fail, not from modesty, nor, I hope, from vanity, but from sheer ignorance; nor would I trust their enumeration by another person. I would much rather be asked for my weight or my height. On the whole, I am inclined to think that my moral characteristics are of such a kind that there must be millions of men in the world for any one of whom I might readily be mistaken if there was nothing else to go by.

But now I venture to say that as scientific investigators we have no right, and we have certainly no need, to start our inquiries from the common distinction between "bodies" whose characteristics are all physical and "spirits" whose characteristics are all moral; and if we assume that right from the outset, we shall pay the penalty of endless confusion which properly falls to those who beg the question at issue. The distinction between body and spirit belongs to a metaphysical theory which has filtered down into popular thought and got itself fixed in popular phraseology. It may be a sound theory—I do not question that; but it is a theory all the same, and must

not be allowed for a moment to prejudice the minds of those who are inquiring into matters of fact. Our business and duty is to be guided solely by the evidence before us; not to assume that the beings with whom we are in contact are this or that, but precisely to find out from the evidence *what* they are. By jumping to the conclusion that they are disembodied spirits we not only saddle ourselves with a tremendous difficulty, which makes the problem of identification next to impossible, but we are interpreting facts ahead of the evidence, or imposing a theory on the facts—the most serious of all scientific errors.

If I am saying something which is not clear, let my hearer ask himself the plain question, How does he know that these beings are disembodied spirits? He may answer, They must be disembodied, because they left their bodies behind them. But that is begging the question, for the very point at issue is to prove that they are the people who left their bodies behind. Or he may say, "I know they are spirits, because there is nothing else they can be." That is metaphysics. In this way psychical research, which is research into the nature of the soul, begins with a metaphysical theory as to the nature of the soul, thereby foreclosing the most important part of the inquiry. It behoves the psychical investigator of all men to be perfectly open-minded, and especially to be open-minded to the question as to what kind of beings they are who appear to be communicating with him. They may be disembodied spirits; but if they are, it is for them to prove themselves so, and not for him to assume it. If he assumes it rashly, he may find that he has misinterpreted the whole body of evidence before him.

Another preconception, closely connected with that of disembodied spirits, and deeply entangled with the whole discussion, is the idea of two worlds, which we distinguish as "this world" and "the next." This distinction is otherwise expressed by the words "departure" and "survival." We speak of the dead as the departed; which means that they have left this world; and when evidence arrives which suggests that they are still in existence, we assume that they have arrived in another. Now all this may be true. On the other hand, it is conceivably false. To prove that the dead survive it is not necessary to assume that they are in *another* world. They may survive in this world. They may even remain organic members of the human race. Like the notion of disembodied spirit, the idea of the two worlds is one we have inherited from other sources; and again our duty is not to accept it as a key to the

evidence, but to bring it to the test of the evidence itself. Here also we need to be quite open-minded. We may find—I do not say positively that we shall—that the upshot of psychical research is not to give us another world, supplementary or successive to this one, or of another nature than this, but to extend the boundaries and deepen the significance of the one world in which we and the so-called “departed” are all living together under a unitary system of law. At all events, let the matter be decided by the evidence, and not by our preconceptions of what the evidence ought to mean. For my part I should be glad to hear no more about “the other side,” unless it be used as a metaphor or as a concession to the poverty of language, though even so I think it confusing and dangerous. If you take it for granted that communications *must* come from another world, or from “another side,” you will find yourself at every step putting meanings into the evidence that it does not actually bear; you will read it in the light of a theory formed in advance, which theory, if the evidence were impartially taken, might be found untenable.

Indeed, our minds are so deeply entangled in metaphysics, there is so much unconscious metaphysic in current language, especially in the distinction between two worlds, this and the next, that the greatest care is needed to prevent ourselves falling into a trap. We are often caught unawares, and find ourselves reporting as evidence what is not really evidence, but something which we have already twisted and forced into the mould of one or other of these unconscious theories. Even in so simple a matter as reporting a dream, unless we are exceptionally alert we fall into the trap at every turn. We say, “I dreamt that I did so and so”; and in so saying we beg the most important question at issue. For the main problem which the student of dreams has to solve is precisely a problem of identity; he has to determine whether the dreamer and the person dreamed about are really one and the same; which question you will observe he settles in advance by saying, “*I* dreamt that *I* did so and so.” Here again the notion of two worlds dogs the inquiry at every step. We speak of “the world of dreams” and “the world of waking realities,” and we think of ourselves as passing from the one to the other during sleep, just as we do in the parallel case of death, and we begin to construct hypothetical bridges which may link the two worlds together. In all this we are simply suffering ourselves to be bound hand and foot by popular metaphysics. Instead of taking the two worlds for granted and assuming a “passage” from one to the other, whether in sleep or in death,

we ought rather to consult the evidence on this very point. Perhaps we should then find that the notion of two worlds, or even two sides to the one world, is entirely without warrant, and that no passage takes place at all. We might find something more surprising still; namely, that the number of worlds is much greater than two, and may possibly extend into millions. In any case the number two is nothing but an obsession, and as such has no right to intrude itself for a moment into inquiries which profess to start without prejudice.

These warnings are not new. Long ago they were uttered by William James and Professor Bergson, my great predecessors in the position I occupy to-day. Both these thinkers have pointed out the confusion which has befallen the whole science of psychology through the presence of subconscious theories formed in advance of the facts to be examined. Perhaps the most valuable part of Professor Bergson's work is the exposure he has given us of the havoc wrought by this habit. Take, for example, the fundamental question of the relation between the mind and the body. When this question is raised we immediately take it for granted that we are dealing with two distinct orders of fact, the material and the mental; just as in psychical research we assume the distinction between embodied and disembodied spirits, or between two worlds, this and the next. That, we think, is the commonsense view of the matter. What can be more obvious than the truth that the mind is one thing, and the body another? Taking that as our starting-point, all our subsequent thinking has to follow suit and uphold the distinction with which we have started out. But Bergson has shown us that the notion of mind being one thing and body another is not commonsense at all, and by no means obvious. It is a highly elaborated metaphysical doctrine, with a long history behind it, which has got itself so deeply entrenched in current thought and speech that we have come to treat it as self-evident and imagined that nothing else is possible. To take it for granted is, once again, to beg the question at issue. Our business as psychologists is not to assume that mind and body are two things, but precisely to find out whether they are so or not. They may be so; but that is a matter for the evidence to decide. Let the evidence therefore decide it. Let this and every other theory be dismissed from the mind. Get, if you can, at the immediate data of consciousness; that is, get at the evidence before it has been warped and twisted by subconscious metaphysical theories. Such is the important plea of Professor Bergson in

regard to psychology in general. It is not easy to act upon, because very few of us are aware of the extent to which our minds are unconsciously pledged to these notions. It requires long training to detect the intruders; and even when they have been detected in one form they often assume another, as a well-known personage is said to do in the moral world, re-appearing at points where we are off our guard.

But since the work of psychical research is relatively new, it ought to be easier to rid our minds of these preconceptions than it is in the older branches of psychology, where the force of habit is more deeply entrenched. What we have to do is to seek for the immediate data: that is, to take the evidence as it occurs, before it has been translated by some reporter into the terms of a theory about disembodied spirits, or about another world, or about anything else.

I freely confess that in what I am about to say I shall not be able to do this thoroughly and consistently. To do it thoroughly one would have to be at the very source of the phenomena: that is, in the position of an actual observer at the moment when a cross-correspondence, or some other manifestation, is taking place. Standing at one remove from the evidence, I cannot do this, for I have to take it in the form in which it has been reported, and it is almost impossible to get any report which has not undergone some process of translation in the mind of the reporter. The best I can do is to tap the evidence as high up as I can reach it.

I propose, then, to take it at the point where some person of known credibility comes forward with the statement that he has received what is called a communication, but before any theory has been formed as to where the communication comes from or as to the kind of being who is communicating. Such evidence can be found in plenty by anybody who will look for it in the records of this Society—especially in the carefully sifted records of the cross-correspondences. I well know that even in this I am giving something more than the immediate data—the word “communications” shows that; but it is the nearest approach to immediacy which the circumstances afford me.

We will assume, then, that communications, genuine communications, are taking place; and, dismissing from our minds the notion that they are coming from disembodied spirits or from another world, we will let the communications themselves tell us where they are coming from, and what kind of beings they are who are making them. Especially will we be on our guard against letting the words “spiritual,”

or "supernatural," or "supernormal" intrude themselves on our observation. These words imply that we have already made up our minds as to what the communications mean, which is the very thing we want to find out. We will not use these adjectives unless the evidence itself convinces that they and no others are the adjectives we ought to use. These precautions taken, we shall find that certain facts now start into prominence which escaped us altogether while we were under the malign influence of our preconceptions; while others which we previously thought unimportant become very important indeed.

To begin with, these communicating beings, wherever they are, and whoever they may be, *quite obviously retain the distinction of sex.* They make use of the personal pronouns masculine and feminine; they speak of one another as "he" and "she"; and they employ the distinction with no discernible difference of meaning from that with which we are all familiar. This suggests at once that the communicating beings stand with ourselves on a common biological ground; and since biological facts, like all other facts, are not isolated, but form part of a context in which the whole order of nature is involved, we could from this one fact alone build out a whole system to correspond, just as the palæontologist when he discovers the bone of an extinct animal can reconstruct the whole animal to which it belonged. This, I say, we could do; and the only thing that has prevented us doing it hitherto is the notion that everything we are going to discover must bear a "spiritual" sense, must mean something other than it would mean if it occurred in the known order—that is, may mean anything we choose to make it mean. Dismissing that notion, we find ourselves in the presence of a fact enormously rich in implications. *These beings retain the distinction of sex.*

Next, and almost equally striking, is their use of language, both in the spoken and the written form. They use it for addressing one another and for addressing us through the medium, and they express by it ideas which are intelligible to human beings. Moreover, the language spoken is plain English, or plain French, as the case may be, with its grammatical forms and constructions on the whole well preserved. Nothing is more surprising to me in the history of psychical research than the little attention that has been paid to this remarkable aspect of the evidence. I can only account for it, as before, by the obstinate prejudice that everything is occurring in a spiritual realm where nothing means what it seems to

mean. But for that we should have brought this fact—the use of language—into the full light of our philological knowledge and drawn from it exactly the same kind of inferences that would follow if we were to learn that French and English were spoken on the planet Mars. In that case we should at once conclude that the inhabitants of Mars are human beings; that its ethnology is a counterpart to our own; that its history, even its social history, is, in part at least, parallel to that of the earth; for every language is an embodied memory, and nobody can speak English or French as his native tongue without being English or French in many other respects—in respect of his present, his future, as well as of his past.

How is it that there has been so little scrutiny of the evidence on these lines? How is it, I cannot help asking myself, that a fact which would throw a flood of light on any world, or sphere, or planet where it was discovered has so far thrown hardly any light at all on the world which these communicating beings are supposed to inhabit? Is it because we have made two compartments in our thinking, just as we have made two worlds in the universe, in one of which every fact has its intelligible context, while in the other each fact can be treated as though it had no context at all?

But the internal evidence is not exhausted by the two facts I have mentioned; indeed, it is so rich that I can do no more than select a small portion of it. At every point these beings are incidentally betraying something of importance. For example, they are evidently in time: they look before and after, and even pine for what is not; they can measure time by our intervals; they speak of yesterday, to-day, to-morrow and next week—distinctions which refer to astronomical conditions and would be meaningless without them. They even make appointments for the future, a strange proceeding if we had to do with the timeless self or transcendental ego of Immanuel Kant. Memory and expectation are theirs. They constantly bid the sinner to *wait* for future developments. They become fatigued under exertion and desist when fatigue comes on. They move from place to place, and distinguish places that are near from those that are far off. They hear and they see; and though I can find no distinct references to an atmosphere which carries the vibrations of sound, I find many references to the light which is necessary for seeing, and to the colours which light produces. They are acquainted with each other's appearance, and describe it, sometimes in detail. There is hardly a case of alleged communication in which you do not find one or more of these striking characteristics; and

if there were only one of them—for example, the power of seeing,—that alone might suggest to science a whole context of necessary relations and natural laws, and enable us to reconstruct with general accuracy the kind of world in which the alleged seeing took place.

Let us pause at this last item of evidence, which is of great interest, and consider the various ways in which it may be taken. We are in communication, let us assume, with beings who by their own account are acquainted with the phenomenon called light. Now, let us suppose that in reading this evidence we do what I have been urging we should *not* do, namely, bring with us the notions or beliefs inherited from popular metaphysics or from religion. In particular, we are all familiar with the notion of a heavenly city where the light is not that of the sun or the moon or the stars, but comes, as we say, from a spiritual source. I have no word to say against this belief; but I do say that it has no business here, and that if we introduce it at this point we are performing the operation which is known as “queering the pitch.” However, suppose we introduce it and jump to the conclusion that the light mentioned must be the light of that city which has neither sun nor moon. What follows? Why, that scientific inquiry comes to a dead stop. Science if left to herself would at once follow up the clue; she would say: If light, then a luminary which produces the light, a medium through which the light is transmitted, an eye sensitive to the action of light, an optic nerve, an appropriate sense organisation, and so forth. But no! This is mystic light, this is spiritual light, light that never was on land or sea: light that has nothing to do with heat; that requires no luminary to produce it; that has no laws of refraction, no rate of transmission; light that never waxes nor wanes, and knows no alternation of day and night. Now, all that may be wholesome mysticism; it may be good religion; it may be sound metaphysics; but its introduction at this point is simply fatal to scientific inquiry. By suddenly changing the meaning of “light” to fit your preconceptions of the spiritual world, you tear out of the hand of science the clue she was just beginning to grasp, and a piece of evidence which is full of significance and might have led to most important conclusions leads to nothing at all.

Let me illustrate my meaning by one of those far-fetched suppositions which, just because they are far-fetched, are the less likely to encounter our prejudice. Suppose we were credibly informed, by any means you choose to imagine, that

a rose, a single flower fully formed, had been discovered on the planet Mars. How Science would leap to her feet on receiving the information! From that single fact she could reconstruct the general characteristics of the flora of Mars, with the greatest ease and almost infallible certainty. A planet which can produce a rose must be able to produce ten thousand other things from the same conditions, and science could tell us in general what they are. Not the flora alone but the fauna would be involved. And beyond all that the fact would expand into a mine of information concerning the climate, the soil, the atmosphere, the seasons, and what not. We may say, with little exaggeration, that the whole planet would give itself away by letting out the single secret that it contained a rose. But now suppose that just as this reconstruction was about to begin we were suddenly confronted with a new and unexpected piece of information. "This rose of Mars," we will imagine our informant to say, "is not what is commonly meant by the word. It is a mystic rose, a spiritual rose of dawn, a rose that grows on no tree, and is planted in no garden: a rose that flourished without the light of the sun; about whose roots no man has dugged; a rose that was never born from a bud; a rose that neither grows nor withers nor dies." What would Science say to that? Needless to say, she would have nothing to answer. She would be stopped on the threshold. The question would pass out of her hands altogether, and it would now be for the metaphysicians, the poets, the mythologists, the mystagogues to make what they could of the new information. And even they could not make much of it. Now that, I make bold to say, is the position in which psychical research is often placed by the habit we all have of translating the evidence into what we call "spiritual terms" before we have given ourselves time to consider what the evidence really means.

But now what does it mean? What information does it convey as to the kind of beings with whom we are communicating? Instead of answering the question by means of an idea which is quite external to the facts, let us consult the internal witness of the evidence itself and be content for the time being with that.

All the characteristics I have named—sex, language, sight, hearing, mental equipment, and the rest—are well-known human characteristics. Following the clue they place in our hands, and arguing strictly from effects to causes, we are led immediately to the conclusion *that these are human beings*. Nothing else is suggested by the bare evidence, and, so far as

we are guided by the evidence, nothing else is conceivable. Whatever other conclusion we might be tempted to draw in deference to metaphysics, to moral philosophy, or to religion, this and this only is the internal witness of the evidence itself.

But, you will say, these people have died, they have passed from this life, they have left their bodies behind them, they are invisible: it is right to assume, therefore, that they are living under conditions so different from those of earth that they cannot be human beings as we understand the terms. They are at least disembodied—for yonder are their bodies in the grave.

Again it seems to me you are leaping to conclusions: you are importing foreign matter; you are going beyond the evidence. To begin with, we must not take it for granted that they are the dead. That is one of the questions at issue: a question which the evidence must decide, and not a known fact which decides the meaning of the evidence. But even if the question were not open, even if it were a proved truth that they are the dead, you are still forcing the pace. No doubt it is natural to think that the world in which these beings now find themselves is very different from the world they have left. But that notion is not in the evidence; it is in your mind. What the evidence reveals is not the difference between the two worlds, but their extraordinary likeness, a likeness so close that it is hard to resist the conclusion that they are one and the same. A world in which sex is maintained and language used in the vernacular, not to speak of a score of suchlike things, must not be set down offhand as a world that is wholly different from this. To say of one of these beings that it is "he" or "she," that it speaks its native language, and so on, does not suggest that it is disembodied, but strongly suggests the contrary.

There is no such thing as an isolated fact in science; every fact has a necessary context, and carries with it the whole context of which it is an organic part. If you find a rose you know there was a tree that bore it; you know there was soil in which the tree was rooted; that there were sun, air, moisture to nourish its growth. In the same way, if you get one of the essential characteristics of a human being you get the lot. If you find sex you find much more than sex, namely, a whole biological system; if you find vision you find light; and if the light, then everything that goes with the light; and this gradually expands into wider and wider contexts until you get the whole order of nature as we know it here and now. Science cannot reason otherwise. To forbid

her so to reason is to take the question out of her hands and pass it to imagination or to faith. No man honours imagination and faith more than I do; but this Society is a scientific body.

Here, then, we are confronted with a most important consideration which, unless I speak in ignorance, has not been sufficiently weighed. To science—not to metaphysics alone, but to positive science in its severest form—every individual carries with it the world to which it belongs. It is the representative of a world; it is the summary of a world. Its full context is nothing less than the whole system of things, of laws and relations in which it stands, and without which it cannot be, and cannot even be thought of. Whenever you get an individual thing you get at the same time the world that goes with it, the world in which it has come to be what it is; if you get the rose you get also the tree, the soil, the sun, the solar system—in fact, the natural universe. Each of us in like manner is what he is, is in fact himself, in and through the world to which he belongs; he and his world are so inextricably bound together that you cannot have the first without having also the second. Strip him of his world and you destroy his identity, you destroy everything that makes him what he is. A rose which survives in another world without a tree, without air, and without sun, is not a rose at all, but something else called by the same name; still less can it be the identical rose that grew in my garden yesterday.

If you remind me that the rose of the next world *once* had the soil, the air, and the light of this, and that, having had them once while it was on this earth, that suffices to maintain it as a rose in its new sphere of being, so that it can now get on without them—if you tell me this, I must say with all respect that though you have made a delightful fairy tale, to science it is nothing but nonsense. My rose, the one that grew in my garden yesterday, was precisely the sort of thing that could *never* get on without sun, air, and soil in any sphere of being, and which lost all the characteristics of a rose very soon after it was deprived of them. Your rose, which can now get on without them for ever, is another kind of article altogether, and nothing that you can say will ever persuade me to identify it with the flower whose ways I knew so well, whose nurture I tended, and at whose withering I shed a tear or composed a melody.

If, then, it is true—and I think it unquestionably is true—that you cannot separate the individual from his world, that

you cannot tear him out of his known context without destroying his identity—what follows? It follows that the theory of human survival involves far more than it seems to do at first sight. It means that the individual carries his world with him and cannot survive on any other condition. In other words, when we are proving the survival of A, B, and C, we are proving also the survival of the world of relations in which their individualities are rooted, and which is the necessary background to each one of them, being the man he is. Such is the load which the theory of survival, so far as it is based on *scientific* evidence, will ultimately have to sustain.

Some may be tempted to say that the burden is too great, that no theory could ever sustain such a load. But why not? I do not see that the survival of the whole order of nature is one whit harder to understand or believe in than the survival of any individual who belongs to that order. And truly it *does* survive, for it dies and lives again incessantly, enacting before our eyes the very thing of which we are in search. At all events, I should insist that the evidence, taken at its best, points unmistakably in that direction; for it indicates human beings, and thereby indicates the whole order of nature which is involved in their existence. It may be that our present notions of the order of nature are too narrow—merely parochial; and that our right course is to expand our conceptions of nature to fit the evidence, instead of forcing the evidence into the narrow mould of our existing ideas. Survival, if proved, cannot stand alone as an isolated fact. It will react upon the whole body of our knowledge, as every new discovery inevitably does. It will compel readjustment all round. Its effect in knowledge might even be revolutionary.

But why talk about “survival” at all? Is not that also a question-begging term? Assuming these beings to be the persons they seem to be, are we quite sure they have “survived”—that that is the proper term to apply to their condition? Do we know for certain that they have made a passage, that they have left a familiar port and arrived at a strange one? We know, indeed, that they died. But were we present in the article of their death, and did we see the departing soul making its exit to “another world”? Did they? Do either they or we know what happened? Does their “survival” stand in the evidence? No, it does not. What stands in the evidence is their existence where they are. There is no evidence—at least, none that I can credit—*of how they got there.*

In past ages the nightly disappearance of the sun gave rise to the belief that the sun had gone away, which is precisely what it seems to do, and a cosmogony was constructed to account for the departure and for the subsequent arrival. Even the idea of "survival" was introduced to account for the strange doings of the sun. We now know that the sun has never moved at all: there has been no departure and no arrival: or rather, it is we who have departed and arrived, and not the sun. May it not be that we are here in presence of a similar problem? May it not be that where these beings now are, *there they have been all along*; that we have simply found them in one of their many homes?

It is a question which opens out into fields of speculation too vast for me to attempt their exploration now. But perhaps the notion of multiple personality may have some light to throw on this matter. *No man knows how many men he is*. Which means that no man knows how many lives he lives, and how many worlds he inhabits here and now. The many in the one! We take that as meaning many atoms of dust combined into one world. But why not many lives in one life, many selves in one self, many worlds in one world? But that is an abyss on the edge of which it becomes me to pause.

I will only say, in conclusion, that in this inquiry we are all too ready to "take the cash and let the credit go." The cash is the particular fact we are in search of—to wit, the fate of some individual whom we have lost and who was dear to us. The credit is the whole system of other facts with which this one stands in necessary relation. To these we give little attention. The emotional stress is often so great that the particular fact we are in search of stands out completely isolated in the mind, and nothing else is of any importance. So we take the cash and let the credit go. But Science cannot look at the matter in this way. Her main interest is with the *credit*; with the bearing of this thing on all other things. I am afraid we have sometimes forgotten that. It is not easy to remember, especially at the present time, when so many millions are held fast in the grip of their private sorrows. But we must try to remember it. After all, the S.P.R., high as its functions are, cannot claim the highest function of all, which is that of administering consolation amid the tragedies of life. If that follows from our labours—well and good! But it is not for us to make it our object.

L. P. JACKS.

TOLERANCE FROM A RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW.

BARON A. HEYKING, PH.D., D.C.L.

ONE of the first acts of the Russian Provisional Government was the abolition of all social, religious, and national restrictions, and the declaration of political liberty and equality of all Russian citizens. This momentous resolve towards universal tolerance has the significance and character of a complete reversion of the Russian State rule, as it abolishes intolerance, which in the past formed one of the fundamental principles of Russian Tsardom and bureaucracy.

The principal working programme of Russian bureaucracy was centralisation. When the small Muscovian State emerged from the Tartar rule, it began at once its policy of conquest, and succeeded throughout the centuries in incorporating the territory of the Russian republics of the North—Novgorod and Pskoff; Finland; the territory of the Livonian Order; Courland; Lithuania; Poland; the Ukrain and Little Russia; Bessarabia; the Tartar kingdoms of the South; the Caucasus; Grusia; Mingrelia; part of Armenia; Bukara, Samarcand; the domains of the Kirghises, the Kalmucks, and other wild nomadic tribes; and the whole of Siberia. In so doing it was guided by the leading idea of the necessity of suppressing local self-government, with a view of assuring a complete centralisation of the whole machinery of State administration. The bureaucracy had a constant fear of popular initiative and local autonomy. Its chief aim was to reduce everything to one uniform pattern, in order to make the administration of the country easier for the bureaucratic centre. This principle was practical enough for its purpose, for it was evidently easier to rule all countries on the same lines than to consider the existing local conditions of the different provinces of the Empire and to conform with them.

It does not need much imagination to perceive that this

method of State administration was not suitable for the real interests of the different parts of the Empire and for the Empire as a whole. As a matter of fact, it was hopelessly inefficient, apart from the cruelty it involved in subjecting countries of the North and of the South to one pattern, which was very ill adapted to the vital requirements of the different parts of the Empire. As a result, there was a constant outcry from the various parts of the Empire for adjustment in administration fitting the conditions of life of the provinces, and evolved from local economic requirements and also from the historic past. But these repeated and earnest demands always fell upon deaf ears, as the Russian bureaucracy felt its vital nerve imperilled by leaving anything to the initiative of self-government and social self-determination. Centralisation has exercised a terrible tyranny in Russia, has occasioned untold sufferings, and has held portions of the Empire and the whole in a state of backwardness and inefficiency. Grave errors made by ruling from one bureaucratic centre—on paper, as it were—a vast Empire comprising one-seventh of the *terra firma* of the globe, and purposely ignoring the differences of climate, race, and religion of the individual components of that Empire, were the result of intolerance, which is incompatible with the principle of freedom.

Russian bureaucracy alleged that the granting of racial freedom is incompatible with the desirable assimilation of alien elements in a State in order to make its population homogeneous. It supposed that the existence of different races in a State involves a constant danger of its disintegration.

However, it cannot be denied that the various races united under one State rule, who have fought on a common battlefield, and spurred by the same spirit of patriotism, feel that they have had an opportunity once more of proving by their devotion, even unto death, that they deserve equal rights and equal treatment with the ruling race. Too much has been expected from the unifying influence of common racial origin. The example of the Bulgarians, who owed a heavy debt of gratitude to their liberators from Turkish rule, the Russians, needs no comment. On the other hand, there are many examples where different races live in peace and concord, forming together a common State. Not only racial and religious homogeneity, but also the same public obligations and rights, and common economic and political interests, exercise a unifying influence, build up civic patriotism, and tend to consolidate a nation. In such gigantic State organisms as Russia, political unity is best assured by the

freedom and satisfaction derived from the fullest development of the potentialities of its self-governing integral parts.

As a result of the progressive tendency in modern times to enlarge the territory of the State, there exists at present hardly a State with a perfectly homogeneous population from a racial point of view. This involves the necessity of providing for a satisfactory co-ordination of several ethnographical units under one State rule.

It must be conceded that, generally speaking, it is easier to control a homogeneous nation than a population consisting of different races. But the issue under consideration is not this, but rather whether racial freedom cannot be observed without imperilling in any way the power, prosperity, and safety of a State. It can be proved by numerous historical instances that the use of forcible means to denationalise alien races entails dissatisfaction and revolt, and has the very opposite effect to the one desired. On the other hand, cases are no less numerous where the strict observance of racial freedom has led to a consolidation of the State, making it more prosperous, and more able to resist any attack from without. Examples of the former are the Finlanders, the Poles, the Armenians, the Little Russians, the Jews in Russia, and the late Turkish subjects of Slav origin who, as a result of the treatment meted out to them, formed an element of danger and weakness to the State to which they belonged. As examples of the latter may be quoted the three racial elements which form the population of Switzerland, the different races of which the United States of America consist, and the heterogeneous population of the British Empire. The case of the Boers is specially noteworthy. Not long ago they fought against the British; while in the present war they are fighting for them as devotedly and loyally as any other race of the great Empire. This change in the attitude of the Boers has been brought about simply by the racial freedom and Home Rule which have been accorded and guaranteed to them. It was due to the principle of not forcing men of different races into one mould, and of according greater self-development, that the political union of the two white races in South Africa was brought about in the shortest possible time.

Now that the shackles of intolerance have been thrown off in Russia, Russian culture and civilisation are bound to develop upon the lines of freedom similar to those which exist in the British Empire.

But this evolution towards tolerance which has been pro-

claimed by the Russian Provisional Government as the basis of its policy is such an enormous change from the ancient ideology of the past Russian rule, that it will take some time to be realised in its real meaning by the masses of the Russian people, who are still hampered by a lack of understanding of freedom. Tolerance has up to the present been so foreign to Russian State rule that its essence and significance will only be better understood when the first wave of revolutionary enthusiasm will have died away and given room to a more mature appreciation of its benefits.

Up to the revolution the Russian citizens were practically classed into four categories:—(1) the Great Russians; (2) the Little Russians; (3) the Poles, Lithuanians, Finlanders, people from the Baltic provinces and from the Caucasus, Mahomedans, and so forth; and (4) the Jews. These categories were from a political and social point of view looked upon in a different manner.

The reason for this inequality was the strongly grounded ethnographical idea of the Great Russian individuality apart from the organic cohesion of all the Russian citizens. The Russian Empire was theoretically identified with the Great Russian race, and was based on an ethnographical principle which was foreign to all the other nationalities not belonging to the Great Russian, but none the less forming component parts of the Empire. The Great Russians were supposed to be the "real Russians," while the other Russian citizens were constantly given to understand that they were more or less tolerated, but not admitted on equal terms in the Russian commonwealth.

In 1905, when the first revolutionary movement took hold of the Empire, a meeting in Petrograd was arranged of representatives of the nations not belonging to the Great Russians; that meeting was attended by Poles, Lithuanians, Grusians, Asserbeidgantses, Armenians, Hebrews, Kirghises, Letts, Esthonians, Tartars, Ukranians, White Russians, Little Russians, and Russians from Galicia. All these representatives pronounced themselves in favour of maintaining their particular national individuality. They complained of the administrative centralisation, and the policy of Russification of the central Government, which was shown in the attempt to suppress the Little Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish languages by all kinds of administrative measures. The unfairness of such a bureaucratic policy is clearly shown if it is appreciated that only 43·5 per cent. of the population of Russia is Great Russian, and the majority—that is to say, 56·5 per cent.—is not.

It was the privilege of the first Council of the Empire and the first Duma, after the Constitution had been proclaimed, to express themselves in favour of a just recognition of the individuality of the different tribes and races of Russia, and of the desirability of a full equalisation of the laws of all Russian citizens, with abrogation of all limitations inherent in a given race. These public bodies recognised that the demands of the different races of the Empire for the retention and development of their particular ethical individuality was a necessary condition for uniting them in one State organism.

It appears, therefore, that the first Imperial Duma had already in view decentralisation—namely, the granting of Home Rule and of the inner administrations of the different races inhabiting the Empire, upholding at the same time the principle of political unity and the integrity of the Empire. According to such constitution, the central organisation of the Empire would have had to engage in interests of an Imperial nature—for instance, military and naval armament, national safety of the Empire from attack, the relations between the different parts of the Empire, international commerce, and imperial finance; while the different Home Rule administrations would comprise the laws and administration referring to local interests only. The observance of these principles makes it possible to administer the different parts of the Empire in a more efficient way, giving due consideration to the particular conditions prevailing on the spot, and at the same time assuring to the central organisation the possibility of devoting itself more completely to the interests of the State as a whole. On broad lines, such decentralisation is a primary condition for further progress in Russia. Her safety and strength are not impaired by a difference in the races belonging to her, if only these latter are satisfied with the way they are treated by the Central Power. As far back as thirty years ago, an eminent Russian teacher of State Law, Professor Kapustin, explained in a pamphlet which he wrote on the significance of nationality that: "Nationalities live in peace with each other if they enjoy freedom and self-government. They become hostile to each other if they are subjected to tyranny, persecution, and humiliation. Experience has taught that the free institutions of a country produce nowadays a closer touch between the different nationalities. Every unnecessary administrative centralisation and interference paralyses the power of social organisations. Any action by a State which endeavours by sheer force to unify the different elements of the population which cannot assimilate ethnographically is utter tyranny." In the same strain Mendeleev,

the famous Russian scientist, declared: "Our nationalisation must embrace the principle of tolerance—namely, must renounce every overestimation which involves an abyss of injustice."

It was a long-felt want of the Russian Empire that all races inhabiting the Empire should be considered as equal; and that the Empire should have the opportunity of drawing on all races in order to obtain national service from them. The principle of racial privileges and racial drawbacks amongst the citizens of one State is contrary to democracy, and is especially inappropriate in a country like Russia, which has from time immemorial been a country inhabited by mixed races. The soundest policy for the administration of an Empire like Russia lies in impressing on the minds of the different races which form component parts of it that they can count upon a guarantee of free development. It is civic patriotism which must bind them all together. Racial patriotism cannot do this, as such patriotism refers only to portions of the Empire, but not to the whole.

It has already been mentioned that it was the Russian Revolution which brought these principles to practical recognition by the proclamation of equality and tolerance. Henceforth religion and racial individuality will in Russia be the concern of the private individual only, as civic obligations have no bearing on religion or ethnographical peculiarities, but consist in the conscientious and whole-hearted devotion to the interests of the community and the State as a whole.

In this respect Great Britain can serve as a model to other countries and also to Russia. In Great Britain the appreciation of good and useful citizenship predominates so much over considerations of racial origin that racial freedom has become a feature of these happy isles. It is this supreme valuation of citizenship as the main driving force in the life of the State which in Great Britain has reached the high significance of the *civis Romanus* of old, and is responsible for the unparalleled success she has achieved in her mission for the cause of civilisation and culture in both hemispheres.

The case of religious tolerance, which, as already mentioned, has also been proclaimed by the Russian Provisional Government, is more complex than that of racial tolerance, as the interests of the "Orthodox" religion and of the State were hitherto deemed to be identical in Russia.

Religious tolerance is often confused with indifference owing to the fact that the protagonists of tolerance have often been men who were indifferent to religion. To them

intolerance in matters of religion could have no meaning, and that was the reason why they were all for tolerance. Voltaire, for example, in his defence of the brother Calas, pleaded for tolerance in matters of religion; and his friend Frederick the Great of Prussia, who shared his religious convictions, made it a rule that in his dominions everyone should be at liberty "to gain bliss in his own fashion."

As a matter of fact, tolerance is not necessarily the outcome of indifference. It is based on a recognition of the right of every human being to freedom of thought and conscience and on a broad appreciation of any honest religious conviction, provided that such a conviction is not contrary to recognised ethical principles. Thus tolerance has in its essence nothing in common with indifference, but exists independently as a principle of the highest order.

Christian religion unmistakably embodies this principle. The writers of the New Testament laid down the rule, "Judge not, that ye be not judged," and this denotes the essence of tolerance, which involves not only a *laissez faire*, but also the avoidance of even mentally passing judgment on other religious creeds and thus taking upon ourselves the right of judging those to be wrong who do not concur in our own belief. If the Christian Church has in the course of history proved to be intolerant, this has been due to causes absolutely foreign to its first conception, brought about as a result of the lust for power and riches. Especially pernicious was its identification with State rule and temporal power. It was a fatal blow to the Christian religion when the Emperor Constantine declared that Christianity was to be the State religion in his dominions, and it served the cause of that religion badly when the Bishop of Rome, fascinated by the world-power which ancient Rome exercised of old, conceived the idea of placing himself at the head of the Christian Church and exercising an absolute power over the world. In this way the Christian religion was vested in a theocratic form of government and became imbued with temporal power. Two principles were here fused together which could not possibly form a good alloy. Religion—*i.e.* "the Kingdom of God"—is not of this world, as the New Testament expressly states, its purpose being to order that man should serve God, and consider life on earth a mere preparation for an existence to come. The aim of the State, on the other hand, is to satisfy all the requirements which are a part of the social co-ordination of the life of man, and to raise it to the highest possible degree of efficiency, development, and prosperity. This fundamental

difference between State and religion makes it abundantly clear that if not kept apart each will interfere with the other. It has always been a mistake to use the power of the State for the spiritual aims of religion, and the power of religion for the temporal purposes of the State. The theocratic form of State rule in Palestine, Egypt, the Papal State of the Church, and in Russia, has proved to be the worst of all forms of State rule, involving inefficiency, stagnation, and the stifling of freedom of conscience. Intolerance formed an essential part of this system, as the power of the State had to support a certain religion, and as religion had to serve the purposes of the State. A great patriot and defender of Russian State interests, Katkov, who himself belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church, wrote as far back as forty years ago in favour of tolerance: "The Orthodox Church as a Catholic Church cannot be identified with one special race. If she is identified with the Russian nationality, this is a sin against her Catholic character, and is at the same time an attempt against the Russian State by estranging from it and pushing into enemy camps all those Russian subjects who from their origin do not belong to the Orthodox Church. Up to the present religion is bound up with race. We, as it were, desire that 'Russian' should mean at the same time 'Orthodox,' as 'Turk' means 'Faithful': against the truth and the spirit of Christianity we are still of the opinion that the Russian State is not as the other States of this world, but that it is already a heavenly kingdom, where the other believers must not have a place. Against our nature, and in contradiction to our vocation, and in opposition to our developments, we imagine that the civic society and the Church are identical, and, in consequence, we deprive the Christian Church in our midst of her character, tear it down from its height and make of it a bureaucratic settlement."

The more fully a division between State and religion was attained in the course of European civilisation, the greater was the moral and material progress. The countries in which that division has been carried out in a satisfactory way have secured the highest efficiency in State administration, and, at the same time, the most enlightened form of religious worship. In Russia, the claims of the "Orthodox" religion to be backed up by State power, and the pretension of the State to be supported by the "Orthodox" religious belief, meant tyranny in the State as well as in religious administration.

It is hardly possible to conceive anything more preposterous than bringing force to bear on religious persuasion. Belief is

the result of an essentially personal inward experience, a conviction built up by freewill, a certitude gained by a psychic effort; while force is an outward factor which may achieve many things, but not religious conviction. Compulsion does not convince. On the contrary, it defeats its own aims when applied to matters of religious belief. In Russia the opposition of the Old Believers and many other sects which were subjected to persecution, but only gained in ascendancy and power, provide an unmistakable proof of this.

The repeated application of force to matters of religion in Russia was the outcome of the belief in the necessity for uniformity—one of the fetishes which stand in open and flagrant opposition to the natural conditions in the life of man. The greatest importance is placed on the outward signs of religious uniformity, based on the performance of certain religious ceremonies. Religious conception, however, depends to a great extent on the degree of intellectual development. The highly trained mind is more accustomed to think in the abstract, while minds of a lower intellectual order have to revert to symbols, and in general to a conception of divinity which is full of anthropomorphic features, appealing to the senses in a more concrete manner. Moreover, the differences of age, sex, and climate play a great part in establishing a variety of attitudes towards the Divinity, and differentiate religious thought far more than allegiance to different religious denominations. Within the boundaries of Roman Catholicism, Russian Orthodoxy, or Protestantism, there are *de facto* many varieties of belief and of religious conviction, which are disregarded for the sake of outward uniformity. Such varieties of belief are only the outcome of the above-mentioned differences in the conditions of human life, viz. climate, age, or sex, and should be acknowledged by admitting the necessity for the same variations in matters of religion, due to these differences.

Of course, any religious denomination is bound to adhere to a certain creed by which the principles of the belief of that denomination are set forth. But the question as to whether tolerance or intolerance prevails is decided by the way in which one religious denomination judges another. If it bases itself on the principle of "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*," or on the notorious dictum of Augustine, "*Virtutes paganorum sunt splendida vitia*," there can be no question of tolerance. Surely it ought to be possible for enlightened and broad-minded people to maintain that they are right in their particular personal religious conviction, without condemning those who do not share their views concerning eternal perdition.

Of course, any thesis has in relation to itself an antithesis. "Omnis determinatio est negatio." But this does not touch the case of tolerance, which simply admits the possibility of different views on the same subject. "By whatever road a man approacheth Me, on that road do I welcome him." The exclusiveness of orthodoxy, and the branding of people as heretics who are of a different religious conviction, denote a state of self-assurance and self-satisfaction which is lacking both in humility and in breadth of outlook. Did not Jesus Christ himself protest in the most emphatic manner against the orthodox belief of the scribes and Pharisees? Was it not he who said that the letter kills and the spirit quickens? The revolution against Roman Papacy, fought for the sake of religious freedom, called the Reformation, achieved much for religious tolerance, but it has not yet been realised in all its aspects. The revolution in Russia may do greater things in relation to tolerance.

But even tolerance has its limits set by the ethical side of religion. If a religion embodies practices which are contrary to the law and the moral principles laid down by the State, it cannot be tolerated—as, for instance, the polygamy of the Mormons, or the self-mutilation of certain sects in Russia; and if a religious belief professes intolerance, it cannot be adhered to by those who profess tolerance.

A quaint and significant story tells us that a member of a denomination which thought it possessed the monopoly of religious truth was, after having been released from this mortal life, being shown his new surroundings by the Apostle Peter. They came to an enclosure from which the singing of church hymns could be heard. The apostle remarked: "Tread softly, that we may not be heard by those inside, who believe that they are the only ones in heaven"! It is precisely this advice, "Tread softly," which contains the essence of tolerance, allowing as it does for diversity of religious belief, in perfect harmony with the religion which places goodwill, charity, and love at the head of its teaching.

It may be concluded, therefore, that uniformity of belief, which is contrary to the varying conditions of existence, stands in opposition to nature, and is a contradiction of the elementary principle of freedom which is necessary to the religious self-determination of the individual. In Russia, tolerance as regards racial and religious individuality has now been won as the result of religious enlightenment, and of those civic liberties which are recognised by modern civilised States.

A. HEYKING.

THE ENGLISHMAN AND HIS LAW.

EDWARD JENKS,

Principal of Legal Studies of the Law Society.

SELDOM has the superficial fallacy, that "ideas do not count in practical affairs," been more crushingly exposed than in the tragic events of the last three years. For it has become increasingly apparent, as the policy which directs the Central Empires has gradually unfolded itself in action, that the shocking outrages on humanity which have disgraced their conduct of the war are due, primarily at least, to the working out in practice of a theory of the State which, whether or not it is sincerely held by the rulers of Germany, has been deliberately fostered by them as an unrivalled machinery for the accomplishment of their purposes, and has been inculcated by every device known to statecraft upon the minds of their subjects, until it has become an obsession against which common-sense and morality, to say nothing of religion, find themselves powerless. On the other hand, the Englishman, *more suo*, has never formulated any definite theory of the relationship of the State to the individual, or to the community as a whole, but has contented himself with treating practical problems as they arise, according to more or less unconscious principles of action. This method has undoubtedly its drawbacks; but it has at least preserved the average Englishman from that peculiar form of insanity which has made the present struggle one of unexampled ferocity, and which bids fair to convict a nation which, not long ago, had indisputable claims to respect, of a deliberate attempt to wreck the civilisation of Europe.

If then, as we surely believe, the Englishman's view of the relationship of the State to its subjects works out in practice with infinitely better results to humanity and civilisation than the German scheme, it becomes worth while to inquire what is the nature of that view. But here we are at once met by the difficulty that, though the present generation has produced

more than one English political theorist of repute, there is no one who commands, in this country, the unquestioned authority enjoyed, for example, by Treitschke in Germany—no one who has imposed upon English consciousness any dominating conception of the State which at all corresponds, for influence and simplicity, with Treitschke's famous "Die Staat ist Macht." The nearest thing to it is, perhaps, the doctrine of "sovereignty," introduced by Hobbes, and elaborated with great temporary success by Austin. But "sovereignty" has never been more than a lawyer's theory; and it has for some time been abandoned by live lawyers, though it continues to find a place in orthodox textbooks. It is, in fact, necessary, if we would know the mind of the Englishman on the relationship which exists between himself and the State, to look, not at the writings of the theorists, but at the practice of ordinary English life, as manifested by the character of the institutions which it has unconsciously created in the course of centuries.

Much confusion has arisen in the past from a failure to discriminate between two conceptions which, though perhaps originally incapable of differentiation, have now certainly, in the minds of clear thinkers, come to represent distinct ideas. These conceptions have already (and designedly) been expressed in these lines by the terms "State" and "community." In common language these two terms are used interchangeably, with unfortunate results. In these pages the term "community" will be used to signify the group of human beings living together under a common government, supreme or subordinate, *e.g.* the people of Holland, or Belgium, or Australia, or the British Empire. By the very fact that these people are subject to a common government, they have common interests and activities, and are therefore entitled to be called a community. It is desirable, of course, that they should have many other common interests as well as subjection to a common government; because the greater the number of their common interests, the greater their chances of harmony and unity. But still, it will be sufficient for our purposes if they are a people under a common government.

By the term "State," on the other hand, it is convenient to express the organisation of government itself, *i.e.* the institutions by which government is carried on. Among rudimentary peoples such institutions hardly exist; and, therefore, there is no "State" at all. Such government as is carried on is effected by the personal activity of the ruler, aided by such ceremonies and appeals to superstition as the inventiveness of the primitive imagination can suggest. But

in all civilised communities (especially those with long histories) government is carried on by means of elaborate institutions such as Parliaments, Boards, Kings, Presidents, Councils, Law Courts, and the like, with which the individual has been familiar from early manhood, and to which he is accustomed to render obedience. To these institutions of government, regarded as a collective whole, it is desirable to give the name of "State," and to the persons who administer them the title of "State officials"; though it must be confessed that the latter suggestion does not entirely accord with practice—*e.g.* it is not usual to call members of Parliament "State officials." But the really important thing, again, is to distinguish between the institutions, which are permanent, and the officials who work them, and who are, to a greater or less extent, temporary. To the institutions alone can the term "State" be properly applied; though it is one of the dangers of all political machinery that the officials who administer it tend to regard themselves, and to be regarded by others, as "the State."

These preliminary distinctions, academic as they may seem, are very necessary if we would understand that often-expressed, but not seldom misunderstood, characteristic of English life, its individualism as regards the State. If they are borne in mind, much that is at first sight puzzling in English institutions will become clear.

English law reflects in a very intimate manner the spirit of the English community. Though it has long been administered by State tribunals, though much of it has been consciously enacted by Parliament, which is, of course, a State organ, yet a knowledge of its history reveals a time when the only law with which the Englishman was familiar was the customs of his immediate neighbours, the "folk-right" of his township and hundred, as expounded by the local elders in their moots. The origin of custom is a mystery which, fascinating as it is, cannot be discussed here; it is sufficient to say that custom is a spontaneous growth, in the sense that it is not imposed by any outside authority, but is generated by unconscious action within the community which adopts it.

With the establishment of a strong central monarchy in England after the Norman Conquest, this easy-going condition of affairs ceased to exist; and the action of the King's judges in going regularly round the country to redress grievances speedily brought the administration of justice within the scope of the State organisation. Had those judges in their decisions continued strictly to follow local custom in each case, there would never have been such a thing as English law, but only

a vast number of local customs enforced by the State. Being officials of a strong central monarchy, they did not do this, at any rate in all cases, but, by a process the details of which are obscure, they harmonised the various local customs into one "common law," which did much to create a strong national life in England at a time when many Continental countries were still without a national sentiment at all.

But it would be a great mistake to suppose that, in thus formulating the common law, the King's judges imposed on the country an alien code, to which the English were obliged to submit. On the contrary, it was the boast of the judges from the earliest times that they created no new law, but merely followed immemorial custom; and though this claim was doubtless exaggerated, the mere fact that it was made shows the desire of the judges to avoid introducing new rules. Probably owing to the fact that England is a small country, which was settled by colonists of a homogeneous type, the differences between the various local customs were not great, and the task of harmonising them not overwhelming. Moreover, it is not always realised that, even at the present day, local custom plays a substantial part in the English administration of justice. One important form of land tenure is governed entirely, or almost entirely, by local manorial custom; and where any contract is silent upon a point governed by a local or trade custom, that custom, unless manifestly unreasonable, is held to govern it.

Once more: though, since the centralisation of justice in the thirteenth century, vast additions to the original English "common law" have been made by Parliamentary statute, yet it must be remembered that Parliament is a representative body which, during the first five centuries of its existence, was representative not merely of localities, but of local communities, each, by its spontaneous life, gradually increasing the output of custom, and that much Parliamentary legislation, during that long period, was avowedly based on petitions seeking the enforcement of the "good customs of the realm." And though, doubtless, with the spread of rationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, legislation tended to assume a more scientific character, especially under the guidance of Bentham, yet the rationalist's ideal of a code, or universal and uniform collection of express rules, has never been realised in England, nor, except among a very few reformers, does there appear to be the least desire for such a development. Whatever criticisms may from time to time be made upon the cost or complexity of English legal pro-

ceedings, or the apparent inconsistencies of English legal rules, the general public is well content to live under a legal system which it feels to be, to a large extent, its own production, and to reflect, in a vague way, the national ideal of a strong but lenient central authority which stands for uniformity, combined with much local variety in details. Thus does the Englishman puzzle strangers by his combination of the two apparently inconsistent ideals of order and freedom.

Another puzzling characteristic of the Englishman is his deep respect for law, combined with his fierce resentment of any exercise of authority which he considers to be excessive; but here again the historical retrospect helps us to solve the mystery. In many countries, law is the symbol of authority; and resistance to law and resistance to authority are there the same thing. Not so to the Englishman. To him, law is not so much the symbol of authority as the expression of freedom. It is his own production, the instrument for giving effect to his ideals of life. Not only in England, but in colonies established by English emigration, the lawbreaker is looked upon, not as a hero, but as a nuisance, and, if the lawbreaker happens to be a State official, as a specially dangerous nuisance. It is one of the most striking features of the English civil war of the seventeenth century that the Parliamentary party, though technically "rebels," persistently maintained, and with justice, that it was they who were asserting the law against a king who was breaking it; and the result of that heroic struggle, despite the apparent victory of the Crown, was to establish what is, perhaps, the most striking feature of English government, the "Rule of Law." By that rule, no excuse, not even the King's personal command, is a defence to an accusation against a State official that he has broken the law to the disadvantage of a private citizen. The plea of "act of State," so familiar to foreign tribunals, cannot be pleaded in England (even under present conditions) to an action against a State official by a British subject. And such an action is tried, not in an administrative tribunal, *i.e.* a tribunal controlled by the Executive, but in an ordinary civil tribunal, presided over by a judge whose position is independent of the favour of the Government, and consisting of a jury of private citizens whose sympathies are invariably in favour of the private citizen as against the State official. The historical explanation of this important rule, so strikingly characteristic of English law that it is said to be peculiar to countries which have adopted that law, is that in England the Judiciary had become a powerful organisation before the development of a strong Executive.

But the rule is so typical of English character, that it is possible that the historical explanation is itself a result of the psychological.

Perhaps the most curious feature of the English legal system is the humble view which it takes of its own limitations. It is a long cry to the time when the King's courts existed only to deal with evils for which there was no remedy in the local tribunals of the self-governing communities. But, until comparatively recent times, the ordinary English tribunals would not (except in the case of mercantile bills) recognise the transfer of any "chose in action," *i.e.* any claim by one citizen against another which could only be enforced by legal proceedings. The State itself discouraged application to its own tribunals in respect of any claim purchased from the original claimant; and though this severe rule has now substantially disappeared, yet it is still a rule of English law that any attempt by one citizen to support, or "maintain," legal proceedings instituted by or against another, unless from motives of common interest or charity, is a civil, and even a criminal, offence. Older provisions concerning "barrators," and "stirrers-up of lawsuits," have fallen into practical disuse; but to this day the King's judges regard with disfavour any activity in litigation which they regard as excessive. "This action ought never to have been brought," is an expression not infrequently uttered on the judicial bench.

Closely connected with this reserved attitude is the hard and clear distinction which English law makes between legal and moral duty. Whatever may have been the source of that important branch of English law which is known as "Equity," it is certain that it now depends as strictly upon statute and precedent as the older common law. As strictly, be it said advisedly; for in spite of the somewhat misleading disclaimers of English judges, it is quite certain that the process of converting morality into law goes on surely, if slowly, in all branches of English law. But the process is slow and deliberate; and the boundary line between legal duty, which is enforced by State penalties, and moral duty, which is left to the sanction of public opinion, always leaves a large field to the operation of purely moral remedies.

It would be easy to multiply examples of this truth. Take, for example, the principle of salvage, or reward for saving life or property. This principle, except in the special sphere of maritime proceedings (derived from foreign sources), is not recognised by English law, though it is freely practised by English manners. Thus, a poor man who finds and

restores, perhaps at great loss of time to himself, a valuable chattel lost by a rich man, has no legal claim against the latter for a reward—not even if he risks his life in the process. It is the same with positive duties. A man who sees a child drowning, whom he might rescue without risk or loss of time, is subject to no legal penalty. It is not attempted here to justify this state of things; it is merely described to illustrate the attitude of English law. But the writer, as an Englishman, may venture to plead that, in spite of this apparent imperfection of English law, the willingness to do voluntary service, sometimes at great risk, is not noticeably less in England than in other countries, and that unorganised public opinion is, in some cases, more efficacious than law.

Nowhere in English law is this limitation of legal control more striking than in the English rules of testamentary disposition. As is well known, almost every civilised system of law, except the English and systems derived from the English, places a restriction on the power of a parent to disinherit his children, or to exclude his spouse from all share of his property, without good cause. In English law, no such restriction exists; and a wealthy man may bequeath every penny of his fortune to a ballet-dancer or a society for spreading absurd religious tenets, leaving his virtuous widow and deserving children penniless. Doubtless, in the social classes which have been in easy circumstances for two or three generations, the practice of making marriage settlements restricts (though it does not entirely abolish) this power; but among the thousands of wealthy Englishmen who have become rich in middle and later life the power exists unfettered, and the trend of recent legislation, such as the statutes enabling married women to dispose of their property, is actually to increase it. The extreme scantiness of the legal code which regulates the relations between parents and children during their lifetime is but another illustration of the same principle; while the narrow scope of the English Law of Guardianship is a standing source of wonder to foreign jurists. It is true, again, that the deficiencies of this law are largely balanced by the frequency and comprehensiveness of settlement trusts, which may, by English law, be created by will as readily as by marriage articles; but it is obvious that such purely private arrangements, which are controlled entirely by the discretion of the parent, are, from a legal standpoint, no compensation for the absence of fixed legal rules. Again, the Englishman can only plead that there are, perhaps, as much genuine family feeling and parental responsibility in England as in other countries.

If we turn from the substance of the law to the methods of enforcing it, the same attitude of aloofness on the part of the State is evident. It is less easy here to give illustrations without becoming involved in technicalities which would only weary the general reader. But one illustration is so striking that it cannot be overlooked. The essential distinction between civil and criminal procedure is, of course, that the former is conducted by the party aggrieved to obtain satisfaction for his personal loss, while the latter is conducted by the State to secure the punishment of offenders. In theory, the principles of the two are as wide as the poles apart. Civil procedure is *litigatory*; that is to say, it is a contest between two private citizens, standing on the same level, in which the judge acts as impartial arbiter. Criminal procedure is an *inquisition* by the State, held in the interests of the community; the party aggrieved merely acting as an important, though not essential, witness. In English law, not only has the party aggrieved no pecuniary interest, save in cases of larceny, in the punishment of the offender (there is no *partie civile* in English criminal procedure), but until quite recently he was expected to conduct the criminal proceedings virtually at his own expense, and to sustain the burden of producing the necessary evidence, except in such grave cases as were deemed worthy of being "taken up by the police." If he were successful, he then had to undergo the further expense of a civil action to recover compensation for his private loss; if he failed, he ran the risk of being subjected to an action for "malicious prosecution" by the accused. In the circumstances, it is hardly wonderful that, some forty years ago, it was found necessary to establish a new department of justice, that of the Director of Public Prosecutions, to do the work which the State had been supposed, for at least three hundred years, to do. The only alternative was to continue to allow the escape of notorious criminals whom their victims declined to prosecute.

It is a more difficult task to explain how those branches of English law which are, undoubtedly, fuller and more minute in their regulations than the corresponding branches of Continental legal systems, do, in fact, aim at encouraging individual initiative rather than at controlling it. It would appear to be obvious that the more law the less liberty; but again the key to the mystery is the fact that English law is less the expression of the will of authority than of the spontaneous desires of the community.

The most conspicuous example of the proposition to be maintained is the English Law of Contract—that is to say, the

law which compels the citizen to carry out engagements voluntarily entered into by him. English law is incomparably more sweeping in its rules on this subject than most Continental systems. Broadly speaking, and up to a certain point, the history of the Law of Contract is the same in all civilised countries. Step by step the State has extended its protection to one kind of contractual engagement after another. In the earliest days, the tendency was to clothe with legal protection any engagement made in accordance with a certain ceremonial, which was held to imply religious or State sanction. As the belief in ceremony waned, the tendency was to regard the form of contracts as immaterial, and to insist upon "cause," *i.e.* the object of the parties in their transaction. Thus legal systems have come to enforce contracts of sale, hiring, partnership, and the like. But hardly any system, other than the English, has taken the bold step of undertaking to enforce *all* contracts which conform to a simple test, provided, of course, that they do not aim at objects manifestly immoral or undesirable. The test adopted by English law is that of mutuality; and it is, surely, as fair a test as could be desired, as well as one of the most comprehensive. If A promises to do or forbear to do a certain act in return for a counter-promise by B, English law does not inquire into the motives of the parties, or the comparative value of the promises, nor does it ask what sort of a contract this may be; it is enough that the parties have shown by their mutual obligations that they intended to contract on a business footing.

But this comprehensiveness, so far from extinguishing individual initiative, or even restricting it, obviously encourages it to the highest degree. It is the very antithesis of the system which limits the activities of the individual to prescribed courses; and though, doubtless, it has been found necessary in recent times to forbid as illegal, or at least to refuse to enforce, contracts having certain objects which, a century ago, would have been looked upon as blameless, or even praiseworthy, yet the principle of "freedom of contract" is still a cherished object of English law, so jealously regarded by the Courts that the fact that a contract aims at restricting it is itself an objection to the validity of that contract.

A similar criticism applies to that branch of English law known as the Law of Torts. This branch deals with those offences (other than breaches of contract) which are left to be made the subject of civil proceedings by the party aggrieved. Minor assaults, defamation, deceit in trade, simple trespass to land or chattels, are conspicuous examples. Here, again, the

law of England is incomparably more detailed than the codes of most Continental countries; but the effect is precisely the opposite to that which might have been expected. Most Continental codes contain a general provision to the effect that any breach of law or morals by which a person suffers damage may be made the subject of an action of this kind. Consequently, it is in the power of the State's official, the judge, in countries governed by those codes, to punish or restrain any action which it considers to be *contra bonos mores*. In England it is necessary for the aggrieved party, before he can succeed in an action of this kind, to prove that his opponent has committed precisely one of the offences contained in the not very extensive list of "torts" known to English law. A remarkable example occurred some years ago, when a newcomer in a suburban neighbourhood gave to his house a name similar to that which had long been borne by a neighbouring house. Great inconvenience naturally ensued to the occupier of the older house, who thereupon brought an action to restrain the continuance of the practice. Owing to the special wording of a recent statute, the complainant had an exceptional chance of success. Nevertheless, he was defeated, on the ground that the defendant had committed no "tort" known to the law, though he might have been guilty of a breach of good manners.

It has been already suggested that, in his steadfast resistance to the application of authority, the Englishman has ever been consciously influenced by any definite theory of the nature of the State. The contributions of England to political science have been practical, rather than speculative. It is well known that the British Constitution has never (save during the brief interlude of the Civil War) been embodied in any authoritative document, and that many of the chief rules of that Constitution have been established by individual action in the courts of law. In these contests, the Englishman has rarely appealed to fundamental principles, or even to arguments based on utility. He has been content to urge, either that there is no precedent for the exercise of authority complained of, or, on the other hand, that he is warranted by precedent in claiming the right which he asserts. Even where a constitutional right has been asserted by a representative body—for example, in the Petition of Right presented to Charles I. in 1628, or the Bill of Rights accepted by William of Orange in 1689—it has been asserted in a precise and definite form, not as a fundamental principle of political science. Thus it is asserted in the Petition of Right, not that "freedom is the undoubted right of every citizen," but "that

no freeman, in any such manner as is before mentioned, be imprisoned or detained." In the Bill of Rights, it is not laid down that all exercise of military authority is a violation of personal liberty, but that "the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law."

To this uniformity of practical and specific steps in English constitutional history, there is one striking exception. It occurred at a time of acute crisis, when James II. had virtually abandoned his throne but his successor had not been formally chosen. It was probably clear to all moderate politicians, that the only possible successor was William of Orange; but great difficulty was found in discovering a theoretical justification for a proposal which, in any case, was bound to shock the feelings of many worthy people, and which, if advocated on injudicious grounds, might have produced civil war. In this crisis, the representatives of the nation in the House of Commons resolved that King James had *broken the Original Contract between king and people*, and that the throne was (for that and more specific reasons) vacant. The theory of the Original Contract, which professed to find the origin of society in a compact between rulers and ruled, had, of course, no foundation in fact; but it expressed, in a convenient form, the deep-seated instincts of the more active English politicians of the day, who had undoubtedly driven James from the kingdom, and invited William to succeed him. Moreover, the men who had deposed James, and whose fathers had deposed and executed James's father, had no intention whatever of handing over James's throne to William except upon conditions which, in substance though not in form, would unquestionably be in the nature of a "contract between king and people." Thus the theory of an Original Contract, in a very remarkable way, fitted both the psychology and the circumstances of the occasion, and still, despite the recent advances in historical study which have rendered it untenable as an expression of historical truth, does unquestionably, in quite a singular way, embody the dominant feelings of the mass of Englishmen with regard to the State.

But if this be true, the theory of the Original Contract will at least afford some clue to the Englishman's conception of the State and his relations thereto. And though it is difficult to formulate a theory which has never been reduced to authoritative form, which, though professing to be historical, will not stand the test of historical examination, and which, in the hands of different exponents, leads to diametrically opposite

practical conclusions, yet it is possible to say that it implies an attitude of mind wholly individual, wholly inconsistent with that attitude which regards the State as an abstract, omnipotent, all-embracing Power, before which the individual is helpless. A contract can only be made with a person; it implies the exercise of free will on both sides; its obligations (at least in the English view) are mutual; failure of the one party to perform his obligations releases the other from his. It is not without significance that the English, despite their love of freedom, have clung so tenaciously to the idea of kingship, even in their most democratic moods. A monarch is an individual, though he is doubtless something more; and the English have always found it far easier to understand and deal with an individual than with an abstraction such as a Republic, or even a "State." The rarity of the word "State" in English public law is a matter of common observation; and it may be said that the fact points to a poverty of imagination, an inability to grasp abstractions. The charge may be true; but the inference suggested may not be correct.

For if it is suggested, as it sometimes unquestionably is, that the Englishman's want of political imagination causes him to be deficient in patriotism, in public spirit, and in breadth of view, the Englishman is entitled to point out certain facts which, at any rate at first sight, appear to make it difficult to accept the suggestion. To take a very concrete and obvious example, it is difficult to suppose that a nation deficient in patriotism could have built up, and maintained for upwards of a century, that remarkable political fabric the British Empire. After all, judged either by its geographical area, by its diversity, or by its population, the British Empire is unquestionably the greatest political achievement of modern history; judged by a combination of all three elements, it is incomparably the greatest. And yet this Empire has been founded and maintained, in the teeth of keen rivalry, by a nation, or rather by a small group of kindred nations, the vast majority of whom have been strong individualists. And although the contributions of Great Britain to literature, science, painting, architecture, and sculpture have not been so eminent as her contributions to political science, yet they have been considerable; and, after all, it is precisely in political science that excessive individualism might have been expected to be fatal.

Is there not an explanation of the mystery? The average Englishman unquestionably believes that the presumption is in favour of individual enterprise against collective action.

Whilst he is a loyal subject of the Crown, and regards without hostility the officials who exercise the authority of the State, he is by no means prepared to accept the view that, on a disputed point, the official is necessarily right and the private citizen wrong. He has been accustomed, for many generations, to criticise, publicly and with the utmost freedom, every action of the State; and he has invented an elaborate system of political administration which enables him to do this without in the least degree reflecting on the character or wisdom of the monarch himself, the Head of the State. The working of that system is far too complicated a matter to be discussed at the end of an article on another subject; but it may be said, briefly, that its very existence depends upon a loyal recognition of the fact, that even the most cherished convictions must give way to the good of the community. Such a system could never have been practised by a nation whose members declined to subordinate individual to public ends.

In truth, the real essence of the Englishman's individualism is this: that before he submits to authority he must be convinced that the claim to exercise that authority is sound. In such affairs the Englishman's two great guides are precedent and reason, or, as he would probably prefer to call it, "common sense." Show him that the claim is warranted by precedent, and he will submit, however reluctantly. Convince him by patient reasoning that it is based on the good of the community, or even of humanity at large, and there is no sacrifice that he will not make, even to fortune and life itself. For the Englishman's individualism is really an expression of his deep-rooted conviction of the dignity and worth of common human nature, which may be persuaded, but may not be treated as mere soulless clay. And it has yet to be proved that this attitude is less calculated to realise the highest human ideals, than that of a blind, unreasoning submission to the exercise of human authority.

EDWARD JENKS.

LINCOLN'S INN.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THE FACTS AND ITS CAUSE.

THE REV. CANON RAWNSLEY.

THE increase of juvenile delinquency demands the serious attention of members of all the churches. The Home Secretary at a Conference held last October pointed out that the average increase in juvenile crime in the great towns was 30 per cent. during the last few months. In the metropolitan police area alone the number of boys under fourteen years of age charged with offences was in 1914, 1708. This number increased in 1915 to 1713. But in 1916 the number of these young persons brought before the courts increased in a single quarter as compared with the same quarter in the previous year from 1304 to 2005.

The causes of this increase are various. Mr D'Eyncourt—the well-known metropolitan magistrate—in a farewell speech made on his retirement last November, blames *inter alia* the Children's Act, which has prevented children between the age of fourteen and sixteen being whipped or sent to prison. "Magistrates," he said, "hesitate to send children to a reformatory school for five years," and it cannot be doubted that offenders between those ages "know," as he put it, "that nothing can be done," and act upon that knowledge.

In this connection the Chief Constable of Leeds stated that the reforms which it was hoped would be brought about by the Children's Act in 1908 were not being realised. Nevertheless, the pathetic fact must be recorded that of the 2913 children that were admitted to the industrial school in 1915, there were no less than 1832 children under twelve and 112 under six. Mr Cecil Chapman, the magistrate of the Tower Bridge police court, found that from November 1915 to January 1916 children's delinquencies had increased by 40 per cent., almost all of them being cases of theft.

Police statistics at Leeds show a remarkable increase of

indictable offences among juveniles. The Chief Constable reports that out of 3381 young persons who were brought up before the courts in 1915, 204 were under the age of sixteen. In his opinion the causes of these delinquencies were the lack of parental control owing to the fathers being with the colours, and the absence of male teachers at elementary schools.

In the opinion of the Leeds Juvenile Advisory Committee another factor which has contributed largely to the lamentable increase of juvenile crime is the harmful influence exerted on young minds by kinema shows. Some children, they say, have developed such a craze for these exhibitions, that they have resorted to various forms of petty theft in order to obtain money for admission; whilst the criminal nature of many of the films has undoubtedly had a serious effect in corrupting their morals and in seducing them from the path of rectitude and honesty. They feel that films which picture theft, arson, murder, and the like should be absolutely prohibited when children are present. A disquieting thing noticed by that Committee is that boys no longer care to play football or cricket in the open spaces provided in the public parks. The picture-house has to a great extent taken the place of cricket and football.

An example of the injurious suggestion of the film was given in *The Times*, Oct. 5, 1916. "Only last week," said a writer, "we had a letter from a father, saying he had found his boy trying to throttle his sister, as he had seen a man throttling a woman at the picture-palace." It has, no doubt, become fashionable for these juvenile offenders when brought into court to fasten the responsibility of their offence on the picture-palace. We must take their statements with reserve, but there can be no question that films which depict daring crimes or scenes of bloodshed and catastrophe must have a pernicious influence upon the sensitive and imaginative mind of the child.

With regard to Liverpool, a Joint Committee of Justices and members of the Education Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr Legge, Director of Education, met last April, and after seventeen meetings to take evidence from those specially cognisant of the facts, reported on the 11th of October. In addition to the oral questions, a series of questions was addressed to the teachers in the elementary schools. Nearly all the evidence or opinion sought laid special stress on the lack of parental control. The report goes on to say that in some measure this is owing to the absence of fathers on war service, but in the main it arises from the

general want of discipline in the homes which existed *before* as well as *since* the outbreak of the war. They deplore the remarkable disregard of responsibility to their children shown by parents, and they urge a closer co-operation than usually exists between the school teachers and the parents. They think that if parents were in a greater degree than at present legally responsible for their children's misdeeds, the former would have a greater incentive to keep their offspring under control. They think that the justices ought to have power to order the birching of boys between the ages of fourteen to sixteen, and the number of strokes increased from six to twelve.

The Liverpool Committee recognise the difficulties that teachers have in the correction of their pupils, and call attention to the fact that school teachers possess considerable powers of discipline over their pupils even out of school hours, and that the education code clearly contemplates the duty of master to pupil as not limited to teaching, but that he is entrusted with the moral training and guidance of his pupils. Teachers, they think, ought to be more clearly and definitely protected by statute when acting in the exercise of such powers out of school, though under the existing law, as decided in *Cleary v. Booth*, 1893, those powers are undoubtedly already theirs. They also draw attention to the vicious influence of street trading on the character of boys. The evidence on this point, they say, was overwhelming. They consider that all children of both sexes under sixteen years of age should be prohibited entirely from trading in the streets. The harmfulness of this street trading on child character is recognised in Scotland as well as England, but notwithstanding the fact that under the Children's Act (1903) any local authority may make bye-laws in respect of street trading by persons under the age of sixteen, it is found that many such authorities admit street trading from the age of eleven upwards.

They agree with the Leeds Committee in deploring the passion for the kinema show amongst juveniles which has led to petty theft, and in this connection they call attention to the unfortunate practice of shopkeepers who display articles outside their shops and in the entrances. They think that in many cases children are thus tempted to steal unobserved. They made a great point of the need of lodging-houses that are supervised and controlled for youths up to eighteen. They know how many a boy has begun a down-grade course by determining to leave home and setting up for himself in a lodging-house often resorted to by older men of doubtful character.

The Committee realised the need of more open spaces or playgrounds to be provided in order that children should find a healthy outlet for their superabundant energy. Many children who have no occupation after school hours necessarily at present have recourse to the streets. Crime is often due, they say, to misdirected energy. The multiplying of the means of healthy education is to be encouraged, and in this connection they cannot speak too highly of the evidence given as to the activities of the Boy Scouts. Every inducement should be offered, they say, to young persons to continue their education after school age.

Now with regard to Manchester, there, owing to the fact that 781 cases had come before the magistrates during last year, and that between January 1911 and December 1915, 2741 cases were considered by the justices in the Juvenile Court—a percentage of 4·2 per 1000 of all the Manchester children under fourteen years of age—it was thought well to obtain statistics and to hold a conference of those interested in the question. This was held under the chairmanship of Mr Spurley Hey, the Director of Education, in October 1916.

The first thing that was noted was that 92·2 per cent. of offences had been committed by boys and only 7·8 by girls. The tendency to commit offences was greatest in children apparently irrespective of sex, of twelve years old, but over twelve the number of offences committed by boys decreased, and though much less in number, offences by girls increased gradually throughout school age. Out and away the greatest number of offences committed by boys was theft. The next greatest number was "breaking in," or burglary. It was established as a fact that a large proportion of those juvenile offences were committed by boys organised into gangs for criminal purposes. Thus, as an example, in a gang whose object was stealing, a coloured riband was worn in the button-hole by the boy who stole most during the week. A typical week's plunder consisted of gold-tipped cigarettes, toffee, and fruit. With regard to the cause of the increase of juvenile crime, the increase is marked not only amongst school children but amongst children of fourteen and sixteen. This is evidenced by the fact that the cases committed to industrial schools and reformatories in 1914 were respectively 16·7 and 23·5 per cent. above the average of the preceding years. The Conference was of opinion that the main ascertainable causes differ only in degree from those existent in peace time, and are largely constant factors in the general problem of juvenile crime. Incapable or indifferent parents who cannot or will not main-

tain position in the home is one cause of it. Another cause is the insubordination of children and refusal to recognise parental authority by reason of the better education of the child. The children have discovered that they can do sums quicker than their parents, can air their French at home, tell their parents facts of earth and sea and sky, which the parents did not know, and therefore in a sense they despise them. An example is given in the Conference report of a girl of nine who refused to obey her father, and gave as her reason that he could not do her home-work if he tried.

A third cause, says the Manchester report, is a disinclination of parents to punish their children. They refrain from administering any form of corporal punishment to them. A fourth cause is the absence from home of elder male relations. Even where the father has not enlisted the elder brother has. It is probable that these elder brothers have had more to do in keeping the youngsters in their places than the fathers of this generation have ever had. Again, the fathers who remain in England have, through pressure of this war, been obliged to be less at home owing to prolonged hours of work. In addition to this, many mothers have also absented themselves from home owing to munition work.

The next cause spoken of by the Manchester Conference is the mentality of juvenile offenders. Teachers and others agree that the leaders of juvenile gangs are alert and precocious boys, rather of supernormal than subnormal intellects. The duller children are led into mischief by these quicker-witted boys and are easily dominated by them. The influence of bad literature, the penny dreadful, the downgrade poster and post card, and the crime film, have a good deal to answer for, it is thought, in the way of incentive to crime. The craze for the picture-palace is very marked, and the picture-house habit among the children has been increased because the children are under less restraint. Again, the school hours are shorter, the streets are dark, and the children have been thrown more on to the streets.

There is no lack of employment and no lack of money to spend on the pictures. The number of children who habitually attend kinematograph shows is very striking. In Liverpool 13,000 attended in one day. In Manchester, where there are ninety-nine of these picture-palaces, careful inquiry among certain schools showed that out of one school there were eighty-five boys in the 6th and 7th standards of whom forty-seven attended twice in the week, and only ten did not attend at all. Out of 193 boys it was shown that only twenty-two were non-

attenders at the picture-house during a certain week. The Manchester Committee, who quite openly admit that the picture-palace must not be condemned wholesale without tabulating the results intellectual and moral, show in a table what type of films are educative for good and what for bad. When one notes how the adventure and crime films awaken the imitative faculty for evil as well as good in children and excite them so that they lose sleep, and that the comic films, though they develop some sense of humour, increase buffoonery and practical joking, and when it is remembered how many cases of theft are known to be the result of a determination to get to the picture-palace at all costs, it is high time, as indeed the Home Office has come to believe, that drastic censorship of the pictures is necessary. Though it is probable that the educational value of the film has been overrated, there is no question that the film proper is entertaining and informative. Let us see to it, therefore, that a film be fit for the child's eyes, and then insist that picture-palace shall not interfere unduly with the sleep and rest of the child.

In this connection a sentence may be quoted from a letter lately received from Sir Robert Baden Powell. "The kinema," he writes, "is an undoubted attraction, and it has come to stay. It might well be utilised and form a strong agent for good, and our idea is to have our own picture lanterns, and to show educative and humorous films as a counter-attraction to others. In America they are already using films to teach processes of manufacture, and we can use them also for nature study, as well as for history, geography, etc."

The Conference at Manchester recognised also that the gambling spirit among boys of school age was very prevalent, and they state that many automatic machines in a certain type of shop are standing inducements. There is a machine called "The Clown," another called the "The Electra," which are games of chance that give prizes to be taken in kind from the shop. This, in the judgment of the Conference, will soon cease in Manchester owing to a decision of the magistrates to make them illegal.

But low-grade shops in that town provide back sitting-rooms where boys and girls may gather, where fruit drinks, cigarettes, and game machines are the attractions. It is believed that these are among the causes of juvenile criminality.

The Conference did not stop here. It puts on record that one of the causes of this increase of juvenile crime is the war excitement in which we are all living. Soldiers in the streets,

pictures in the newspapers, military bands, and flags are factors that awaken a combative spirit in boys, and this is reflected in their conduct. Flash-lights and air-guns were found to be in the possession of juvenile gangs who had absorbed something of the war spirit of their elders. It is notorious that in London vans have been stopped and looted on the pretence and make-belief that they were German supply wagons on their way to the front.

Here, as in Leeds, the absence of men teachers owing to the war has added to the difficulty of maintaining discipline of a pre-war standard in the schools, and the effect of the shortening of school hours and the turning of the children into the street, many of them with no home to go to because their mothers were out at work, has added to the possibility of mischief.

The Manchester Conference was of opinion that the war demand of juvenile labour, both for full-time and out-of-door employment, has also its dangers. There are 6000 children in Manchester employed for wages out of school hours, in running errands, delivering milk and newspapers. These children are increasingly thrown into the company of adults on more equal terms than they used to be. They earn money easily, and it is not surprising that they get swelled heads and an idea of their self-importance which is dead against their listening to advice from their elders. The men workers among boys in lads' clubs, lads' brigades, and scout troops have much diminished because of the war, and thus the important personal elements of discipline and example amongst the younger boys have ceased.

The Conference realised that one of the basal difficulties was the want of proper home surroundings for the children, and they came to the conclusion that the result of the inquiry was an impeachment of parents rather than of children.

They believed that the criminal offences attributed to children were mainly due to unconsidered mischief and love of adventure rather than to the criminal instinct. They say that the qualities shown by many juvenile offenders are the very qualities that the schools wish to develop, and that the problem is to turn these qualities into proper channels.

This is insisted upon by Sir Robert Baden Powell, in an admirable article on the prevention of so-called juvenile crime in the *Headquarters' Gazette* for November last. In that article he appeals first for the co-ordination of all institutions that are dealing with young men, and gives an account of a flagrant example of juvenile crime recently reported in the

press. "Two small boys appeared on remand charged with housebreaking and setting on fire the house of Mr ——. It was stated they had got into the empty house and had there remained for five days, during which time they had laid a fire in every grate, burning books, etc. They had slept in every bed in the house, and had littered jam and flour all over the place. The chief constable reported that the interior of the house was a veritable pigsty. The inspector of the N.S.P.C.C. reported that the elder boy had stated that they had acquired the art of burglary through seeing it on the films." Sir Robert Baden Powell, continuing, says, "Splendid fellows! They were possessed with the spirit of high adventure. Had the kinema showed examples of gallant deeds of life-saving, they would probably have devoted themselves to that kind of activity with equal gusto. As it was, I expect they must have had a simply glorious time. They are young heroes to me, as I am sure they are to themselves as well as to their schoolmates. What scouts they would make if they only had the chance—and so would half of these so-called juvenile criminals. The point is, can we give them the chance?"

The Medical Officer of Health for Westmorland, whose speech at the Manchester Conference was one of the most interesting speeches made, takes the same view. He realises that war conditions have accentuated juvenile crime. He says the absence of fathers and male teachers, the lurid crime films at kinemas, the abnormal wages earned too soon in life so that the boy in the home becomes the person to be consulted—all these are acute causes intensifying the trouble. But the essential cause of the trouble lies deeper. It lies in our mismanagement of child nature, and it is a Nemesis on our past mishandling of the child. We have crammed the workers into cities and forgotten the child. The adult escapes from the horrible environment of the slums through the swing-doors of a public-house. There is a ghastly element of truth in the judge's remark, "the quickest way out of Salford is to get drunk."

But what of the child? How is it to seek to escape? Think of his restless, explosive little body thirsting for adventures! We have filched his childhood from the slum lad, and the city child twists and wriggles that little body between the bars of his penthouse. In other words, he gets into mischief, as we prim and prosy grown-ups say. Not only have we mishandled the child's environment, but we have mishandled the child's soul. Let us be honest with ourselves, and confess with Mr Edmund Holmes that we have in the past over-emphasised

the doctrine of original sin, with the desolating result that we have set great store on discipline by repression. We have dinned into the child whole strings of "Don'ts!" What if there is a more excellent way? What if there is such a thing as original goodness to appeal to latent in every lad; deep down perhaps, but dormant, are instincts and inspirations which are noble and fine. Not all the grimness of the environment we have built round our children, not all our discipline by repression has killed these indestructible elements in the child. They are there for us to guide into right channels. These same instincts of adventure are too often stifled by social necessity in that dim land we call the slums, too often they slowly waste away, or take the wrong turning for want of a guiding hand, and lead a lad into hooliganism and juvenile crime. Discipline let us have, by all means, but let it be the discipline of the led and not the discipline of the driven; less of the discipline of "form fours" and more of the discipline of "form character."

We shall most of us agree with the speaker that it is along these lines and the line developed by Sir Robert Baden Powell that we should look for the prevention of juvenile delinquency. The latter has shown us how to kindle into flame and guide wisely into right channels those very instincts in growing boyhood that we, as educationalists and formers of character for the new nation after this war, most desire.

Sir Robert says the so-called juvenile crime can be traced to various causes, and is mainly the result of boys getting high wages and so becoming independent of parental control, and the fact that—other than the kinema—they have no kind of amusement outside their squalid homes. This counter-attraction we ought to be able to supply, and the large majority of boys would welcome it, provided that it was run for their recreation and not too obviously for the purpose of making them good. "Compulsory evening attendance," he adds, "at school has been recommended, but this would hardly catch the older boys, and would be very difficult to apply. The suggestion, then, with which some of our local associations are experimenting, is this: to form large clubs in various centres of the city, and to run competitive games in connection with them."

We may live in hope that Sir Robert Baden Powell's scheme of central clubs for young people, to include such attractions as kinema, gymnasium, skating rink, swimming bath, boxing room, noisy-games room, quiet-games room, drill room, workshops, reading room, and possibly refreshment room,

may be realised in all our larger cities. Could there be more useful memorials of our gallant dead after the war than such institutions?

But the problem for us now is how to use such machinery as we have for the safeguarding of the play-hours of the children. We have quite unnecessarily aided and abetted the mischief of youth by darkening our streets. It is darkness and not Satan that is finding mischief for idle hands to do.

We have added to our difficulties by turning the school children at an earlier hour into their only common playground—the streets,—and the evil has been intensified in munition areas by the fact that the mothers have filled their houses with lodgers, who, when they return tired out from their work, do not wish to be troubled by the noise of children.

What, then, are we to do? Public-spirited individuals here and there might gather a certain number of youths and girls from our day and Sunday schools into their own homes and give up two or three evenings in the week to teaching something better than hooliganism, but the problem is too large to be dealt with in this sporadic manner, and we must turn for help to the system that is now working so admirably in twenty-four play-centres in the East End of London. I have been in correspondence with Mrs Humphry Ward, who started these play-centres at the Passmore-Edwards Settlement nineteen years ago. Beginning the first year with an attendance of 418,113 children, these play-centres now deal with more than a million and a half of children in the year. The County Council schools are placed by the education authority at Mrs Humphry Ward's service free of charge for lighting, heating, and caretaking. They are open five evenings a week, from 5.30 to 7.30, and for an hour and a half on Saturday mornings. Each centre is under the direction of a paid superintendent, assisted by a staff of paid secretaries, and voluntary help is also given. The children, from five to fourteen years of age, are chosen in the first instance by the head teachers of the four or five schools within easy reach of the centre. Most of them attend three evenings in the week, though in cases where the mother is from home, arrangements are made for the children to attend every evening, and little ones under seven are also admitted every evening. In the larger centres the weekly attendances vary from 3500 to 4000 in the week. Hand work, such as cooking, both for boys and girls, sewing, knitting, basket work, carpentering, clay modelling, painting and drawing, dancing combined with old English song and nursery rhymes, musical drill, and gym-

nastics, games, acting, and the children's library of story and picture books—these are the pleasures and occupations which have attracted the London children from the streets to the play-centres in ever-increasing numbers, and the result is testified to by one of the most active of the police court magistrates. Boys who before were frequently had up at the Children's Court have been able to find in these play-centres an outlet for their superfluous energy, which has prevented them from joining the criminal classes. A superintendent of one of the play-centres writes: "I have been able to break up a club of boys who called themselves 'The Clutching Hand Gang.' They are as amenable as possible now."

This recreative occupation in the schools in winter is carried on in open spaces and playgrounds during the summer months.

Now as to ways and means. The cost of each centre, roughly speaking, is £250 per annum. Payment of the staff is 4s. an evening. Specially trained teachers—such as drill instructors and manual instructors—are paid 5s. For the Babies' room, and for infants of school age, a motherly working woman takes charge for 6s. a week. The superintendents begin at a salary of £45, rising to £50 after the first year, and travelling expenses are allowed up to 2s. 6d. a week. The total cost for the last year's working, which catered for a million and a half of children, was £5183, 15s. 7d., and this was met by voluntary subscription. But when we consider that the work done is the formation of character and good citizenship, and when we remember that "between street-play and play-centre play there is all or nearly all the difference between making good citizens and bad citizens," many of us feel that it is a matter not for private enterprise but for the central Board of Education and the Treasury to undertake.

New York is able to teach London in this matter. There the education department is paying £6750 a year to private recreation centres for boys and girls in buildings in the winter and for playgrounds and parks in the summer, and in addition it pays £2250 to private trainers and instructors.¹

Side by side with this, more certainly ought to be done in the summer months in the way of organising and superintending the games of our young people, and to this end it would be well if at once throughout the whole of our elementary schools the system of præfects could be introduced.

¹ Since the above was written our Education Authority has issued a circular to school managers urging them to allow their schools to be used for this purpose, and offering to pay one-half the cost under certain conditions.

We cannot allow so many young lives to run to waste as in the past. The taxpayer, as Sir Robert Baden Powell puts it, is paying 20s. on schools for making the children efficient citizens, and he is paying 30s. on prisons and police for rectifying their failure to respond to the training!

What is our anchor of hope? It is surely the organisations which exist to help the youth of our big cities—the Y.M.C.A., the Boys' Brigades, Church Lads' Brigade, school influence, parental influence, and very specially the Boy Scout and Girl Guide and Boy and Girl Club movement.

The first thing we have to do is to get the right mission spirit into all these organisations. The boys and girls must be got hold of by one another. I quote a letter from Sir Robert Baden Powell to *The Times*:

"It may interest your readers to know that among other steps suggested for checking the increase of juvenile crime, the principal authorities of one great centre called in the help of the Boy Scouts a few months ago. As a result, a system has been established whereby each scout takes at least one street boy under his charge and brings him in as an honorary member to use the Scouts' Clubs, and to play in their games and practise their hobbies, thereby gaining improved environment and activities. We find that the worst hooligan soon makes the best scout; he only needs direction for his adventurous energy and attractive pursuits to fill a void. So soon as he proves his worth he is given an armlet to wear as a 'temporary scout.' This scheme is not used as a means for recruiting members to the movement, for with our present depleted staff of scoutmasters we have not room for them, but it meets the wish on the part of the scouts themselves to render service, and we hope that with its extension to other centres it will have visible effect, not only in decreasing the present crime in the streets, but in increasing future efficient citizenship for the State."

Our appeal must be to those who are entrusted with the difficult task of inspiring our youth with nobler ideals of citizenship and a higher *esprit de corps*. Have we in the past done all we could to quicken and call out the sense of love of the school and shame to dishonour it, that is certainly part of the character-forming that goes on in our public schools? Have we given the præfect system, spoken of just now, a chance in our elementary schools?—a system which, it is true, puts responsibility for keeping order and enforcing discipline on young shoulders, but thereby calls out *esprit de corps* and powers of self-control and government.

Have we encouraged the closer link between the home and the school which is essential to the understanding of the character of the children, and have we helped the home to help the school by urging the need of home discipline?—for it is in that bedrock of home-life that a healthy and wisely disciplined childhood can alone grow up to the glory of God and in favour with God and man. If only religion could once more be brought into the homes of the people, and if the responsibility of fatherhood and motherhood could once again be realised, we should find that one of the greatest causes of juvenile crime would pass away.

But our appeal must also be to local authorities. They can, if they will, prevent the scandal of our public hoardings by obliging all posters to be sent to the chief constable a week before publication. They can urge that the police keep vigilant watch on the shops that deal with objectionable post cards; and with regard to the kinema shows, the local authority has no excuse for tolerating the down-grade film or the down-grade poster advertisement.

Last November the Home Office sent round to local authorities for the use of the licensing magistrates a notice of the proposed official censorship of films, which they hoped would become law in the early part of this year, and they included with it a draft of model conditions for insertion meanwhile in future cinematograph licences, and the justices were told that these clauses might with advantage be inserted in any licence granted before the Government censorship was an established thing.

In Birmingham the increase of juvenile crime was remarkable. In 1915, 1646 children more than in the previous year were brought before the court, and in 1916 this number was greatly exceeded. The Birmingham magistrates therefore determined last November to take the suggestion of the Home Office, and they inserted at the Licensing Sessions the three following model clauses as a condition of the licence being granted:

“1. No film shall be shown which is likely to be injurious to morality, or to encourage or incite to crime, or to lead to disorder, or to be in any way offensive in the circumstances to public feeling, or which contains any offensive representation of living persons. If the licensing authority serve a notice on the licensee that they object to the exhibition of any films on any of the grounds aforesaid, that film shall not be shown.

“2. No poster, advertisement, sketch, synopsis or programme of a film shall be displayed, sold or supplied, either inside

or outside the premises, which is likely to be injurious to morality, or to encourage or incite to crime, or to lead to disorder, or to be in any way offensive in the circumstances to public feeling, or which contains any offensive representation of living persons.

“3. Every part of the premises to which the public are admitted shall be so lighted during the whole of the time it is open to the public as to make it possible to see clearly over the whole area.”

Other local authorities have done the like, and there is no reason why these conditions for the granting of licences to kinema shows should not become general. The mere fact that the Government has withdrawn its contemplated film censorship has cast a very heavy responsibility on the licensing bench.

As things are now there is no official specially told off to visit the kinema shows in a given area, with power to protest to the manager and to report to the magistrates. A film which appears objectionable in one area is allowed to go free in another, and the suggestion has been made that the chief constables should black-list objectionable films or posters which are withdrawn, and allow the chief constables of other towns to know what films or posters are so black-listed.

H. D. RAWNSLEY.

THE PULPIT AND ITS OPPORTUNITIES.

A LAYMAN'S VIEW.

F. H. CUTCLIFFE.

THE National Mission of Repentance and Hope—giving evidence, as it does, of the genuine concern of the Church at its own past failures and a determination to regain its influence over the consciences of men—seems to invite a candid and friendly statement of opinion from any who unwillingly find themselves, to whatever extent, aloof from the churches of their fathers, and perhaps of their own earlier days.

Worship of some kind is the almost indispensable need of all who are striving to live up to the highest moral and spiritual ideals of which they are conscious: does the Pulpit aid the satisfaction of that need as it should, or as befits its influential position in the Churches? In pursuing this inquiry we will leave out of consideration the pulpits occupied by men who preach because they happen to have been brought up to the preaching profession, and those occupied by men whose chief ambition is to shine as orators; we are concerned only with the preachers who sincerely believe they are commissioned with a Divine message which the world needs—a message designed to save men from sin and its consequences.

The preacher's mission is to proclaim a Gospel of salvation from sin, but when we listen to the individual message as it is delivered, we become aware of a confusion of tongues—amid whose clamour great collective spiritual achievements become as impossible as did the rearing of the tower of Babel to its crowd of polyglot builders.

The Evangelical dogmatically declares that what is amiss with men is their bondage to the world, the flesh, and the devil. But who can draw a dividing line between the Church and the world, the wheat and the tares? In spite of Christ's warning, our Puritan fathers essayed to do it, with consequences disastrous both to the Church and the world, and to-day we

realise that though the dividing line exists, it is as invisible as the Equator. We know also that the flesh may prevail in the cell and be mastered in the camp. As for a personal devil, what evidence of his existence is admitted by our general attitude towards human problems? It is not that men have ceased to be enslaved by those enemies of the soul designated in the Puritan category, but only in grosser cases have we clear proof of the slavery, and to direct our attention towards the sins of individuals is a futility which only leads to Pharisaism. The motor car or picture palace or cigar (as Spurgeon reminded us) may be a means of grace to one man and a curse to another; they may even fill both rôles to the same man at different times and under different circumstances.

The Sacerdotalists have discarded impossible Puritanical tests only to impose those of sacrament or creed: observance or neglect of the sacraments, obedience to the authoritative pronouncements of the Church, a public profession of faith, even attendance at public worship, are held to be the outward signs (or means) of inward and spiritual grace. How has the war treated such tests? Is there a dogmatist who would deny sacramental grace to the tens of thousands who, while indifferent to the sacraments and services of the Church, have not declined the supreme sacrifice of life itself for a cause which they believed to be righteous? Dares anyone preach a Gehenna for our dead heroes?

Which proves (what has been increasingly evident for a long time) that the Pulpit has lost its once powerful terrorising dynamic; for the average "irreligious" man does not hesitate to dare destiny in multitudinous good company.

Not only so, but with the ability to terrify has been lost the power to attract. So long we have been familiarised with the idea of one sacred book (in the popular mind the Bible is emphatically a book and not a literature), one holy day in seven, one chosen people, one type of heaven, one special sequence of revelation, that the grandeur of the book, the real privilege of the day, the significance of the Hebrew character in history, the charm of the heaven, the sublimity of unfolding revelation have eluded our mental grasp. They have been elevated above our common life as the Sphinx above the desert sand, and often there is as little organic connection in the one case as in the other—as little flow of sympathy as there is between the high and dry pulpit and the vacant pew.

Meanwhile what sources of inspiration of noble living are left unexplored? Comparative religion might as well be non-

existent for any use the average pulpit makes of the inspiration which modern men find in the sacred books of all time; and comparative morality might be a myth for what reinforcement the average pulpit gains from the loftiest achievements of literature, science, and art, from the world of affairs, the thoughts of the sages, the insight of modern prophets, the sublime vision of the poets. The Book of Genesis holds a less significant revelation for our generation than the discoveries of modern science. It is, indeed, the most heinous of profanities that while we have labelled Jewish history "sacred" we have regarded English history as "profane," thus virtually robbing God of any concern for our destiny, and degrading Him in our concept to the level of a tribal deity.

The archaic cult of Hebraism has no sanction in the teaching of Jesus. The people heard him gladly, not because he excelled the scribes as an exponent of the old law, not because he was always harking back to Abraham and Moses, but because he made the dead rod of legalism to blossom as an almond tree; because he sweetened the springs of daily life and touched the hearts and stimulated the spiritual vision of his hearers by some simple picture of blowing lilies, of husbandmen tilling their fields, of maidens at a marriage feast, of the beggar lying at the gate—thus conveying some swift suggestion of the sacredness of common life.

Instead of desecrating these beautiful stories, as they are desecrated when reiterated year in year out without one illuminating gleam of imagination, one flash of real insight, cannot our preachers find new points of contact with their hearers from the events of their own times, from the scenes being enacted under their own eyes? There are, for an instance, the wondrous revelations of the kingdom of heaven sent us direct in the hearts of the little children who fill our homes and throng our streets. Slighting and neglecting these, are we not disregarding the counsel of the Master Himself, who "set a little child in the midst of them"; and so also ignoring the very latest messages from

"God who is their home"?

Above all, the preacher needs to do much study in the street, in the homes of the people, in their workshops and clubs; these are full though the pews are empty. Not long ago we had a census of the attendance at public worship; it would be more helpful to the preacher to know where the non-worshippers are and how employed. He must know the seamy side of life if he is to lead his hearers to a knowledge of

the good, for all knowledge proceeds from the known to the unknown. It may well be that the best means of filling the pews will yet be found in a determined effort to empty the gutters of the little wastrels who have no happier home; they are not very promising as Sunday School material, but we might give them a week-end in Paradise by playing with them and telling them stories in our bright gardens or cosy sitting-rooms—an act surely not less commendable than rescuing a beast from a pit on the Sabbath day. But once begin to contemplate rescue work, and the immensity of the task becomes so appalling, that one wonders whether the best hope of achieving it would not be to cease preaching and listening to sermons, and for preacher and congregation together, after a brief meeting to supplicate Divine blessing and guidance, to go forth into the highways and byways, not to compel people to come to a worship which they seem utterly incapable of appreciating, but to lead them by gradual steps to the simple yet rich enjoyments which spring from faculties being developed in harmony with the marvellous universe in which God has placed us.

For, let us consider a moment the springs of squalor and vice. Is it not a poverty of imagination which sends lads into our streets on Sunday with no better occupation for their leisure than horse-play and obscene jests at the expense of passing churchgoers? And is this poverty only theirs? Is it not shared by those of us (parsons and laymen alike) who—shame to us after the bold lead of Charles Kingsley!—might gather the lads for a bright practical talk, with a game of cricket or football afterwards. It is a similar lack of knowledge and debasement of imagination which leads still growing boys to assert their manhood by smoking and worse practices which stunt their growth and destroy the very virility they are eager to anticipate. It is untutored love-hunger which sends girls in shrieking laughter through the swarming streets; the desire for comradeship and sociability which leads to public-house brawling and sottishness; the old, old craving for the knowledge of good and evil which sends men guzzling in the filthiest columns of the worst class of Sunday newspaper. We see, indeed, the pathetic fact that all the most deadly and shameful evils of our social life arise from a blind and uninstructed following of the universal quest, "Who will show us any good?"

A wise pulpit instructing a devoted church would meet the evil influences we have been noticing with counter-suggestions of good—simple suggestions vividly brought home.

What might not the Sunday cinema do in this way if actually run by the church with a purely religious and educative motive? Suggestions of good or evil are the roots of most of our conscious activities: heroes not less than criminals are born of the suggestion, "Others have done it—why not I?"

This leads to the thought of the added efficiency the preacher would gain even by the most elementary study of the laws of physiology and psychology—laws which are surely as plainly God-given as any to be found in the Mosaic Code, and which govern all physical and mental—possibly all moral and spiritual—development. One of the most notable sermons the writer ever heard showed from the Parable of the Talents how loyalty (whether to God or man) is dependent on a disciplined memory; and W. James's chapter on "Habit" may be recommended as a more practical guide to goodness than many a volume of sermons devoted to theological hair-splitting.

Visions of self-conquest: the boy what he may become; the young man what he may achieve; woman and her influence; parents and their responsibilities; middle age and its dangers; the respective duties of capital and labour—surely if the Pulpit would bring about a moral revival it must plumb these great currents of human life, test their force and direction, and thus learn to guide them into channels where they shall purify all our individual and corporate life.

Our excursion has avowedly been to scour the byways, to glance at the worst sides of life outside the pale of the churches. But no one will therefore conclude that the main body of those who absent themselves from public worship are immoral or degraded. The reverse is the fact. Many have left their Father's house, not to spend their substance in riotous living abroad, but because they cannot find subsistence in the husks provided for them at home. And if plain truth were told, many of those who are still to be found at home in their pews are just as hungry, just as dissatisfied as their wandering brothers.

They feel, many of them, that the Pulpit should deal frankly and courageously with the doctrine of evolution in its relation to Christian revelation; that it should show us in some sequential form the historical development of Christianity; that it should testify, with a broad and catholic appreciation, to the contributions of other faiths in the great unfolding of the Divine purpose for man; that it should cease to wrench our lives into the fatal dualism of sacred and secular; that it should learn to recognise inspired voices among ourselves and

in our own time, as well as those which spoke in Judea thousands of years ago; that it should, indeed, itself be inspired to speak with an authority not derived from the scribes.

With rare exceptions like the enduring labours of F. W. Robertson, our pulpits are so incoherent, so scrappy, so devoid of any great unifying purpose or scientific plan. To try to gather equipment for sane virile Christian conduct from the sermons one hears is like seeking an education from the pages of *Tit-Bits*. Even the great common virtues of purity, honesty, truthfulness are seldom treated of in a searching, comprehensive fashion. The Pulpit is now and again a flash-light, turning its uncertain beams on great national crises, social convulsions, hectic personal experiences; sometimes it is a farthing dip illuminating age-long cobwebs out of the recesses of a dusty bushel; what we look for is a clear, steady radiance on the whole pathway of life, a consistent reflection of that Light which "lighteth every man coming into the world."

Incoherence and scrappiness lead to futility, but ponderosity is worse. Who has not felt a spiritual chill in time of worship when the simple, chaste language of the Scriptures, the harmony of thought and expression of a beautiful liturgy, the still nobler harmony of classic hymn wedded to a tune that is its soul partner, when these are followed by a discourse phrased wholly in an abstract terminology? This plunge—as from the glow of summer sunshine to the damp folds of autumn mist—is a constant experience in many places of worship, and must have wrecked many a spiritual constitution.

Every pulpit aspirant is supposed to have a sound knowledge of his mother tongue, and should know something of the elemental force that is freed when Saxon speech is used—"the Word was God." Yet how many sermons are phrased in the light of this fact? How many would compare in this matter with the Lord's Prayer, with its more than seventy per cent. of Saxon elements? It may be answered that Christian doctrine, appealing, as it does, to man's highest powers of reasoning, must necessarily make use of Latin forms of dialectics. This may be admitted to a certain extent, but probably the persistence of such forms of expression in our pulpits is much more the result of habit, and of age-long association with Latin legalism, than of any reasoned choice. In any case we are concerned with practical effects, which may be put to a simple test by any preacher. He has but carefully to clothe his thought in Saxon dress on alternate

Sundays for a period of, say, two months, keeping to his Latinity on the intervening Sundays; then let him get a trusted friend to take up a suitable position and watch the effect on the congregation.

But the neglect of English by our spiritual teachers does not end with inattention and restlessness in the pew. Not long ago Mr Robert Blatchford made a determined attack on the foundations of the Christian faith; and if you talk with a good many thoughtful working-men you will find them of opinion that the attack was successful. Why do they think this? Surely not because the atheistic arguments were more cogent than those in defence of the faith, but chiefly because of Mr Blatchford's rare command of simple, vigorous English. The irony of the situation lies in the fact, which Mr Blatchford gratefully admits, that he largely owes his style to close study of the Bible. If he could forge such a weapon from the Christian armoury, what should not be done by the disciples of him whom the common people heard gladly?

We have perhaps outlined work enough for an army of preachers, each endowed with talents of a rare order, each possessed of unquenchable energy, each inspired with flaming enthusiasm and a clear understanding of the splendid opportunities of his high vocation. We have the army, nor are the qualifications of its members wanting. What we lack is organisation. One man cannot do the work of an army: to each man his special qualification, to each his particular post. This implies at once a degree of specialisation of subject and interchange of sphere which have hitherto hardly been suggested in connection with the pulpit, and yet, judging by analogies from the other professions, some such organisation would seem to be essential to efficiency. Be that as it may, the Pulpit can hold aloof from no interest of our daily life without losing its influence whenever and wherever that interest is concerned. If it is to be our "guide, philosopher and friend," it must be practical and know what it is talking about.

FRED H. CUTCLIFFE.

OXFORD.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"SCIENCE IS ONE OF THE HUMANITIES."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1917, p. 353.)

IN Professor Baillie's article in the *Hibbert Journal* for April, one follows with great sympathy and delight his severe castigation of the "scientific mood." "It is worth observing how the over-indulgence in the luxuries of science seems to destroy a man's balance of judgment in other realms of experience, practical and religious. Specialisation, so essential to science, distracts the mind to the point of indiscretion and unreliability." And he justly observes, "The cultivation of the scientific spirit is not alone a guarantee of a high level of humanity—a conclusion which has been painfully brought home to us at the present stage of human history." All who have been at times amused and annoyed by the rigidities and common stupidities of the ultra-scientific temper will thoroughly enjoy the enthusiasm with which Professor Baillie lashes it.

Nevertheless, his article will be read by many with gradually extending eyelids. As an old fellow-student of Mr Baillie, there are some things in the article which I note with profound astonishment as coming from such a thorough student of the Hegelian philosophy. A most interesting and valuable plea for the symmetrical development of human nature along the lines of its threefold ideal of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness is made the occasion (in the earlier part of the paper) for the deliberate expression of two very one-sided views which, I am sure, will be eagerly challenged: (1) a too narrow conception of "science," and of what is meant by the scientific explanation of the world; (2) an altogether too enthusiastic idealism (amounting to a pure subjectivism) in his statement of the relation between thought and things.

Take the second of these to begin with. Professor Baillie leaves us in no doubt of his position here (a position which is by no means adequate as an expression of the conclusions of contemporary philosophy), since he makes it clear by two or three concurring lines of argument. The first indication (or eye-opener) one receives as to the position assumed is on page 356: "these truths (of science) are products of mental activity and of mental activity alone." Then he says: "We construct the story of nature in terms of our own thought." "In thinking out the processes of nature, or interpreting nature, it is our own thought and its ends which

determine our procedure from first to last" (357). "The conceptions by which scientists proceed and *the laws at which they arrive* are equally constructions of their own minds" (358). "Scientific truth is the creation of the scientific mind and not of outer nature" (359). "Science is through and through anthropomorphic; it is, if we care to put it so, a human invention" (361).

Now, there is in such sayings either a special meaning attaching to the words "science" and "scientific truth," or we have here an example of subjectivism gone mad. Philosophy has long been occupied with that knot-point, that ganglion—the relation of thought to things, and the origin of the categories of truth (and in spite of all the centuries of speculation a complete rationale has not yet been achieved); but this bald assumption on the part of such a sane philosopher as Professor Baillie cannot be allowed to pass without challenge. This pure subjectivism as to the nature of scientific truth is not the position modern philosophy has arrived at. It is one thing to say that "Science itself is one of the activities of mankind" (365)—that is true, and is what Professor Baillie is really contending for in his article; but it is a totally different thing, and a most gratuitous assumption, to say that "the results" (of scientific investigation) "are the outcome of human thought" (359).

It is astonishing to read the discussion on page 359: "We can put the same thing in another way" (he says). "The processes of scientific thinking are, to begin with, tentative and experimental. . . . Many of our lines of thought lead nowhere. . . . We go from hypothesis or suggestion till we strike the true theory. Now, all these tentative efforts surely and without question take place within our minds. There are no hypotheses in outer nature." That is without doubt true. But notice what follows: "If the process of carrying on our thoughts in this manner is entirely our own, if it is guided by the laws of our own intellect and directed towards satisfying our own minds, *we cannot possibly maintain that at a certain stage it ceases to be ours, and suddenly becomes something independent of our minds.* If the process belongs to our own mental procedure, the result must likewise be our own achievement. When the result is false or inaccurate, we never hesitate to ascribe it to our own thought. But equally, if the result be true, it must be the outcome of our thought, otherwise the specific function of the human intellect would be to make mistakes."

Now, on reading this one is tempted to ask, Is there any distinction between truth and error? If so, what is it? What is the difference between a tentative hypothesis and the true theory? The scientist who has discovered the true theory has first of all proceeded by means of tentative hypotheses. But at a certain stage he stops. He abandons all other theories and rests satisfied with the one he has at last discovered. Now, why does he stop? Surely because he is stopped. What is he stopped by? By something different from his own mental processes which constructed his tentative theories. He is stopped by *facts*. He has discovered the truth. When a scientist at length stops with the light of discovery in his eyes at what we call "the true theory," there is surely some essential difference—some new element is introduced into the process between the two stages.

It is certainly not "the specific function of the human intellect to make mistakes"; but neither is it the specific function of the human

intellect to create the truth. The very distinction between a false theory and a true one is that the true theory corresponds to facts, and the scientist in his adventure at length rests there because he has discovered something essentially different from his tentative theories—something not his own. True science is the discovery of truth and not the creation of truth—and all true philosophy, either realist or idealist, allows of the difference.

The fact is that Professor Baillie, in his enthusiasm against the scientific temper which makes outer nature dominant over the humanities of life, has been led into the expression of a wholly gratuitous assumption with regard to the epistemological situation; he has allowed himself to forget the glory of Hegel, and to become entangled in Hegel's grand error.

The glory of the Hegelian philosophy was that it secured the true and essential objectivity of the conceptions of human reason, and set us, with all our mental categories, in a world of ultimate reality. So that Professor Baillie's subjectivism is dreadful heresy.

The great error of Hegel, as Croce has clearly pointed out, was that, through applying his Dialectic of Opposites to the connection of Distincts, he really and hopelessly confused the difference between truth and error. There must be a world of difference between a tentative hypothesis and a true theory, and the difference must rest in facts, which by no philosophical juggling can be called the "outcome of our own thought."

I have left no space to refer to the extraordinary view of "science" found in the article. But surely there is some strange confusion in such a statement as this: "Science is thus but the consequence of a peculiar frame of mind which characterises certain Western peoples. It is neither universal to humanity nor essential to all mankind" (363).

Is not science at least the effort of the human mind to know, and (so far as true results are reached) is it not a universal thing, and universally valid? Professor Baillie would make science—*i.e.* human knowledge, the inquiry of the human intellect in its pathetic search for truth—a European mood! In recent philosophy, certainly, the intellect has been dethroned (and justly) from the supreme position it held; but such a denial of any absolute power of finding or even seeking for truth has surely never been launched at the intellect before!

C. W. INGLIS WARDROP.

BIGGAR.

"LOVE AND THE LAW."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1917, p. 485.)

ONE might fairly assume there would be general agreement with Miss Constance Maynard's cogent argument (excepting, probably, by the negligible number who are "peace at any price") that it is the duty of nations to fight on occasion for civil and ethical reasons. There would also be agreement, presumably, combined with a spice of enjoyment, when Miss Maynard proceeded to demolish the anæmic pacifists who issued the card of "Love, love, forgive, forgive" (when it would be supererogatory to forgive until our savage enemies of the Central Empires gave genuine

evidence of penance for their unspeakable deeds); but Miss Maynard is on more debatable ground, I think, when she states that she draws the line rigidly at resistance to ethical wrongs, and that she cannot proceed further and cross the border where religious freedom may be imperilled and has to be defended. She would nobly prefer to suffer martyrdom in a religious cause rather than resist or provoke revenge. She reminds us that missionaries of the Christian religion wisely eschewed weapons of offence or defence—and, as far as individual cases are concerned, possibly the martyrdom and the endurance of suffering in such a cause may be ultimately more ennobling to humanity than a temporary and unopposed success; but when the argument travels from isolated and spectacular instances of “bearing witness to the truth” and resolves itself into a nation being trampled upon because of its religious beliefs, and when the beliefs are to be jeopardised by the sword and possibly quenched entirely, then surely it becomes the duty of that nation to combine and, granting it has sufficient vigour, to defend its religious freedom to the death. Otherwise would not that nation’s supineness be misunderstood by the persecutors and be an encouragement to them in the work of extermination?

Miss Maynard says, “This principle of complete non-resistance stood firm, and in the few instances where it gave way, as in that of Ziska leading the Bohemians, the failure seemed to be openly marked with divine disapproval” (*sic*). Now this example of Ziska is the weakest among the many that Miss Maynard could have selected as a typical defender of the faith, for he was not a Condé, and he quarrelled with the moderate section of his own party. Then she asks, “Does it not prove that the servants of God should never take the sword into their hands, no, not even under that severest provocation, the defence of those they love?” Well, the answer depends upon one’s environment and how one’s spirit has been developed. I am not forgetting the lofty standpoint of the writer, but we must take human nature as it is plus spirituality, and if anyone with warm blood coursing through his veins could stand idly by while those he loved were being done to death for righteousness’ sake, then he, the passive onlooker, would have small title to the name of a man. History is full of references to those who freely gave their lives for a good cause—it is done daily these epoch-making times; but to allow those we love to be butchered for religious causes when we might have prevented it, is, thanks to human nature, the rarest occurrence known. No, not even for that type of religion need we stultify this noble impulse. But religion does not ask the sacrifice.

Let us consider a reference to a few apposite and *successful* examples of organised resistance to religious tyranny as opposed to Miss Maynard’s thinking.

I. Religious liberty was at stake in the Netherlands in the middle of the sixteenth century when the Duke of Alva was riding roughshod over men’s convictions; his persecutions were intolerable and crying for vengeance when William of Nassau (Prince of Orange) organised his forces, and after weary years of oscillating struggle succeeded in giving religious and civil liberty to Holland. Had this resistance not been offered to Philip of Spain’s governors, who can say but that the religious torpor of Spain to this day might have been continued in the Netherlands?

II. Were the Huguenots not justified in resisting the persecution that was engineered against them? They were in danger of being absolutely

wiped out unless they had banded themselves together and determined to fight for their religion as well as their existence. Had they not done so and had they been annihilated, would this not have been the triumph of error? Surely no one would say that it is the will of Heaven that the doctrine of frightfulness should succeed?

III. Scottish religious history affords direct evidence of the justification of resistance. Mary Stuart was determined to impose Papacy on the Scottish people, but the influence and spirit of John Knox so acted on the people and the nobles that they resolved to fight for their religious liberties, and, as the world knows, this "good fight" is among the imperishable records of history.

A century later, in the "killing times," the Scottish Covenanters were in "the imminent deadly breach" of having Prelacy thrust upon them, and again the national freedom-loving spirit manifested itself in deeds and slew tyranny and persecution on the battlefield. It is to these our virile ancestors that we Scotsmen owe our religious liberty to-day, and can anyone say they fought in vain? Is it imaginable that they should have stood silent with arms folded and allowed their hard-won freedom to be filched from them?

IV. The last example I shall cite will occur readily to every English reader when he recalls what Cromwell and his Ironsides accomplished. It was not only civil freedom they fought for, but religious freedom as well; and if it had not been for these valorous warriors, what would have been the fate of Britain to-day? Macaulay's remark is as true now as it was when he wrote it, that it was a striking fact that Roman Catholic countries were conspicuous for their lack of mental and industrial progress; and if one reflects on the condition of European Catholic states—including Ireland—contrasted with Protestant states, the fact is apparent. Had our English and Scottish ancestors not taken the sword to defend their religious rights, had the peoples remained overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, we should possibly have glided into the condition of Spain.

It is interesting to note the fact which emerges from a reflection on the struggles of religious persecution, that, as competition is said to be the life of trade, so the fiercer the persecution became, the more widespread and flourishing were the reformers; and, conversely, whenever the ardour of the aggressors relaxed for a period, as in France, the new principles languished. There are interesting deductions—but that is "another story."

I think it is true to say that religious truth, being the greatest thing in the world, is worth fighting for, and if attacked should be defended at all costs.

J. W. CAMPBELL.

NORTH BERWICK.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

On page 483 of the *Hibbert Journal*, April 1917, some figures were quoted by Miss Maynard concerning suicides and attempted suicides, which are very different from those furnished by the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. These are as follows:—

1915. Females under thirty years of age.

Thames . . .	Suicides, 6.	Attempted suicides, 9.
Serpentine . . .	" 0.	" " 2.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

IN one of his Imaginary Conversations, Landor makes Barrow tell Sir Isaac Newton that it is time Philosophy shared in literature. "Frigid conceits on theological questions, heaps of snow on barren crags, compose at present the greater part of our domain: volcanoes of politics burst forth from time to time, and vary, without enlivening, the scene." No theologian in these volcanic days could despair thus of his republic. A hot interest is taken in its future and fortunes. Even novelists will devote their spare moments to a revision of its constitution, and belated denials of its very right to exist, like Mr M'Cabe's *The Bankruptcy of Religion* (Watts) and F. Le Dantec's *La Problème de la Mort et la Conscience Universelle* (Flammarion), are at least enlivening. When there is no room for religion or spiritual values in an author's scheme of things, it is not surprising that he has an iconoclastic passion against the theologies which are interpretations or working formulas of faith. As the present survey is designed to be objective in the main, however, it would be out of place to table the obvious objections to this summary method of procedure. It is enough to note the burning interest shown by those who have time not only to think but to write about theology in faith and hope. One feature of this, during the past six months, has been the impetus given by the situation towards a redefinition of "Catholicism," which is designed to yield some basis for the readjustment of organised Christianity. The impetus has driven writers along various lines, according to their previous experience, but it is due to the common desire for greater simplicity and for the elimination of needless friction. Among the books which deal with this aim, Mr Sinclair Burton's *The Renewing of Catholicism* (Robert Scott) is concerned with the special problem of our British Christianity on its practical side. If the real sense of "catholicism" is allowed to be the "presentation of Jesus Christ, God and man, to the social consciousness of religious humanity, or, in a word, the social realisation of Christ in mankind," or, as Dr W. E. Orchard puts it trenchantly in his recent pages on *The Outlook for Religion* (Cassell), if a new Catholicism is required which will be free, that is, a synthesis of comprehensiveness, holiness, and unity, without making either liberty or unity a cloak for licence, then indeed changes are in store. What these changes are to be, even in the direction of federal union, is another story. Dr Orchard's writing is tense and highminded as ever. But perhaps the best conservative answer to those who plead naïvely that we shall have to use less theology in future is given by Rev. O. C. Quick in his *Essays on Orthodoxy* (Macmillans),

a book which has the two merits of steadiness and frankness in its Anglican outlook. This volume and Mr R. G. Collingwood's *Religion and Philosophy* (Macmillans), which is written with more detachment and less traditional interest, deserve to be ranked alongside of Dr W. Tudor Jones's *Spiritual Ascent of Man* (University of London Press) as much more than ephemeral literature upon Christian theology. The three books supplement one another, and their very difference of standpoint only serves to bring out their underlying unity of conviction. The Master of Balliol's introduction to Dr Jones's pages will probably commend them to some who might otherwise miss their vindication of the spiritual heritage of mankind. Mr Collingwood's discussion of the presuppositions is alert, even where it is not novel; it cannot fail to instruct, whether the reader inclines to follow out the trail in the direction of Mr Quick's dogmatic house or of Dr Jones's mounting path.

Among the books which make rather less demand, in their restatement of Christianity, two are American—Dr H. C. King's *Fundamental Questions* (Macmillans) and a volume of essays, mainly by scholars in Chicago University, entitled *A Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion* (The University Press, Chicago). The former discusses questions like prayer, liberty, suffering, and Christianity as a world-religion. There is a moral soundness in Dr King's writings which always carries them to a wide circle of sympathetic readers. The Chicago volume is modernist and critical; the contributors could certainly claim that God had not given to them "the spirit of fear," in dealing with problems like the Old Testament and miracles, and they show "power" of conviction, a "love" of truth, and "a sound mind" in the sense of cohesion and breadth. Like Dr Orchard's, this is a stimulating book, even for those who would not take its guidance at every point on the road. People nowadays are asking with a new accent of emphasis, "What is the Christian estimate?" One reason why the answers vary in such a bewildering fashion is that some uncertainty prevails about the historical or philosophical basis of Christianity, the result being that some whose replies are well meant fail to persuade because they rely unduly on intuition. The value of a book like the *Guide* is that it will help some to clear up their minds about fundamental principles and methods.

Another little book for those who occupy the place of the unlearned is Dr E. W. Winstanley's seven lectures on the Incarnation: *The Divine in Human Life* (S.P.C.K.), an untechnical but careful attempt to show historically how the revelation and apprehension of Christ's person were progressive, and how the primitive communities realised Him as Messiah, Son, and God. The argument is skilfully presented. Some will probably feel that the author attaches too much importance to the influence of the imperial cult and the mystery-religions upon Paul's usage of "Lord." Also, while it may be "perfectly true" to say that "the whole Incarnation doctrine of Nicæa and Chalcedon" is implicit in the Pauline confession "Jesus is Lord," and that the Pauline formula "God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ" did not suggest to the early Church that Jesus was a second God, the matter needs fuller comment. Not all will be content to leave it there. In *The Princeton Theological Review* (January, pp. 1-20), Professor Warfield offers a study of the latter formula, contending that Paul never used "Lord" of the Father, and that "God" and "Lord" were alike to him designations of deity. Perhaps. But, even so, these

terms were not so fixed and theological then as they are now. The following article by Dr Geerhardus Vos (pp. 21-89) upon the recent developments of the "Kurios Christos Controversy" is of great value in this connection. It is written with the author's well-known erudition, and serves to bring out the complex issues raised by Bousset's attempt to identify "Lord" with the Hellenistic circles of the early Church. But, as Dr Vos points out, the idea of the Messiah as Lord was not unknown to pre-Christian Judaism, and therefore it ought not to be summarily excluded from the Palestinian communities. "The absence of the name or formal title is of no importance; for the possibilities of a further Christian development the presence of the idea is the essential thing."

This phase of debate involves research into the theology of the synoptic gospels, and the recent interest of English scholars in the gospel of Matthew, which contrasts with the comparative indifference to Luke's gospel, has been illustrated afresh by two books. One is Dr Lukyn Williams's *The Hebrew Messiah* (S.P.C.K.), a study of Matthew's christology from a somewhat conservative point of view. The author accepts the Virgin Birth and the miracles, thinks that in the term "Son of Man" the stress falls on "Man," the aim of Jesus being "to teach a deeper anthropology than He found at the time, or even than He finds to-day"; and concludes that "in spite of St Matthew's strict monotheism, which brooked no tampering with the deification of men, the pressure of the events of our Lord's life, together with His teaching, compelled him to come to the amazing conclusion that Jesus was not only the Son of David, and the Son of Man, but even the Son of God, in the highest meaning of that supreme title." Those who wish to test the exegetical evidence for this will find it discussed critically in Canon P. A. Micklem's edition of the gospel in the Westminster Commentaries (Methuen), a careful piece of work, which caters for English students. In *The Church Quarterly Review* (April, pp. 31-42) Dr T. H. Bindley agrees with those who have identified the book of Papias with an expansion of St Matthew's gospel, "logia" being taken as an equivalent for Old Testament messianic prophecies. This is an item of dispute which is of minor importance, however. So far as the larger problems of Christology are concerned, it is a pleasure to notice the appearance of a treatise like Dr H. M. Relton's *Study in Christology* (S.P.C.K.). Part of it is historical, part is constructive. Thus there is a special discussion of the view technically known as Enhypostasia, suggested by Leontius of Byzantium—whom Bishop Gore calls "the best theologian of the sixth century"—in order to show that the human nature of Christ became real and complete by its fusion with the Logos-nature. A survey of some modern hypotheses follows, with adumbrations of a positive doctrine. The book is stronger on its critical than on its constructive side, as a rule, but it is a renewed proof that, as Loisy said some years ago, "le problème christologique est encore actuel." Dr T. R. Glover's charming impressionist study of *The Jesus of History* (Students' Christian Movement) will appeal to those who find experience and life a guide to the understanding of the gospels rather than technical theology. The Archbishop of Canterbury's foreword does justice to the spirit and insight of the book. After all, to appreciate the problem which Greek metaphysic sought to solve for the Church it is essential to begin by realising the facts which Dr Glover has presented with such graphic realism. Otherwise the Christological controversy, whether ancient or modern, will

be sure to seem an unreal logomachy—which it is not, although some of the protagonists were apt occasionally to convey the impression that it was.

Sidelights upon early Christian thought are sometimes found in unexpected quarters, and an instance of this is afforded by Professor C. H. Moore's *Religious Thought of the Greeks* (Harvard University Press), which is valuable to more than classical students, since it carries the story of Hellenism down to the early Christian school of Alexandria. The paragraphs on Origen whet our appetite for Sir A. W. W. Dale's forthcoming monograph on that great thinker of the Church. Meantime we note one or two contributions to patristic theology: a revolutionary study of *The So-called Egyptian Church Order and Derived Documents* (Cambridge) from Dom R. H. Connolly, who claims that Order for Hippolytus and insists that the title of this primary work should be "The Apostolic Tradition"; an appreciation of the hymns of St Ambrose by A. S. Walpole (*Church Quarterly Review*, January, pp. 252–269), which argues that "the masterly combination of the old external form and of the deepest religious feeling justifies us in dating the birth of modern poetry from the time of their composition"; a translation of *The Work of St Optatus against the Donatists* (Longmans) by O. R. Vassall-Phillips, which is said to be the first English version of that writing; and a translation of *The Cathetical Oration of St Gregory of Nyssa* (S.P.C.K.) by Dr S. R. Srawley. Mr T. A. Lacey's lectures on *Nature, Miracle, and Sin* (Longmans) impress the reader with a sense of cheerful competence. They conclude with an appendix which, among other things, criticises Dr McTaggart's idealism as a theory of eternal "collegiate intelligence." Like Dr Rashdall and Professor Pringle-Pattison, Mr Lacey hesitates to accept this pluralistic notion, on the ground that it involves an act of faith which goes beyond experience and intelligence, and also that it implies unanimity not merely of thought but also of will in a multitude of Selves. "The hypothesis of Creative Will involves tremendous moral difficulties, with which St Augustine did battle as few men have done before or since, but it satisfies the understanding." The allusion to St Augustine is not lugged in by the ears, for the sub-title of the book is "A Study of St Augustine's Conception of the Natural Order," and the author insists that the subject is timely, since Augustine's plea for the moral unity of creation is helpful at a crisis like the present, when the war has stirred sharp doubts with regard to the moral government of the universe and the problem of evil. What the great African father did was not so much to furnish a solution that holds good at every point as to face the facts and rule out inadequate solutions. "He lost himself in some labyrinthine byways, but the scheme on the whole is coherent," i.e. that sin is the only evil to be recognised, and that *omnis natura bonum est*, in the light of God's Creative Will. Some cognate problems are handled in an essay on "Gods Almacht uit den mensch begrepen" by H. G. van Wijngaarden (*Theologisch Tijdschrift*, 1917, pp. 71 f.), and in a Cambridge volume of lectures on *The Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human Life, considered from a Christian Point of View* (Cambridge). In spite of its cumbrous title, this book has some effective arguments, notably those of Professor Sorley on theism and modern thought, and of Professor Oman on human freedom and the war. Before leaving St Augustine, however, we must chronicle an essay by P. Batiffol in the *Revue du Clergé Français* (15 Mars, 1917) upon the doctrine and practice of penitence in the early Church, apropos of the

bishop's famous interview with the doomed Marcellinus. The passage under discussion is Epist. cli. 9. Finally, in this connection, we note the publication of the late Principal Stewart's Croall Lectures on *Creeds and Churches* (Hodder & Stoughton), a dignified and sober-minded sketch, which disentangles some of the more salient features of the subject from the complex of historical debates and decisions. Mr A. W. F. Blunt's little book on *The Church's Message for the Coming Time* (Oxford University Press) contains an exposition of the Apostles' Creed, which marks the progress made by popular requirements since Westcott published his *Historic Faith*. It is admirably adapted to instruct those who wish not only to behold the beauty of the Lord but to inquire in his temple. Mr Blunt has not hesitated to speak out at several points. For example, those who know how the risen body has been discussed in some popular theologies will be the first to appreciate the frank remark that "the hymn 'On the Resurrection Morning' is a perfect example of how *not* to expound this article of the Creed."

Mr Blunt happens to quote (p. 86) from Lowell's lines on "The Present Crisis," in arguing against the attempt to maintain a Christian or hopeful view of the universe apart from the Christian view of Jesus Christ. This leads us to notice a large volume by Dr A. H. Strong upon *American Poets and their Theology* (Philadelphia). In his *Reminiscences* Goldwin Smith says that he remembers Lowell in his anti-British phase, and takes a depreciatory view of American poetry altogether. He can hardly credit Longfellow "with anything more than sweetness as a poet"; which is unjust. "Bryant lives by his 'Waterfowl,' and almost by that alone. Poe had poetic genius, if he had only taken more care of it and of himself. Excepting him, can it be said that America has produced a poet? Perhaps America might ask whether at this time there is such a thing as a true poet in the world." Dr Strong very naturally sees more poetic fruit in American literature than Goldwin Smith did. He has already published a book on *The Great Poets and their Theology*, and the present volume seems to be an attempt to do for America what Stopford Brooke did forty-three years ago for England in his charming *Theology in the English Poets*. With writers like Whittier, Lanier, Longfellow, and Bryant, Dr Strong has little or no trouble; orthodoxy can manage to extract some comfort and support from their verses. Lowell is dismissed as a moralist rather than a real poet; Emerson¹ and Holmes are bracketed as adherents of a natural theism; and while Andrew Lang once called Poe's poetry "the echo of a lyre from behind the hills of death," Dr Strong severely adds, "Yes, from the Inferno of sin and guilt and despair," such poetry being "melody without truth and without love." He has still less mercy on Whitman, though he admits that the experiences of the Civil War effected a moral transformation of that writer's character and verse. The fact is, most poets have shared the somewhat contemptuous spirit of Rossetti's couplet:

"Let lore of all Theology
Be to thy soul what it *can* be."

And when the measuring rod of Calvinistic orthodoxy is used, their productions are apt to prove as uneven and disappointing as Dr Strong has

¹ In the *Revue Chrétienne* (Janvier 1917, pp. 1-14) Marie Dutoit writes: "De la notion d'héroïsme d'après Emerson," and emphasises the religious basis for his conception of true heroism.

found the majority of his fellow-countrymen in verse. Estimates of this kind are exceptionally difficult to write; they require sympathy as well as moral zeal, if they are to be of any service to literature or to theology. As it happens, a contemporary illustration of the right method is afforded by Mr H. L. Stewart's article on "Carlyle's Conception of Religion" in *The American Journal of Theology* for January (pp. 43-57). He points out that Carlyle had "an irresistible impulse, especially when talking theology, to play with metaphysics," and that his formulas therefore need to be carefully weighed. What they yield is not a natural theology but an intuition of duty which is allied to a theistic creed. Yet "he was surely right in his insistence that a theistic view of the world is not readily adopted by those who look upon the difference of right and wrong as a mere contrast of feeling. Its natural affinity is with the ethics that rests on reason. The historical development of systems in our own day has gone far to confirm Carlyle's conviction that belief in God is intimately bound up with belief in conscience as a function, not of the feelings but of the reason." Almost simultaneously, the danger of exaggerating intuition in the theistic proof has been reiterated by Jean Wagner in a critical study of "Le Problème de Dieu" (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, 1917, pp. 52 f.).

Once more it is our melancholy task to chronicle losses inflicted on the theological world by the Great War. At the age of seventy, Dr C. R. Gregory, the German-American, who won his reputation at Leipzig in textual criticism, has died in the fighting lines of the German army. One could have wished him a better cause for which to give his life. But what Burns wrote about the Battle of Sheriffmuir applies to this conflict also:

"Some fell for wrang, and some for right;
But monie bade the world guid-night."

A heavier loss, which comes home to ourselves, is the death of a non-combatant. Professor James Hope Moulton, that peaceable and lovable scholar, was on his way back from India, when his ship was torpedoed by these ruffians of Europe, and he died of exposure to the elements. Dr Moulton's work was done in several fields, including comparative religion. But it is a special and poignant regret that he was not spared to finish either his *Vocabulary of the Greek Testament* in collaboration with Professor Milligan, or his *New Testament Grammar*. The latter remains in its first volume, and it will be hard to find anyone with Dr Moulton's knowledge of Greek and fine general scholarship to continue and complete the undertaking. There seems to be a fatality about modern works on this subject. It is nineteen years since Schmiedel's revision of Winer stopped in the middle of a sentence, and now this murder has robbed us of all but the first volume of what would have been a standard English treatise.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS

God the Invisible King. By H. G. Wells.—Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1917.

IN this book Mr Wells presents what he calls "the modern religion." The word "modern" will no doubt prove attractive to many minds; but equally, and for reasons perhaps as good, it will be repellent to many others. It were well if Mr Wells had taken some pains to make clear what he means by *modern* religion—since he uses the phrase so often. Sometimes he appears to mean that his religion is brand-new, which startles those who have long been familiar with his leading idea. Sometimes he speaks as though it were a revival of an ancient religion, for he calls it a *renascence*. And again he implies that it is the essence of all religions both ancient and modern. And by calling it "the" modern religion he suggests that it is the only one that can be so called. But I could tell him—anybody could tell him—of a dozen religions that are just as modern as this—in fact, more so; and perhaps the bitterest opposition to his book will not come from the ancient religions, but from these modern rivals. A new religion is described in this number of the *Hibbert Journal* by the Countess of Warwick, and it is different from that of Mr Wells. Nor does he seem to have weighed the fact, as obvious as it is important, that every religion, at the time of its birth, was modern, up to date, and the last thing out. There is no doubt, for example, that the Council of Nicæa, which Mr Wells treats with much disrespect and ingratitude, was bursting with the consciousness of modernity. To be modern, to be consciously modern, is to be the most old-fashioned kind of person conceivable. It is what all our fathers have been in their day and generation. Indeed, one of the remarkable features of the book is that it shows the author as unaware how old-fashioned he is. Had he been aware of it, the tone of the book would have been different: it would have been less combative, less ungrateful, less irritating, less witty at other people's expense. It would not have called the doctrine of the Trinity a scarecrow; and it would not have compared Dr Foakes Jackson and his brother ecclesiastics to groaning camels. To call yourself modern is only an emphatic way of declaring that you are the product of the past—the same past that produced the scarecrows and the groaning camels. Mr Wells owes more to the scarecrows and the groaning camels than he knows. He owes more to the Council of Nicæa than he knows. If there had been no

Council of Nicæa, there would have been no Mr Wells. Take the description of God on page 21, ending with the statement that he is "our friend and brother and the light of the world." There is hardly a phrase in that passage which would have occurred to Mr Wells had he not been born, cradled, and nurtured in the atmosphere of historical Christianity.

There is another being often mentioned in this book to whom the author is also more indebted than he chooses to confess, and that is the Veiled Being, the power behind Nature, on whom he turns his back, and to whom he resolutely refuses to give the name of God. Again, we cannot help remembering that the power which is behind Nature is also behind Mr Wells, who, with that ever-active brain of his, is a most intimate part of Nature. We are actually told that the Veiled Being (acting through a subordinate, the Life Force) becomes self-conscious in man: which suggests that the Veiled Being is not so thickly "veiled" as this book makes out, but quite the reverse; and clearly proves that Mr Wells has no right to turn his back on him. For he owes it to the Veiled Being that he is self-conscious; that he is able to distinguish himself from old fogies like St Ambrose or St Athanasius, and groaning camels like the modern ecclesiastics.

I confess that after reading the book twice, and that with the close attention that is rightly due to it, the total impression each time has left me much more deeply interested in the Veiled Being than I am in Mr Wells' somewhat parochial God. Indeed, unless I suspected that the two are really the same I should not be interested in the latter personage at all, and should feel just as indifferent to him as Mr Wells is to the Trinity. I become interested in him only when I connect him with the Veiled Being, and then, it is true, but not till then, he becomes more than interesting. Mr Wells has himself to thank for producing this effect. As a literary artist, and the writer of many notable novels, he knows, better than anybody can inform him, the dramatic value of veiled personages. For downright enthralling interest give me a story that contains a mystery, "a Woman in White," or a veiled being of any kind. Mr Wells says the modern religion has no mysteries. It has a very big mystery, and the Veiled Being is the name of it; and is only the more mysterious because it tries to keep the mystery out instead of frankly bringing it in. From the moment a veiled being is introduced into a story I suspect his (or her) presence everywhere; I read it between the lines; I look for the secret pulling of the strings. This book throws me into the same attitude of mind, though I am quite sure that the author, literary artist though he be, had no intention of producing that effect on his readers; he has done it from habit, unconsciously. Be that as it may, I am convinced that the Veiled Being has had a great deal to do with this book, with its original conception, its argument, its purpose, its composition, its literary form, its printing and its publication. It is obvious that unless the Veiled Being had become self-conscious in Mr Wells, the book could not have been written at all. I think of the brain in eager activity, of the blood rushing through the cerebral centres, of the nervous currents running to the fingers as they moved the pen or worked the typewriter; I think of the ink, the paper, and the printing-press; I think of Mr Wells, self-conscious at the centre; and I see the Veiled Being behind it all, in it all, through it all, of it all. Again, I think of the rock from which Mr Wells was hewn

and the hole of the pit from which he was digged; I think of him as a product of the ages; of the evolution of his body and of his mind; of all his roots in the immeasurable past; and whichever of these things I think of, the Veiled Being is present to me. We are told that possibly "God" knows no more about the Veiled Being than we do. But I am convinced that the Veiled Being knows all about God, and he knows all about the author of this book. This follows from his becoming self-conscious in Mr Wells, and presumably also in his God. It would not surprise me to learn that it was the Veiled Being who suggested the writing of the book; certainly it could not have been written unless he had been, not only a consenting party, but an active partner in the whole operation. Under these circumstances it is more than effrontery, it is positive ingratitude, when the author turns his back on the Veiled Being, who, after all, is the real hero of the piece.

We are told that the modern religion does not argue about God, but simply relates; for it is based entirely on experience. Well, whether or no this book argues about its own God (and I think it does), it argues a great deal about the God of other people. But often it does not argue well, especially when it comes to the question of "finite" or "infinite," terms which whosoever touches plays with fire. Mr Wells lays great emphasis on the point that his God is finite. But the term "finite" tells us absolutely nothing, unless we are further told precisely *how* finite God is. "Finite" may be as big as you please, or as little; it may be as powerful as you please, or as feeble; it may be as good as you please, or as bad. It is capable of infinite expansion on the one side, and of infinite contraction on the other; and for that reason it is, in the hands of those who use it in-advicably, only the infinite in disguise. Call a thing or a person finite, and neglect to tell us how finite he is, what precisely his limits are, and you can play the game of "heads I win, tails you lose" at your pleasure; which is precisely what Mr Wells charges the devotees of "infinite" with doing, and which, justice requires me to add, they have often done. I have searched in vain through the book for any reasonable indication of God's limits. In some passages he is described as the God of "this round earth," which gives a fairly good geographical limitation; and in connected passages he is closely identified with the interests of humanity, and in particular with social reform, especially with that kind of social reform which Mr Wells is known to favour. This gives a pretty clear historical limitation. But then in another passage, in close juxtaposition to these, we are startled to find that the designs of God include the conquest of the stars! Then he is a cosmic deity after all, or at least aims to become so. There is an enormous difference between these two conceptions. On page 21 we are informed that God will never end—a strange quality for a finite being. And how does Mr Wells know that he will never end? Three pages farther on comes the statement that our knowledge of God is based entirely on experience. But no amount of experience can reveal that God will never end. Here it would seem that Mr Wells has been departing from the principles of modern religion by arguing, at least to himself, about God. It is idle to call this "relating."

And then as to the relating itself. So far as Mr Wells confines himself to relating his own religious experience—I wish he had related more of it—I treat every word he says with the profoundest respect, for I am certain that he is sincere. As a personal confession his book is a religious docu-

ment of great value, and any critic, any theologian, who overlooks that fact will make a serious mistake. But when the modern religion begins, through its mouthpiece, Mr Wells, to relate things about other religions, we have the right to be on our guard. And here I say without hesitation that the modern religion will have to be more correct, as well as more polite, in relating things about other religions, before the world will be willing to give due weight to what it relates about itself. Here is a characteristic example: "We have to remember the poorness of the mental and moral quality of the Churchmen of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, who saddled Christendom with its characteristic dogmas, and the extreme poverty and confusion of the circle of ideas within which they thought." Now that is not what we expect from a man of genius and a student. Has he never heard of St Augustine? The passage goes on in the same strain, and I will venture a comment clause by clause. "Many of the makers of Christianity, like St Ambrose of Milan, had been pitchforked into the Church from civil life": Mr Wells has pitchforked himself from literature into theology. "They lived in a time of pitiless factions and personal feuds": so do we. "They had to conduct their disputations amid the struggles of would-be emperors": we have to conduct our disputations among the struggles of would-be intellectual Popes, who are equally mischievous. "Court-eunuchs and favourites swayed their councils": our councils are swayed by persons not one whit more worthy of respect. "Popular rioting clinched their decisions": which was not a worse method than the modern one of suspending decisions in a perpetual riot of warring minds. "The whole audience by which a theory could be judged did not equal, either in numbers or accuracy of information, the present population of Constantinople": and a very good thing too, for there was less playing to the gallery and less attention paid to what the public would think. I say that to write in this strain is to write bad history, bad comparative history; and one can only trust that the habit is not kept up when the modern religion relates its own experience, which is too important to be trifled with.

I doubt if Mr Wells' philosophy is any sounder than his history; I am sure it is not sound enough to warrant him in calling the first four centuries of the Christian era childish and unphilosophic, as he does. And why, if true religion "does not argue but relate," should he deem it a fault in any age to be unphilosophic or even childish? It is true that the principles, or the nature, of the modern religion do not require him to be meticulously philosophic; but he insists on being philosophic in spite of this, and it seems to me that he comes to grief. He attacks the philosophy of other people, which is the most arrogant way of being philosophic; and he states philosophic positions of his own. He describes an important movement of philosophy which has gone on from Plotinus to Hegel as "featureless presumption": and sets up against it the thesis that at the back of all known things there is an impenetrable curtain. Now, it may well be that there is such a curtain; but it does not follow that *Mr Wells is entitled to draw the curtain wherever he pleases*. The main question philosophy has to decide is precisely—*Where is the curtain to be drawn?* which question Mr Wells ignores, and proceeds, quite coolly, to draw the curtain at the point where religion ceases to interest him and where it becomes most interesting to many of his neighbours. He will not allow his religion to be bothered with questions about the cosmos:

which is cold comfort to the man who remembers that out of the cosmos came the stray bullet that slew his son. In fact, there is a want of catholicity here, which one hardly expects in a religion so excessively modern. There is something eminently dogmatic, also, in the manner in which the curtain is drawn. Unless Mr Wells is more careful he may become the founder of a very narrow and bigoted sect. There is too much of what is good in this book to be thus imperilled.

I suppose that a religion which relates instead of arguing about God may still be expected to be consistent with itself. At all events there are many inconsistencies in the account here given: as when Mr Wells in one place insists that God is youth and in another makes him coeval with the progress of mankind; or when he says that God "looks for ever to the future" and on the next page describes him as the memory of the race, which means, of course, that he never ceases to look into the past. A being who is in time, as we are told God is, cannot "look for ever" either into the past or the future; he must look both ways if he is to look either; and as to his being "youth," he is just as old or as young as the time makes him which has elapsed since he began to be. Immortal youth is no doubt a very attractive conception, but not a philosophical one; for youth, like senility, is always of a certain age, and there is no doubt, from many statements in this book, that the God of the modern religion has been growing older for several thousands of years; and when more thousands have been added he will, since he is in time, be so much older than he is now. Mr Wells cannot put God into time and keep him youthful for ever. Sooner or later the modern religion (then no longer modern?) will have to discard the symbolism of the beautiful youth "newly arisen to a day that was still but a promise," and revert to some such venerable figure as Michael Angelo painted on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. For my part, I feel that on Mr Wells' own showing Michael Angelo's figure is the more appropriate even at the present day to a being whom we have to define as the memory of the race. These men of old, in spite of their limited audiences, and their riots, and their susceptibility to the influence of court-eunuchs, were not so stupid as our author makes them out. They knew what they were about when they represented God as a venerable being; for, unlike Mr Wells, they were thinking not alone of what God is going to do, but of what he has done already—his vast experience, his mighty acts, his weaving the ages as a work upon a loom.

Another unfortunate consequence of the relating method adopted by the modern religion is that it leaves the reader in doubt as to whether the God in which its adherents believe is really the same God in every case. We may even be tempted to surmise that the God of this book is only another name for each man's daimon or attendant spirit, and that there are therefore just as many Gods in existence as there are believers. It certainly might be so for anything the relating method here indicates to the contrary. I cannot but think that the modern religion, much as it dislikes argument, will find itself obliged to argue this point, and indeed to prove it. One can hardly expect Mr Wells, after his remark about the featureless presumptions of philosophers from Plotinus to Hegel, to undertake what is technically known as a proof of the unity of God. Yet something is required to allay our questionings on this matter. If six sincere persons were to relate their religious experience, I greatly doubt

if any one of their six accounts of God would tally with that given by Mr Wells; and it would certainly be most unfair to infer that they were not sincere because they happened to disagree with Mr Wells. For example, I believe Plotinus was a perfectly sincere person; John Smith the Cambridge Platonist was another; both of these have related their religious experience, and the account of God they severally give differs radically from that of the modern religion. In each account the God of whom it relates is obviously that Veiled Being with whom the modern religion will have nothing to do. Are there then two Gods—one for Mr Wells and another for Plotinus and John Smith; and as many more as there are distinct varieties of religious experience? The matter calls for consideration, and I do not see how it is to be elucidated without argument. The thinkers of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, whom Mr Wells treats so contemptuously, were fully conversant with this difficulty; for polytheism was then a thing in being, and a very formidable thing too, well equipped with philosophy and religious experience; and not the least notable part of what took place at the Council of Nicæa, which Mr Wells sets down to bad temper and court-eunuchs, was due to the need of meeting this clamant need. And sooner or later it will have to be met by the modern religion. In the alternative the modern religion will go to pieces.

Mr Wells has written a very provocative book about the least provocative of subjects—God. It is probable that nobody can write a book about God, or even preach a sermon about him, without doing violence to something that is essential in the Divine nature: for God is precisely that Being who by no manner of means can be made into public property. He sees and is seen in secret, when we have entered into the inner chamber and shut the door. This our author knows very well, and it is the great merit of the book to betray that he knows it, and to leave a clear impression at the end that he has found God, or rather that God has found him. My conviction of this fundamental fact is not the least impaired by the other, equally strong, conviction that Mr Wells is philosophically all astray in the account he gives of the Divine Being. However, in presence of the central discovery his philosophical errors matter very little either to himself or to anybody else. And to God, perhaps, they matter not at all.

His discovery of God began in an earlier discovery—that of his own essential need of salvation, which he shares with mankind at large. In this he reminds me constantly and vividly of Professor Royce, lately dead, one of the best-equipped philosophers of this age, and as modern as Mr Wells himself, though at the same time vastly more ancient. Like Professor Royce—in the *Problem of Christianity*—Mr Wells has realised the futility, the failure, the muddle, the peril of the life of the natural man. He views that life as one of misery, and of confusion which is always on the verge of disaster. He quotes Metchnikoff to illustrate the incompleteness, the mess of imperfections, in which nature and the natural man are alike involved. He sees what needy beings we are even at our best. He sees that so long as the natural man is unredeemed, science, culture, education, social reform, and all the rest are quite powerless to alter these conditions and to save us from their attendant miseries—sees this as Gotama saw it, as St Paul saw it, as Dante saw it, as Schopenhauer saw it, as Nietzsche saw it, as Royce saw it, as any Salvationist sees it. Mr Wells has felt the strain and the tension of it all in his soul, both as an original

misery of his own and as reflected from the souls of his contemporaries. He has felt it as a representative man of his age must feel it. He finds no way of escape in verbal devices, in "isms" of one kind or another—in the "altruism" of Metchnikoff or Joseph McCabe, in "the group instincts" of Professor Gilbert Murray. These terms are only fresh elements in the muddle; they make matters worse.

Then comes the discovery of God, how made I know not and cannot learn from this book. But so it is that, in the heart of all this confusion and misery and aimless striving for we know not what, Mr Wells is apprised of the presence of another will, not his own nor yours nor mine, not the "collective mind" of the community nor any other hollow abstraction of that kind. God declares his presence in the hearts of his servants, and there is an end of it, so far as "proof" is concerned. And not only is this offered as the personal testimony of Mr Wells himself, but we are further told that the same experience is now happening all the world over. It is useless for sceptical philosophy to put up barriers against the flowing tide. Presently the world will know that there stands in the midst a Spirit, a God, born out of the confusion itself and pledged to the task of overcoming it, the Captain of our salvation, who summons all men to his standard, whose will is the only law, whose purpose the only end of human life. His will is to conquer—to conquer the very confusion out of which he has been born; and in self-identification with him is our only peace.

It is a tremendous theme, and the time is ripe for its reception. It is so tremendous, so weighty in itself, that those who are burdened with it need spend no time in overthrowing the theological errors of the past; for the theme itself will drive these aside by its own impetus, and they will die quickly if left severely alone. But the errors are not to be despised, nor to be mocked. Taken in the large they arose from the very effort which Mr Wells is making in this book—to say that of which the better half must always be left unsaid.

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

Mens Creatrix: An Essay. By William Temple.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1917.—Pp. xiii + 367.

MR TEMPLE, in his Preface, tells us this book was planned and partly written nine years ago at Oxford. It was continued during his headmastership at Repton, but more than half of it was "dictated during spare half hours" last year in London. The author, I gather, designs it to be his contribution to philosophy—at least the best contribution the exigencies of a busy life permit him to make—as well as a tribute to an old ambition. The book covers a wide field, and discusses problems of a very varied kind. As one would expect from the circumstances under which it was executed, Mr Temple's work is unequal: some of his discussions are suggestive and helpful in a high degree, while others are rapid, meagre, and disappointing. But even at his worst the author is never superficial and commonplace, and when at his best he is very vigorous and stimulating. The style is always clear, and the reader is never in doubt about the author's meaning. If I may judge, the first half of the book will be found more careful and satisfying than the second half, which tends in parts to become very slight and sketchy.

The plan of the volume may be briefly outlined. Part I. deals with epistemological and metaphysical questions. Part II. is a discussion of Art, its meaning and value. Part III. deals with the problem of conduct; while Part IV. investigates the general nature of religion in its relation to Science, Art, and Morality. The preceding four divisions constitute Book I. In Book II. the writer takes up the problem of revealed religion and finds in it the ultimate solution of the issues he has raised. The ground traversed by the author is too wide for me to follow him in detail within the limits at my disposal. I must content myself with referring to some of the more interesting and important points.

In his opening chapters Mr Temple will be found criticising severely the old syllogistic logic. He is here on familiar ground, but it is hardly fair to describe the syllogism as a mere device of rhetoric rather than of logic. The syllogistic method is a good mental gymnastic, and it is at least often a test of consistency in argument. It is, of course, true that the actual movement of thought is both analytic and synthetic, and the process of scientific knowing is one of mutual testing between universal and particulars. In dealing with the problem of the development of knowledge, Mr Temple follows writers like Messrs Bradley and Bosanquet in holding that the categorical judgment passes into the hypothetical where a connexion of ground and consequence is expressed, and finally into the disjunctive form where thought comes to its goal in the idea of a determining system. One may agree that the ideal of knowledge is the development of connexion in experience into systematic unity, and at the same time hold that there is something artificial in the derivation of the process from the forms of the judgment. The fact is that categorical judgments of perception cannot be translated into hypothetical without losing a good deal of their meaning, and there are judgments purely hypothetical which do not imply a relation of ground and consequence. And I should contend that prior to judgment there is a mere awareness of an object which only tends to become a judgment.

The goal of knowledge, according to Mr Temple, is the Infinite as the inclusive system of the finite. Those who accept this principle end by identifying God with the Absolute or systematic whole. But Mr Temple, when he comes to theology, holds God is transcendent as well as immanent. He is no doubt right in this view, but it does not seem to me to cohere well with his principle that alike in science, art, and morality the goal is always a harmonious system. I think we must recognise that the purely rational method cannot yield more than an immanent world-ground, and to reach a genuine theism the judgments of reason must be related to and qualified by the judgments of ethical and religious experience. Value cannot be absorbed in rationality, and the character of the world-ground must be determined by both lines of evidence. In a way Mr Temple admits this when he lays stress on Christian theism as the issue of converging lines of evidence. But he does not make it clear that the result he desiderates cannot be reached as the issue of a single principle realised in different aspects of experience.

Mr Temple is no doubt far from being a pure intellectualist. He says in so many words that intellect, working purely by its own method, will not yield the transcendent God of religion. Thought, owing to its initial abstraction, remains abstract to the end, and is involved in perpetual and restless movement. It is imagination which gives us relatively complete

wholes, and Art is the culmination of Science. Mr Temple even goes so far as to say that "the infinite delicacy of the logical structure of the real world is only grasped by imagination when it grasps the real in its concreteness, with all that minute articulation which can never be artificially construed by the intellect" (p. 40). The impulse to totality which is the fruit of the will to know is not realised intellectually, but is achieved by the artistic imagination. And the individual itself is not exhausted by the relations into which it enters.

Some of the most fresh and suggestive passages in the book will be found in the section on Art. Mr Temple has profited by the study of Hegel, Croce, and Professor A. C. Bradley, but he is not a slavish follower, and he can say his own word and go his way when need arises. He is at his best in his chapter on "Tragedy," where he works out his principles in detail and enforces them with a wealth of illustrations. "The world revealed in tragedy is a noble world, and better than any we can conceive—yet it is terrible and pitiable and sad beyond belief. We would not alter it, yet we cannot be content with it. This is the Philosophy of Tragedy" (p. 152).

In Science, and still more in Art, Mr Temple discerns a movement of the human spirit above the successiveness of time. In the world of will and purpose this conquering process reaches a yet higher stage. In life, and especially in life filled with a lofty purpose, we approach nearest to the realisation of eternity. It is not clear to me what exactly is meant by this transcendence of time, and the author takes no pains to explain it. A mode of consciousness which rises above our present time-span is intelligible, but a mind which is timeless in the sense of excluding changing states is something inconceivable. I may add that in his discussion of ethics Mr Temple recognises the ultimate and irreducible nature of good and evil as values, and urges that the moral problem is essentially a social problem. The breadth of his interests is seen in his chapters on "Education" and "Internationalism," which conclude the section.

Mr Temple closes the first part of his work with a brief statement of the nature of religion, followed by a longer chapter on the "Problem of Evil." Religion, we are told, unites in itself the principles of Science, Art, and Morality: it is the culmination of the growing deliverance of the mind seen in these spheres. The movement of mind which follows these different lines demands the *actuality* of the ideal to which they point. "Philosophy by itself only shows that God must exist if the world is to be perfectly reasonable." Now it is true that philosophy does carry us back to a ground of the world, but that this ground coincides with the religious idea of God by no means follows. In this chapter almost nothing is said of the psychological nature of religion, and the treatment is too slight to be convincing. The chapter on "Evil" is better, and much fuller. Mr Temple's view is, on the whole, a hopeful one. Suffering elicits sympathy, and the existence of the two together is better than the absence of both. Pain coupled with fortitude is the condition of what is best in life. The essence of sin is self-will, and sin is there that love may conquer. "In fact, a sinful world redeemed by the agony of Love's complete self-sacrifice is a better world, by the only standards of excellence we have, than a world that never sinned" (p. 286). Nevertheless one is glad to know that Mr Temple allows that there are much failure and sordid

misery in the world which can only be justified if we assume the existence of an eternal world, and he admits that only in so far as sin is conquered by love is it justified as an element in the world and history. I merely add that he does not deal with the serious problem of the distribution of evil, and lays little stress on the part played by man's free will in the development of moral evil. The truth is that sin can never be fully rationalised or reduced to "good in the making," if we recognise it as essentially that which ought not to be.

The conclusion of the volume is a sincere and vigorous plea for Christianity—the religion of the Incarnation—as the final solution of the problem of religion and life. As this portion of the work is compressed into little more than sixty pages, the treatment is perforce brief and fragmentary. In his chapter on the "Religion of Israel" Mr Temple, I confess, does not seem to me to say much which is either interesting or important. His general conclusion is, that the historic Incarnation is just the fact to which the different lines of thought he has been developing converge, and in which they find their consummation. Here religious aspiration finds its rest. "The creative mind in man never attains its goal until the creative mind of God, in whose image it is made, reveals its own nature and completes man's work." And the divine kingdom as it finds expression in Christ is the medium "of God's transcendent breaking in on history." I may note in closing that when Mr Temple suggests that in certain essential respects the Johannine Christ is in harmony with the Christ of the Synoptics, he is maintaining a proposition which, to say the least, is doubtful.

This is a very interesting book, and it will well repay perusal. One cannot read it without being impressed with the ability and versatility of the writer. But it bears obvious marks of haste, and I hardly think it is sufficiently thorough and well balanced to have permanent influence and value.

G. GALLOWAY.

ST MARY'S COLLEGE, ST ANDREWS.

Principles of Social Reconstruction. By Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1916.

"To me," says Mr Russell, "the chief thing to be learnt through the war has been a certain view of the springs of human action, what they are, and what we may legitimately hope they will become." In the eight lectures comprised in this volume, the author sketches the view of human nature to which his reflections have led, and indicates the lines along which he conceives civilisation must advance, if it is to provide for individual personalities scope for development and to enable them to get out of life the best which life has in it to yield. Like all that Mr Russell writes, these pages are full of stimulating suggestion, of vigorous criticism, and of fresh and original thinking. Moreover, they are written with a sincerity and fervour to which none but a dull and languid reader can be insensible, and which will win for them consideration even where they fail to carry conviction. With much that Mr Russell has to say about "war as an institution," the "worship of money," the education of the young, and other problems of

practical import, a large body of thoughtful persons will be in accord. Yet I cannot help feeling that, in framing his general theory of social life, the circumstances of the present moment—tremendously significant though they are—have loomed too prominently in his mind, and have been allowed to dwarf the lessons of the human centuries. And I venture to predict—as it is, no doubt, safe to do in regard to any writer upon social questions just now—that if, in future years, when the passions of these stormy days are stilled, Mr Russell returns to the topics here discussed, he will handle many of them differently and from a wider point of view.

“Impulse has more effect than conscious purpose in moulding men’s lives,”—such is the principle upon which Mr Russell is prepared to base a philosophy of politics. And elsewhere he has expressed his conviction that man, scientifically regarded, is like the animal, “a bundle of impulses and passions.” It is difficult, however, to determine what exactly he understands by “impulse.” Is it a mental state, or is it merely a state of the bodily organism? Sometimes he seems to mean the one, sometimes the other. Impulse belongs, he tells us, to “the more instinctive part of our nature,” and is “a tendency to activity not prompted by any end or purpose” (p. 13); it is “erratic and anarchical, not easily fitted into a well-regulated system” (p. 16); “all impulse is essentially blind, in the sense that it does not spring from any prevision of consequences” (p. 17). While blind impulse may lead to destruction and death, it may also lead to the best things the world contains. “Blind impulse is the source of war, but it is also the source of science, and art, and love” (pp. 17–18). Mr Russell is a consistent atomist, and is here attempting to interpret human life along the lines of an atomistic philosophy. Like every so-called “thing” in nature, a conscious mind, I suppose he would say, is a “complex,” made up of elements that preserve their essential identity, notwithstanding the relations in which they enter as elements of the complex. Just as on the cognitive side of our being, sensation, perception, imagination, and thought are separate and distinct functions, so, on the conative side, impulse, desire, and will are separate and distinct modes of activity. Desire involves not merely the representation of an end as likely to satisfy the agent, but also what may perhaps be expressed as the adoption of such end on the part of the desiring subject. Will is apparently conceived as a “directing force,” and is said to consist mainly in following desires for more or less distant objects (p. 13).

Now, no doubt, everyone would recognise, in a certain sense, a broad distinction, and even contrast, between impulse and desire. Unquestionably there is a stage in mental development below which impulse would be “blind” in Mr Russell’s sense; in such primitive impulses there would, that is to say, be in no way prefigured anything of the nature of an end or purpose. But it seems to me an important error to assume that “impulse” retains unaltered, in a self-conscious being, the character it possessed in its original form; that it remains alongside of desires and volitions, the merely instinctive craving which it can be described as being prior to the emergence of desire and volition. On the contrary, when we are dealing with the mature mind, there is, so far as I can see, no fundamental difference in kind to be drawn between impulse and desire. The so-called lower impulses—the impulses to satisfy hunger, thirst, etc.—are doubtless connected with organic wants, and an organic want is in itself a purely physiological fact. It is not, however, until the feelings that arise in conse-

quence of the want and the accompanying movements have been interpreted by the individual as signifying want, and thus have been associated with the idea of possible satisfaction, that we have what can properly be called an impulse in the human subject. Though still dependent on natural or organic conditions, such impulses cannot be viewed as operating in the same way as we might imagine inherited dispositions to operate in determining the instinctive habits of animals. They are in no sense mechanical, save in this—that they depend upon conditions altogether distinct from the representation which may be formed by the individual of the means of satisfying them. And they are “blind” in no other sense than in this—that the individual is not responsible for the organic conditions which naturally determine their origin and in part their strength. The consideration that appears to have weighed with Mr Russell in pronouncing impulses to be “blind” is that often they do not contain the explicit representation of an end. But much the same is true of all forms of conative activity. By reason of their repeated occurrence, many desires and volitions tend to become habitual, and psychologically it is a mistake to suppose that the one essential feature of voluntary action is the actual momentary awareness of an end. Habit, in this respect, is second nature, and it is none the less the purpose of the individual that is expressed in such habitual modes of activity. A similar consideration applies to “impulses.” As T. H. Green pointed out, the drunkard probably drinks, as a rule, not for the mere pleasure of drinking, but to drown the pains of self-reproach or win the pleasures of a quickened fancy or of a sense of good-fellowship, of which only the thinking man is capable; and such purpose cannot be said to be wanting because the man does not represent it to himself every time he takes the glass to his lips. So, too, “our envies, jealousies, and ambitions—whatever the resemblance between their outward signs and certain expressions of emotion in animals—are all in their proper nature distinctively human, because all founded on interests possible only to self-conscious beings.” And when it becomes a question of the higher impulses—the creative and intellectual impulses, as Mr Russell himself calls them, leading to art and science—it is surely paradoxical to insist that they too are blind and merely instinctive. In spite of himself, Mr Russell is perpetually using language which implies just the opposite. “Creative impulses,” he writes in the Preface, “aim at bringing into the world some valuable thing, such as knowledge, or art, or goodwill”; and, to take another instance at random, “most men,” he avers, “unless the impulse is atrophied through disuse, *feel a desire to create something, great or small according to their capacities*” (p. 211).

Our author admits, it is true, a certain measure of unity to subsist in an individual life. “The impulses and desires of men and women, in so far as they are of real importance in their lives, are not,” he says, “detached one from another, but proceed from a central principle of growth” (p. 24). Yet this central principle of growth is merely “an instinctive urgency leading them in a certain direction, as trees seek the light.” I am baffled, I confess, when I try to form an intelligible conception of this “instinctive movement,” this “intimate centre in each human being,” to which are assigned powers so fundamental as that of determining for each man the type of excellence of which he is capable. One thing, however, is clear. A “central principle” of the kind indicated can in itself be no guarantee that the individuality which would emerge from its unimpeded growth

would be of a character such as would make for the progress of mankind. In order to ensure that the growth shall be in the right direction, Mr Russell requires for it a social environment, and a social environment which is essentially not an embodiment of the life of instinct but of the best that rational insight and reflection can procure. And in the long run he is forced to recognise that "instinct alone will not suffice to give unity to the life of a civilised man or woman: there must be some dominant object, an ambition, a desire for scientific or artistic creation, a religious principle, or strong and lasting affections" (p. 229).

The atomism which underlies his conception of an individual personality dominates Mr Russell's treatment of the State as a political organisation. With characteristic boldness he outlines a doctrine of the State corresponding in many essentials, and allowing for the difference of historical circumstances, with that against which Plato brought the resources of his dialectic to bear in the *Republic*. The State, it is contended, is in essence the repository of the collective force of its citizens, and, endowed with unquestioned authority, stands over against the individual as a supreme coercive power, "only limited internally by the fear of rebellion, and externally by the fear of defeat in war" (p. 45). Generated chiefly by tribal feeling, the State derives its strength principally from two fears—that of anarchy from within and that of aggression from without. Mr Russell emphasises the evil wrought in the modern world by the excessive power of the State, exhibited in its promotion of efficiency in war, and in the sense of individual helplessness it engenders by reason of its vastness, the latter leading to something of the weariness and discouragement that we associate with the Roman Empire. He maintains that the first evil can only be permanently ended by a world-federation, which would mean that so far as military functions are concerned there will only be one State; and the second by ceasing to make law a fetish, so to speak, in consequence of which it becomes "too static, too much on the side of what is decaying, too little on the side of what is growing," and by "perpetual readiness to alter the law in accordance with the present balance of forces" (p. 66). In certain directions, however, he argues, the functions of the State ought to be extended rather than curtailed. On the one hand, there are matters in regard to which the general welfare depends upon the attainment of a certain minimum, *e.g.* sanitation and the prevention of infectious diseases, the care of children, compulsory education, and the encouragement of scientific research. On the other hand, the State ought to possess powers that aim at diminishing economic injustice. But justice is by itself, like law, too static to be made a supreme political principle, and in attempting to remedy an injustice care should be taken to avoid destroying any form of vigorous action which is on the whole useful to the community. It is suggested that no such form of action is associated with the private ownership of land, and that the State ought, therefore, to be the primary recipient of rent.

The prior question, surely, is whether the State can rightly be thus placed as a controlling power over against the individuals it controls, the individuals being regarded as invested with the moral qualities and rights of humanity. For is it not a fact that the individuals only acquire these qualities and rights as members of a State, and that the very power which is set over against them as though it were extraneous has been derived from the development of those institutions for the

regulation of a common life without which they would have no rights or interests at all? Or, to put the same question in another way, is it conceivable that humanity could have developed in any other manner than through the instrumentality of a social organisation which provides the means of maintaining the conditions required for the rational, as distinct from the merely animal, life? One lesson in this connection we ought at least to have learnt from Plato and Aristotle—namely, that to treat the State as though it were an accidental growth or a necessary evil which has sprung up through the play of a contingent set of historical circumstances is to proceed altogether on a wrong track. Man is not, and never has been, an independent monad in the world; he is essentially φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, and the modern State is no more a conventional product of civilisation—a “product of capitalism” (p. 64), or what not—than is the family or the faculty of speech. The view of the “State” as equivalent merely to “Government” always tends to give a false isolation to a single function of the State, considered as a politically organised community; and the difficulty of consistently carrying out the view is illustrated in the book before us, in which, as I have indicated, it is urged that various important positive functions ought to be undertaken by the State. Mr Russell, however, has considerable sympathy with syndicalism, and thinks there should be a constant endeavour to leave the more positive functions in the hands of voluntary organisations. Theoretically, no doubt, there is much to be said in favour of this position. But, on the other hand, one cannot lose sight of the fact that “strong organisations which embody a sectional public opinion” have only too frequently been the very reverse of “safeguards of liberty and opportunities for initiative.”

The lecture that deals with education appears to me to be quite admirable and almost entirely on the right lines. Mr Russell complains, and surely not without reason, that the present system of education, with its large classes, and fixed curriculum, and overworked teachers, is framed almost as though it were intended to produce a dead level of mediocrity. The child is “moulded” by the teacher, as clay in the hands of the potter; little is done to foster the inward growth of mind and spirit; “to be ordinary, and to acquire the art of getting on, is the ideal which is set before the youthful mind, except by a few rare teachers.” He pleads that a teacher who is to educate really well must be filled through and through with the spirit of reverence; must feel in all that lives, but especially in human beings, and most of all in the young, something sacred, indefinable, individual, and strangely precious. And, animated by that spirit, his endeavour will be to rouse and stimulate the love of “mental adventure,” the joy of which grows naturally out of the period of make-believe and fancy. As things are, that joy is rare in later life, because everything is done to kill it during the years of education. “Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth—more than ruin, more even than death” (p. 165). The modern examination system, as it is worked at present in England, is deserving of all the opprobrium which Mr Russell casts upon it. What, for instance, could be more crassly silly and stupid than the idea, prevalent enough in some quarters even now, that a university student, after working for two or three years under a teacher who has been trying to awaken in him interest in certain special problems of science or philosophy, should have his capacity tested at the end by an “external examiner,” who inquires not about the lines of thought along

which he has been led, and who, indeed, conceives it to be his duty to avoid questioning him, as far as possible, upon those things to which most of his time has been devoted? It means, as Mr Russell says, driving the unfortunate pupil to a long drudgery of examination tips and textbook facts, which will secure high marks, until, at last, he becomes disgusted with learning, and longs only to forget it and to escape into a life of action.

Lastly, much of what Mr Russell says about "Religion and the Church" seems to me profoundly true, and greatly in need of being fearlessly proclaimed. I think, indeed, that here, too, he is inclined to institute far too sharp a distinction between what he calls the three sources of human activity—instinct, mind, and spirit. To me it seems that what he describes as the life of the spirit, which "centres round impersonal feeling," is essentially a further stage of what he describes as the life of the mind that "consists of thought which is wholly or partially impersonal." But, like him, I am persuaded that "if life is to be fully human it must serve some end which seems, in some sense, outside human life, such as God or truth or beauty" (p. 245). It is only contact with this "eternal world" that can bring a strength and a fundamental peace, which the struggles and apparent failures of our temporal life are powerless to destroy. "It is this happy contemplation of what is eternal that Spinoza calls the intellectual love of God. To those who have once known it, it is the key of wisdom." And, like him too, I am convinced that what is amiss with the Churches of to-day is not so much that their creeds are wrong, as the mere existence of creeds at all. The life of the spirit can only be truly lived when it is free to dwell in that vision of the mystery and profundity of the world to which it is being constantly led, and it is impeded and thwarted by the restraints which the traditional dogmas impose. Once more, in emphasising the importance, for the good life, of the "creative impulses" as contrasted with the "possessive impulses," Mr Russell is giving voice to a conviction that is rapidly winning its way wherever these problems are being discussed at the present time. Fortunately for the human race, it is possible for those who mourn over the lack of creativeness in their own lives to realise the conditions under which it may be fostered in others, and thus to contribute their share towards furthering the progress of mankind.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

Growth and Form. By D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson.—Cambridge: at the University Press, 1917.—Pp. xv+793.

THIS book may be described as a treatise on the mathematics of biology. It is clear and lucid, and deals with problems of enormous, often of surprising, interest—problems of science and problems of philosophy. The exposition is so admirable that no one need fear that the mathematics will obscure for him the philosophy, or the philosophy the science, or the science and philosophy the mathematics.

To every thoughtful person growth and form are a subject of constant wonder. The living creatures which occupy the surface of this planet vary in size and shape. All begin their individual existence with a certain

volume or mass which is constant within narrow limits for the species, and also with a definite form. They grow, but their growth is limited. In growing they maintain their form, and their form in some way determines their growth. What are the determining factors of size and shape? When our imagination is called into play, as when we read "and there were giants in those days," we cannot help wondering why our average stature is the five or six feet it is and not five or six inches or fifty or sixty feet, why the years of our life are threescore and ten and not measured in hundreds or thousands, why Brobdingnag and Lilliput are only legendary countries. When wonder turns, however, from the literary and artistic mood to follow a purely scientific direction we come at once on actual problems of absorbing interest. An elephant and a mouse are mammals which correspond point to point in all essential living functions, as also in their vital organs and in the general scheme of their structure; yet the linear dimensions of the elephant are not less than fifty times those of the mouse, and therefore the bulk of the elephant must be 125,000 times that of the mouse. How is the essential unity of design and function reconciled with this enormous difference of bulk? Is there, as we should naturally expect, a corresponding difference in the bulk of each constituent cell? No, the nerve-cell of the elephant is only about twice that of the mouse in linear dimensions, and therefore about eight times greater in volume or mass. There must be then more than 15,000 times as many individual nerve-cells in the elephant as there are in the mouse. In like manner there is the same striking difference of bulk, together with an essential unity of structural design, in the humming-bird and the ostrich. Here then is a problem of evolution. Some species have tended to grow large, some to grow small, but the range within which the cell constituent can vary in volume is much narrower than the range within which the living organism itself can vary. Then again we know that in past geological ages there have from time to time arisen gigantic forms which have later become extinct. Great saurians and mammoths have disappeared; great whales have survived. In carboniferous times there were gigantic insect forms. On the other hand, among the lowly forms there are certain foraminifera in our oceans to-day which appear to have retained the identical form of their ancestors in the earliest palæontological rocks. Clearly some force or forces have determined the thus far and no farther of growth and form in each direction in living species. It is the science of this growth and form which is set forth in this book.

The method is first to describe fully the particular problem and then to schematise it by plotting the curve of growth and form. This graphic presentation makes it evident at once that much, and often the most fundamental part, of the special phenomenon admits of simple physical explanation, or rather that all that is necessary is to call to our aid the simple laws of physical combination which serve us to explain inorganic form, and to observe the mechanical alterations of form which the organic substance undergoes under varying conditions of tension and strain. This is not all. Many problems are yet unexplained, but their nature is so clearly indicated by the curves that we can with confidence say, even when we have not found the physical explanation, we are on the way to discover it.

The philosophical principle followed is that true explanation consists in resolving complex phenomena into simple physical laws and expressing

these in simple mathematical formulæ. "The great cosmic mechanisms are stupendous in their simplicity" (p. 162). "If we blow into a bowl of soapsuds and raise a great mass of many-hued and variously shaped bubbles, if we explode a rocket and watch the regular and beautiful configuration of its falling streamers, if we consider the wonders of a limestone cavern which a filtering stream has filled with stalactites, we soon perceive that in all these cases we have begun with an initial system of very slight complexity, whose structure in no way foreshadowed the result, and whose comparatively simple intrinsic forces only play their part by complex interaction with the equally simple forces of the surrounding medium" (p. 159). The ground, then, or the sufficient reason of all change of form is to be sought in the constituent matter and the energy at work in the field of force within which the matter lies. This principle involves the entire rejection of teleology or of finalistic explanation. On this the author is insistent, but the reason for the rejection and for his insistence is important and of primary philosophical interest. It is not merely that finalistic interpretation is anthropomorphic, or that it obscures the issue, or that it necessitates the introduction in some form of a *deus ex machina*, it is that it is redundant. In so far as any teleological explanation explains anything, it always turns out to be because it is the physical explanation in a merely altered form. This reminds us of Bergson's remark that finalism is only mechanism projected forwards and read backwards. But while Bergson leaves mechanism and finalism to cancel out one another, Professor Thompson, while reducing them to an identity, holds to the mechanistic formula. For him τὸ ἀγαθόν is τὸ καλόν; whatsoever is most beautiful and regular is also found to be most useful and excellent. Mathematics is the perfection of simple use and simple beauty.

Whether or not the student is satisfied with this attempt to explain the phenomena of biological change by showing that they can one and all be brought within the range of known physical actions, or at least that known physical phenomena produce similar effects, there can be no question as to the soundness of the scientific procedure. If, as many hold, it leaves, and of necessity must leave, the vital principle itself untouched, nevertheless it is work of supreme importance in itself and productive of knowledge, and it is not easy to see how it could be obtained by any other method. If anyone is in doubt he has only to read this book.

Let us glance briefly at some of the special problems, and first at the problem of magnitude itself. It is really a twofold problem. What is the least possible volume or mass, and what the largest possible, which will sustain the physiological process we regard as the condition of a biological phenomenon? The determining factors of the maximum are much more easy to ascertain than those of the minimum. This is natural enough, for we are able to appreciate by direct experience and also by easy experiment the main force, that of gravity, which has to be countered by creatures of excessive bulk. Perhaps the most striking case is that of the animals adapted for flight. Their size has clearly been determined by the ratio between their mass and the minimum velocity necessary to maintain their stability in the air. The ostrich seems to have reached a magnitude at which flight by muscular action has become physiologically impossible. Were the ostrich compelled to fly, it could only be with a very high minimal velocity as compared with that required by smaller birds. If a sparrow, for example, requires a minimal velocity of fourteen miles an hour

in order to maintain its equilibrium, the ostrich, being some twenty-five times greater in its linear dimensions, would require, according to the mathematical formula, a minimal velocity of five times fourteen, or seventy miles an hour.

The determining factors of minimum volume are much more difficult to ascertain, mainly because the lower limit lies far below the range of aided vision. For that reason the speculative inquiry is peculiarly fascinating. Not only is there greater difficulty of study, but there is an essential difference of kind between the phenomena of form in the larger and smaller organisms. "In the smaller organisms and in the individual cells of the larger organisms we reach an order of magnitude in which the intermolecular forces strive under favourable conditions with, and at length altogether outweigh, the force of gravity, and also those other forces leading to movements of convection which are the prevailing factors in the larger material aggregate" (p. 34).

It is here, of course, that the mechanistic hypothesis undergoes its most crucial trial, for the volume of these organisms, even of some which we positively know to exist, come quite appreciably near to molecular and atomic magnitudes themselves. Professor Thompson suggests that on this side of minimal volume there is zero or absolute limit, and he thinks there is ground for the speculative hypothesis of Lord Kelvin that life may even cross the interplanetary spaces in the form of a mass so attenuated that it may be driven by the pressure of light alone.

Accepting the principle of explanation by physical laws and mathematical formulæ and following the delightful exposition of it in the two chapters entitled "On Magnitude" and "On Rate of Growth," two reflections occur to me. The first is that there is a phenomenon at the upper limit of size and a similar or identical phenomenon at the lower limit which offer a peculiar difficulty, not merely to a mechanical hypothesis of the nature of life, but to any possible physical explanation of the vital principle. And I cannot find any indication that Professor Thompson has given attention to this double phenomenon or remarked its significance. It is in the hope of calling his attention to it that I mention it here. The phenomenon at the higher limit is that the bulky animal, say the elephant, contains in its organism not only a vast deal more living matter than the tiny animal, say the mouse, but also a vastly greater number of living constituent cell elements. By every mechanical standard therefore there is more life in the elephant than in the mouse. But this certainly does not accord with our concept of the nature of life. The phenomenon at the lower limit is that the living principle, in all its completeness, in its individuality and its concreteness, is met with in volume so small that the molecules it contains will not suffice for the changes it will undergo. Both these facts are clearly brought out in this book, they belong to the same order, and they point to the same conclusion, that there is a certain indifference of the vital principle to volume or mass.

The other reflection is in regard to this same problem of the minimal dimension to which an organism can attain. Has not the new physical and mathematical principle of relativity a most important relevance here? "A whole field of speculation is opened up when we begin to consider the cell, not merely as a polarised electric field, but also as an electrolytic field, full of wandering ions. Indeed, it is high time we reminded ourselves that we have perhaps been dealing too much with ordinary physical

analogies, and that our whole field of force within the cell is of an order of magnitude where these grosser analogies may fail to serve us, and might even play us false, or lead us astray" (p. 185). Professor Thompson is here treating of the internal structure of the cell and of the splitting and separation of the chromosomes, and of course intends no reference to the principle of relativity, which he would rightly regard as irrelevant. But consider the new vista which that principle opens out to us at this point. If we regard our solar system as a closed system, and our spatial and temporal co-ordination of it as absolute, then when the mass on which an activity depends approaches the molecular dimension it is approaching its extinction in the absolute zero. But if, on the other hand, we regard our system as a relative system, its limit is not zero but another system of relative movement. Let me try and indicate what seems to me the application. On p. 40 we are told that the mass of the man is in the neighbourhood of 5×10^{18} times greater than that of the bacillus. It has also, I believe, been calculated that the length dimension of the hydrogen atom is 10^{-23} times the length dimension of the solar system. If then we think of the bacillus as an observer (and why not, since it is a living individual?), we see at once that to it the hydrogen atom must have the vast dimensions of a new universe. This only means that, when we follow the living principle (whatever it be and however we conceive it) to the limits of our system of reference, what comes into view is not absolute zero but the confines of new systems of reference. It seems to me that this offers to us at least as fruitful a source of speculation as that already noticed, viz. the possibility of the translation of living material particles by the pressure of light.

My notice has dealt mainly with the more speculative portions of the book. I should not like to leave the impression that this is the whole or even the most important part. The greater portion is occupied with the demonstration of the applicability of mathematical methods and symbols, universally employed in physics, to the morphology of living things. The striking success and the amazing simplicity and beauty of the results will silence at once any sceptical doubt as to the utility of the method. It shows as clearly as demonstration can show that the line between the living and the non-living, the organic and the inorganic, is not marked by a freedom of living matter from ordinary physical laws. We find no life force opposing gravity or surface tension. Physical forces are balanced by physical forces in living as in inanimate forms. What we do feel, however, throughout the whole inquiry is an intense longing to know what life itself is. That need is not satisfied by the scientific study of growth and form, useful and profoundly interesting as it is.

H. WILDON CARR.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

Phases of Early Christianity. By J. Estlin Carpenter, D. Litt.
New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916.

THIS is the twelfth volume in the well-known series of "American Lectures on the History of Religions," and the first in which any epoch or aspect of Christianity has been treated. The period selected is from 100 A.D.-250 A.D.,

and the leading conception that of Christianity as redemption or salvation. No one will deny the interest of the period or the importance of the subject. On the contrary, we shall congratulate Dr Carpenter on his choice, and ourselves on another journey along with a competent guide through a country, often visited, but never yet fully explored.

But what is the object of our guide? What does he wish us to see? The aim of the book is not, I think, apologetical. Dr Carpenter does not seek to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity over all other faiths. Had that been his object it would have been simpler and more direct to have chosen some other period. For the Christianity of the second century is not essential Christianity. It is neither Apostolic nor Catholic. It is transitional. It satisfies neither the Evangelical nor the Catholic type. To those who find the most perfect presentation of Christianity in the New Testament books, the writings of the second and third centuries reveal a serious declension from the ideal standard of faith and doctrine; while to those who take the Roman Catholic position, or even that of the first four so-called œcumenical councils, much also seems to be wanting. No one, I suppose, goes to the second century to find out what Christianity is, or compare it with other religions. Too much preliminary work would need to be done before the problems emerged. The fairest and most satisfactory application of the comparative method is only possible when we have before us the classical or highest forms of the religions to be compared.

But the comparison of degenerate or immature presentations of Christianity with contemporary forms of religion has nevertheless an interest and value of its own. The historian who desires to picture to himself the actual life of a particular age will examine and compare all phases of religious belief within the period; and the student of religion will find even greater interest in such comparisons. There is much need for works of the character of the one before us. They may not appeal to a very wide circle of readers or arouse the keen interest of the lovers of controversy. They may even repel the more enthusiastic by a certain coldness and aloofness of method. But they provide material upon which men of larger vision and more ardent temper can work. The patient scholar has his function, and no mean one, in the extension and purification of the religious spirit.

Those who turn to this book, then, must not expect to find a volume of popular lectures. The audiences are likely to be few and small which could listen with patience and profit to lectures which, as printed, occupy on the average over seventy pages each, and are crammed with information on every page. It will not be surprising if the reader finds himself becoming somewhat restive, as he turns over page after page, so uniformly good and informative, and yet so calm and even and unemotional. Dispassionate writing on religious topics is apt enough to produce weariness, if it does not indeed provoke resentment. An animated style is almost as much to be desired as a sober judgment in a sphere where truth and life are so intimately connected.

The idea of treating the Christianity of the period from the point of view of salvation is excellent, and the division of the material is attractive: "Christianity as Personal Salvation"—"The Person and Work of the Saviour"—"The Church as the Sphere of Salvation"—"The Sacraments as Means of Salvation"—"Salvation by Gnosis"—"Christianity at the Parting of the Ways." But the first thing which strikes us when we consider this

outline is a remarkable omission. Why are the two methods, salvation by sacraments and by gnosis, the only two which are emphasised? Are there no traces in the second century of the New Testament teaching of salvation by faith? If not, the gap between the two eras is even greater than is generally supposed. But let us not unnecessarily exaggerate the contrast. No doubt the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith is very little in evidence: nevertheless faith still maintained its place in men's thoughts regarding salvation. In the second century as in the first the victory which overcame the world was neither sacraments nor gnosis but faith; and that triumphant experience was revealed not only in deeds but in words. It ought to be made central in any description of vital Christianity in the period.

This doctrine of salvation might be inferred from quotations scattered in various parts of Dr Carpenter's book. But we should have had a truer picture of the total life and thought of the time if such quotations had been multiplied and grouped together and emphasised as indicating at least one method, if not the chief method, of salvation. In the same way salvation by discipline or asceticism might fitly have found a place alongside of the two selected methods.

Dr Carpenter hardly does justice to the positive content of the Christian experience. In illustration one might point to his treatment of salvation as a blessing already realised. Here, if anywhere, we should expect as full and careful a marshalling of the evidence as possible. But of the thirteen pages devoted to this subject only about three are concerned with the testimony of the more representative Christians of the period: the other ten are occupied with interesting allusions to Plato and Philo and Epictetus, to the Orphic teachers, the Hermetic books, and the Odes of Solomon, to Hindu, and Persian, and Mohammedan mysticism. The distinctive features of Christian experience are hardly recognised at all. This is unfortunate, for the writer's mind seems to be so occupied with the many, semi-Christian, semi-pagan views which he rightly finds in the second century, that his interpretation of the first century is unconsciously coloured by them. What, for example, could be more inadequate than the comparison on p. 48 between Pauline, Petrine, and Johannine mysticism, if mysticism is the right term to describe the Christian experience, and the mysticism of Hermes or of the Odes of Solomon? Concerning the latter Dr Carpenter says, "It is silent concerning sin, repentance, and forgiveness" and yet "presents a remarkable parallel" to the New Testament doctrine. But is not the divergence more remarkable even than the parallelism? In the neighbourhood of the texts quoted by Dr Carpenter will be found statements which give to the doctrines of the mystic union and eternal life quite a different complexion to that noticed by the author of these lectures. It is not simply that these truths are connected with Christ, a divinely human Christ, not a gnostic Christ, but with just those facts of sin, repentance, and forgiveness which Dr Carpenter finds to be absent from the Odes of Solomon. The typical New Testament teaching always connects the realisation of salvation with sin, repentance, and forgiveness, and not with a mystical death or a merely physical resurrection or chemical transformation of the human elements into the Divine.

The prevailingly lucid and logical character of the writer's mind is very evident in this book; but in matters of historical criticism the logical

instinct sometimes betrays us. Unfortunately for the historian, men do not always think consistently or act rationally. Ideas and methods of thought are not stereotyped for a lifetime. Under the influence of new surroundings and new experiences modes of thought and speech may be both radically and suddenly changed. It is difficult to be quite certain that books so different as the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse could not have been written by the same man, or have derived their inspiration from the same source. If we give up the Neronian date of the Apocalypse, as Dr Carpenter does, and bring the two works very near together in time, the differences in language and even in thought are surprising. But, unless one is quite sure of the dates and also of the circumstances under which the two books were written, it is wiser not to be over-confident as to authorship. Under the strain of terrible experiences men have often written in a style which their friends would never have recognised as theirs. And is there not great danger of exaggerating the differences of thought in these books? There is an Apocalyptic element in the Fourth Gospel, and there is even in the Apocalypse the peace and joy and victory of the eternal kingdom clearly revealed at the heart of all the strife and conflict of time. Dr Carpenter reminds us that in the Gospel the Messiah announces that the victory over the world is won. But have we not quite as clear an announcement of accomplished fact in Rev. iii. 21: "Even as I also overcame and am set down with my Father in his throne"? It is true that the Apocalypse is full of ideas of imminent judgment, of conflict and suffering, and of impending glory and defeat. But is not the same note struck repeatedly in the Gospel, in the words of Jesus to His disciples, "in the world ye shall have tribulation," and elsewhere? The intensity of the conflict between the world of light and the world of darkness is not more powerfully, though it may be more dramatically, presented in the Apocalypse than it is in the Fourth Gospel. In the Gospel Dr Carpenter says, "The Son is not sent to judge the world, but to save it," whereas in the Apocalypse He "dons the blood-sprinkled robe." But does not the Fourth Gospel also represent Jesus as saying, "For judgment I am come into this world," and "All judgment hath been committed unto the Son"? Dr Carpenter speaks of the Gospel as "a sanctuary of peace"; but is there any more peaceful picture than the exquisite one of those who have come out of great tribulation (Rev. vii. 14-17), or of the eternal city of which the seer knew he was already a member (Rev. xxi.)? So many are the points of real contact between the two works, that one is inclined to reverse the judgment, "Strange indeed is it that tradition should have identified the seer and the evangelist." The same twofold presentation of Christianity is in both. They do not "belong to entirely different modes of religious thought."

Another indication of Dr Carpenter's preference for logic above psychology is the adoption of the Emersonian alternative, catholic or liberal. Logically, it may be, love of ecclesiastical order, rites, and traditions ought not to go alongside of the free life of the spirit and regard for advancing knowledge. The logician says they cannot exist in the same person. But the psychologist finds that they do. There are few, if any, pure types. The great majority of men are neither liberal nor conservative, neither traditionalists nor free thinkers, neither socialists nor individualists, but both. It is unhistorical and uncritical to maintain that men cannot be sympathetic towards opposite tendencies. They are, and they choose to be so.

H. H. SCULLARD.

INDEX.

ARTICLES.

- AMERICAN COLLEGES, RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN, 299.
AMERICA'S SELF-REVELATION, 393.
ASSYRIA AND PRUSSIA: AN HISTORICAL PARALLEL, 97.
BROOKE, STOPFORD, THE THEOLOGY OF, 56.
CHRISTIAN ETHICS, THE ORIGINALITY AND FINALITY OF, 240.
COMPULSORY SERVICE, DEMOCRACY AND, 204.
CULTS, FIVE NEW RELIGIOUS ONES IN BRITISH NEW GUINEA, 448.
DRUDGERY AND EDUCATION, 419.
ENGLISHMAN, THE, AND HIS LAW, 638.
FESTIVAL OF LIVES GIVEN FOR THE NATION IN JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN FAITH, 256.
FORCE AND THE CONQUEST OF EVIL IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS, 464.
FOURTH GOSPEL, THE LITERARY METHOD OF, 40.
FRENCH NATIONALISM, 217.
GERMAN SERMONS, 18.
HAPPIER, ARE WE, THAN OUR FOREFATHERS?, 75.
HATE, NATIONAL, 407.
INTELLECT, THE DISTRUST OF THE, 125.
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT, IS IT POSSIBLE?, 199.
INTERNATIONALISM, CHRISTIAN, 140.
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THE FACTS AND ITS CAUSE, 651.
LIBERTY, IS IT AN ADEQUATE IDEAL OF STATE ACTION?, 305.
LODGE, SIR OLIVER, AND THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD, 598.
LOVE, THE, WHICH IS NOT THE FULFILLING OF THE LAW, 479.
MODERNIST REVIVAL OF ANGLICANISM, THE, 90.
NATIONAL TRAINING, 493.

- NATIONAL TRAINING: THE MORAL EQUIVALENT FOR WAR, 177.
 PEACE, ENFORCING, 189.
 PERSONALITY THE FINAL AIM OF SOCIAL EUGENICS, 529.
 POLAND, IMMORTAL, 113.
 PROCLUS AS CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHER, 279.
 PULPIT, THE, AND ITS OPPORTUNITIES, 665.
 PUNISHMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION, 373.
 RECONSTRUCTION, EDUCATIONAL, 547.
 RECONSTRUCTION—OF WHAT?, 542.
 RELIGION, PRACTICAL, 572.
 RELIGION, THE NEW, 561.
 ROOT OF THE MATTER, THE, 1.
 SACRAMENTAL RELIGION, 230.
 SCIENCE IS ONE OF THE HUMANITIES, 353.
 SOLOVYOV, VLADIMIR, THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF, 434.
 STUMBLING-BLOCKS, 289.
 ✓ SURVIVAL, THE THEORY OF, IN THE LIGHT OF ITS CONTEXT, 614.
 ✓ SURVIVAL AND IMMORTALITY, 585.
 TOLERANCE FROM A RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW, 628.
 TOWNS TO LIVE IN, 578.
 TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, AFTER, 382.
 WAR, THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE PRESENT, 25.
-

- Alexander, Hartley B., Prof.*, America's Self-Revelation, 393.
Bacon, B. W., Prof., D.D., The Festival of Lives given for the Nation in Jewish and Christian Faith, 256.
Baillie, J. B., Prof., Science is one of the Humanities, 353.
Bang, J. P., Prof., The Root of the Matter, 1.
Barbour, G. F., D.Phil., Force and the Conquest of Evil in Christian Ethics, 464.
Begbie, Harold, National Training: The Moral Equivalent for War, 177.
Bosanquet, Helen, Reconstruction—Of What?, 542.
Carpenter, J. E., Rev., D.Litt., The Theology of the Rev. Stopford Brooke, 56.
Chapman, Edward M., Enforcing Peace, 189.
Chinnery, E. W. P., New Religious Cults in British New Guinea, 448.
Clark, Henry, Rev., D.D., Is Liberty an Adequate Ideal of State Action?, 305.
Coulton, G. G., M.A., Democracy and Compulsory Service, 204.
Crozier, John Beattie, LL.D., Practical Religion, 572.

- Cutcliffe, F. H.*, The Pulpit and its Opportunities. A Layman's View, 665.
- Dennis, Geoffrey*, Immortal Poland, 113.
- Diggle, J. W.*, *Right Rev., Bishop of Carlisle, D.D.*, Sacramental Religion, 230.
- Duddington, Mrs J. N., M.A.*, The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov, 434.
- Ferguson, A. S., Prof.*, More German Sermons, 18.
- Fisher, H. A. H., Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University*, French Nationalism, 217.
- Haddon, A. C., Sc.D., F.R.S.*, New Religious Cults in British New Guinea, 455.
- Heyking, A., Baron, Ph.D.*, Tolerance from a Russian Point of View, 628.
- Hobson, J. A., M.A.*, Is International Government Possible?, 199.
- Hodgkin, Henry T.*, Christian Internationalism, 140.
- Holliday, Carl, Prof.*, Religious Belief in American Colleges, 299.
- Holmes, Edward*, Drudgery and Education: A Defence of Montessori Ideals, 419.
- Inge, W. R., Right Rev., Dean of St Paul's*, Survival and Immortality, 585.
- Jacks, L. P., Rev. Principal, M.A., D.D., LL.D.*, Punishment and Reconstruction, 373.
- The Theory of Survival
in the Light of its
Context, 614.
- Jenks, Edward*, The Englishman and his Law, 638.
- Lethaby, W. R.*, Towns to Live in. A Hint to Reconstructors, 578.
- Lindsay, James, Rev., D.D.*, Proclus as Constructive Philosopher, 279.
- Lock, Walter, Rev., D.D.*, The Literary Method of the Fourth Gospel, 40.
- Lodge, Sir Oliver*, After Twenty-five Years, 382.
- M'Laren, A. D.*, National Hate, 407.
- Marriott, J. A. R., M.P.*, Educational Reconstruction, 547.
- Maynard, Constance L.*, The Love which is not the Fulfilling of the Law, 479.
- Mercier, Charles A., M.D.*, Are we Happier than our Forefathers?, 75.
- Sir Oliver Lodge and the Scientific World, 598.
- Moxon, Cavendish, Rev., M.A.*, The Modernist Revival of Anglicanism, 90.
- Osler, Mrs A. C.*, Stumbling-blocks, 289.
- Paton, Lewis Bayles, Prof., M.A.*, Assyria and Prussia: An Historical Parallel, 97.
- Rawnsley, H. D., Rev. Canon*, Juvenile Delinquency: The Facts and its Cause, 651.
- Rynd, Reginald F., Rev., B.D.*, National Training: A Reply to Mr Begbie, 493.
- Scott, J. W., M.A.*, The Distrust of the Intellect, 125.
- Scullard, H. H., Rev. Prof., D.D.*, The Originality and Finality of Christian Ethics, 240.

Thwing, Charles F., President, The American Civil War and the Present War, 25.

Ward, James, Prof., Sc.D., F.B.A., Personality the Final Aim of Social Eugenics, 529.

Warwick, Countess of, The New Religion, 561.

DISCUSSIONS.

Bone, Frederic, Rev., "Sacramental Religion," 501.

Boyd, Francis Leith, Rev., "Sacramental Religion," 499.

Brocklehurst, Theodore P., Rev., "The Modernist Revival of Anglicanism," 504.

Campbell, J. W., "Love and the Law," 674.

Elliot, Hugh, "Scientific Materialism," 317.

Hyslop, James, Prof., Mr Elliot's "Defence of Scientific Materialism," 152.

Lodge, Sir Oliver, Mr Elliot's "Defence of Scientific Materialism," 150.

Scott-Moncrieff, C. E., Rev., "National Training," 503.

Sinclair, G., Rev., "The Problem of Conscience," 154.

Wardrop, C. W. Inglis, "Science is one of the Humanities," 672.

REVIEWS.

Astley, H. J. Dukinfield, Rev., D.D.—G. Buchanan Gray, The Forms of Hebrew Poetry, 521.

Bosanquet, Bernard, LL.D.—E. Douglas Fawcett, The World as Imagination, 515.

Burgess, Walter H., Rev., B.A.—W. T. Whitley, Editor, The Works of John Smyth, Fellow of Christ's College, 1594–8, 175.

Burns, C. Delisle, M.A.—L. Curtis, Editor, The Commonwealth of Nations, 344.

L. Curtis, *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, 166.

Carr, H. Wildon, D.Lit.—G. Watts Cunningham, A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson, 331.


D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, *Growth and Form*, 697.

Cook, Stanley A., M.A.—Louis H. Jordan, Comparative Religion: its Adjuncts and Allies, 168.

- Drummond, James, Rev., D.D.*—Author of "Pro Christo et Ecclesia," and Others, Concerning Prayer: its Nature, its Difficulties, and its Value, 327.
- Freeston, Frank, Rev.*—R. J. Campbell, A Spiritual Pilgrimage, 526.
- Galloway, George, Rev. Principal, D.D.*—William Temple, Mens Creatrix: An Essay, 689.
- Ginsberg, Morris, M.A.*, Wilhelm Wundt, Elements of Folk Psychology, 337.
- Hicks, G. Dawes, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., Prof.*—Bertrand Russell, Principles of Social Reconstruction, 692.
- Jacks, L. P., M.A., LL.D., D.D., Rev. Principal.*—G. G. Armstrong, Our Ultimate Aim in the War, 161.
H. G. Wells, God the Invisible King, 683.
- Mellor, Stanley A., Ph.D., Rev.*—Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 347.
- Owen, Morris B., B.A., B.D., Rev. Prof.*—John R. Mozley, The Divine Aspect of History, 341.
- Rolleston, T. W., M.A.*—George Moore, The Brook Kerith: A Syrian Story, 524.
- Schiller, F. C. S., Sc.D.*—L. P. Jacks' Writings: i. Mad Shepherds; ii. From the Human End; iii. Philosophers in Trouble, 172.
F. S. Marvin, *Editor*, Progress and History, 511.
- Scullard, H. H., D.D., Rev. Prof.*—J. Estlin Carpenter, Phases of Early Christianity, 701.
- Sidgwick, Mrs Henry.*—Sir Oliver Lodge, Raymond, 518.
- Williamson, Claude C. H.*—C. C. Martindale, The Life of Robert Hugh Benson, 350.

SURVEYS OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

- Hicks, G. Dawes, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., Prof.*, Philosophy, 156 and 505.
- Moffatt, J., D.D., Rev. Prof.*, Theology, 321 and 677.



BL
1
H5
v.15

The Hibbert journal

**PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET**

**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY**

